TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good. The market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product. Consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy. We compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality. Contrary to theoretical predictions, firms do not differentiate quality under full information. Rather, both tend to offer products of similar, high quality, entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory. Under no information, we observe a “lemons” outcome where quality is low. At the same time, firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost. In two intermediate treatments, quality is significantly higher than the no‐information level, and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality. Taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect. (JEL L15, C91, D82)     

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE POLICIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY

While theory suggests that information programs may correct market failures and improve welfare, the empirical impacts of these policies remain undetermined. We show that mandatory disclosure programs in the electricity industry achieve stated policy goals. We find that the proportion of fossil fuels decreases, and the proportion of clean fuels increases in response to disclosure programs. However, the programs may produce unintended consequences. For example, programs may make “clean” firms cleaner, while leaving “dirty” firms relatively unchanged. If the marginal benefits of pollution abatement are larger at dirty firms than at clean firms, disclosure programs may induce inefficient abatement allocations. (JEL D83, Q58, D21)     

SCHOOL QUALITY AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HOUSING MARKET

In this article, we investigate the relationship between school quality and information disclosure in housing markets. When presented with the option of identifying their local public school in a real estate listing, we find that sellers with homes assigned to higher‐performing schools are more likely to provide this information. We find more evidence of selective disclosure in 2001–2002 than in 2006–2007, when the costs of gathering and disclosing information on school assignments and quality were lower. Furthermore, we find more evidence of strategic behavior among sellers of large single‐family units that presumably appeal to families with children. After controlling for school quality, information disclosure does not appear to affect housing prices. Taken together, our results support the findings of the education literature on the importance of school quality capitalization in residential real estate and they provide the first evidence of strategic information disclosure in housing markets. (JEL L15, I20, R31)     

INFORMATION AND THE PROVISION OF QUALITY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS

Governments often enact information provision policies to overcome asymmetric information of product qualities. We show that increasing awareness among consumers of the quality of a good can (but will not always) encourage firms to produce goods with higher levels of quality. Even if product qualities increase, social welfare may fall as information provision results in too much product differentiation. We show that the effectiveness of emission taxes and output subsidies are affected by the level of consumer knowledge of product quality, and we identify conditions under which information provision is welfare enhancing relative to these price instruments. ( JEL L1 5, Q58)     

DISCOUNT PRICING

We investigate the practice of framing a price as a discount from an earlier price, with information such as “was $200, now $100.” We discuss two reasons why a discounted price—rather than a merely low price—can make a consumer more willing to purchase. First, a high initial price can indicate the seller has chosen to supply a high-quality product. Second, when a seller with limited stock runs a clearance sale, later consumers infer that unsold stock has higher expected quality when its initial price was higher. We also suggest a behavioral explanation, which is that consumers with reference-dependence preferences are more likely to buy if they perceive the price as a bargain relative to the earlier price. Discount pricing is therefore an effective marketing technique, and a seller may wish to deceive potential customers by offering a false discount. The welfare effects of regulation to prevent fictitious pricing are subtle, with potential unintended consequences, and depend on whether consumers are sophisticated or naive. (JEL D18, D42, D83, L15, M31)     

ZONING UNDER SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper investigates zoning in a duopoly model of spatial price discrimination. We find that the zone in which the firms are not allowed to locate depends on the bias of the regulator. A bias toward firms is deduced when locations around the central area are forbidden, and a bias toward consumers exists when firms are only allowed to locate at places around the central area. The design of the zoned area guarantees that firms locate optimally and works under simultaneous or sequential choice of locations by the two firms. (JEL L13, R38)     

Showing a tree to sell the forest: The impact of attribute- and alternative-based information presentation on consumers’ choices

Consumers can be provided with information in either an attribute- or an alternative-based way. We consider the literature on information presentation through the theoretical lenses of the Construal Level Theory. We propose and find that providing product-related information in an attribute- rather than an alternative-based way shifts choices. The attribute-based pattern leads to high construal levels and choices driven by desirability-related, high-level attributes (e.g., design). But when the same information is acquired following the alternative-based pattern, it leads to low construal levels and choices driven by feasibility-related, low-level attributes (e.g., price). As a consequence, choice shares for products whose strength lies in convenience and other feasibility-related features are boosted by the presentation of alternative-based information. Conversely, choice shares for products whose strength lies in design and other desirability-related features are increased by the presentation of attribute-based information. We further find that consumers acquiring information in an alternative-based way envision consumption much closer in the future than those acquiring information in an attribute-based way. Finally, we find that attribute-based information leads to more clicking.     

The minimum wage and productivity differentials

A firm’s ability to adjust its production process to economize on low-skilled labor when faced with a minimum wage increase will differ greatly depending on industry or occupation. For example, more capital-intensive means of cleaning hotel rooms or serving customers at restaurants may not be readily available without degrading service quality. In such situations, the productivity of labor is essentially capped, and firms have few options when the minimum wage increases. This simple observation has implications for studies that rely on microdata to examine the effects of minimum wage increases. If firms only increase prices in response to a minimum wage increase, employment effects are likely small. If the goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute income from firms and consumers to workers, minimum-wage increases targeted at industries and occupations where such rigidities result in an inelastic demand for labor may achieve the desired goal at a lower cost than across-the-board increases. However, such a scheme causes an inefficient allocation of labor and would be subjected to substantial political pressures that may lead to anomalous results. Additionally, it is unreasonable to conclude that policy makers have the necessary information to skillfully set the minimum wage. I thank Brian E. Chezum and Jeff Waddoups for helpful comments. All mistakes, of course, are my own.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS IN MULTI-LEVEL MARKETING

Multi-level marketing (MLM) firms recruit individuals into a business opportunity but are not required to disclose the earnings of past participants. Some MLMs voluntarily create income disclosures, which may serve both marketing and risk-management functions. We create an economic experiment to explore the impact of MLM income disclosure on consumer interest and expectations. Results suggest that disclosure does not significantly alter interest in the business opportunity but does reduce expectations, on average, when subjects are asked to estimate annual income in a lab environment. We discuss findings in the context of current regulatory policy. (JEL D18, D82, M38)     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND MEDIA DIVERSITY

We estimate a mixed logit model of the demand for local news service. Results provide evidence that suggest the representative consumer values more diverse news, more coverage of multicultural issues, and more information on community news, and has a distaste for advertising. Demand estimates are used to calculate the impact on consumer welfare from a marginal decrease in the number of independent television stations that lowers the amount of diversity, multiculturalism, community news, and advertising. Consumer welfare decreases, but the losses are smaller in large markets. For example, small‐market consumers lose $45 million annually while large‐market consumers lose $13 million. (JEL C9, C25, L13, L82, L96)     

FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND THE PATTERN OF R&D COLLABORATIONS

We consider an oligopoly setting in which firms form pairwise collaborative links in research and development with other firms. Each collaboration generates a value that depends on the identity of the firms that collaborate. First, we provide properties satisfied by pairwise equilibrium networks and efficient networks. Second, we use these properties in two types of situation: (1) there are two groups of firms, and the value of a collaboration is higher when firms belong to the same group; (2) some firms have more innovative capabilities than others. These two situations provide clear insights about how firms' heterogeneity affects both equilibrium and efficient networks. We also show that the most valuable collaborative links do not always appear in equilibrium, and a public policy that increases the value of the most valuable links may lead to a loss of social welfare. (JEL C70, L13, L20)     

Health Information Seals of Approval: What do they Signify?

Much of the health information available to consumers on the Internet is incomplete, out of date and even inaccurate. Seals of approval or trustmarks have been suggested as a strategy to assist consumers in identifying high-quality information. Little is known, however, about how consumers interpret such seals. This study addresses this issue by examining assumptions about the quality criteria that are reflected by a seal of approval. This question is of particular importance because a wide variety of quality criteria have been suggested for online health information, including: core aspects of quality such as accuracy, currency and completeness; proxy indicators of quality such as the disclosure of commercial interests; and indicators that reflect the quality of the site or the interaction it affords, such as the availability of a search mechanism. The results of this study suggest that seals of approval are assumed to certify information quality primarily with respect to core quality indicators, aspects that subjects both consider to be important and feel relatively less able to evaluate for themselves (compared with their ability to rate proxy indicators of information or indicators of site or interaction quality). This assumption is largely inconsistent with practice: most seals of approval involve assessment of proxy indicators of information quality, rather than direct assessment of content. These results identify a problem that certification or accreditation bodies must address since, unless and until consumer expectations are congruent with evaluation practice, seals of approval will seem to promise more than they deliver.     

INFORMATION VALUE UNDER DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET LEADERSHIP

In an oligopoly model with firms choosing to produce in one of two periods, we identify the circumstance under which a firm's having early information regarding stochastic demand results in market leadership. High demand volatility leads to Stackelberg competition with the information‐advantaged firm leading. In the N‐firm case an equilibrium with multiple leaders and multiple followers emerges endogenously. In a duopoly information acquisition game we identify conditions that determine whether neither, one, or both firms will pay to acquire early information and note that one firm's obtaining early information may generate a positive externality benefitting its competitor. Both symmetric and asymmetric outcomes are possible and Stackelberg market leadership may occur in equilibrium, but only when firms have different costs of information. Our finding that an information advantage may convey leadership which then affects the value of information to the players applies to other settings exhibiting first‐mover advantage such as certain public good provision games. (JEL C72, D82, L13)     

RENT-SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY

Do consumers' consumer-surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent-seeking firm, consumers ' CS-defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent-seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. (JEL D72, L12)     

DECEPTION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND LABORATORY EVIDENCE

We model two‐candidate elections in which (1) voters are uncertain about candidates' attributes; and (2) candidates can inform voters of their attributes by sending advertisements. We compare between political campaigns with truthful advertising and campaigns in which there is a small chance of deceptive advertising. Our model predicts that voters should vote in‐line with an advertisement's information. We test our model's predictions using laboratory elections. We find, in the presence of even a small probability that an advertisement is deceptive, voters become substantially more likely to elect a “low‐quality” candidate. We discuss implications of this for existing models of voting decisions. (JEL C92, D72, D82)     

Consumers' Online Information Search Behavior and the Phenomenon of Search vs. Experience Products

This study investigates consumers' importance evaluation and usage of the Internet as an information source, compared with other traditional information sources. The main issue is the extent to which experience products can be transformed so as to be searchable on the Internet. The results of a web-based survey showed that consumers of experience products tended to use more online information than those of search products. Online information sources from other consumers and neutral sources were perceived to be more important and were used more often by the consumers of experience products; whereas retailer/manufacturer websites were perceived to be more useful by consumers of search products. Perceived usefulness, perceived ease-of-use, market mavenism, and usage of offline information sources were also positively related to the usage of online information.     

PRODUCT BUNDLING AND INCENTIVES FOR MERGERS AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

This paper analyzes firms' choice of a merger or a strategic alliance in bundling their products with other complementary products. Tying two products of unequal value makes them equally valuable as they become inseparable for purchase. Consequently, firms can charge a higher price for the bundled products than before. If foreclosure is not the main purpose of bundling, firms would prefer strategic alliances to mergers because mergers only intensify competition by internalizing the complementarities of two products. In equilibrium, bundling occurs only through strategic alliances. (JEL L4, L11, L13, L23)     

EXPERIENCE-DEPENDENT INFORMATION DIFFUSION AND PRODUCT QUALITY

In a monopoly market for an experience good the diffusion of product-quality information may depend on whether or not the information is favorable. To capture this asymmetry, our model uses as its information source a quality survey which suffers from response bias. Consumers may attempt to adjust for bias, but are not required to do so correctly. As a result, quality under perfect information need not be, and usually will not be, higher than quality under imperfect information. In addition, the externality exerted by informed consumers on uninformed consumers may not be the traditional beneficial externality. (JEL L15)     

HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

We examine a merger between two competitors in a Bertrand‐Edgeworth model. We find that the effects of merger depend on the tightness of capacity constraints. The combination of two firms has no price effect if and only if the capacity constraints of all firms are binding both before and after the merger. However, a merger may turn a binding capacity constraint into a slack one, which results in higher prices. In an industry where excess capacity drives the premerger prices of all firms to the marginal cost, a merger may cause prices to rise even though aggregate capacity remains constant. (JEL L13, L40)     

MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND CONSUMER PRODUCT PRICES

This article examines the interaction of commercial media and retail producers of well-known consumer products when advertising is used to differentiate brands. In particular, I address how competition in the media market affects choices of advertising and program quality. The results suggest counterintuitively that advertisers may actually prefer media markets with less competition for audiences. Product differentiation through advertising is more effective when media markets are less competitive, leading to higher prices for advertised products. As a result, media concentration may lead to higher profits for advertising firms if the additional revenue exceeds the higher advertising costs associated with media concentration. (JEL L11 , L82 , M37 )