| 股东失权制度功能定位与体系化适用 |
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| 引用本文： | 曾佳.股东失权制度功能定位与体系化适用[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2023,25(2):95-104. |
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| 作者姓名： | 曾佳 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国人民大学 法学院，北京 100872 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金重大项目“健全以公平为原则的产权保护制度研究”（20ZDA049） |
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| 摘 要： | 《公司法（修订草案）》第46条首次规定股东失权规则，不同于除名制度旨在将违反重大义务或者不再具有所需资格从而威胁公司人格存续的股东驱逐出公司，失权制度并不直接指向股东身份，其制度目的在于督促股东履行出资义务，收回股东未缴出资部分对应的股东权利，丧失股东身份是股东完全未履行出资义务的附带结果。股东失权制度的优势在于公司不必被动地等待身处债务人地位的股东的履行行为，而可以掌握收回股权并另行吸纳充实公司资本的主动权。股东失权制度的功能定位与该规则设计的解释与适用具有直接关联。从要件构成、司法实践等方面来看，《公司法司法解释三》第17条总体指向的是股东除名规则，与第46条具有适用上的递进关系。部分未履行出资义务和完全未履行出资义务不仅具有量的差异，更存在适用股东失权与股东除名不同规则的质上的区别。两种规则在公司法体系下各自发挥不同的规范功能。
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| 关 键 词： | 股东失权 公司法修订 股东除名 违反出资义务 失权事由 |
| 收稿时间： | 2022-02-28 |
Functional Orientation and Systematic Application of Forfeiture of Shares |
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| Affiliation: | Law School, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China |
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| Abstract: | Article 46 of the Company Law (Revised Draft) stipulates the rule of forfeiture of shares for the first time, which is different from the delisting system, which aims to expel shareholders who violate major obligations or no longer have the required qualifications, thus threatening the survival of the company’s personality. Forfeiture of shares does not directly point to the identity of shareholders, but aims to urge shareholders to fulfill their obligations of capital contribution, The withdrawal of shareholders’ rights corresponding to the unpaid capital contribution of shareholders and the loss of shareholders’ identity are the incidental results of shareholders’ complete failure to fulfill their capital contribution obligations. The advantage of forfeiture of shares is that the company does not have to passively wait for the performance of shareholders in the position of debtor, but can take the initiative to recover equity and absorb and enrich the company’s capital. The clear positioning of the function of forfeiture of shares directly determines the specific design and implementation of the legal norm. From the perspective of elements and judicial practice, Article 17 of the third judicial interpretation of the Company Law generally points to the rule of delisting shareholders, which has a progressive relationship with Article 46. There are not only quantitative differences between partial non performance of capital contribution obligations and complete non performance of capital contribution obligations, but also qualitative differences in the application of different rules of forfeiture of shares and shareholder delisting. They play different normative functions under the company law system. |
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