复合产权:一个实质论和资本体系的视角——山西介休洪山泉的历史水权个案研究

本文依据一个历史的个案——山西洪山泉的水权研究,从实质论的产权和资本体系的视角,论证了产权的复合存在(包括经济产权、文化产权、社会产权、政治产权和象征产权),进而对"复合产权(multiplepro perty right)"进行了探讨。     

“关系产权”:产权制度的一个社会学解释

关于产权制度的讨论大多是在经济学特别是新古典经济学的产权理论框架中进行的。经济学产权理论的基本命题是 :“产权是一束权利” ,即产权界定了产权所有者对资产使用、资产带来的收入、资产转移诸方面的控制权。产权为人们的经济行为提供了相应的激励机制 ,从而保证了资源分配和使用的效率。与经济学的思路不同 ,本文从社会学制度学派的解释逻辑出发 ,提出“关系产权”的概念 ,以此来强调“产权是一束关系”这一中心命题 ,为解释产权在中国转型经济中扮演的角色和有关的经济现象提供一个不同的分析角度。这一思路的基本观点是 ,一个组织的产权结构和形式是该组织与其他组织建立长期稳定关系、适应其所处环境的结果。因此 ,产权结构和形式并不是像经济学家所说的那样反映了企业的独立性 ;恰恰相反 ,产权反映了一个组织与其环境即其他组织、制度环境 ,或者组织内部不同群体之间稳定的交往关联。本文讨论了关系产权的概念、理论思路和实证意义 ,并从这一思路出发 ,重新解释了“模糊产权”在中国乡镇企业发展中的意义。     

欧美现代企业产权治理发展新趋势

深化企业改革,一个重要方面就是突破企业产权制度障碍,建立明晰的企业产权制度优化公司治理结构的产权经营与管理基础,进现代企业发展。公司治理结构包含法人治理结构和市场治理结构两大方面,其核心都与企业产权密切联系,产权治理是公司治理结构的主线与基础。欧美企业产权制度经过演变和发展,近年来,在产权治理上出现了六个方面的变化与发展新趋势,正对现代公司治理产生现实而深远的影响。分析欧美现代企业产权治理新变化有助于我们的企业建立更为合理的公司治理结构,更加合理地配置有效资源,提高企业市场竞争力。在产权拥有上,积极寻求成…     

产权怎样界定--一份集体产权私化的社会文本

产权界定,作为一种当事人之间缔结或改变权利合约的互动过程,无疑是经济生活史上一项重要的社会活动。20世纪90年代中期以来,乡镇集体企业改制的某些经验事实表明,社区集体产权主要不是一种市场合约性产权,而是一种社会合约性产权。这种社会性合约既不是某种有意识设计的制度,也不是社会关系的自然表达,而是特定行动关系协调的产物,反映的是一种社会和谐秩序。在市场合约不完备的情况下,它有可能以非正式的方式比较好地处理和解决社区内部的合作问题和产权冲突,具有界定和维护社区产权秩序的作用;但是在制度环境发生急剧变化时,这种作用就十分有限了。在当下依靠行政力量推动改制时,如果仅仅以制度设计来取代非正式的社会合约规则,而不能充分考虑到后者的延续或替代问题,将会给社区的持续发展带来严重的不良后果。     

民办教育产权制度改革的对策与措施初探

在现实中,民办教育产权问题已成为制约民办教育健康发展的重要问题之一。民办高校产权的运行机制是否合理、科学,将直接影响到民办高校的办学质量和效益。本文从分析民办高校产权问题现状及影响出发,建议一方面     

我国土地环境产权的界定及其保障措施

为使土地资源得到合理的利用和对土地环境进行有效的保护,必须对土地环境产权进行科学的界定.本文在明确土地环境产权的主体和客体的基础上,提出了保障我国土地环境产权运行的几点措施.     

产权型保障性住房发展历程和展望——以武汉为例

城市保障性住房是一个关系社会民生的问题,随着城市的高速发展,住房的价格也在逐步上升,导致很多中低收入群体的最基本住房需求无法得到满足.我国的保障性住房主要可以分为产权性质的保障房和使用权性质的保障房两类.本文介绍了我国保障性住房的发展概况,然后以武汉市为例,分析了产权型保障房中的典型代表——经济适用住房的发展及其作用和弊端,最后探讨了共有产权住房的发展、特点及其对产权型保障性住房的意义.     

我国共有产权住房制度的优化策略——基于八个城市的政策文本分析

共有产权住房制度是健全多主体供给、多渠道保障、租购并举的重要的住房制度安排,这一政策的推出不仅有利于深化住房供给侧结构性改革,还有助于完善住房保障体系和规范共有产权住房的建设与运营管理.在制定共有产权住房法律政策时,首先需要明确立法的目的,以指导具体实施细则的制定,这是共有产权住房法律政策设立的起点和归宿.同时,制订共有产权住房法律政策时,也需要参考具体实施细则的可操作性.因此,立法目的与各实施细则之间是相辅相成的关系.     

马克思主义产权思想视域下国有企业管理体制的改革与完善

在此轮深化国有企业改革进程中,重点是以管资本为纽带,以国资改革带动国企改革,加强对国有企业管理体制的改革与完善。马克思在其经典著作中运用辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义分析法,通过分析生产力和生产关系的矛盾运动过程,构建了以坚持公有制为基础的经典的马克思主义产权思想,从而奠定了我国国有企业管理体制改革与完善的理论基础。我国国有企业管理体制改革要从国有资产产权多元化、国有资产形态转化与国有资产监督管理机构职能转变三个层面进行设计。发展混合所有制经济,加快国有资本合理流动,组建国有资本投资运营公司,转化国有资本形态,转变机构职能。同时,在深化国有企业管理体制改革与完善的进程中,从微观运行层面借鉴西方当代产权思想,进一步丰富马克思主义产权思想。     

改革开放以来上海国有企业产权改革的历史分析

本文从对上海国有企业产权改革进程的阶段描述入手,梳理上海国有企业产权改革的历史脉络,进而进行宏观的历史分析和经验总结。文章认为,上海国有企业产权改革是沿着“政府退出”与“市场进入”的路径进行的,采用渐进式的方式进行改革,在政府的推动下,逐步建立现代企业产权制度,并在产权改革过程中积累了大量的经验教训,这对于上海完善社会主义市场经济体制、深化经济体制改革具有十分重要的现实意义。     

The structure of rights in the context of private property

Some rights to resources adhere to individuals on the basis of ascribed characteristics—these are rights of person. These rights are not subject to voluntary alienation. And there are rights that adhere to specific characteristics of resources and are subject to alienation. These are rights in property. However, there has been a systematic tendency to promote property rights at the expense of the rights of person and, in so doing, confound the analysis of the commons, of common property, and of private property. Given a delineation of fundamental concepts, this paper examines critically the foundational works of Demsetz and Coase and shows that their theoretical arguments depend on an implicit denial of all rights of person. It is shown, however, that rights of person are not properly analyzable by the standards that apply to rights in property and that the optimal policy to pursue in contemporary society is to determine a desired configuration rights and responsibilities in combination with rights in property.     

WOLVES, CHIMPS AND DEMSETZ

Harold Demsetz has argued that when an externality can be internalized through the existence of property rights such that societal benefits exceed costs, property rights will emerge. This paper shows that property rights exist in some animal systems with respect to specific pieces of property and for reasons similar to those postulated by Demsetz. Two cases are considered: wolves, where the property right is in land; and chimpanzees, where the property right exists for meat. The external costs or benefits that produce the property rights are examined and comparisons are drawn with situations in which no externalities exist and no property rights emerge.     

The structure of rights in the context of private property

Some rights to resources adhere to individuals on the basis of ascribed characteristics—these are rights of person. These rights are not subject to voluntary alienation. And there are rights that adhere to specific characteristics of resources and are subject to alienation. These are rights in property. However, there has been a systematic tendency to promote property rights at the expense of the rights of person and, in so doing, confound the analysis of the commons, of common property, and of private property. Given a delineation of fundamental concepts, this paper examines critically the foundational works of Demsetz and Coase and shows that their theoretical arguments depend on an implicit denial of all rights of person. It is shown, however, that rights of person are not properly analyzable by the standards that apply to rights in property and that the optimal policy to pursue in contemporary society is to determine a desired configuration rights and responsibilities in combination with rights in property.     

臧村“关系地权”的实践逻辑——一个地权研究分析框架的构建

本文以周雪光的"关系产权"为学术起点,基于产权研究的社会视角提出了"关系地权"的分析性概念,明确了其原则、层次和类型,尝试构建一个地权研究的分析框架,用以观察和分析当下中国乡村的地权制度与乡村社会结构的新变化,并用臧村的几个典型农地纠纷案例予以经验支持。研究发现,在以臧村为代表的村落中,"关系地权"的强力原则在地权配置实践中占据强势地位。在市场化、城市化日渐深入乡村共同体的背景下,一个围绕农地牟取私利的"谋地型乡村精英"逐渐形成。作为新时期乡村社会结构的实体要素之一,该群体的行为对当代中国以"家庭承包责任制"为主体、以"均等原则"为特征的地权分配方式起着严重的扭曲和变形作用。     

ENCLOSURE

We model the development of property rights as an endogenous process, driven by capital accumulation. Property rights internalize the portion of the return to capital that is otherwise treated as common property. This enclosure further encourages capital accumulation and sustains economic growth. We view effective property rights as multilateral agreements among agents that can only be implemented and sustained when agents are sufficiently patient. Patience is determined by the marginal product of capital; the marginal product of capital shrinks, and consequently patience increases, as capital grows. Hence, property rights can be established only when an economy is rich enough. ( JEL P14, O11, C73)     

Should ownership last forever?

This paper investigates the utility of all intellectual property rights being time limited with no limits required for real assets and corporate shares. Ownership rights evolved from hereditary rulers seeking to maintain political power and wealth in perpetuity. This objective is no longer relevant with rulers elected for a fixed time. Neither are perpetual rights consistent with economic justice, efficiency and sustainability. A review of modern techniques of investment analysis reveals that unlimited life property rights are not required and that they can result in investors obtaining benefits in excess of the incentive required to bring forth their investment. Tax incentives provide a voluntary way to introduce time limited property rights to improve equity and efficiency by transferring the ownership of realty or firms to their operational/strategic stakeholders. In this way the wealth of nations could be both democratized and localized to build a more sustainable and just society.     

THE EXTENDED COASE THEOREM AND LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM: THE NONEQUIVALENCE OF LIABILITY RULES AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Many authors have held that in a world with reasonable positive transactions costs, the assignment of liability for pollution damages affects profits, thus long run equilibrium. Therefore, the Coase Theorem fails for such cases. Others have defended the Theorem in such situations .
This paper shows that the disagreement has its roots in a confusion of liability rules and property rights. A simple general equilibrium model is used to show that the Theorem is correct for property rights assignments, but not for liability rules. Liability rules are shown to be, in effect, incomplete property rights, which leads to inefficiency .     

Private Property Wrongs: Uncovering the Contradictory Articulations of an Hegemonic Ideology*

One of the most effective sources of legitimation for privileged access to the environment and its natural resources comes in the form of hegemonic ideologies, such as private property rights. The concentratiosn of ownership and control over land and natural resources is rarely contested, because to question the rights of an industrial actor's property rights would be to question the ideological premise that private property ownership promotes societal well-being and progress. The staying power of this and other hegemonic ideologies, however, derives from the ability to keep certain internal contradictions associated with those ideologies concealed. Using recent conceptual work on ideology, this article focuses on recent events in forest politics in northern California, to illustrate the means by which environmental catastrophe has served as a source of vulnerability to the present hegemony of the ideology of private property rights. As with other instances of environmental justice mobilization, this case illustrates how the ability to elucidate contradictions in hegemonic ideologies may provide a more potent avenue for social transformation than attempts to introduce alternative ideologies.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND THE EFFICIENCY OF INSTITUTIONS

This paper explores the efect on economic efficiency of the distribution of wealth and systems for enforcing property rights. We construct a two-person, two-period economy in which each person can consume, plant, transfer or steal corn. We find circumstances in which redistribution of wealth is Pareto optimal and in which increasing sanctions against theft to their maximum level is not. These results suggest that it is not only important to consider distribution in the design of property institutions, but also that redistribution itself may serve to increase the efficiency of systems of property rights.     

Institutions and the adoption of rights: political and property rights in Colombia

Citizenship rights are the result of specific political bargains between different collective actors and state authorities (Tilly Theory and Society 26(34):599–602, 1997). The political bargains for rights are encoded in institutions, and these institutions develop independently from each other and take organizational characteristics that make certain rights easier to adopt than others. I argue that these institutions vary along two dimensions that affect the extent to which states can adopt rights successfully: one dimension is distributional and the second is the depth or extension of the rules that frame a given right. This article focuses on the institutional differences between property rights, especially land property, and political rights, and on the consequences of those differences on their adoption. I then illustrate my argument with examples from Colombia since 1980.