Revisiting the Impact of Union Structures on Wages: Integrating Different Dimensions of Centralization

Abstract. In a framework of a unionized oligopoly, this paper reconsiders the impact of the bargaining structure on union wages. In particular, two dimensions along which centralization may occur, namely the professional and firm line, are integrated into one modelling framework. It will be shown that, when taking into account different centralization dimensions, wage outcomes of different bargaining regimes cannot simply be ranked according to the degree of bargaining centralization. The argument will be that negotiated wages rather depend on the technical relationship between different groups of labour and goods as well as upon the dimension along which centralization takes place.     

Union–Firm Bargaining,Productivity Improvement and Endogenous Growth

This paper presents a growth model with two sectors. In the high‐tech sector, R&D increases productivity and union–firm bargaining determines wages, but in the traditional sector there are neither R&D nor labour unions. The government is able to regulate union bargaining power. The main results are as follows. Because firms try to escape wage increases through the improvement of productivity by R&D, the increase in union bargaining power boosts R&D and growth. It is welfare enhancing to strengthen (weaken) unions when the growth rate is below (above) some critical level. A specific rule is presented for when de‐unionization is socially desirable.     

National Culture and Industrial Relations and Pay Structures

The paper develops an explanatory model of comparative industrial relations and labour market structures based on national culture. The four cultural variables derived by Hofstede (Culture’s Consequences, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984) are used to investigate the relationship between national culture and various dimensions of industrial relations and pay structures. The paper finds national culture to be associated with the centralization of bargaining, the extent of corporatism, the degree of co‐ordination in bargaining, the coverage of collective bargaining, trade union density, the extent of worker participation in decision making, and most dimensions of the pay structure. Hofstede’s MAS variable, measuring cultural values representing gender social structuring, is associated with both industrial relations institutions and the pay structure. The results provide support for our cultural model.     

Risk Aversion,Collective Bargaining,and Wages in Germany

We develop an open‐shop model of trade union membership in which workers differ in their risk attitudes, and derive conditions under which the bargained wage will fall and union membership will increase with a general rise in risk aversion. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel we define broad bargaining units and show that wages decline as average risk aversion of union members in these units rises, controlling for individual effects of risk aversion. Given a negative relationship between wages and employment, this suggests that secular changes in risk attitudes, because of an aging workforce or greater female labour force participation, can help to explain variations in the employment performance of unionized economies.     

Unions and the Welfare Impact of Foreign Direct Investment — A Wisdom Extension

Abstract. This paper extends the recent literature, e.g. Leahy and Montagna (Economic Journal 110: 80–92, 2000), in relation to the link between unionization, inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and country welfare in an oligopoly market structure. It is shown that the common results, that unions may reduce welfare under FDI while multinational enterprises (MNEs) will strictly trade off union wages at each location, are generally driven by the assumption relating to the scope of the bargaining with the union, namely the ‘right to manage’ (RTM). In particular, our extension to efficient bargaining (EB) demonstrates that union power may increase welfare in the presence of FDI, while the MNEs’ choice between FDI and exports will include profit‐sharing arbitrage with unions, in addition to the usual wage comparison considerations.     

The Role of Profit Sharing in Dual Labour Markets with Flexible Outsourcing

We combine profit sharing for high‐skilled workers and outsourcing of low‐skilled tasks in a partly imperfect dual domestic labour market, which means that only low‐skilled labour is represented by a labour union. In that framework we analyse how the implementation of profit sharing for high‐skilled workers influences the amount of outsourcing and the labour market outcome for low‐skilled worker. By doing this, we use some specific assumptions, e.g. exponentially increasing outsourcing costs or the wage for low‐skilled workers will be determined by a union whereas the wage for high‐skilled workers is given. Assuming that low‐skilled labour and outsourcing are interchangeable we show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the wage for low‐skilled workers and helps to decrease wage dispersion. However, under these circumstances, profit sharing enhances outsourcing. Concerning the employment effects for high‐ and low‐skilled workers, we show that there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wages for low‐skilled work, which can be offset by higher productivity of highly skilled workers, as the domestic labour inputs complement each other.     

Trade Unions,Wage Bargaining Coordination,and Foreign Direct Investment

Conventional wisdom is that a high trade union bargaining strength and a system of coordinated wage bargaining reduce the attractiveness of an economy as a location for foreign direct investment, although there is limited evidence for this. The paper takes panel data for 19 OECD economies to examine the relationship between trade union bargaining strength, bargaining coordi nation, and a range of incentives for inward foreign direct investment. It finds a strong negative effect of trade union density on inward foreign direct investment, which is dependent on the degree of wage bargaining coordination. A high degree of coordination weakens the deterrent effect of high union density, which is consistent with the notion that under certain circumstances a coordinated increase in wages can increase profits of the multinationals by hurting domestic firms.     

Economic Growth and Welfare in a Neoclassical Overlapping Generations Growth Model with Minimum Wages and Consumption Taxes

We examine the effects of minimum wages on both the long‐run per worker GDP and welfare in the textbook Diamond style overlapping generations economy. In addition, we assume the existence of unemployment benefits financed at a balanced budget with consumption taxes. Under suitable conditions, it is shown that a regulated‐wage economy with unemployment performs better than a competitive‐wage economy with full employment in the long run. Moreover, a welfare‐maximizing minimum wage exists. Our findings may have interesting policy implications.     

Preliminary Evidence on Wage Setting in Greek Manufacturing

Abstract. The negotiating power of the unions and their role in wage determination depends on the level of centralization of the wage bargaining system as well as on other institutional arrangements. In this study, we estimate a set of wage equations in order to study the employment effects of different unions’ stances in wage determination as well as to investigate other characteristics of employment in Greek manufacturing. We discriminate between workers and employees (blue‐ and white‐collar workers) and between sectors in order to capture differences in the relative supply as well as differences in the negotiating power among the staff of the same industry. Empirical findings reveal that the persistence of unemployment arises as a result of the great bargaining power of the unions in negotiations at a sectoral level. White‐collar workers exhibit a stronger negotiating power compared with blue‐collar workers because of differences in the institutional framework.     

Endogenous Contracts in Unionized Oligopoly

We study the endogenous determination of contracts in a unionized oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. Alternative contracts specify the sequencing in the selection of R&D and wages. They can be classified as ‘fixed’ when the unions set wages before the firms make their R&D decisions or ‘floating’ when the sequencing of these choices is reversed. If the unions are highly employment‐oriented, we find that either all firm–union pairs choose floating‐wage contracts or both contract types may coexist depending on the degree of technological spillovers. However, when the unions have stronger preference over attaining a good wage deal, then it becomes very likely that fixed‐wage contracts will endogenously emerge because they can serve as an insurance device against oppor tunistic wage increases. Our welfare analysis suggests that welfare‐improving contracts may nevertheless not always arise in equilibrium.     

Unions,Firing Costs,and Unemployment

Abstract. We study the effects of firing costs in unionized economies with heterogeneous workers. We consider an overlapping generations model where workers participate in the labour market both when young and when old. All workers belong to the same union that sets wages unilaterally. We find that at given wages firing costs increase youth unemployment and decrease old‐age unemployment. However, once the wage response is considered, firing costs increase both youth and old‐age unemployment. Indeed, knowing that when firing costs are higher firms refrain from firing, the union increases the wage of old workers, and, therefore, old‐age unemployment increases.     

Is Wage Leadership an Instrument to Coordinate Unions’ Wage Policy?The Case of Imperfect Product Markets

Given an oligopolistic product market, trade unions organized at firm level want to coordinate their bargaining activities. If for some exogenous reasons centralization is not possible, unions could try to coordinate wage setting by wage leadership. The outcome of such wage leadership is compared with that of an uncoordinated bargaining and is characterized by higher utilities for all unions. But wages and employment levels are not symmetrical either for unions or for firms. The leader firm employment decreases and the follower firm employment rises compared with uncoordinated bargaining. This may cause problems with the implementation of wage leadership.     

Employment‐protecting Labour Market Institutions and Inward Foreign Direct Investments

Abstract. This paper proposes labour market institutional arrangements as a strategic device to induce or deter export‐substituting inward foreign direct investments (FDI) — in either instance protecting domestic employment. In a union‐oligopoly context it is shown that, if the FDI‐associated unit costs (FC) are not high enough, then employment‐neutral (‐enhancing) inward FDI will emerge in equilibrium if the domestic wage setting is credibly centralized and the unemployment benefit is sufficiently high (low), each instance arising for a different range of — intermediate — FC values. If however the FC values are sufficiently high, then the centralized structure of wage setting along with a low enough unemployment benefit will deter employment‐reducing inward FDI.     

Wage Commitment,Signalling, and Entry Deterrence or Accommodation

Abstract. We analyse the wage choice of a monopoly union against entry threat. The wage carries information about market demand, which is crucial to an uninformed entrant, and in addition affects the entrant's post‐entry cost through labour market institutions. The union may wish to deter or accommodate entry depending on whether the entrant will hire from a different source or from the union. Equilibrium wage is distorted downwardly (upwardly) for deterrence (accommodation); but because of wage correlation a low (high) wage can also turn entry profitable (unprofitable). Therefore, separating equilibrium may not always exist, and entry outcomes may be inefficient.     

Paying More than Necessary? The Wage Cushion in Germany

In Germany, more than 40 per cent of plants covered by collective agreements pay wages above the level stipulated in the agreement, giving rise to a wage cushion between actual and contractual wages. Cross‐sectional and fixed‐effects estimations indicate that the wage cushion mainly varies with the profit situation of the plant and with indicators of labour shortage and the business cycle. Whereas plants bound by multi‐employer agreements seem to pay wage premiums in order to overcome the restrictions imposed by the rather centralized bargaining system in (western) Germany, plants that use single‐employer agreements are significantly less likely to have wage cushions.     

Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search,Matching, and Endogenous Contact Rates

Building upon a continuous‐time model of search with Nash bargaining in a stationary environment, we analyze the effect of changes in minimum wages on labor market outcomes and welfare. Although minimum wage increases may or may not lead to increases in unemployment in our model, they can be welfare‐improving to labor market participants on both the supply and demand sides of the labor market. We discuss identification of the model using Current Population Survey data on accepted wages and unemployment durations, and show that by incorporating a limited amount of information from the demand side of the market it is possible to obtain credible and precise estimates of all primitive parameters. We show that the optimal minimum wage in 1996 depends critically on whether or not contact rates can be considered to be exogenous and we note that the limited variation in minimum wages makes testing this assumption problematic.     

The Determinants of Child Labour: The Role of Primary Product Specialization

Abstract. The paper tests predictions of a traditional intra‐household bargaining model which, under reasonable assumptions, shows that lack of bargaining power in the value chain significantly reduces the capacity for obtaining benefits from increased product demand arising from trade liberalization and therefore is positively associated with child labour. Cross‐sectional and panel negative binomial estimates in a sample of emerging countries support this hypothesis. They show that proxies of domestic workers’ bargaining power in the international division of labour (such as the share of primary product exports) are significantly related to child labour, net of the effect of traditional controls such as parental income, quality of education, international aid, and trade liberalization. The positive impact of the share of primary product exports on child labour outlines a potential paradox. The paradox suggests that trade liberalization does not always have straightforward positive effects on social indicators and that its short‐run effects on income distribution and distribution of skills and market power across countries need to be carefully evaluated.     

Explaining the Desire for Local Bargaining: Evidence from a Finnish Survey of Employers and Employees

Abstract. This paper describes divergences in employers’ and employees’ opinions on the proper share of local bargaining in contract wage gains in Finland. Employers want the locally bargained wage share to be approximately half of the total wage rise, while the majority of employees would prefer this share to be in the region of 1–24 per cent. Employers in firms that are large, foreign owned or operate in the financial services industry desire the largest locally bargained share of contract wages. Employees in large firms, on the other hand, resist local bargaining. When the firm uses performance‐related pay, employees would prefer a large role for local bargaining in contract wage gains.     

A Theory of the Firm with Non‐binding Employment Contracts

This paper examines an employment relation in which individual workers enjoy some bargaining power vis‐a‐vis the firm although they are not unionized. The main elements of the situations studied here are that the employment contracts are non‐binding across periods of production and that the firm has opportunities to replace workers. The paper analyzes a dynamic model in which the processes of contracting and recontracting between the firm and its workers are intertwined with the dynamic evolution of the firm's workforce. The analysis of the model is somewhat complicated because the employment level is a nondegenerate state variable that evolves over time and is affected by past decisions. The main analytical results characterize certain important equilibria: the profit maximizing and stationary equilibria. The unique stationary equilibrium is markedly inefficient: it exhibits inefficient over‐employment and the steady state wages coincide with the workers' reservation wage. It confirms earlier results derived by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a, b) in the context of a static model and shows that they are very robust even when the firm has nearly frictionless hiring opportunities. In contrast, in the profit maximizing equilibrium the outcome is nearly efficient and the wage exhibits a mark‐up over the reservation wage.     

Quality‐Speed Competition in Customer‐Intensive Services with Boundedly Rational Customers

We consider a system in which two competing servers provide customer‐intensive services and the service reward is affected by the length of service time. The customers are boundedly rational and choose their service providers according to a logit model. We demonstrate that the service provider revenue function is unimodal in the service rate, its decision variable, and show that the service rate competition has a unique and stable equilibrium. We then study the price decision under three scenarios with the price determined by a revenue‐maximizing firm, a welfare‐maximizing social planner, or two servers in competition. We find that the socially optimal price, subject to the requirement that the customer actual utility must be non‐negative, is always lower than the competition equilibrium price which, in turn, is lower than the revenue‐maximizing monopoly price. However, if the customer actual utility is allowed to be negative in social optimization, the socially optimal price can be higher than the other two prices in a large market.