An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance Provision and Wage Determination

We investigate the effect of employer‐provided health insurance on job mobility rates and economic welfare using a search, matching, and bargaining framework. In our model, health insurance coverage decisions are made in a cooperative manner that recognizes the productivity effects of health insurance as well as its nonpecuniary value to the employee. The resulting equilibrium is one in which not all employment matches are covered by health insurance, wages at jobs providing health insurance are larger (in a stochastic sense) than those at jobs without health insurance, and workers at jobs with health insurance are less likely to leave those jobs, even after conditioning on the wage rate. We estimate the model using the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and find that the employer‐provided health insurance system does not lead to any serious inefficiencies in mobility decisions.     

Modes of Entrance by Gender and Wage Differential in the French Labour Market

Abstract. This paper explores the gender wage differential after the exit from school in France. Using survey longitudinal data on young men and women leaving the French school system in 1998, we show that the residual entrance‐level wage differential by gender may be explained by the expected gender differential of access to job opportunities. A hierarchical classification is used to estimate the probability to obtain easy access to non‐subsidized jobs. After control for hours worked and hierarchical levels, and for the predicted values of this previous estimation, we find no significant impact of gender on entrance‐level wages.     

Job Matching and the Wage Distribution

This paper brings together the microeconomic‐labor and the macroeconomic‐equilibrium views of matching in labor markets. We nest a job matching model à la Jovanovic (1984) into a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)‐type equilibrium search environment. The resulting framework preserves the implications of job matching theory for worker turnover and wage dynamics, and it also allows for aggregation and general equilibrium analysis. We obtain two new equilibrium implications of job matching and search frictions for wage inequality. First, learning about match quality and worker turnover map Gaussian output noise into an ergodic wage distribution of empirically accurate shape: unimodal, skewed, with a Paretian right tail. Second, high idiosyncratic productivity risk hinders learning and sorting, and reduces wage inequality. The equilibrium solutions for the wage distribution and for the aggregate worker flows—quits to unemployment and to other jobs, displacements, hires—provide the likelihood function of the model in closed form.     

Preference Change and Increasing Wage Inequality

Abstract. This paper argues that preference change could explain, in part, the growth of within‐group wage inequality in the USA and the UK in the 1980s. The absence of such preference change in continental European countries might also help explain why their wage inequality did not rise in the same way. The argument relies on evidence from the World Values Surveys and uses an efficiency wage model of within‐group wage inequality where there are differences in the degree of discretion at work across firms and workers value not just the wage but also the degree of discretion on the job.     

Low‐wage Jobs — Springboard to High‐paid Ones?

We examine whether low‐paid jobs have an effect on the probability that unemployed persons obtain better‐paid jobs in the future (springboard effect). We make use of data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and apply a dynamic random effects bivariate probit model. Our results suggest that low‐wage jobs can act as springboards to better‐paid work. The improvement of the chance to obtain a high‐wage job by accepting low‐paid work is particularly large for less‐skilled persons and for individuals who experienced longer periods of unemployment. Low‐paid work is less beneficial if the job is associated with a low social status.     

The Gender Wage Gap in the Turkish Labor Market

Abstract. This paper examines the sources of the gender wage gap in the Turkish labor market by using matched employer–employee data and the standard wage regression estimations as well as the Oaxaca decomposition method. The extensive number of variables in the data set enables a thorough quantitative analysis of the role of various individual‐ as well as firm‐related factors leading to wage differentials between men and women, namely human capital endowments including job tenure, occupational and industrial segregation, private/public sector location, coverage of the workplace under collective labor bargaining, and firm size. It also examines the extent of gender‐based industry and occupational segregation within the confines of data set and computes the Duncan & Duncan segregation index. We find that a large portion of the gender wage gap is attributable to women's considerably lower levels of work experience and job tenure. Other important variables that lead to pay differentials are women's lower concentration in jobs covered by collective labor bargaining and a substantial degree of occupational and industrial segregation. The differential rates of return to many of the wage determinant variables are also found to be significant in the formation of the gender wage gap.     

Efficiency Wage,Fixed Employment Costs,and Dual Labour Markets

The standard efficiency wage‐based explanation of labour market dualism hinges on the existence of differences in monitoring across sectors. The paper proposes fixed employment costs as an alternative source of wage differentials for homogeneous workers. It shows that firms with larger fixed costs pay higher wages in order to elicit more effort from their workers, and tend to have higher capital/labour ratio and labour productivity. The model generates both involuntary unemployment and involuntary confinement in the secondary sector: high effort–high wage jobs are preferred to low effort–low wage jobs and either are preferred to unemployment. The proposed framework can also account for the various types of treatment of marginal jobs in primary sector firms envisaged by Doeringer and Piore (Internal Labour Markets and Manpower Analysis, 1971). In particular, an increase in fixed costs beyond a certain level may induce primary sector firms to restructure, segment production, and enter the secondary sector, thus converting their jobs into secondary jobs. From a welfare point of view, we cannot state in general the desirability of subsidizing fixed employment costs; however, we show that an employment subsidy financed by a wage tax is able to increase employment with no loss in terms of production.     

Wage Flexibility for Skilled and Unskilled Workers: New Evidence on the Norwegian Wage Curve

Empirical evidence is provided in favour of a hypothesis that wages for unskilled workers are more responsive to unemployment than wages for skilled workers. The results imply vigorous wage responsiveness to low levels of unemployment for both groups, while the wage curves become almost entirely flat for unemployment rates above 1.7 percent. One interpretation of this result is that firms have strong incentives to increase wages in order to recruit and retain workers when unemployment is below some critical level. Since unemployed workers will certainly find work, the expected costs of a job loss are small, as are costs associated with an egalitarian wage policy.     

Discriminatory Barriers and the Gender Wage Gap in France

Abstract. In this paper, we propose a method of decomposition that identifies the wage effect of the gender discriminatory barriers in the allocation of grades and full‐time jobs. Standard decomposition techniques tend to interpret the explained portion as a non‐discriminatory component, though discriminatory barriers in the labour market also affect the characteristics of individuals. Using survey data generated by INSEE in France in 2000, we find some evidence that the gender discriminatory barriers within the French labour market explain much of the difference between men and women's attainment and full‐time employment. Our method substantially changes the traditional empirical conclusions since the discriminatory barriers in the allocation of grades and full‐time jobs account for one quarter of the gender monthly wage gap. When adding to the pure wage discrimination portion, we thus show that half of the gender monthly wage gap is not explained.     

Education,Mobility and Employers’ Monopsony Power: A Search‐theoretic Analysis

Abstract. We analyse the efficiency of schooling choices in a wage‐posting search equilibrium model with on‐the‐job search. The workers have multidimensional skills and the search market is segmented by technology. Education determines the scope — or adaptability— of individual skills. Individuals obtain schooling to leave unemployment more quickly and to climb the wage ladder rapidly through job‐to‐job mobility — that is, to speed up job shopping. Education reduces firms’ monopsony power in the wage determination by improving workers’ mobility. As a result, the wage distribution shifts rightward with aggregate schooling. However, the ratio of vacant jobs to job seekers also falls in each sector. Either one or the other externality may dominate, implying, respectively, under‐ or over‐education. A combination of minimum wage and schooling fee can decentralize the efficient allocation.     

The Impact on Inequality of Raising the Minimum Wage: Gap‐narrowing and Reranking Effects

Raising the minimum wage may reduce inequality by increasing the wages of low‐skill workers, but it may also increase inequality due to negative impacts on employment that produce wage losses. Using previous estimates of the elasticities of wages and employment to changes in the minimum wage in Colombia and Brazil, we show that the net impact on inequality of increasing the minimum wage may depend on the distributional weights used for inequality measurement. The results are obtained by decomposing the Gini index into reranking and gap‐narrowing effects. Inequality‐increasing reranking effects, which are associated with job losses, may dominate inequality‐decreasing gap‐narrowing effects, which are associated with wage gains, when high weights are placed on workers with low earnings. For standard distributional weights, however, the likely net impact is a reduction in wage inequality.     

Impact of the Minimum Wage on Youth Labor Markets

We study the effect of the minimum wage on labor market outcomes for young workers using US county‐level panel data from the first quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2009. We go beyond the usual estimates of earnings and employment effects to consider how differences across states in the minimum wage affect worker turnover via separations and accessions and job turnover through new job creation and job losses. We find that a higher minimum wage level is associated with higher earnings, lower employment and reduced worker turnover for those in the 14–18 age group. For workers aged 19–21 and 22–24, we find less consistent evidence of minimum wage effects on earnings and employment. But, even for these age groups, a higher minimum wage is found to reduce accessions, separations and the turnover rate.     

New Firms as Employers: The Wage Penalty for Voluntary and Involuntary Job Switchers

According to previous research, new firms pay lower wages. However, previous studies have been unable to control for the possibility that the opportunity costs of accepting employment at new firms may differ across individuals. In this paper, we investigate whether a wage penalty for being employed at a new firm exists if we take the individual employee's experience and status in the labour market into consideration. We focus on individuals who decide to switch jobs and use matched employee–employer data about all firms and employees in Sweden for the period 1998–2010. Our results show that the share of job transitions into lower wages are higher for those who switch to new firms compared with incumbent firms (40 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively). Our endogenous wage equation estimates indicate that being an involuntary job switcher has an equally negative effect on wages at both new and incumbent firms. However, the positive effect of education on wages is more pronounced for job switchers selecting into incumbent firms.     

Equilibrium Wage‐Tenure Contracts

In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage‐tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage‐tenure contract that implies a worker's wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker's wage can be due to job‐to‐job movements as well as wage‐tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.     

Wage Expectations for Higher Education Students in Spain

We assess students' ability to forecast future earnings by using data on expected wages self‐reported by college students with different graduation horizons. We find a significant gender gap, by which wage expectations are systematically lower for women than for men. However, women do not fully account for the gender gap in their future earnings. We also find that student performance, degree type, and graduation horizon play a relevant role in wage forecasts. In any case, students' expectations do not conform market wages but become more realistic as they approach graduation.     

Wage Inequality of US Truck Drivers

Using CPS data for the period 1979–2009, the wage dispersion of truck drivers (and subsets of the truck driving sample) is compared with the trends in wage dispersion of males economy‐wide. We find that truckers' wages experienced a decrease in inequality post‐deregulation, as expected given the literature on regulation's impact on the labor market. We also find that the wage dispersion for truckers is markedly different from males economy‐wide, providing evidence that the wage distribution of truck drivers has been dominated by the changing structure of the occupation post‐deregulation and largely immune to the factors that increased inequality for the aggregate labor market.     

Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage–Tenure Contracts

I construct a theoretical framework in which firms offer wage–tenure contracts to direct the search by risk‐averse workers. All workers can search, on or off the job. I characterize an equilibrium and prove its existence. The equilibrium generates a nondegenerate, continuous distribution of employed workers over the values of contracts, despite that all matches are identical and workers observe all offers. A striking property is that the equilibrium is block recursive; that is, individuals' optimal decisions and optimal contracts are independent of the distribution of workers. This property makes the equilibrium analysis tractable. Consistent with stylized facts, the equilibrium predicts that (i) wages increase with tenure, (ii) job‐to‐job transitions decrease with tenure and wages, and (iii) wage mobility is limited in the sense that the lower the worker's wage, the lower the future wage a worker will move to in the next job transition. Moreover, block recursivity implies that changes in the unemployment benefit and the minimum wage have no effect on an employed worker's job‐to‐job transitions and contracts.     

Employer Changes and Wage Changes: Estimation with Measurement Error in a Binary Variable

Self‐reported tenure is often used to determine job changes. We show there are substantial inconsistencies in these responses; consequently, we risk misclassifying job changes as stays and vice versa. An estimator from Hausman et al. is applied to a job change model for Ireland, and we find that ignoring misclassification may substantially underestimate the true number of changes and lead to diminished covariate effects. The main contribution of the paper is to control for misclassification when estimating the wage effects of job mobility. A two‐step approach is adopted. We find ignoring misclassification leads to a significant downwards bias in the wage impact, and we provide an estimate that corrects for measurement error.     

The Impact of Worker and Establishment‐level Characteristics on Male–Female Wage Differentials: Evidence from Danish Matched Employee–Employer Data

Abstract. This paper uses matched employer–employee data from Denmark to examine how gender segregation at the level of occupation, industry, establishment, and job‐cell impacts the gender wage differential of full‐time, private‐sector salaried and manual workers. Wage effects of gender segregation at the above four levels are estimated through fixed effects or through controls for the proportion females within these structures. We find that occupation has a much larger role than industry or establishment in accounting for the gender gap for salaried but not manual workers, and that for both groups there is a significant within‐job‐cell gender wage differential.     

Worker and Firm Heterogeneity in Wage Growth: An AKM Approach

This paper estimates a wage growth equation containing human capital variables known from the traditional Mincerian wage equation with year, worker and firm fixed effects included as well. The paper thus contributes further to the large empirical literature on unobserved heterogeneity following the work of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis [1999; Econometrica 67(2): 251–333]. Our main contribution is to extend the analysis from wage levels to wage growth. The specification enables us to estimate the individual‐specific and firm‐specific fixed effects and their degree of explanation on wage growth. The analysis is conducted using Danish longitudinal matched employer–employee data from 1980 to 2006. We find that the worker fixed effect dominates both the firm fixed effect and the effect of the observed covariates. Worker effects are estimated to explain 7–12 per cent of the variance in wage growth whereas firm effects are estimated to explain 4–10 per cent. We furthermore find a negative correlation between the worker and firm effects, as do nearly all authors examining wage level equations.