Changes in the Quantum of Russian Fertility During the 1980s and Early 1990s

To investigate whether Russia's dramatic fertility changes pre‐ and post‐Soviet times were due primarily to tempo effects, as has been argued recently, or to quantum effects, this study standardizes for factors that distort conventional fertility indexes. A time series spanning 1978–93 of period parity‐progression ratios for the Russian Federation is constructed applying the PADTFR technique, which takes into account age, parity, and time elapsed since the birth of the previous child, to data from the Russian micro census of February 1994 (2.8 million maternity histories). Both the fertility rise of the 1980s and the fertility fall of the early 1990s are found to be primarily due to changes in the probability of a second birth. The impact of tempo on the conventional TFR is significant, but of relatively minor magnitude in comparison to changes in the quantum of fertility. The social and economic context in which the fertility change took place is described.     

Japan's fertility: effects of contraception and induced abortion after World War II

This report studies the effects of contraception and abortion on crude birth rate (CBR) and total fertility rate (TFR) in Japan from 1947-1980. The CBR declined from 34.3 in 1947 to 17.3 in 1957, and the TFR from 4.5 to 2.0 in the same period. Both stabilized (CBR in the range of 17.0 to 19.0 and TFR at 2.0 to 2.1) between 1957 and 1973. This dramatic decline in fertility was initiated under the serious socioeconomic difficulties of post-World War II Japan. At the onset of the postwar fertility decline, fertility within marriage was controlled most strongly by induced abortion, and to a lesser extent, lactation and contraception. During the period of stable low fertility (1960-1980) the effect of abortion decreased and the effect of contraception increased. KAP surveys show that in the late 1970's more than 75% of contraceptive users in Japan employed the condom, while condom use in other Asian countries is generally very low. A shift from traditional to modern methods of contraception is unlikely to alter the already low level of fertility in Japan but would have considerable social, medical, and economic impact.     

The changing relationship between unemployment and total fertility

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether there has been a fundamental change in the relationship between economic conditions and fertility. We use panel data methods to study the short-term changes in total fertility and the unemployment rate in a range of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 1957 to 2014. We find that although fertility was counter-cyclical before 1970, with good economic times being associated with lower fertility, since then it has become pro-cyclical, with good economic times being associated with higher fertility.     

Determined to stop? Longitudinal analysis of the desire to have no more children in rural Mozambique

Classic demographic theories conceptualize desired family size as a fixed goal that guides fertility intentions over the childbearing years. However, a growing body of research shows that fertility plans, even nominally long-term plans for completed childbearing, change in response to short-term conditions. Because of data limitations, much of this research has focused on low-fertility contexts, but short-term conditions are likely to be even more important in high-fertility contexts. This paper uses three waves of survey data collected in rural Mozambique to study predictors of the desire to stop childbearing in a context of relatively high fertility and high individual and social instability. We use fixed effects models to assess how women’s desires to stop childbearing are shaped by demographic factors, household economic conditions, and health status, controlling for constant individual characteristics. Results provide evidence that fertility desires both reflect stable underlying goals and evolve in response to individual and social circumstances.     

East Asian childbearing patterns and policy developments

Childbearing behavior in East Asian countries has changed rapidly during the past half century from an average of five to seven children per family, to replacement-level fertility, and subsequently to unprecedentedly low levels, the lowest in the world. This article analyzes fertility trends in Hong Kong, Japan, singapore, south Korea, and Taiwan using cohort fertility data and methods, then examines social and economic causes of the childbearing trends, and surveys policies pursued to reverse the fertility trends. Postponement of childbearing started in the 1970s with continuously fewer delayed births being "recuperated," which resulted in ultra-low fertility. A rapid expansion of education and employment among women in a patriarchal environment has generated a stark dilemma for women who would like to combine childbearing with a career. Policy responses have been slow, with a more serious attempt to address issues in recent years. Thus far public and private institutions are not devoting sufficient attention to generating broad social change supportive of parenting.     

生育理性和生育决策与我国低生育水平稳定机制的转变

自改革开放以来 ,我国人口生育率水平出现了迅速的转变 ,特别是 1 992年我国确立了市场经济为目标的经济改革以来 ,生育率水平更是进一步降低到更替水平以下。如果说 ,生育率的迅速转变是在国家计划生育政策干预下启动的 ,那么 ,在 1 990年代生育率的下降应该主要是社会和经济发展的结果。以市场经济为导向的经济改革和经济的迅速发展 ,已经为稳定我国城市地区人口低生育率水平提供了必要的经济条件 ,同时 ,制度、技术和文化等因素的变革已经为我国个人生育决策理性化创造了条件 ,低生育水平的稳定机制已经开始从政策控制为主转向群众自我控制为主的转变     

Characteristics of age composition of China's population]

The age composition of Chinese population is analyzed via data collected in the 1982 census, which has been the basis for planning the social and economic life of 1 billion people. The census reflected complete population age composition, by birth, mortality and growth rates, from the time of the Liberation in 1949. The 10% sample, based on the national age composition, did not include the 4,240,000 people in military service which, as .42% of the total population, did not constitute a large differential. The population has grown rapidly since 1949. A few years before and after 1960, growth was reduced due to economic conditions, but the overall growth trend remained unchanged. The census showed that since 1970, growth has experienced a downturn, but the decrease was not related to the sudden drop before and after 1960. The census also showed China's population had changed from 1964's primarily young population to an adult population, but the process of population aging is only beginning, with a still relatively young population. China's population is not a stable one. This increase and decrease were greatly influenced by the changes in social and economic conditions. The disparity in age composition caused by these changes has created problems in social life, education, employment, marriage, housing, health, transportation, and cultural facilities. There are large differences in age composition between regions and ethnic groups. The decreases in birth and growth rate of the eastern coastal provinces were more rapid than those of the southwest and northwest regions. The age composition of minority nationalities is considerably younger than the Han people. Factors that influenced age composition characteristics included reduction of the neonatal mortality rate, the rises and falls of economic development, and the work in planned fertility.     

Age at marriage is rising for Asian women and men,according to new data

The social transformations in Asia are described: delayed age at marriage and the proportions marrying. Policy implications are ascertained. The norm for female age at marriage has risen from 15 years to 17-18 years in south Asia, and from 18 years to 24 years and older in east Asia. Men's marriage age has also risen but not as much. Concurrent changes have occurred with fertility declines and small family sizes and lower population growth, with changing roles for women, and with emergent youth subcultures and increased prevalence of premarital sexual behavior. The number of singles is rising and expected to continue to rise. Examples are given of marriage age changes for Nepal and Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, South Korea, and regional totals. Southeast Asian countries experienced less dramatic changes, and changes primarily in the 20-24 year old group (from 30% to 74% of single women). Change for men has been less regular and with less magnitude. In Southeast Asia, the rise in marriage age for men has risen only 1-2 years compared with women. East Asia patterns vary by country, i.e., South Korean increases of 6 years, Taiwanese increases of 4 years, and 2 years in Japan. Single males have been common in South and Southeast Asia, while in East Asia married male teens 25 years are rare. Marriage timing for men is not as closely associated as for women with social and cultural change. Downturns for men follow momentous, temporary disruptions such as happen during wars and periods of migration, while women's patterns are more reflective of structural change. The trend for never marrying is on the increase, particularly for men in Japan (1.1% in the 1920s to 18% in the early 1980s for men 50 years). Women not ever marrying are increasing in Thailand, Bangladesh, and Hong Kong. Never marrying is common in urban or educated populations, i.e., Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines. The implications are a longer gap between successive generations and a shorter period of exposure to risk of conception. Research findings have shown that a 1 year delay in age at 1st marriage reduces fertility by 20% of a child. Schooling delays marriage age as well as marriage laws, but structural and economic changes may be more important than policy changes. Policies affect the status of women and opportunities.     

Japan’s changing fertility mechanisms and its policy responses

This paper discusses Japan’s decline in fertility over the past 50 years. The change in Japan’s postwar fertility is analysed using formal demographic tools such as parity progression ratios and decomposition methods. The analytical results show that before the oil crisis of 1973, the reduction in marital fertility played a dominant role, while the delayed timing of marriage has been a principal factor since the mid-1970s. The delayed timing of first and second births has also played a relatively important role in determining actual fertility levels in the 1990s. The paper examines various socio-economic factors contributing to these demographic shifts over time in postwar Japan. A number of policies and programs implemented over the past decade by the Japanese government to boost fertility are briefly described, together with their limitations.     

Effects of population policy and economic reform on the trend in fertility in Guangdong province,China, 1975–2005

An analysis of data mainly from China's 1990 and 2000 censuses and 2005 mini-census shows how fertility decline between 1975 and 2005 in the province of Guangdong has been influenced by both fertility policy and economic and social development. Guangdong's development since 1975 has been very rapid and has attracted huge numbers of migrants from other provinces. The analysis of the province's fertility trend from 1975 shows clearly the influence of fertility policy on the trend. The analysis also shows that economic development has brought about large changes in population composition by urban/rural residence, education, occupation, and migration status, which, together with large fertility differentials by these characteristics, have contributed substantially to Guangdong's fertility decline, in large part through changes in proportions currently married.     

Sixty years of change in Tibetan fertility: An assessment

Existing knowledge of Tibetan historical population development is mostly based on ‘best-guess’ estimates and is heavily politicized. Using census data, I reconstruct the development of Tibetan fertility in China since the 1940s, with the objective of providing an independent assessment that can be used as benchmark for future studies and debates on Tibetan demography. Following major social and economic transformations starting in the 1950s, Tibetan fertility unexpectedly increased from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. As noted in several existing studies, Tibetan fertility in China then declined swiftly from the early 1980s onwards and has now reached values close to replacement level. Focusing on the 1950–70 period, I examine factors that contributed to shaping the Tibetan fertility increase in more detail. This confirms that changes in nuptiality and disease-related infertility both played a role in pushing up fertility rates among Tibetan women in China.     

The economic rationality of high fertility: An investigation illustrated with Nigerian survey data

Summary In much of the developing world, especially among rural populations who usually are the majority, field researchers find that fertility is high and fairly stable and that there is little evidence either that high-fertility parents are relatively economically disadvantaged or that they believe themselves to be so. On the other hand most of modern economic-demographic theory suggests that the members of large families should be worse off than the members of small families. It is argued that the 'hardest' data are those of high fertility and the relative well being of large families and that the proper social scientific approach should have been to base further investigation upon such findings. It is suggested that much of the economic theorizing has erred because of bad survey data and ethnocentric bias in the research. Data are analysed from research programmes in Ghana and Nigeria to show that high fertility is not as disadvantageous as is often suggested. The main source of evidence is Project 2 of the Nigerian segment of the Changing African Family Project, a 1973 sample survey of 1,499 females and 1,497 males, Yoruba and over 17 years of age, in the Western and Lagos States of Nigeria. It is concluded that the economic ends of a society are largely determined by its social ends and that the economic rationality of high fertility can be determined only within the context of a society's structure and ends. There can be no such thing as a purely economic theory of fertility. It is also concluded that the society studied is moving towards a condition where high fertility will be increasingly disadvantageous and that this is being brought about more by Westernization than modernization.     

Marital Fertility Decline in the Netherlands: Child Mortality, Real Wages, and Unemployment, 1860–1939

Previous studies of the fertility decline in Europe are often limited to an earlier stage of the marital fertility decline, when the decline tended to be slower and before the large increase in earnings in the 1920s. Starting in 1860 (before the onset of the decline), this study follows marital fertility trends until 1939, when fertility reached lower levels than ever before. Using data from the Historical Sample of the Netherlands (HSN), this study shows that mortality decline, a rise in real income, and unemployment account for the decline in the Netherlands. This finding suggests that marital fertility decline was an adjustment to social and economic change, leaving little room for attitudinal change that is independent of social and economic change.     

Modelling Households: A Synthesis

The 1973 U.S. National Survey of Family Growth is used to examine the effects of removing number and timing failures from the reproductive histories of various cohorts of white and black married women. Blacks are more fertile than whites primarily because of their greater unwanted fertility. Removing number and timing failures from the past reproductive histories of American women would have reduced their fertility considerably. These reductions would have been greater for blacks than for whites and would be greater if some wanted pregnancies had continued to terminate in foetal loss.     

The differential attainment of family size goals by Race

Summary The 1973 U.S. National Survey of Family Growth is used to examine the effects of removing number and timing failures from the reproductive histories of various cohorts of white and black married women. Blacks are more fertile than whites primarily because of their greater unwanted fertility. Removing number and timing failures from the past reproductive histories of American women would have reduced their fertility considerably. These reductions would have been greater for blacks than for whites and would be greater if some wanted pregnancies had continued to terminate in foetal loss.     

Modernization and Tradition in the Recent History of Italian Fertility

The secular decline of Italian fertility, started in the last decade of the nineteenth century, came to an end in the early 1950'sand has recovered slightly in the last fifteen years. Italian experience seems to follow, with a twenty-year lag, the experience of the more advanced western European populations. At present, with an average of 2.5 children per marriage, Italian fertility is very close to the French and to the average European level.At the regional level, two contrasting patterns can be detected. On one side stands the very low fertility of the North and of the Center, mostly below replacement in the last thirty years;on the other, the still high fertility of the South.In the North and in the Center, where the decline started earlier, fertility has fallen well below replacement level in the last thirty years. In the South, where the decline started in the late 1920's and early 1930's, a large family system still prevails, and the spreading of voluntary control faces barriers setup by a long historyof cultural isolation,attachment to tradition and religion. In the last 15 years, however, the gap has narrowed slowly, more because of an upturn of fertility in the North and in the Center than because of the decline in the South.Another interesting feature of Italian fertility is low class differentials: the fertility of the most prolific segment (farmers, farm laborers) is only 20 percent higher than the fertility of the less prolific professional groups. Finally, Italian experience provides an interesting example of the changing relationship linking the economic level of the population and fertility changes; in 1931-51 a negative correlation linked the changes in fertility to the economic level of the region, while in 1951-61 and 1961-66 a very high and positive correlation can be observed.As for the future trends in fertility, two factors may have an important role. In the first place, on the one hand, the economic policy of the government, aiming at reducing the economic gap between the South and the rest of the country, may accelerate the leveling of regional fertility differentials. The same effect, on the other hand, may be reached by more liberal legislation, now under way, for birth control and family planning propaganda.     

Social and economic factors affecting China fertility transition]

China's fertility rate, affected by various economic, cultural and social factors, is in a state of flux. In analyzing the major factors affecting the change, and in determining a fixed ratio for the degree of effectiveness of each factor, it is possible to improve birth policy in terms of predicting trends in fertility changes. Based on data gathered in 1981, the following observations were made: 1) A look at gross output value for industry and agriculture by geography shows that the more economically developed an area is, the lower is the fertility rate, and that the less economically developed an area is, the higher is the fertility rate. For example, Yunnan, with an average gross output value per person of 406.5 yuan, has a total fertility rate of 3.814, whereas Shanghai's average gross output value per person is 5566.4 yuan, and its total fertility rate is 1.316. 2) Figures comparing educational levels with total fertility rates show that cities with a greater number of women with a middle school education tend to have a lower fertility rate than cities with fewer such women. For example, Beijing's 516,000 middle school educated women have a total fertility rate of 1.589, compared to Anhui's 186,000 middle school educated women who have a total fertility rate of 2.799. Also, among college educated women, the fertility rate is 41.5/1000, the 1 child rate is 88.6%, and the multiple child rate is 1.2%, whereas those women with a primary school education have a fertility rate of 86.4/1000, a 1 child rate of 44.3%, and a multiple child rate of 26.7%. 3) As towns become urbanized, the fertility rate of those towns tend to decline. For example, Sichuan, with an Urbanization Index of 14.3 has total fertility rate of 2.650; Tianjin's Urbanization Index is 68.7, and its total fertility rate is 1.645. 4) A comparison of women engaged in physical labor to those in non-physical jobs shows that the former tend to have a higher fertility rate: women working at physical labor have a fertility rate of 86.7/1000, compared to a fertility rate of 65/1000 for those in non-physical jobs. 5) China's family planning programs advocating late marriage, late births and 1 child per couple in itself does not influence fertility rates, but taken with economic factors, it will have far reaching consequences. For example, cities with high gross output value tend to have a higher rate of 1 child per couple. 6) As the average age at marriage for women rose from 18 years in 1949 to 23 years in 1981, the rate of women having multiple children has declined in all age groups since 1964.     

移民的文化适应：宁夏吊庄移民的生育观念调适

以扶贫与保护生态环境为重要出发点的宁夏吊庄移民规划,使居住在宁夏西海固地区的大量回族群众搬迁到了宁夏北部易于得到黄河灌溉的地区。伴随着这样的移民搬迁,回族群众的思想观念必然发生变迁。在移民的各种思想观念中,生育观念的转变体现得最为直接与明显。因此,移民群众在生育观念方面的调适就显得极为重要。移民迁出地的历史传统、文化习俗以及迁入地的社会观念、价值标准．都深刻地影响着移民的生育观念。在这些因素中,迁入地城市文化的影响则是一个极为重要的因素。     

Zum Mehrwert von Gesundheit im Postfordismus

Since the 1980s, health has turned out to be one of the highest individual values and an economic, social and political force. But what is the structural background of this development? Based on discourse analysis focusing the social and structural conditions of Post-Fordism, this article argues that the value of health is currently characterized as a double movement. On the one hand, an expansive dynamic of this value has developed since the 1970s that was provoked by a subjective and a symbolic surplus value of health. On the other hand, the appropriation of this surplus value of health in Post-Fordism is more and more restricted. Therefore, the article concludes, the culture of health tends to become a constitutive element in the reproduction and enforcement of social inequalities.     

Closing a Sociodemographic Chapter of Chinese History

At its recent Fifth Plenary Session held in Beijing, the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to abolish the one‐child policy and allow all couples to have two children, thus closing an important chapter of China's social and demographic history. Recent fertility trends make it clear why it is urgent to abandon this policy. Census and survey data show that China's TFR had already fallen below replacement in 1991. Since the mid‐1990s, TFRs in most years have been lower than 1.5 children per woman. Since 2010, even lower fertility rates have been recorded by the annual population change surveys. Since the mid‐1990s, fertility decline has been increasingly driven by generalized ideational changes resulting from the social, economic, and cultural transformation of recent decades. In recent years many couples who were entitled to have a second child have chosen not to do so. For this reason, the termination of the one‐child policy is unlikely to lead to a major upturn in fertility, but rather to the continuation of a low‐fertility regime with more diverse fertility patterns across different sub‐populations, a pattern that has been observed in many countries.