| 财政分权、晋升激励与地方政府债务风险形成——基于省级面板数据的实证分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 杨婷婷.财政分权、晋升激励与地方政府债务风险形成——基于省级面板数据的实证分析[J].宁波大学学报(人文科学版),2019,0(3):77-81. |
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| 作者姓名： | 杨婷婷 |
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| 作者单位： | (中共中央党校 研究生院,北京 100091) |
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| 摘 要： | 选取2010-2017年30个省份的面板数据，采用固定效用模型进行回归分析，实证研究了财政分权和晋升激励对地方政府债务风险的影响。研究发现，财政分权与地方政府债务风险呈显著的负相关关系，晋升竞争激励程度与债务风险呈显著正相关关系，两因素的共同作用对地方政府债务风险的影响更为显著。这一结果为管理我国地方政府债务风险提供了思路。
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| 关 键 词： | 地方政府 债务风险 财政分权 晋升激励 |
YANG Ting-ting |
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| YANG Ting-ting.YANG Ting-ting[J].Journal of Ningbo University(Liberal Arts Edition),2019,0(3):77-81. |
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| Authors: | YANG Ting-ting |
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| Affiliation: | (The graduate school, Party School of the Central Committee of C.P.C., Beijing 100091, China) |
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| Abstract: | The paper selects the panel data of 30 provinces from 2010 to 2017, uses the fixed utility model for regression analysis, and empirically studies the impact of fiscal decentralization and promotion incentives on local government debt risk. The study finds that fiscal decentralization has a significant negative correlation with local government debt risk，while promotion incentive is significantly positively correlated with debt risk. The combined effect of these two factors has a more significant impact on local government debt risk, which provides an idea for managing the local government debt risk in China |
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| Keywords: | local governments debt risk fiscal decentralization promotion incentive |
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