Efficiency or Competition? A Structural Econometric Analysis of Canada's AWS Auction and the Set‐Aside Provision

In 2008, Industry Canada auctioned 105 MHz of spectrum to a group of bidders that included incumbents and potential new entrants into the Canadian mobile phone market, raising $4.25 billion. In an effort to promote new entry, 40 MHz of spectrum was set‐aside for new entrants. In order to estimate the implicit cost of the set‐aside provision, we estimate the parameters of the bidders' profit function via a maximum match estimator based on the notion of pairwise stability in matches. We find that all telecommunications firms valued both geographic complementarities across auction licenses as well as absolute spectrum. Under a reasonable alternative scenario, our results indicate that the set‐aside led to a total profit loss of approximately 10%.     

制造商售后服务质量决策对灰色市场的影响研究

考虑一个分散式供应链下零售商窜货的灰色市场结构，其中制造商直接将产品销往高端市场，但通过中间零售商销往低端市场，两个市场相对独立。零售商未经制造商授权私自将产品窜货到高端市场而形成灰色市场。为了抑制灰色市场，制造商额外在低端市场提供增值售后服务。本文将建立两种模型：基本模型和服务决策模型，通过两种模型的对比分析，研究制造商售后服务质量决策对灰色市场规模和企业收益的影响。研究发现：对于制造商而言，售后服务质量决策是一种有效的灰色市场管理手段，不仅可以抑制灰色市场规模，同时还可以增加制造商的收益；对于零售商而言，售后服务质量决策有可能降低零售商的收益，也有可能增加零售商的收益，取决于消费者对高端产品和低端产品支付意愿的差异程度。     

Constrained Efficiency in the Neoclassical Growth Model With Uninsurable Idiosyncratic Shocks

We investigate the welfare properties of the one‐sector neoclassical growth model with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. We focus on the notion of constrained efficiency used in the general equilibrium literature. Our characterization of constrained efficiency uses the first‐order condition of a constrained planner's problem. This condition highlights the margins of relevance for whether capital is too high or too low: the factor composition of income of the (consumption‐)poor. Using three calibrations commonly considered in the literature, we illustrate that there can be either over‐ or underaccumulation of capital in steady state and that the constrained optimum may or may not be consistent with a nondegenerate long‐run distribution of wealth. For the calibration that roughly matches the income and wealth distribution, the constrained inefficiency of the market outcome is rather striking: it has much too low a steady‐state capital stock.     

Alternative Logics Coexistence: the Supplementary Health Field in Brazil

The paper examined the conditions that allow alternative logics a long standing coexistence, when no one logic predominates in the supplementary health field in Brazil. It contributes to the literature bringing the analysis of the coexistence over several decades of the following competitive logics - professional, public, market, regulatory, and social protection logic, in an institutional order level, while medical groups, insurance companies, and cooperatives established alternative health provision logics in the market level. The state’s incapacity or unwillingness to alienate the private sector is the main reason for the emergence of the various market medical providers with their distinct forms of service delivery.     

Avoiding skill shortages in the new technologies

In many countries skill shortages are acting as a constraint on the development of the new technologies, such as information technology (IT), microelectronics and biotechnology. As the lead times to develop skilled people can be 5–10 years, the planning of future education and training provision to meet these needs can be extremely difficult. Drawing on current research in the U.K., this paper identifies the types of key skills needed to develop the new technologies and shows the critical role of higher education in providing the basic supply of skilled manpower. The extent of current shortages is considered as well as the likely direction of future demand. The past linkages between higher education and labour market demand are explored and directions for future policy to alleviate likely future shortages are suggested. The paper concludes that future supply and demand trends need to be monitored and better understood, and employment, education and training policies adjusted accordingly if skill shortages are not to be a recurring problem.     

Financial Intermediaries and Markets

A complex financial system comprises both financial markets and financial intermediaries. We distinguish financial intermediaries according to whether they issue complete contingent contracts or incomplete contracts. Intermediaries such as banks that issue incomplete contracts, e.g., demand deposits, are subject to runs, but this does not imply a market failure. A sophisticated financial system—a system with complete markets for aggregate risk and limited market participation—is incentive‐efficient, if the intermediaries issue complete contingent contracts, or else constrained‐efficient, if they issue incomplete contracts. We argue that there may be a role for regulating liquidity provision in an economy in which markets for aggregate risks are incomplete.     

INFLATION STABILIZATION AND WELFARE: THE CASE OF A DISTORTED STEADY STATE

This paper considers the appropriate stabilization objectives for monetary policy in a micro‐founded model with staggered price‐setting. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2002) have shown that under certain conditions, a local approximation to the expected utility of the representative household in a model of this kind is related inversely to the expected discounted value of a conventional quadratic loss function, in which each period's loss is a weighted average of squared deviations of inflation and an output gap measure from their optimal values (zero). However, those derivations rely on an assumption of the existence of an output or employment subsidy that offsets the distortion due to the market power of monopolistically competitive price‐setters, so that the steady state under a zero‐inflation policy involves an efficient level of output. Here we show how to dispense with this unappealing assumption, so that a valid linear‐quadratic approximation to the optimal policy problem is possible even when the steady state is distorted to an arbitrary extent (allowing for tax distortions as well as market power), and when, as a consequence, it is necessary to take account of the effects of stabilization policy on the average level of output. We again obtain a welfare‐theoretic loss function that involves both inflation and an appropriately defined output gap, though the degree of distortion of the steady state affects both the weights on the two stabilization objectives and the definition of the welfare‐relevant output gap. In the light of these results, we reconsider the conditions under which complete price stability is optimal, and find that they are more restrictive in the case of a distorted steady state. We also consider the conditions under which pure randomization of monetary policy can be welfare‐improving, and find that this is possible in the case of a sufficiently distorted steady state, though the parameter values required are probably not empirically realistic. (JEL: D61, E52, E61)     

A Measure of Throughput Orientation: Scale Development and Nomological Validation

Throughput orientation, although a well‐established concept in operations management and well recognized by practitioners, has received limited empirical attention potentially due to lack of a psychometrically validated scale. Based on the tenets of throughput orientation—mindset, methodology, and measurement—we propose and develop a psychometrically validated 26‐item scale of throughput orientation (TO). To lower the possibility of nonfalsifiability between TO and performance, we draw on an unexplored context—bank branches in India—where we expect this relationship to be weaker. Furthermore, as throughput in operations is mainly dependent on market demand, market orientation (MO) is proposed as a nomological moderator strengthening the TO‐performance relationship. Using a sample of 173 branch managers of a major private bank in India, we validate the throughput orientation scale, and find that MO strengthens the relationship between TO and performance.     

Customers’ Capital Market Information Quality and Suppliers’ Performance

We empirically examine the association between downstream firms’, i.e., customers’ capital market information quality, and the operating performance of upstream firms, i.e., suppliers. Customers’ capital market information quality is measured by the customers’ provision of earnings forecasts, the customers’ reported earnings quality, and the customers’ coverage by financial analysts and credit rating agencies. We hypothesize and find a positive association between customers’ capital market information quality and suppliers’ operating performance measured by the DuPont profitability ratios. The association is stronger for suppliers with higher sales volatility, no order backlogs, customers who are less dependent on their input, and shorter business relation with customers. Collectively, the results suggest that the quality of information provided by the customers to the capital market has a spillover effect in the input market, i.e., helps the suppliers improve their performance.     

Pediatric vaccine procurement policy: The monopsonist's problem

Vaccination against infectious disease is an extremely important public health endeavor. Yet, in the past 40 years, the manufacture of pediatric vaccines has become less profitable due to rising costs and limited demand, inducing many pharmaceutical companies to leave the market. To ensure the safe, secure, and reliable provision of vaccines, the economic interests of the vaccine industry must be considered by public health policy makers. The monopsonistic market power of the federal government uniquely positions it to significantly influence the pediatric vaccine market by negotiating contractual agreements that increase the vaccine manufacturers’ financial incentives to remain in the market. The Monopsonist Vaccine Formulary Pricing and Purchasing Problem (MVF3P) is introduced, which seeks pediatric vaccine prices and purchase quantities that ensure a birth cohort is fully immunized according to the recommended childhood immunization schedule at an overall minimum system cost while also ensuring that vaccine manufacturers each attain a reservation profit level. The practical value of MVF3P is demonstrated by analyzing and assessing pricing and purchasing policies that the Centers for Disease Control could adopt in attempting to actively manage the long-term provision of pediatric vaccines.     

The Implications of Utilizing Market Information and Adopting Agricultural Advice for Farmers in Developing Economies

To alleviate poverty in developing countries, governments and non‐governmental organizations disseminate two types of information: (i) agricultural advice to enable farmers to improve their operations (cost reduction, quality improvement, and process yield increase); and (ii) market information about future price/demand to enable farmers to make better production planning decisions. This information is usually disseminated free of charge. While farmers can use the market information to improve their production plans without incurring any (significant) cost, adopting agricultural advice to improve operations requires upfront investment, for example, equipment, fertilizers, pesticides, and higher quality seeds. In this study, we examine whether farmers should use market information to improve their production plans (or adopt agricultural advice to improve their operations) when they engage in Cournot competition under both uncertain market demand and uncertain process yield. Our analysis indicates that both farmers will use the market information to improve their profits in equilibrium. Hence, relative to the base case in which market information is not available, the provision of market information can improve the farmers' total welfare (i.e., total profit for both farmers). Moreover, when the underlying process yield is highly uncertain or when the products are highly heterogeneous, the provision of market information is welfare‐maximizing in the sense that the maximum total welfare of farmers is attained when both farmers utilize market information in equilibrium. Furthermore, in equilibrium, whether a farmer adopts the agricultural advice depends on the size of the requisite upfront investment. More importantly, we show that agricultural advice is not always welfare improving unless the upfront investment is sufficiently low. This result implies that to improve farmers' welfare, governments should consider offering farmer subsidies.     

The Role of Discount Vouchers in Market with Customer Valuation Uncertainty

Online discount voucher market In the discount voucher market, customers usually face two types of valuation uncertainty, namely, preference uncertainty and consumption state uncertainty. Preference uncertainty is related to the customer's lack of relevant experience with the merchant, whereas consumption state uncertainty is related to the advance selling nature of the discount voucher mechanism. By taking a comprehensive perspective (i.e., considering revenue management and promotion effect at the same time), we find (i) no show of voucher buyers may not be a good thing for the merchant, especially for those large or start‐up ones; (ii) offering refund may always hurt the merchant's profit and the PayPal model may not be optimal in terms of maximizing social welfare; and (iii) market segmentation is not necessary for the profitability of promotion.     

Inequality in Incomes and Access to Education: A Cross‐country Analysis (1960–95)

Abstract. In the current debate on the relationship between inequality in income distribution and growth, one of the possible links works through access to education. Starting from an optimal demand for education where, among other things, the years of education depend on family income, we derive two testable predictions in the analysis of aggregate data on school enrolments: a negative (linear) dependence of enrolment rates on the Gini concentration index on income distribution; and a positive dependence on public resources invested in education and/or on skill premium in the labour market. These predictions are tested on a (unbalanced) panel of 108 countries for the period 1960–95. The main finding of this analysis is that, once we control for the degree of development with the (log of) per capita output, financial constraints seem mainly relevant in limiting the access to secondary education. However, when considering gender differences, there is evidence that female participation in education is more conditioned by family wealth, in some cases starting from primary education. Finally, there is weak evidence that public resources spent on education raise the enrolment rates.     

When to Offer Lower Quality or Remanufactured Versions of a Product

We investigate the profitability of adding a lower quality or remanufactured product to the product portfolio of a monopoly firm, both in single‐period and steady‐state settings. Consumer behavior is characterized by a deterministic utility function for the original product and a nonlinear relative utility function for the lower quality product. We find a threshold for the cost of the low‐quality product below which it is optimal to add it to the firm's portfolio, and show that while a cost advantage is necessary to make the lower quality offering profitable under linear or convex relative utility functions, market segmentation alone can justify the addition of the lower quality product under concave relative utility functions. In particular, we characterize (i) the new product cost under which it is optimal to offer a lower quality version of the product even if it is as costly to produce as the original product; and (ii) the weighted average of new and remanufactured product costs in the steady state under which it becomes cost effective to offer new products under the remanufactured label. Finally, we also identify the maximum possible profits from customer segmentation and the form of the relative utility function that achieves them. We discuss the implications for the common marketing practices of branding and generics.     

The Market Provision of Management Services, Information Asymmetries and Service Quality—Some Market Solutions: an Empirical Example

This article examines the problems of information asymmetry associated with the market provision of managerial services. Such problems are heightened by those characteristics which differentiate services from goods. Two unique, and central, characteristics of services, are intangibility and perishability. These create special problems for the market provision of services. In particular they make for difficulties in assessing quality; whereas the producer may know product quality, the buyer often does not. The asymmetry between sellers and buyers is of two types: Adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection occurs when the buyer cannot observe the relevant characteristics of the seller or the conditions under which they work. The problem of moral hazard is the buyer's inability to observe the action taken by the sellers. If these difficulties are not overcome, the market could collapse as companies withdraw and internalize service provision. However, each market has a number of in-built mechanisms which remedy the harmful effects associated with information-related problems. The institutional arrangements which predominate in particular markets are dependent upon the trust-producing mechanisms within those markets. Consequently, market responses to information asymmetries are far from uniform. The argument is illustrated using the example of the executive recruitment industry. In this respect the paper is a highly focused study of those mechanisms which overcome information asymmetries in one service market.     

Testing Systems of Identical Components

We consider the problem of testing sequentially the components of a multi-component reliability system in order to figure out the state of the system via costly tests. In particular, systems with identical components are considered. The notion of lexicographically large binary decision trees is introduced and a heuristic algorithm based on that notion is proposed. The performance of the heuristic algorithm is demonstrated by computational results, for various classes of functions. In particular, in all 200 random cases where the underlying function is a threshold function, the proposed heuristic produces optimal solutions.     

Fixed fee licensing for cost-reducing technologies: Should innovators reveal their private information?

In the process of licensing their technology to downstream firms, innovators often get some information on the firms’ cost reductions. Revealing this information to the market influences the market game, and thereby the licensees’ willingness to pay. We analyze the innovator’s optimal information provision with fixed fee licensing. Our main result is that the innovator should reveal the number of licenses, but should keep silent on the cost reductions of licensees. The intuition is that the innovator’s profit depends only on the willingness to pay of the critical firm which only just buys a license, and this firm benefits if the number of firms is revealed, but nothing is learned on the actual cost distribution.     

Sollten den Betreuern wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses Anreize gesetzt werden?

In many European countries efforts are undertaken to improve doctoral education. With the organization of PhD programs at US research universities very often serving as the model, the new public governance of higher education has strong ideas concerning the most promising paths to improvement: less state, less academic self-governance, greater reliance on quasi-markets, a stronger internal hierarchy, and more influence by external stakeholders. Based on an explorative analysis of qualitative and quantitative data of 26 continental European, English and US economics departments, we investigate the steering impact of these five governance dimensions for the years 2001–2002 on subsequent academic placement success of PhD graduates. To control for the importance of resource levels, we take into account: financial resources, the publication record of faculty members, the total number of professors, and the annual average number of PhD graduates in a department. Based on a fuzzy-set QCA of our data, our results deliver strong support for a variety of locally best governance configurations with no evidence for a single optimal system. Introducing market elements appears to be necessary for success with any governance system. The level of financial resources is the only one of our control conditions that contributes to our understanding of the placement success of PhD programs and the steering of PhD education.     

Interactive profit-planning systems and market turbulence: A dynamic capabilities perspective

This article describes, theorizes and empirically investigates the concept of interactive profit-planning systems (PPS) through the lens of the dynamic capabilities logic. With this conceptualization: interactive PPS capabilities comprise budgeting, forecasting and results-reporting routines, in which top and middle managers interact to create knowledge for sensing, seizing, and business model reconfiguring (to manage strategic business change). Survey data from 331 Australian firms is analyzed employing partial least squares structural equation modeling. The data provides support for two hypotheses: (1) greater market turbulence strengthens the positive effect of interactive PPS capabilities on business unit performance; and (2) greater market turbulence strengthens the positive effect of flexibility values (of organizational culture) on interactive PPS capabilities. Our findings show that interactive PPS capabilities function according to the salient tenets of the dynamic capabilities logic, and clarify the beneficial roles of formal cybernetic control systems and the intertwined involvement of top and middle managers in using dynamic capabilities.     

Pricing,Allocation, and Overbooking in Dynamic Service Network Competition When Demand Is Uncertain

We study the problem of combined pricing, resource allocation, and overbooking by service providers involved in dynamic noncooperative oligopolistic competition on a network that represents the relationships of the providers to one another and to their customers when service demand is uncertain. We propose, analyze, and compute solutions for a model that is more general than other models reported in the revenue management literature to date. In particular, previous models typically consider only three or four of five key revenue management features that we have purposely built into our model: (1) pricing, (2) resource allocation, (3) dynamic competition, (4) an explicit network, and (5) uncertain demand. Illustrative realizations of the abstract problem we study are those of airline revenue management and service provision by companies facing resource constraints. Under fairly general regularity conditions, we prove existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for dynamic oligopolistic service network competition described by our model. We also show, for an appropriate notion of regularity, that competition leads to the underpricing of network services, a finding numerically illustrated by an example of intermediate size. Our proposed algorithm can be implemented using well‐known off‐the‐shelf commercial software.