Seat Biases in Proportional Representation Systems with Thresholds

In proportional representation systems, apportionment methods are used to convert the number of votes of a party into the number of seats allocated to this party. An interesting characteristic of any such method are the seat biases, that is, the expected differences between the actual seat allocation and the ideal share of seats, separately for each party, when parties are ordered from largest to smallest. For electoral systems with a threshold, that is, with a minimum percentage of votes that parties must reach in order to be eligible to participate in the apportionment process, we show that seat biases decrease from their maximum to zero, as the threshold increases from zero to its maximum, and that all seat biases decrease linearly.     

Certificates of optimality: the third way to biproportional apportionment

The biproportional apportionment problem (BAP) must be faced in many proportional electoral systems where seats must be allocated to parties within regions. BAP is a non-trivial optimization problem, and only sophisticated algorithms are currently available for solving it. The issue is: are they “writable” as an actual law? Citizens rightly demand simple, easy to understand, voting systems. The alternative, though, seems to have simple, but unsound electoral laws. We propose the following way out of this dilemma: leave to a mathematically sophisticated algorithm the task of producing an optimal apportionment, but attach to it a “certificate of optimality”, that is, describe a simple procedure whereby anybody can check, through some elementary operations, that the seat allocation output by the algorithm is indeed an optimal apportionment. We discuss one such certificate, based on the Max flow- min cut Theorem, relative to a parametric max flow method of ours for BAP.     

Proportional representation in variable-size legislatures

This paper examines a method to achieve proportional representation (PR) for parties in a legislature that allows the size of the legislature to vary as a function of voting results. The legislature's base consists of one elected candidate from each voting district. Seats are then added to underrepresented parties to approximate their nationwide vote proportions. Additions are governed by rules designed to honor the single-member district concept, to keep the increase manageable, and to satisfy other desirable criteria.These rules work well in the two-party case although they limit the extent to which true PR is achieved. When there are three or more parties, it is necessary to relax the rules if reasonable moves toward PR are to occur.     

A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation

 A spatial model of party competition is studied in which: (i) Parties are supposed to have ideology. By this we mean that their goal is to maximize the welfare of their constituencies. (ii) The policy implemented after the election does not need to coincide with the one proposed by the winner. The policy implemented should be a compromise that considers the proposals made by the different parties. In the case of proportional representation this compromise is modeled as a convex combination of the proposed policies with weights proportional to the number of votes obtained by each party. We provide some existence theorems and compare the equilibrium in our model with the equilibrium that exists under some probabilistic models. It is also shown that proportional representation will create incentives for the parties to announce radical platforms. Received: 17 May 1994/Accepted: 5 March 1996     

Feelings of power lead people to take sides with other powerful parties

Abstract

It has often been noted that power has various self-reinforcing effects, in the sense that it leads people to support the interests of other powerful people and harm the interests of the powerless. In the current article we investigate this in a fundamental manner and show that the experience of power makes people more inclined to side with parties that are higher in the hierarchy and against parties that are lower in that hierarchy. Two studies demonstrate that people who experience elevated power side with parties higher in the hierarchy and against parties lower in the hierarchy. A third experiment identifies an important moderator: if people sense their power is unfair and illegitimate, this effect is blocked. These results extend our understanding of the effects of power on moral thinking to actual side taking with one party against another in an interpersonal, moral conflict.     

The Balinski–Young Comparison of Divisor Methods is Transitive

The ‘favoring small states’ relation of Balinski and Young (Fair representation, 1982) imposes stronger requirements on the nature of seat transfers than the majorization-ordering introduced by Marshall et al. (Soc Choice Welfare 19(4):885–900, 2002). For divisor methods, however, the two relations coincide. As a consequence, when restricted to the class of divisor methods the Balinski and Young relation is transitive.     

Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems

In this paper, three characterizations are given of a rule that models list systems of proportional representation the plurality ranking rule. It is shown that a social preference rule is the plurality ranking rule if and only if it satisfies three independent conditions: consistency, faithfulness, and first score cancellation. It is also shown that first score cancellation is implied by neutrality, anonymity, and topsonlyness. This means a second characterization is found, containing deeper axioms than the previous one. A third characterization contains the notion of top monotonicity. In order to motivate topsonlyness, we show that a scoring seat allocation rule is proof against party fragmentation if and only if it is topsonly. Various other properties of the plurality ranking rule are related to its characterist properties.     

Political–economic equilibrium when parties represent constituents: The unidimensional case

 A political–economic environment is studied in which two parties, representing different constituencies of citizens, compete over a proportional tax rate to be levied on private endowments, to finance a public good. Although parties know the distribution of citizen traits (preferences and endowments), they are uncertain about the distribution of traits among the citizens who will turn up at the polls. This uncertainty engenders an endogenously derived function π(t ₁, t ₂) giving the probability that any one tax policy t ₁ will defeat another t ₂ in the election. Equilibrium existence theorems are proved, and the nature of equilibrium is compared with the equilibrium that exists when Downsian parties (ones whose objective is to maximize the probability of victory) face uncertainty. Both constituency-representing parties and uncertainty are needed to generate equilibria in which parties propose different policies. Received: 4 April 1995/Accepted: 2 April 1996     

Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case

We study the strategic behavior of voters in a spatial model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters’ preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.     

Liberal political equality implies proportional representation

This article shows that for a single-vote electoral system for a representative body to treat all voters and all parties equally, it must produce results essentially identical to list proportional representation (PR). Democratic theory has often been agnostic concerning representative institutions. Different institutions have been compared in terms of behavioral outcomes rather than axiomatic properties. Building on van der Hout (Annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, San Diego, 2002) result, we show that for an electoral system to completely respect the principle of liberal political equality and popular sovereignty, its results must be equivalent to those of list PR.     

Secondary issues and party politics: an application to environmental policy

This article develops a political economy model to assess the interplay between party formation and an environmental policy dimension viewed as secondary to the redistributive dimension. We define being a secondary issue in terms of the intensity of preferences over this issue rather than in terms of the proportion of voters who care for the environment. Equilibrium policies are the outcome of an electoral competition game between endogenous parties. We obtain the following results: (i) The Pigouvian tax never emerges in an equilibrium; (ii) The equilibrium environmental tax is larger when there is a minority of green voters; (iii) Stable green parties exist only if there is a minority of green voters and income polarization is large enough relative to the saliency of the environmental issue. We also study the redistributive policies advocated by green parties.     

The Merit of Party Institutions: Women’s Descriptive Representation and Conservative Parties in Australia and the United Kingdom

ABSTRACT

Generally, right-wing political parties tend to fall behind their left-wing counterparts on women’s representation. Conservative parties emphasize individual merit rather than structural barriers as an explanation for low levels of women succeeding in candidate selection processes. Some right-wing parties have made more progress than others. Comparing parties within the conservative family, we aim to reveal what institutional factors may retard or promote women’s representation. We find that the decentralization of the candidate selection process combined with electoral losses created opportunities for critical actors to act to increase women’s representation to around 20% in Australia, some 15 years earlier than in the United Kingdom.     

The proportional random allocation of indivisible units

Indivisible units are randomly allocated among agents with a claim/demand on the resources. The available resources fall short of the sum of individual claims.  The proportional method distributes units sequentially, and the probability of receiving a unit at any step is proportional to the unsatisfied claims.  We characterize the family of probabilistic rationing methods meeting the three axioms Consistency, Lower and Upper Composition. It contains the proportional method, all deterministic fixed priority methods, and the priority compositions of proportional methods. The proportional method is the only fair method in the family. Received: 30 November 1999/Accepted: 15 November 2000     

The peculiar history of scientific reason

Science is a social field of forces, struggles, and relationships that is defined at every moment by the relations of power among the protagonists. Scientific choices are guided by taken-for-granted assumptions, interactive with practices, as to what constitutes real and important problems, valid methods, and authentic knowledge. Such choices also are shaped by the social capital controlled by various positions and stances within the field. This complex and dynamic representation thus simultaneously rejects both the absolutist-idealist conception of the immanent development of science and the historicist relativism of those who consider science as purely a conventional social construct. The strategies used in science are at once social and intellectual; for example, strategies that are founded on implicit agreement with the established scientific order are thereby in affinity with the positions of power within the field itself. In established scientific fields of high autonomy, revolutions no longer are necessarily at the same time political ruptures but rather are generated within the field themselves: the field becomes the site of a permanent revolution. Under certain conditions, then, strategies used in struggles for symbolic power transcend themselves as they are subjected to the crisscrossing censorship that represents the constitutive reason of the field. The necessary and sufficient condition for this critical correction is a social organization such that each participant can realize specific interest only by mobilizing all the scientific resources available for overcoming the obstacles shared by all his or her competitors. Thus, the type of analysis here illustrated does not lead to reductive bias or sociologism that would undermine its own foundations. Rather it points to a comprehensive and reflexive objectivism that opens up a liberating collective self-analysis.For Darwin, living means to submit an individual difference to the judgement of the entire congregation of those alive. This judgement includes only two sanctions: either to die, or to become in turn, for a time, part of the jury. But, one is always, for as long as one lives, both judge and judged. (Canguilhem, 1977)Two people, if they truly wish to understand one another, must have first contradicted one another. Truth is the daughter of debate not of sympathy. (Bachelard, 1953)     

The battle over the allocation of interstate waters : Two contending doctrines

The doctrinal basis for resolving interstate water disputes is in a confused state because of a recent Supreme Court decision which holds that market forces should determine the allocation of interstate ground waters even though the same court has consistently held that doctrine of equitable apportionment governs interstate surface waters. Although there are arguments for both approaches, the doctrine of equitable apportionment is preferable in that by allocating shares to individual states it provides stability for state and regional water planning while limiting the excesses of territorial chauvinism by requiring sharing. The market approach is a single edged sword which protects a state wanting to take water from another. Equitable apportionment, on the other hand, is a double edged sword which protects both states and allocates to each an equitable share of interstate water resources.     

Demand for decision autonomy and the desire to avoid responsibility in risky environments: Experimental evidence

This paper experimentally studies individuals’ willingness to pay for the authority to make risky decisions for themselves, and the willingness to take responsibility for others, as primary determinants of leadership willingness. We consider a setup involving a pair of individuals, where one individual is designated to make both parties’ decisions by default. Depending on treatment, either party can express a willingness to pay to change this situation. If one’s willingness to pay to make her own decision herself is positive (negative), we interpret it as a demand for autonomy (a desire to delegate). On the flip side, if one’s willingness to pay to avoid making a decision on behalf of another person is positive (negative), we interpret it as a desire to avoid responsibility (a demand for authority). We find that on average, individuals are willing to pay positive amounts of money to make their decisions themselves, and incur positive but smaller opportunity costs for the right to make decisions for others. Certain individual and contextual characteristics emerge as important predictors. Notably, (1) men are more likely to demand both autonomy and authority at the same time, (2) individuals with other regarding preferences are more likely to pay to avoid taking responsibility for others’ decisions when the probability of loss is high. Exploring differences between individuals’ own decisions and the decisions they make on behalf of others, we find that subjects with other-regarding preferences tend to “cautious-shift” when making decisions on behalf of others. Also, we find that individuals who would like to avoid responsibility also tend to “shift” their decisions when put in a decision-making role. The results have implications for the allocation of decision-making authority in pairs and leadership.     

Bandwagon, underdog, and political competition: the uni-dimensional case

This article studies the effects of bandwagon and underdog on the political equilibrium of two-party competition models. We adapt for voter conformism the generalized Wittman?CRoemer model of political competition, which views political competition as the one between parties with factions of the opportunists and the militants that Nash-bargain one another, and consider three special cases of the general model: the Hotelling?CDowns model, the classical Wittman?CRoemer model, and what we call the ideological-party model. We find that the presence of voter conformism significantly affects the nature of political competition, and its effect on political equilibrium is quite different depending on the model one uses. In the Hotelling?CDowns model, political parties put forth an identical policy at the equilibrium, regardless of the type of voter conformism, and this is the only equilibrium. In both the ideological-party and classical Wittman?CRoemer models, parties propose differentiated policies at the equilibrium, and the extent of policy differentiation depends on the degree of voter conformism.     

Contradictions in Caring: Reciprocity and Interdependence

In this article the author draws on research into the experiences of women with learning difficulties and shows that they very often find themselves in caring roles, and like other women find them both sustaining and frustrating. Drawing a clear distinction between carer and dependant is frequently impossible: both parties in the caring relationship both give and receive. There can be reciprocity and interdependence. Care and dependence are seen as false dichotomies. A plea is made for the interests of carers and those cared for to be considered together, not in opposition to one another.     

A fair division solution to the problem of redistricting

Redistricting is the political practice of dividing states into electoral districts of equal population in response to decennial census results to ensure equal representation in the legislative body. Where the boundaries are drawn can dramatically alter the number of districts a given political party can win. As a result, a political party which has control over the legislature, can (and does) manipulate the boundaries to win a larger number of districts, thus affecting the balance of power in the US House of Representatives. This work introduces a novel solution to the problem of fairly redistricting a state that is motivated by the ideas of fair division. Instead of trying to ensure fairness by restricting the shape of the possible maps or by assigning the power to draw the map to nonbiased entities, this solution ensures fairness by balancing competing interests against each other. Essentially, it is a simple interactive protocol that presents two parties with the opportunity to achieve their fair representation in a state (where the notion of fairness is rigorously defined) and as a result a balanced electoral map is created.     

A comparative study on Italian new communities abroad: the cases of Tunisia and South Africa1

This paper presents two case studies about Italian new communities abroad: one Tunisian and one South African. These case studies were conducted – in a larger international research project on 14 countries – with different types of interview: focus interviews, in-depth interviews, focus groups, etc. The mixed interview modes brought to light how – with a different research strategy (methodological triangulation): quantitative and qualitative data – our complex social experience can be inquired into, in particular migration processes. The authors decided to utilise semi-standardised and non-standardised techniques. This paper discusses how the mixed research logic – utilised in both of these cases – is very productive in terms of knowledge. It seems that focus group interviewing techniques (and others) have been used progressively more and more over the past years as both a self-contained method for conducting qualitative research and in combination with other research methods. In the authors’ opinion, mixed-methods research (or multiple research strategies) represents a smaller corpus of literature that is getting increased attention. The essays in our paper are grouped along four themes: (a) economic development and globalisation; (b) perceptions and discourses; (c) the new migration phenomenon; and (d) fragmentation of identity. The authors believe that rebuilding a morceau de vie of Italian emigration helps to better analyse the role of the communities of immigrants in the construction of national processes. As a result of this, their survey introduces reflections on theoretical—methodological logic and concurs with placing such aspects in a global and social structural dimension. However, the universal and social structural dimension can be extended to the specific case. Its contribution in the first part investigates a variety of linkages of migration with broader processes of social–economic development and social globalisation. That global patterns of migration and the processes of globalisation are linked in various ways has long been recognised. The second part of the paper stresses the meaning of perceptions and discourses linked with the migration phenomenon and underlines the importance of an accurate methodological approach in order to provide new sociological points of view and appropriate research strategies.