| 风险投资主体、银行和创业企业家三方委托代理研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 晏文隽,郭菊娥.风险投资主体、银行和创业企业家三方委托代理研究[J].管理科学,2009,22(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 晏文隽 郭菊娥 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安交通大学,管理学院,西安,710049 |
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| 摘 要： | 研究创业企业家、风险投资主体努力程度的影响因素和他们之间的双向道德危害风险,并从风险管理的角度解释创业企业家难以从银行得到贷款的原因,在Casamana的研究基础上,通过赋予纯金融机构明确的现实定义,构建风险投资主体、创业企业家、银行三方参与的委托代理模型.得出双向道德风险下的最优权益分配.研究表明,若只有银行投资或银行和风险投资主体同时投资时,存在风险限制,当风险高于限制时,创业企业家不可能贷款成功;若只有风险投资主体投资时,则没有风险限制;若银行和风险投资主体同时投资,他们权益分配的最高限制将低于只有一方投资时所得权益分配的最高限制,风险限制高于只有银行投资时的风险限制;若机构在既无资金也无非资金贡献的情况下瓜分风险投资利益,将导致创业企业家努力程度降低;银行、风险投资主体和创业企业家三方参与风险投资时,风险投资主体的最优权益安排与风险投资主体和创业企业家的生产力有关,随着风险投资主体生产力的增大而增大,随着创业企业家生产力的增大而减小.
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理模型 风险 努力程度 双向道德危害 |
The Study on Principal Agent Relationship among Venture Capitalist,Bank and Enterpriser |
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| YAN Wen-jun,GUO Ju-e.The Study on Principal Agent Relationship among Venture Capitalist,Bank and Enterpriser[J].Management Sciences in China,2009,22(2). |
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| Authors: | YAN Wen-jun GUO Ju-e |
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| Affiliation: | YAN Wen-jun,GUO Ju-e School of Management,Xi'an Jiaotong University,Xi'an 710049,China |
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| Abstract: | For investigating effect factors of effort level and double moral hazard between venture capitalist and enterpriser,and explaining the reason that enterpriser is hard to get loan from bank,based on research of Casamatta,a principal agent model which includes bank,venture capitalist and enterpriser has been set up by giving the real definition of pure financial institution,and then the optimal equity share under double moral hazard is obtained.The conclusions proves that if bank participates investment alone... |
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| Keywords: | principal agent model risk effort level double moral hazard |
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