Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation

This paper discusses the Harsanyi power solution for cooperative games in which cooperation among players is based on an arbitrary collection of feasible coalitions. We define the Harsanyi power solution as a value which distributes the Harsanyi dividends such that the dividend shares of players in each feasible coalition are proportional to the corresponding players’ participation index, (i.e., a power measure for players in the cooperation restrictions). When all coalitions can be formed in a game, the Harsanyi power solution coincides with the Shapley value. We provide two axiomatic characterizations for the Harsanyi power solution: one uses component efficiency and participation fairness, and the other uses efficiency and participation balanced contributions. Meanwhile, we show that the axioms of each axiomatization are logically independent. The study also shows that the Harsanyi power solution satisfies several other properties such as additivity and inessential player out. In addition, the Harsanyi power solution is the unique value that admits the \(\lambda \)-potential.     

Distributed Decision‐Making in Supply Chains and Private E‐Marketplaces

This paper develops a distributed decision‐making framework for the players in a supply chain or a private e‐marketplace to collaboratively arrive at a global Pareto‐optimal solution. In this model, no player has complete knowledge about all the costs and constraints of the other players. The decision‐making framework employs an iterative procedure, based on the Integer L‐shaped method, in which a master problem is solved to propose global solutions, and each player uses his local problems to construct feasibility and optimality cuts on the master problem. The master problem is modeled as a mixed‐integer program, and the players' local problems are formulated as linear programs. Collaborative planning scenarios in private e‐marketplaces and in supply chains were formulated and solved for test data. The results show that this distributed model is able to achieve near‐optimal solutions considerably faster than the traditional centralized approach.     

员工甄别和筛选:基于动机公平偏好隐藏的激励契约研究

作为代理人的员工在纯粹自利偏好之外,往往还有追求动机公平的偏好,不过现实中员工的公平偏好往往是隐藏的,是其私人信息。作为委托人的企业如果要雇佣所有类型的员工,设计契约来甄别不同类型的员工是不可能的,这样员工往往可以获取信息租金。企业如果仅仅雇佣某一类型的员工,则可以通过参与约束条件实现对员工的甄别与筛选,从而完全抽取员工的信息租金,提高企业的期望利润。     

模糊合作对策的Shapley值

考虑合作对策中支付函数是模糊数的情形,利用模糊数学相关理论,对Shapley提出的三条公理进行拓广,并构造了模糊Shapley值.针对局中人在合作完成后需要对具体的联盟收益进行分配的情况,文中利用构造的模糊Shapley值隶属函数给出了确定的收益分配方案.最后将该方法应用到动态联盟伙伴企业收益分配的实例中.     

Social Learning in One‐Arm Bandit Problems

We study a two‐player one‐arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop experimenting is irreversible, and players observe each other's actions but not each other's payoffs. We prove that all equilibria are in cutoff strategies and provide several qualitative results on the sequence of cutoffs.     

情绪影响下群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型分析

考虑到情绪因素对参与者行为的影响,基于等级依赖期望效用理论框架构建了群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型,讨论了不同情绪状态下的博弈纳什均衡的存在性,分析了情绪因素对参与者选择混合策略的行为机理。研究发现:情绪因素对群体性冲突的博弈均衡有着显著的影响,当博弈参与者具有“悲观”情绪时,倾向于"对抗"性的行为,当参与者具有“乐观”情绪时,易于做出“让步”性的行为。在情绪的驱动下,参与者还会受到对方采取某个策略的判断的影响,如当弱势群体认为对手采取“压制”策略的概率低于某个分界点时,随着乐观情绪指数的增大,其选择“对抗”策略的概率将随之增大。最后,以房屋拆迁群体性冲突为例,数值分析了博弈模型的结论。     

DNMA: A double normalization-based multiple aggregation method for multi-expert multi-criteria decision making

This paper develops a comprehensive algorithm for multi-expert multi-criteria decision making problems considering quantitative and qualitative criteria in forms of benefit, cost or target types. We focus on using probabilistic linguistic term sets to express the qualitative evaluations due to their excellence in expressing complex individual and collective linguistic assessments. Firstly, we develop a target-based linear normalization technique and a target-based vector normalization technique. A weight adjustment method is proposed to achieve the tradeoff between criteria after normalization. Given that the two target-based normalization techniques have different advantages, we then propose a ranking method, which consists three subordinate models, based on these two target-based normalization approaches and three aggregation techniques. Reliable results of a multi-expert multi-criteria decision making problem are determined by integrating the subordinate utility values and the ranks of alternatives. The proposed method is implemented to solve the green enterprise ranking problems and the excavation scheme selection problem for shallow buried tunnels, respectively. The advantages of the proposed method are emphasized through comparative analyses with other ranking methods.     

考虑利他主义的古诺模型研究

针对完全利己和(或)完全利他可能不具有集体帕累托效率这些经济现象,利用文献[1]建立的GR博弈模型和GR均衡,建立了基于GR(黄金规则)的古诺模型,研究了GR均衡的集体帕累托效率性质与GR博弈中权重系统(描述厂商关心自己和他人的程度)之间的关系.结果表明,(1)对于N-厂商的情形,GR均衡集合与具有集体帕累托效率的策略组合构成的集合一致的充分必要条件是每个厂商都均等地关心自己和他人的利润;(2)对于两厂商的情形,GR均衡都具有集体帕累托效率的充分必要条件是,存在一个厂商均等地关心自己和他人的利润.这些结果一方面在古诺竞争的背景下加强了文献[1]的结果;另一方面表明.一个"平等地看待竞争对手利益"的古诺竞争将会获得集体有效率的竞争均衡.     

效率与公平视角下企业及政府的资源配置决策

考虑企业及政府资源配置中效率与公平目标的不同内涵,采用"客户嫉妒"和"个体变权"刻画不同主体的决策行为,分别引入公平参数建立多目标决策模型,并提出基于客户和决策者偏好的公平参数选择方法,实现效率与公平的权衡。将模型转化为变分不等式,设计修正投影算法求解。通过算例进一步分析了不同主体的决策行为差异、公平参数的选择及影响。研究表明：企业与政府的效率最优决策相近,但公平最优决策差异明显;客户公平偏好越高,企业资源配置的分化特征反而越显著;政府决策者公平偏好越高,所有个体间资源配置趋于均等。     

Population monotonicity in matching games

The matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population monotonic allocation scheme is a collection of rules defining how to share the profit among players in each coalition such that every player is better off when the coalition expands. In this paper, we study matching games and provide a necessary and sufficient characterization for the existence of population monotonic allocation schemes. Our characterization implies that whether a matching game admits population monotonic allocation schemes can be determined efficiently.

     

Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a game in strategic form. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash's two‐player variable‐threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies, the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable. (JEL: C70, C71, C78, D70)     

Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player

Finite population noncooperative games with linear‐quadratic utilities, where each player decides how much action she exerts, can be interpreted as a network game with local payoff complementarities, together with a globally uniform payoff substitutability component and an own‐concavity effect. For these games, the Nash equilibrium action of each player is proportional to her Bonacich centrality in the network of local complementarities, thus establishing a bridge with the sociology literature on social networks. This Bonacich–Nash linkage implies that aggregate equilibrium increases with network size and density. We then analyze a policy that consists of targeting the key player, that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate activity. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an intercentrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and her contribution to the centrality of the others.     

Security Investment in Contagious Networks

Security of the systems is normally interdependent in such a way that security risks of one part affect other parts and threats spread through the vulnerable links in the network. So, the risks of the systems can be mitigated through investments in the security of interconnecting links. This article takes an innovative look at the problem of security investment of nodes on their vulnerable links in a given contagious network as a game‐theoretic model that can be applied to a variety of applications including information systems. In the proposed game model, each node computes its corresponding risk based on the value of its assets, vulnerabilities, and threats to determine the optimum level of security investments on its external links respecting its limited budget. Furthermore, direct and indirect nonlinear influences of a node's security investment on the risks of other nodes are considered. The existence and uniqueness of the game's Nash equilibrium in the proposed game are also proved. Further analysis of the model in a practical case revealed that taking advantage of the investment effects of other players, perfectly rational players (i.e., those who use the utility function of the proposed game model) make more cost‐effective decisions than selfish nonrational or semirational players.     

Bargaining without a Common Prior—An Immediate Agreement Theorem

In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement. The main result states that, despite this, if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future, then in equilibrium they will agree immediately. This result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism.     

TRANSFER FEE REGULATIONS AND PLAYER DEVELOPMENT

This paper studies the role of transfer fees in professional sports, where players can commit to binding long‐term contracts. They cannot switch clubs before their contract expires unless the old club agrees to let them go; the transfer fee is the price of that agreement. Transfer fees have been defended as a necessary incentive for clubs to invest in training their young players. The apparent absence of significant training costs (compared to the level of transfer fees) has undermined this defense. We present a model without training where an industry of clubs with heterogeneous marginal revenue products for player ability and a population of players with various levels of talent and experience match. Transfer fees are needed to allocate scarce playing opportunities efficiently among players of different levels of known and potential ability. We show that total surplus is lower without transfer fees because playing time gets reallocated towards older players with less upside potential. The resulting increase in player salaries exceeds the transfer fee costs for each level of ability. (JEL: J31, J41, K12, L83)     

EXPLAINING GIFT‐EXCHANGE—THE LIMITS OF GOOD INTENTIONS

This paper explores the limitations of intention‐based social preferences as an explanation of gift‐exchange between a firm and a worker. In a framework with one self‐interested and one reciprocal player, gift‐giving never arises in equilibrium. Instead, any equilibrium in a large class of multistage games must involve mutually unkind behavior of both players. Besides gift‐exchange, this class of games also includes moral hazard models and the rotten kid framework. Even though equilibrium behavior may appear positively reciprocal in some of these games, the self‐interested player never benefits from reciprocity. We discuss the relation of these results to the theoretical and empirical literature on gift‐exchange in employment relations.     

基于顾客公平偏好的服务机制与定价研究

由于顾客异质性（单位时间等待成本不同），服务提供商通常对顾客采取分类服务策略，然而分类服务会引起服务系统中不同类型顾客之间等待时间和服务价值的差异性，从而给顾客带来心理上的不公平感，进而引起顾客在服务系统中的流动和转移，进一步影响企业收益和社会福利。本文针对非抢占M/M/1服务系统顾客分类情形为背景，由两种顾客之间期望等待时间的不同和公平偏好参数相结合构建普通顾客的公平心理效用模型，以垄断型服务系统为背景，分别从企业收益、社会福利与顾客效用三个视角进行分析。研究表明，服务提供商应对顾客采取可观测型的分类服务机制来获得最大收益；从社会福利视角，服务提供商应对顾客采取不可观测型的分类服务机制；从顾客效用视角，服务提供商应取消顾客分类服务，仅保留普通顾客。最后同现有结论进行比较分析，并进行拓展研究。本文研究对服务提供商采取合理的服务机制及相应的服务定价具有重要参考价值和指导意义。     

The importance of key celebrity characteristics for customer segmentation by age and gender: Does beauty matter in professional football?

This paper examines through the lens of sport whether male and female customers as well as differently aged customers focus on different celebrity characteristics and whether they are influenced by celebrities’ facial attractiveness. Drawing on psychological and sociological theories like attachment theory, social role theory of gender, or social norm theory as well as on the academic literature on celebrity endorsement in general, we develop several hypotheses regarding how a fan’s age and gender affect the importance of key characteristics of football stars—namely experience, personality, exemplary behavior, and skills. Using a proprietary dataset that combines archival data concerning professional football players and clubs with survey data of more than 2100 football fans, we find evidence that female fans attach more importance to a player’s personality and behavior while male fans seem to focus on experience and skills. We further find that when fans get older, the importance of a player’s behavior and experience increases. Moreover, our results show that the facial attractiveness of players clearly influences fan perceptions. Our results contribute to existing research on customer segmentation by providing a more differentiated picture of the effects of key celebrity characteristics on different customers.     

Designing an intervention strategy for public-interest goods: The California electric vehicle market case

We study the intervention problem for public-interest goods. Public-interest goods are known as goods with positive externalities, allowing the consumer as well as others who do not pay for them benefit from the consumption. Health related goods, such as vaccines, or products with less carbon emissions are well known examples. We consider a supply chain for such a product. Generally, wider adoption or usage of such goods is ensured by the intervention of a central authority in their supply chain. We explore the problem for a setting composed of a retailer and a central authority. The main goal of the central authority is to design and fund an intervention scheme so that decisions of the channel are in line with the good of society, specified as a social welfare function. We propose two intervention tools applied simultaneously: (1) investing in demand-increasing strategies, which affects the level of the stochastic demand in the market; and (2) rebates that affect revenue per unit received by the retailer. We introduce a model that determines a utility maximizing intervention scheme and further investigate the model. We also present two decentralized approaches as benchmarks. Finally, we conduct a case study for California׳s electric vehicle market and validate our findings by a detailed analysis of the results, including comparisons with the current practice.     

Fair task allocation in transportation

Task allocation problems have traditionally focused on cost optimization. However, more and more attention is being given to cases in which cost should not always be the sole or major consideration. In this paper we study a fair task allocation problem in transportation where an optimal allocation not only has low cost but more importantly, it distributes tasks as even as possible among heterogeneous participants who have different capacities and costs to execute tasks. To tackle this fair minimum cost allocation problem we analyze and solve it in two parts using two novel polynomial-time algorithms. We show that despite the new fairness criterion, the proposed algorithms can solve the fair minimum cost allocation problem optimally in polynomial-time. In addition, we conduct an extensive set of experiments to investigate the trade-off between cost minimization and fairness. Our experimental results demonstrate the benefit of factoring fairness into task allocation. Among the majority of test instances, fairness comes with a very small price in terms of cost.