Taxes and economic behavior: Some interview data on tax evasion in Sweden

The article describes a survey carried out with a sample of 426 Swedish male adults. In telephone interviews questions were asked on attitudes to taxation, attitudes to tax crimes, the respondent's economic situation, tax evasion in the sense of underreporting income and overstating deductions, black payments, and tax planning, i.e. attempts to reduce the tax burden by legal means. Multivariate analyses of the data indicated that younger age, more opportunity for tax evasion than people in general, more negative attitudes than the average, and lenient attitudes to tax crimes were significant factors for explaining tax evasion and black payments. Financial strain was not a significant factor, since those who admitted tax evasion judged their economic situation more favorably than the rest of the sample.     

Reforms of Tax Systems in Transition Countries

In the 15 years since the beginning of their transformation reforms, nearly all 27 post-socialist countries have adopted the three main taxes typical for a market economy, namely, personal income tax, corporate income tax, and value-added tax. However, there is great diversity in the detailed solutions, rates, deductions, allowances, and tax bases applied to taxes in these countries. Nevertheless, the basic prerequisite for the further enhancement of these systems has been met. In recent years, it has been possible to observe a clear tendency to broaden tax bases and reduce the top income tax rates. In spite of this, serious problems persist, as regards further improvement of the functioning of the system, increasing its transparency and homogeneity, and limiting implementation problems. For some countries, this is a very serious problem, particularly in connection with the so-called quasi-tax activity in the area of energy resources and the size of the informal economy. The paper also provides a short comparative analysis of the size of public revenues in a historical context – from the beginning of the transformation process to the beginning of the current millennium.     

Does philanthropy reduce inequality?

Wealthy individuals often voluntarily provide public goods that the poor also consume. We show that, rather than reducing it, such philanthropy may aggravate absolute inequality in welfare achievement, while leaving the change in relative inequality ambiguous. Additionally, philanthropic preferences may increase the effectiveness of policies to redistribute income, instead of weakening them. Our results thus suggest that philanthropy and direct redistribution may often be better viewed as complements, rather than substitutes, in the context of inequality reduction. In so doing, they also bring into question the general normative case for large tax deductions for charitable contributions.     

Progressive taxation and redistributive taxation: Different labels for the same product?

The paper examines different approaches to measure tax progressivity. In particular the distributional aspect of taxation is considered in some depth. For each member of a parametric class of inequality concepts, including more than only the relative and the absolute view of inequality, a necessary and sufficient condition for a tax function to be inequality reducing with respect to this concept for all admissible pre-tax income distributions is derived, both in strong and weak form. Only three very natural properties are required to prove this result: each tax liability is less than the corresponding pre-tax income, taxation does not reverse ranks on the income scale, and inequality is reduced if a rich gives to a poor such that they do not interchange their ranks. A definition of tax progressivity based on the shown equivalence is suggested. It is demonstrated that inequality reducing taxation is equivalent to progressive taxation in the sense of an increasing average tax rate if and only if the concept of relative inequality is used.An early version of this paper was presented at the seminar on Distributive Justice and Inequality at the Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin, May 20–24, 1986. Some of the material contained previously circulated under the heading Generalized concepts of tax progression and inequality reduction.The author is indebted to Peter Lambert whose survey of tax progressivity inspired the present analysis incredibly. James Foster, John Weymark, and two anonymous referees provided helpful comments. Remaining errors and omissions are all mine.     

Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result

Our objective in this paper is to examine majority voting in an environment where both public and private alternatives coexist. We construct a model in which households are differentiated by income and have the option of choosing between publicly provided services and private services. Publicly provided services are financed through income tax revenues and made available to all citizens at zero price. Majority voting determines the tax rate. Even though preferences over tax rates are not single peaked, we provide conditions under which a majority voting equilibrium exists. We illustrate our existence result with CES preferences and a Dagum income distribution. Received: 21 December 1993 / Accepted: 2 September 1996     

Mental accounting of income tax and value added tax among self-employed business owners

Mental accounting describes a series of cognitive operations that help organize financial activities and facilitate money management. Self-employed taxpayers who make use of a separate mental account for future income tax payments or collected value added tax (VAT) might find it easier to declare their taxes correctly than taxpayers who do not. This study used a questionnaire to investigate whether self-employed taxpayers (N = 350) use mental accounting to manage their income tax and VAT obligations, whether mental accounting relates to tax knowledge, business and personality characteristics, and to what extent mental accounting is related to intended tax behavior. Our results reveal that some taxpayers mentally segregate taxes from turnover (segregators) while others do not (integrators). We found small differences in mental accounting between income taxes and VAT. Moreover, confirmatory factor analyses suggested that tax knowledge and mental accounting are distinct constructs. Segregation of taxes was related to lower impulsivity and more positive attitudes toward taxation. Individuals who stated they segregate taxes due from turnover more often claimed to run financially prosperous businesses. Mental accounting was not related to intentions of evading taxes, but individuals with higher mental accounting scores reported more pronounced levels of tax planning. While our research design does not allow drawing causal inferences, these findings could suggest that increasing self-employed taxpayers’ ability to organize their financial activities might be a promising strategy to strengthen the competitiveness of their businesses.     

EMPLOYMENT AND DEADWEIGHT LOSS EFFECTS OF OBSERVED NONWAGE LABOR COSTS

To assess the employment effects of labor costs, it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm‐worker data set, we estimate a long‐run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss effects of observed employers' contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers' deductions (social security and income tax). We find that nonwage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white collars and by 53% for blue collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers' and workers' contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white collars and 12% for blue collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%. (JEL J23, J32)     

The effects of income source,context, and income level on tax compliance decisions in a dynamic experiment

This study employs a laboratory experiment to explore the joint effect of income source (earned versus endowed) and decision context (tax versus nontax) on tax compliance behavior. During the experiment, subjects faced various income levels and made multiple reporting decisions. The results indicate that overall compliance is not significantly affected by the interaction of income source and context. However, this joint effect influences the relationship between income level and compliance and how compliance behavior evolves over time. In both cases, the treatment group with earned income in a tax context displays behavior that is distinct from the other three groups.     

Shacking Up or Shelling Out: Income Taxes,Marriage, and Cohabitation

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the income tax penalty associated with marriage contributes to the decision of a couple to live together as a married vs. a cohabiting couple. In this paper, we use household data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics to estimate the impact of various factors, including the federal individual income tax, on a couple's decision to marry instead of cohabit. We find that the initial decision to form either a cohabiting or a married union is only marginally affected by the income tax consequences of one form of union vs. another, and other factors play a more important role. However, for those already living together as a cohabiting couple, the decision to make the transition from a cohabiting to a married couple is significantly affected by the tax consequences of such a move. Here, an increase in the income tax at legal marriage, or an increase in the marginal tax rate with marriage, has a statistically significant and negative impact on the probability of transition from cohabitation to legal marriage. However, the magnitude of the tax impact is generally small, and several other variables are more important determinants.     

A note on minimally progressive taxation and absolute income inequality

The Lorenz curve of income after tax is known to dominate the one before tax for all given pre-tax income distributions, if, and only if, average tax liability is increasing with income (Jakobsson 1976; Eichhorn et al. 1984). It is shown in this note that the absolute inequality of incomes (Kolm 1976) is unambiguously reduced by taxation if, and only if, tax liability is increasing with income.It is a pleasure to acknowledge the intellectual debt I owe to W. Eichhorn, H. Funke, and W. F. Richter whose result on progressive taxation and income inequality stimulated the present research. I am grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments on an earlier draft improved the paper.     

The earned income tax credit and union formation: The impact of expected spouse earnings

Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation from 2001, 2004, and 2008 and federal and state variation in earned income tax credit generosity over time, I investigate how changes in expected household earned income tax credit benefits associated with marriage affect cohabitation and marriage behavior among low-income single mothers. I simulate a marriage market to predict potential spouse earnings for a sample of single mothers in order to estimate the potential losses or gains in earned income tax credit benefits upon marriage. Using multinomial logistic regressions, I then analyze how the anticipated loss in earned income tax credit benefits upon marriage affects the likelihood of marrying or cohabiting. Results suggest that the average earned income tax credit-eligible woman can expect to lose approximately US$1,300 in earned income tax credit benefits in the year following marriage, or about half of pre-marriage benefits. Single mothers who expect to lose earned income tax credit benefits upon marriage are 2.5 percentage points less likely to marry their partners and 2.5 percentage points more likely to cohabit compared to single mothers who expect no change or to gain earned income tax credit benefits upon marriage. Despite recent policy efforts to reduce the size of the marriage penalty embedded in the earned income tax credit structure, these results suggest that the earned income tax credit still creates distortions in marriage and cohabitation decisions among low-income single mothers.     

True positives and false alarms in the detection of tax evasion

The probability of errors in tax returns has not been modeled explicitly before. However, corrections on individual tax returns, made by the fiscal authorities, may be related both to tax evasion and to errors made by the taxpayers. The probabilities of detecting tax evasion (true positives) and errors in tax returns (partly interpreted as false alarms) are specified and parametrized by variables known from the literature. In an empirical survey, the response to a questionnaire has been combined with information from the tax administration regarding tax returns. Taxpayers' willingness and ability to conceal income from the tax authorities are key factors with respect to tax evasion. Furthermore, the model enables the estimation of tax evasion probability, given the level of education and the opportunity to conceal income. The probabilities of tax evasion and errors could be explained to some extent.     

THE GREAT OVERESTIMATION: TAX DATA AND INEQUALITY MEASUREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1913–1943

Historical measures of income inequality in the United States must grapple with the challenge of data quality. We examine one such problem affecting the well-known estimates of income inequality produced by Piketty and Saez (2003) using the records of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Prior to 1943, incomes were self-reported. Combined with lax enforcement on the part of the IRS, self-reporting of incomes could provide a misleading portrait of the income distribution. To test the accuracy of IRS records, we compare them to independently tabulated state income tax returns between 1919 and 1945 from states with more comprehensive and rigorously enforced tax collection procedures. State income tax records show lower overall levels of income inequality than IRS records. However, we still find that top income concentrations declined across the period between 1929 and World War II. These findings attest to the sensitivity of distributional estimation to the reporting selectivity and economic quality of underlying tax data, suggesting that the existing IRS-derived series systematically overstates top-income concentration in the interwar period. (JEL H2, N32, D31, E01)     

THE WELFARE COSTS OF DEFICIT FINANCE

We analyze the welfare consequences of deficit finance in a general equilibrium model fit to the US. economy. Current spending may be financed with current and/or future distortionary taxes. The economy is open to international capital flows. The welfare costs of financing marginal current spending are substantial and are sensitive to the timing of the required taxes; postponing a tax on labor income is advantageous but postponing a tax on asset income is not. Ricardian equivalence poorly approximates the economy we consider.     

Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis of a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy

In this paper, both a conjoint analysis and a lab experiment are conducted to analyze the influence of changes in the tax rate and the tax base on the perceived tax burden. Our results show that the majority of individuals do not make rational tax decisions based on the actual tax burden but rather use simple decision heuristics. This leads to an irrationally high impact of changes in nominal tax rates on the perceived tax burden. Taxpayers favor tax options that apply a lower tax rate on their gross income over a higher tax rate applied on their net income despite the lower actual tax burden of the latter option. This result suggests that politicians could combine increasing fiscal revenues and decreasing subjects’ tax perception. Furthermore, overestimation of tax rate changes increases considerably when information on tax rate is considered first (framing effect).     

Cointegration and Structural Change: An Application to the U.S. Demand for Money

I perform the cointegration tests for the trivariate model of real monetary aggregates, real personal income, and short‐term interest rate. I find the existence of a long‐run relationship among these three variables. To check the stability of a long‐run money demand relationship, I implement a rank constancy test and CUSUM test. The test results show that real M1 is relatively more stable than other aggregates, but structural change occurred during the 1970s and early 1980s. This is consistent with prior research on money demand.     

The Impact of Uruguay's 2007 Tax Reform on Equity and Efficiency

In 2007, the Uruguayan government implemented a tax reform which introduced a new progressive labour income tax and a flat capital income tax, and reduced some indirect taxes, with the objective of improving fiscal balance, income distribution and economic growth. This article evaluates the impact of such tax reform on equity and efficiency on the basis of data derived from the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) for 2006 and 2009. Using a Difference‐in‐Differences technique, it shows that the new system reduced inequality by 2 Gini points without producing any discernible disincentive effect, suggesting that suitably designed reforms of direct taxation can simultaneously promote equity and efficiency.     

Distribution-neutral provision of public goods

The paper describes a normative approach to budget incidence, given the provision of a public good. The objective is to balance the budget by an income tax such that the budget is distribution-neutral. This property requires that every consumer’s net welfare gain, i.e. the benefit from consuming the public good and the tax burden in financing it, does not change the inequality inherent in the income distribution. The properties of the distribution-neutral tax are investigated and completely determined. The marginal willingness to pay for the public good is decisive for the degree of progression of the tax schedule. My co-author Georg Tillmann passed away in March 2006, much too soon. He was my friend, more than a colleague. I dedicate this paper to his memory.     

AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAFFER CURVE

The Laffer curve shows the relationship between tax revenue and the personal income tax rate, with tax revenue being a presumably concave function of the tax rate and equal to zero at tax rates of zero percent and 100 percent. If the personal income tax rate is reduced, then tax revenue will decrease (increase) if the economy is on the positively (negatively) sloped section of the Laffer curve. This paper derives a sufficient condition for the economy to be on the positively sloped section of the Laffer curve. In light of the current knowledge of the elasticities of supply of labor and supply of saving, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a decrease in U.S. personal income tax rates will decrease tax revenue.     

Changes in Income Concentration: Taxes or Macroeconomic Conditions?

We examine the relative importance of tax rates and macroeconomic fluctuations in explaining the share of national adjusted gross income (AGI) reported by the top 0.5% of all taxpayers. Results indicate that cutting the top income or capital gains tax rate would increase the top AGI share but not by enough to increase revenues. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the top AGI share is affected more by the capital gains tax rate than by the income tax rate but that real gross domestic product fluctuations have even larger effects.