Middle classes,democratization, and class formation

Conclusions This analysis of the South Korean case demonstrates the importance of the historical context for understanding the political role of the middle classes. In late industrialization, as occurred in South Korea and other East Asian countries, the new middle class has emerged as a significant social class, before the capitalist class established its ideological hegemony and before industrial workers developed into an organized class. Neither of these two major classes was able to offer an ideological or organizational leadership to the middle classes. In this context, the middle class can act as more than merely a dependent variable. In South Korea, the minjung movement led by an intellectual segment of the middle class played a critical role in the formation of the working class, by providing an opposition ideology, new politicized languages, organizational networks, and other resources.The Korean experience also highlights the significant role of the state in class formation. The predominant role of the state in economic and social development puts it at the center of major social conflicts. Social tensions and conflicts that emerge in rapid industrialization are directly and indirectly related to the character of the state and the economic policies it implements. A high level of politicization among Korean middle-class members, not only among intellectuals but also among a large number of white-collar workers, is the product of the authoritarian regimes of Park and Chun and their repressive control of civil society. Both the nature of Korean middle-class politics and its relationship with the working-class formation have been shaped by the nature of state politics.The role of the middle class in the South Korean democratization process has been complex and variable, in part because of its internal heterogeneity and in part because of shifting political conjunctures in the transition to democracy. It would not make much sense, therefore, to characterize the Korean middle class as progressive or conservative, because different segments of it were inserted into the shifting conjunctures of political transition differently. At the same time, it would be also unsatisfactory to characterize middle-class politics as simply inconsistent or incoherent, because there exists some definite pattern in their behaviors.This analysis suggests that political behaviors of different segments of the middle class can be explained in terms of their locations within the broad spectrum of middle-class positions between capital and labor and by the changing balance of power between the two major classes. This is to acknowledge the fact that capital-labor relations constitute the primary axis of conflict and that middle-class politics must be understood ultimately in terms of this principal mechanism of class struggle. This is, however, not to assume that middle-class politics is simply a terrain of struggle between the capitalist and the working classes, as many Marxist theorists do. To repeat, in certain historical contexts middle-class politics can have an independent effect on the formation of the two major classes and the outcomes of struggles between the two.     

Labor after Neoliberalism: The Birth of the Insecure Class in South Korea

Abstract

This article examines the rise and fall of organized labor in post-democratization, neoliberal Korea and traces the process through which a new labor underclass has been created since the late 1990s. Under the sweeping implementation of neoliberal policies, Korean labor has become increasingly fragmented, stratified, and marginalized both in the market and political arena. In this polarizing process, an ‘insecure class’ was born, consisting of irregular workers and the low-income self-employed. These working people are characterized by precarious labor conditions, bare social protection coverage, and frail organizational–political representation. This study explicates such a drastic restructuration of the Korean working people from the interaction of chaebol-centered economic structure, labor unions' organizational narrowness, and unrepresentative political parties devoid of programmatic competition. The examination of the insecure class in Korea casts light on the significance of class issues in neoliberal political economy and the analytical importance of rethinking social class in contemporary capitalist societies.     

Economic development and political transformation

Conclusion Social structure and economic development largely influence the nature of social conflicts and political transformation. A combination of low political and economic integration and a high level of consolidation results in reformist conflicts. Low state intervention in the allocation and accumulation of capital reduces the probability that class conflict will be directed against the state. When state intervention is low, depoliticized, abstract market forces determine capital allocation and accumulation. In addition, low political and economic integration may give the state the appearance of serving societal interests rather than the interests of the upper class. This appearance of autonomy is reinforced by the institutions of formal democracy. As a consequence, class conflict is contained within civil society and deflected from the state. When consolidation is high, reformist conflicts against holders of capital may emerge. The United States experienced such movements in the 1930s. During the Great Depression, the state was drawn into some conflicts, but was not attacked by the working class. Today, the United States, like other advanced industrial societies, is less receptive to consolidation because of moderate levels of economic polarization, greater economic resilience, and high social differentiation. When state intervention and consolidation are low, organized groups with resources may gain economic benefits through segmented class conflict, whereas collectivities with weak solidarity and few resources remain inactive. Such is the case in the United States today.The combination of a high level of state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation with a high level of consolidation increases the likelihood of revolutionary conflict. High state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation has crucial social consequences. First, it politicizes other-wise abstract market relations. Second, it clearly reveals the state to be allied with a small circle of upper-class entrepreneurs, thereby discrediting the state's claim to serve societal interest. As a consequence, class conflict can readily assume a political character, expanding its target to include the state. A high level of consolidation enhances the capacity of challenging groups to act collectively to resist repression and seize power. Consolidation is more likely in societies with a high level of economic polarization, highly dependent economies, and low social differentiation. Russia in 1917 and Iran and Nicaragua in 1979 are revealing examples. The Russian and Nicaraguan revolutions were carried out primarily by workers and peasants, which helps explain the socialist orientation of the new leadership. In contrast, in Iran, the revolution was largely based on the conflicts and struggles of the traditional middle class, which eventually led to the formation of the theocratic state. A combination of high state intervention and low consolidation generates segmented conflict directed against the state. Many Third World societies are experiencing such a conflict today.To conclude, Marx's analysis focused primarily on social classes underemphasizing the significance of the state and its relation to society and economy. Skocpol's analysis, on the other hand, primarily focused on the state and the upper class, and failed to specify the proper, determining variables. If the analysis presented here is useful in specifying the conditions and forms of social conflicts, we must pay greater attention to social structural analysis, the nature of the relationship between the state, economy, social classes, and solidarity structures.     

Sending countries and the politics of emigration and destination

This article examines available means and activities of sending countries in their efforts to exert control over the "long-term temporary" emigration process. In the European case, the structure of migration has provided sending countries with ongoing channels for promoting their interests. In this picture the political dimensions of immigration are analyzed as epiphenomenal, dependent, or inconsequential. It is assumed that 1) state power directly correlates with economic power, and 2) economic and strategic power differences between states necessarily imply inequality in social and cultural terms. Although emigration may not serve the long-term "objective" interests of senders, it does provide a short-term safety value from the point of view of political managers. Both sending and receiving countries' interests are best served by a system of temporary labor migration, not permanent immigration. The receivers' ability to act according to narrow economic self-interest is restricted by a host of multilateral agreements that regulate and define the obligations and rights of the participants in international migration. Bilateral agreements not only specify the conditions of recruitment, employment, and family migration, they also provide a continuing basis for sending country influence throughout the migration process. Sending states that have a long history of emigration tend to have more developed and articulated emigration policies and commensurate institutional structures to channel and control the migration process in all stages--leaving, working abroad, and returning. The reluctance of Europe's immigrants to serve their social and political ties to their countries of origin is reinforced by the sending countries' activities aimed at insuring the continued long-term but temporary nature of migration.     

Social mobility and demand for redistribution in Europe: a comparative analysis

The literature on preferences for redistribution has paid little attention to the effect of social mobility on the demand for redistribution and no systematic test of the hypotheses connecting social mobility and preferences for redistribution has yet been done to date. We use the diagonal reference model to estimate the effect of origin and destination classes on preferences for redistribution in a large sample of European countries using data from the European Social Survey. Our findings are consistent with the logic of acculturation in the sense that newcomers tend to adapt their views to those of the destination class at early stages and that upward and downward mobility do not have distinctive effects on the formation of political preferences. However, even though social origins seem to have a limited impact on preferences for redistribution, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that mobile and non‐mobile individuals are alike. We also find that the effect of social origin on preferences varies largely across countries. The empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that the effect of social origin on preferences for redistribution increases in contexts of strong familism.     

STRUCTURING POLITICAL OPINIONS:

Political democracy assumes that citizens can form consistent political attitudes that guide their political actions, thereby communicating political preferences to elites. Responding to the longstanding debate about the democratic competence of the U.S. mass public, we use a multitiered framework of opinion formation to describe the structure of mass opinion, showing that the mass public displays relatively consistent responses across multiple issues and uses these to evaluate presidential candidates. Confirmatory factor analysis allows us to examine multiple models of political attitudes, showing the best fit to be three positively correlated general orientations for economic, social, and racial issues. We find no significant racial or educational differences in the structuring of these attitudes but some evidence of "race-coding" of economic issues and class differences in levels of support for economic and social liberalism. Liberal/conservative self-identification operates as a basic structuring principle for organizing these general orientations with liberals and conservatives assigning different salience to specific issues. These general political orientations, in turn, influence presidential evaluations net of party loyalties. Although the mass public may not be ideologically sophisticated, it is "deliberative and reasonable" in its political thinking and, in this sense, democratically competent.     

Class Formation and Class Identity: Birth,Death, and Possibilities for Renewal

While social class served as a powerful organizing identity for much of the 19th and 20th centuries, many doubt its contemporary relevance. This article examines the formation and development of theories of class identity over the past century. From a debate largely among Marxists in the early 20th century about the conditions under which the working class will mobilize to defend its interests – moving from a “class in itself” to a “class for itself” – the question of the relationship between individuals' class position, social interests, and political mobilization attracted greater attention among social scientists following World War II. However, postwar socioeconomic transformations led some to argue for the “death of class” as a central organizing principle for modern social and political life. While others countered that class identities remained relevant, the sharp decline in class‐based organization in the late 20th century led scholars to develop more nuanced understandings of the relationship between individuals' class position and collective identities. Although current scholarship shows that there is no natural translation of class identities into collective action, the reality of growing socioeconomic inequality, along with the resurgence of social and political mobilizations to contest that growth, suggests that class identities retain the capacity to unite.     

Social origin,field of study and graduates’ career progression: does social inequality vary across fields?

Research on stratification and mobility has consistently shown that in the UK there is a direct impact of social origin on occupational destination net of educational attainment even for degree‐holders. However, only a few studies applied a longitudinal and dynamic perspective on how intergenerational mobility shapes graduates’ working careers. Using multilevel growth curve modelling and data from the 1970 British cohort study (BCS70), we contribute to this research by looking at the emergence of social inequalities during the first ten years since labour market entry. We further distinguish between graduates of different fields of study as we expect social disparities to develop differently due to differences in initial occupational placement and upward mobility processes. We find that parental class does not affect occupational prestige over and above prior achievement. Separate analyses by the field of study show that initial differences in occupational prestige and career progression do not differ between graduates from different classes of origin in STEM fields, and arts and humanities. It is only in the social sciences that working‐class graduates start with lower occupational prestige but soon catch up with their peers from higher classes. Overall, our results indicate no direct effect of social origin on occupational attainment for degree‐holders once we broaden our focus to a dynamic life course perspective.     

WHOSE GAY COMMUNITY? SOCIAL CLASS,SEXUAL SELF‐EXPRESSION,AND GAY COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

The visible and political gay community has been characterized as an increasingly middle-class, white institution. It is hypothesized that this middle-class nature requires economic and psychosocial resources that are not available to the working class and, thus, may limit the expression of sexual orientation for the working class. An analysis of data from the multicity Urban Men's Health Study supports this hypothesis. Nine of 14 hypothesized effects are statistically significant and indicate that working-class men who are homosexually active are less likely to describe themselves as gay, are more likely to have heterosexual experience, and are less likely to be involved in the gay community. Thus, it is important to incorporate class differences when addressing the social and the political dynamics of sexual orientation.     

The social stratification of time use patterns

Time use is both a cause of social inequality and a consequence of social inequality. However, how social class stratifies time use patterns is seldom studied. In this paper, I describe the time use patterns in the years 1983 and 2015 by social class, and gender in the British context. Using sequence analysis methods, I show how the diversity of time use patterns in British society is socially stratified. I find that 13 clusters capture the heterogeneity of time use patterns and that these clusters are associated with social class, gender, and day of the week. These clusters capture patterns of paid and unpaid work schedules, as well as leisure patterns. The results show that men have experienced a reduction of the standard Monday to Friday 8-hr working day, while women have experienced a general increase in this type of schedule. On the other hand, patterns of domestic working days have reduced for women and increased for men. Important differences exist in paid and unpaid work patterns between social classes. Working-class women have experienced an important increase in shift work on weekends. They are also much more likely to be doing unpaid work on weekdays compared to upper-class and middle-class women. Working-class men are more likely to experience non-working days and leisure days on both weekdays and weekends and are more likely to be doing shift work. They are also more often doing unpaid work on weekdays compared to men in upper-class households. Patterns of childcare indicate that all families have increased their childcare time. Men in upper-class households in particular have experienced an important growth in childcare time between 1983 and 2015. I conclude by discussing how time use can further our understanding of social stratification.     

Middle Class Identity in the Modern World: How Politics and Economics Matter

It is widely accepted that people tend to identify with the middle classes regardless of their social class position. Nevertheless, this “middle class identity bias” is not equally prominent in all western democracies. The goal of this article is to assess the role of political and economic conditions in shaping this phenomenon. By exploring the relationship between class identity and national context in 15 modern societies, I address two main questions: (1) how individual‐level income affects where people place themselves in the class system, and (2) how national political and economic context affects this relationship. In doing so, I offer several important findings. First, although there is a positive relationship between income and class identification in all 15 societies, middle class identification is weakest when income inequality is high. Consistent with previous findings, the results suggest that economic development has a positive impact on class identity. The results also uncover a role for political ideology by suggesting a lingering affect of Communist rule. Even after controlling for economic development and income inequality, respondents in former Communist countries are more likely than others to identify as belonging to a low social class.     

Sozialstrukturelle Interessenlagen und Parteipräferenz in Deutschland

Based on Allbus data, stability and change of the impact of social structurally defined interests on party preference in Germany is investigated. We use both traditional cleavage indicators like union membership or frequency of church attendance and further social structural characteristics like class identification, occupation or unemployment experience. We apply a two-level model with varying intercepts for the 16 Allbus surveys from 1980 to 2008. Beyond the expected results we observe some deviations from the stable relationship between social structural variables and party preference. (1) The younger generation of active Catholics prefers the Christian Democrats less than the older cohorts and the East German working class leaned towards this party immediately after unification. (2) Union members got alienated from the Social Democrats since 2004 due to reforms of unemployment benefits for people being out of work for a longer period of time with the consequence that Die Linke could profit from this trend in West and East Germany. (3) This left socialist party and its forerunner, the PDS, has always been the preferred party of people with unemployment experience. (4) The Greens and the Liberal Party are enduringly supported by specific social groups, the Greens by the social and cultural service class and the FDP by the self-employed, at least since this latter party ended the social liberal coalition with the SPD in 1982.     

Territoriale Ungleichheiten in der erweiterten Eu

In a multi-level system like the European Union, social interests and conflicts are also defined in territorial categories. In this respect, the considerable regional disparities between Eastern and Western Europe may interfare with attempts at intensifying political cooperation within an enlarged European Union. They may give rise to considerable additional transfer payments or even endanger the further enlargement of the EU. This trilemma of enlargement, increased political cooperation and budgetary neutrality can only be overcome, if a polarization between East and West European interests can be avoided by a quick convergence of Eastern und Western performance levels or by a differentiation of the individual, interregional or international employment and income situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The growth rates of recent years and the economic structure of Central and Eastern Europe do not support the thesis of a quick convergence. However, the capital regions and the Western border regions in Central Europe are developing in a very dynamic way. A relatively permanent prosperity gap between Eastern and Western Europe as well as an increased regional differentiation within Central and Eastern Europe is to be expected. Historical dimensions of the economic and political differences between Eastern and Western Europe are analyzed. The relative stability of the European center-periphery structure does not support the thesis of a “deterritorialization” of social relationships. Instead, there is some evidence for a non-identical, path-dependent reproduction of long-established dependency relationships.     

Reifications of the intellectual: representations,organization and agency in revolutionary China

How did ‘intellectuals’ evolve from a class of subjects in Marxian thoughts to highly visible populations under communism? Such ‘reifications of the intellectual’ have deeply affected subjectivity, conflict and organization, but received little attention in the political sociology of communism. This essay draws on research on classifications and social boundaries to address the objective and subjective foundations of the reifications and their impact on communist rule. The intellectual is viewed as an identification formed and performed around multiple social axes (most notably family background, educational achievement, occupational history, institutional affiliation and revolutionary rank) that reflected broader patterns of communist political domination. I use the Chinese Communist movement to demonstrate that (1) interaction of political contests, ruling strategies and institutional developments turned a diversity of persons into ‘intellectuals’ who were allegedly imbued with reprehensible interests and habits linked to privileged economic classes; (2) constant competitions for power and organizational changes led to classificatory ambiguities and, in turn, allowed individuals some control over their identifications; and (3) the developments profoundly influenced identity, state and class formation. Focusing on the dynamics that produced a highly visible but fluid population of ‘intellectuals’ opens new pathways for comparative research on communism.     

Bourdieu and Adorno: Converging theories of culture and inequality

The theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Theodor Adorno both conceive culture as legitimating the inequalities of modern societies. But they postulate different mechanisms of legitimation. For Bourdieu, modern culture is a class culture, characterized by socially ranked symbolic differences among classes that make some seem superior to others. For Adorno, modern culture is a mass culture, characterized by a socially imposed symbolic unity that obscures class differences behind a facade of leveled democracy. In his later writings, however, Bourdieu’s theory converges with that of Adorno. He too begins to privilege the high culture of intellectuals over mass culture by employing the universal standard of autonomy from economic interests. But there remains one vital difference between these theories. Bourdieu grounds the origins of a critical, autonomous culture in specific social structures, while Adorno grounds it in technology.     

Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right? Education,class, multiparty competition,and redistribution in Western Europe

In this article, we revisit the main claims of Part Four of Thomas Piketty's Capital and Ideology and especially the changing support coalitions for parties of the left. Piketty's core argument in this part of the book is that the left now represents the highly educated and that, as a result, the redistributive preferences of the working class do not find representation in today's party systems. We address these claims building on existing political science research that has investigated the transformation of politics in advanced capitalist societies. We argue, first, that the educational divide cannot be adequately analyzed by looking at a left and a right bloc, but crucially needs to pay attention to the rise of green/left‐libertarian and radical right parties. Second, we contend that the new middle classes that support parties of the left are largely in favor of economic redistribution. Analyzing data from the European Social Survey in 11 West European countries from 2002 to 2018, we show that the effect of education on voting left or right is indeed largely driven by green/left‐libertarian and radical right parties, while there is little empirical evidence that social democratic parties represent the educational elite. We also find that redistributive preferences remain at the heart of voting behavior and that, especially for educated voters, these preferences determine whether someone votes for a party of the left rather than the right.     

Class, work, and politics*

Le texte explore la relation entre la classes sociale et l'idéologie politique en utilisant les résultats d'un sondage-échantillon effectué parmi environ 1800 Canadiens au travail. En se basant sur les catégories de classe de Marx et les développements théoriques de Carchedi, l'auteur fait ressortir des différences modérées entre les classes pour ce qui a trait à l'appui du mouvement ouvrier, les dépenses encourues pour le bien-être social et pour une nouvelle répartition des revenus. Une analyse de régression démontre qu'une attitude plus gauchiste dans la classe ourvière reflète certains aspects des conditions de travail. En effet, la situation au travail joue un rôle considérable dans l'attitude politique, endehors des différences associées à la classe sociale. Par contre, la famille et l'instruction ne se révèlent pas comme étant des facteurs importants pour expliquer la relation entre la classe et l'idéologie politique.
The paper explores the relation between social class and political ideology using data from a simple survey of approximately 1800 Canadians with jobs. Using Marxist class categories, following theoretical developments by Carchedi, moderate class differences are found to support the labour movement, social welfare expenditures, and redistribution of income. A regression analysis shows that the more left-wing position of the working class reflects a number of aspects of working conditions. Indeed, aspects of the work situation have a considerable impact on political attitudes beyond those differences associated     

Lone motherhood and socio-economic disadvantage: insights from quantitative and qualitative evidence

Children's socio‐economic origins have a major impact on their socio‐economic destinations. But what effect do they have on other kinds of destinations, such as family life? In this article we assess the extent and nature of the relationship between social class background and lone motherhood, using a combination of research methods. We analyse three large datasets and explore in detail qualitative information from 44 in‐depth interviews. Our analysis shows that women from working class backgrounds are more likely to become lone mothers (especially never‐married lone mothers) than women from middle class backgrounds. Moreover, the experience of lone motherhood is very different for women from working class backgrounds compared with other women.     

Social Class and Success Goals: An Examination of Relative and Absolute Aspirations*

Aspirations may be measured in absolute terms, by asking individuals how much of a given goal they desire, or in relative terms, by asking individuals how much they desire a given goal relative to other goals . Prior studies on the relationship between social class and success goals have always employed either relative or absolute measures alone, with the absolute measures focusing on desire for education, occupational prestige, or income and the relative measures usually focusing on such goals as job security, advancement, and importance. This paper argues that a focus on absolute or relative aspirations alone can produce a misleading image of the relationship between social class and success goals, and it remedies the above neglect by examining the absolute and relative aspirations of different social classes for the same, set of goals. Using a sample of males from Detroit and Baltimore, it was found that the lower class places more emphasis on economic security, while the upper class places more emphasis on self-actualization goals like job advancement and importance. However, when absolute aspirations were examined, it was found that lower-class people have a strong desire for self-actualization and that middle-class people do not have a strong desire for security. These findings provide a more complete picture of the relationship between social class and success goals, and they are relevant to such topics as Rodman's "lower-class value stretch." social mobility, anomie theories of deviance, and explanations of social movements based on relative deprivation.