战略柔性与竞争绩效:环境动荡性的调节效应

作为一种特殊的竞争能力,战略柔性日益成为驱动企业竞争绩效的战略要素,因而备受 关注. 通过对前人研究成果进行回顾和总结,重点探讨战略柔性与核心能力、企业竞争绩效之 间的关系以及环境动荡性所扮演的特殊中介角色,并运用来自中国企业的调研数据,利用基于 偏最小二乘法(partial least square) 的结构方程模型(SEM) 验证了不同类型的环境动荡性在战略 柔性与企业竞争绩效之间的关系中的调节效应.     

组织内部要素与竞争优势的获取

本文在已有的关于竞争优势获取途径研究的基础上着重考察了关键资源、核心竞争力和组织学习这三个组织内部要素与竞争优势的关系,说明了这三个要素在确立竞争优势过程中的不同的作用层次和机理。建立了一个简单的数学模型探讨了三个要素在确立竞争优势中的不同效率以及通过建立核心竞争力和开展组织学习所能获得的比较优势。     

中国房地产企业的竞争优势与核心能力——对广州市房地产企业的实证研究

本文从建立房地产企业竞争优势分析框架入手,以广州市房地产企业为研究对象,对中国房地产企业的竞争优势问题进行了实证研究,验证了房地产企业竞争优势与其核心能力和战略选择的关系。     

财务柔性对新兴制造企业研发投入的影响研究——基于竞争战略的双重效应

在剖析财务柔性对企业研发投入的影响中引入企业竞争战略,通过实证研究发现财务柔性与研发投入强度之间正相关关系显著,企业竞争战略的不同维度对研发投入强度的影响存在差异;企业竞争战略的不同维度对财务柔性与研发投入强度关系的调节作用存在不同作用机理。     

中小型制造企业竞争优先权关系实证研究

制造战略竞争优先权关系研究是制造战略研究的重要分支.中小企业作为企业群体的重要的组成部分,有着高效率、高灵活性等一系列优点.本文将从中小型企业的角度出发,对该类企业的战略竞争优先权进行验证性实证分析.本文结合2001年国际制造战略调查(IMSS)数据样本,运用因子分析、相关分析和回归分析等方法研究企业竞争优先权之间的关系以及竞争优先权与绩效之间的关系,构建了竞争优先权和绩效关系模型.结果显示,中小型制造企业竞争优先权关系符合累积关系,但累积关系排序与以往的研究结果不一致;在企业绩效方面,重视多种竞争能力的企业优于那些重视单一能力的企业.     

试论竞争情报与企业竞争战略

现阶段,我们正处于这样的一个时段:企业之间,情报竞争与战略制胜的时代。这里,情报的竞争,是企业得到竞争优势的必备要素。与此同时,也不难发现一些传统管理方式已经很难跟上企业竞争需要,必须开发新的战略管理,特别是竞争战略,已经渐渐成为企业获求竞争优势的有力武器。本文把竞争情报和企业竞争战略紧密联系在一起进行研究,分析了竞争情报在企业竞争战略制定、实施、评价全过程的作用,揭示竞争情报与战略管理关系。     

经济危机情况下的企业竞争战略研究

随着中国市场走向成熟、逐步开放,它已经成为国际市场的重要组成部分,但也伴着越发频繁的经济危机,如何在经济危机或者说经济不景气的情况下来制定企业自身的竞争战略,最终把企业带出困境呢。本文从我国企业制定和选择竞争战略存在的问题点、制定战略的基本步骤以及两大竞争战略的具体对策分析三个方面进行了详细阐述。     

动态竞争的战略主题及核心能力的提升路径

现代企业之间的竞争已经从过去的静态竞争演变到动态竞争,核心能力成为竞争优势的最终来源和动态竞争的根本驱动因素。这就要求企业将过去的产品中心战略转变为能力中心战略,利用汲取机制和组织学习持续提升核心能力,保持和扩大竞争优势。     

企业未来竞争的新趋势:基于标准化竞争的思考——兼评《企业标准化竞争的理论与策略研究》

随着经济全球化趋势的加剧,越来越多的企业运用标准化战略培育竞争优势,打造核心竞争力。本文从标准化竞争的基本策略;企业标准提升策略;企业标准化竞争中的技术标准联盟;企业标准化竞争中的公共政策四个方面系统的介绍了当今企业如何在标准化竞争中获得竞争优势,并提出了企业在标准化竞争中的一些具体方法和策略,以此打造企业的核心能力,使企业在未来的市场竞争中取得更大的市场收益。     

战略规划如何成为竞争优势:联想的实践及启示

本文在回顾企业正式战略规划理论的基础上,对联想公司2000年的3年战略规划系统的特征进行了描述,分析了其失误的深层原因,并探讨了其新一轮战略规划中的改进行动及对竞争优势的影响。在此基础上,提出了一个中国转型经济中本土企业战略规划体系设计的改进框架。本文的研究表明,转型经济中战略规划体系的组织改进和能力强化是大中型本土企业发展的关键要素之一,企业战略规划体系设计需要在高管直接领导下使战略规划侧重点与创新性与企业业务的战略情境相匹配,并选择合适的规划工具与模型,同时在规划流程中发挥直线管理者和公司规划人员各自不同的作用,才能使战略规划成为本土企业的一种竞争优势。研究也揭示了高管的反思与学习能力对本土企业战略规划体系发展的重要作用。     

Money in Search Equilibrium,in Competitive Equilibrium,and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first‐order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second‐order welfare losses.     

考虑渠道势力和研发溢出的竞争制造商研发决策研究

针对供应链中渠道势力的变化，构建了不同渠道势力结构下的研发决策模型，考察了渠道势力变化和研发溢出效应对竞争制造商最优研发决策以及供应链利润的影响。研究发现：1）随着零售商渠道势力的增强，制造商的研发水平降低。2）研发溢出效应对最优研发水平的影响与制造商之间的竞争程度有关：当制造商之间的竞争程度较弱时，随着研发溢出效应的增强，最优研发水平上升；当制造商之间的竞争较强时，随着研发溢出效应的增强，最优研发水平下降；当制造商之间的竞争程度适中时，随着研发溢出效应的增强，最优研发水平呈上升后下降的"倒U"形变化。3）渠道势力的变化不会改变研发溢出效应对研发水平的影响结论，但是会改变结论变化的临界值大小；4）渠道势力对供应链利润的影响主要取决于制造商竞争程度和研发溢出效应的大小。     

Investment and Competitive Matching

We study markets in which agents first make investments and are then matched into potentially productive partnerships. Equilibrium investments and the equilibrium matching will be efficient if agents can simultaneously negotiate investments and matches, but we focus on markets in which agents must first sink their investments before matching. Additional equilibria may arise in this sunk‐investment setting, even though our matching market is competitive. These equilibria exhibit inefficiencies that we can interpret as coordination failures. All allocations satisfying a constrained efficiency property are equilibria, and the converse holds if preferences satisfy a separability condition. We identify sufficient conditions (most notably, quasiconcave utilities) for the investments of matched agents to satisfy an exchange efficiency property as well as sufficient conditions (most notably, a single crossing property) for agents to be matched positive assortatively, with these conditions then forming the core of sufficient conditions for the efficiency of equilibrium allocations.     

企业竞争能力的层次结构及其经济学分析

与其说完全竞争均衡状态下企业之间的产品具有同质性,倒不如说企业的资源能力具有同质性。资源能力的不同质量状态构成了竞争优势分析的横向分析线索;三种主流战略管理理论分别解释了竞争优势来源的三个不同层次,构成了竞争优势研究的纵向研究视角。以一般资源能力作为研究分析的理论基点,从可交易资源能力的角度,可以折射出各种资源能力对企业竞争地位和状态的影响,并为企业能力理论的研究纳入主流经济学研究范畴奠定基础。     

Technology Learning, Technology Strategy and Competitive Pressures

This paper develops some hypotheses concerning technological learning in firms. The hypotheses are examined using a detailed study of Europe's leading dedicated biotechnology firm, Celltech Ltd. It relates how the competitive pressures facing the company, and similar US companies, have changed over the past decade, and how Celltech's technology strategy has placed considerable emphasis on technological learning in order to maintain its competitive position compared with large, multinational pharmaceutical companies. Some of the features of technological learning are examined, including: its purposive character; its differential and complex nature; its internal and external components; the complementary nature of the company's technology and human resource development strategy; and the importance of organizational considerations.     

平台竞争、排他性协议与竞争瓶颈

在很多双边市场中，经常出现平台一边的用户与平台之间产生利益纠纷的现象，例如顺丰速运与菜鸟网络之间的纠纷等，本文从理论模型的角度研究了这种经济现象。文章通过将双边市场的用户分为视平台有差异和无差异两种类型，研究了平台如何掠夺视平台无差异的用户所有剩余的问题。研究发现，平台厂商有与视平台无差异的用户签订排他性协议的激励；无论签订排他性协议与否，这类用户都将被掠夺所有剩余，产生了所谓的"竞争瓶颈"；排他性协议带来的福利效应并不明确，当平台的边际成本和交叉外部性参数较大时，排他性协议的签订能够提升社会总福利。     

The Impact of Costliness,Competitive Importance,and Modularity of Investments on Outsourcing

This study is motivated by examples of outsourcing that are not readily explained by widely established economic theories. We extend recent literature that develops the idea that outsourcing can help firms avoid overinvestment by specifying more precisely the conditions under which this thesis is likely to apply. Our extension is realized through a two‐period game theoretic model in which the outsourcing and in‐house investments are driven by (1) the cost required to develop a product or process module, (2) competitive relevance, defined as the module's share in the production cost or the module's importance to the customer, and (3) modularity, defined as the extent to which generic investments in the module can approach firm‐specific investments in terms of the overall product/process performance. The analysis generates predictions about what types of insourcing, outsourcing, and non‐sourcing behaviors are likely to emerge in different parts of the parameter space. Outsourcing to a more concentrated industry upstream emerges at equilibrium when modularity is high, relevance low to medium, and development cost high enough that none or only a subset of focal firms wants to invest. While firms are forced to insource and overinvest due to a prisoner's dilemma when the development cost is sufficiently high relative to the module's relevance, we do not find outsourcing equilibria that solve this problem in a two‐period game with no commitment. This result implies that some form of tacit coordination in a multi‐period game may be necessary. We conclude the study with a discussion of empirical implications.     

A WTP‐Choice Model: Empirical Validation,Competitive and Centralized Pricing

Willingness To Pay (WTP) of customers plays an anchoring role in pricing. This study proposes a new choice model based on WTP, incorporating sequential decision making, where the products with positive utility of purchase are considered in the order of customer preference. We compare WTP‐choice model with the commonly used (multinomial) Logit model with respect to the underlying choice process, information requirement, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Using WTP‐choice model, we find and compare equilibrium and centrally optimal prices and profits without considering inventory availability. In addition, we compare equilibrium prices and profits in two contexts: without considering inventory availability and under lost sales. One of the interesting results with WTP‐choice model is the “loose coupling” of retailers in competition; prices are not coupled but profits are. That is, each retailer should charge the monopoly price as the collection of these prices constitute an equilibrium but each retailer's profit depends on other retailers' prices. Loose coupling fails with dependence of WTPs or dependence of preference on prices. Also, we show that competition among retailers facing dependent WTPs can cause price cycles under some conditions. We consider real‐life data on sales of yogurt, ketchup, candy melt, and tuna, and check if a version of WTP‐choice model (with uniform, triangle, or shifted exponential WTP distribution), standard or mixed Logit model fits better and predicts the sales better. These empirical tests establish that WTP‐choice model compares well and should be considered as a legitimate alternative to Logit models for studying pricing for products with low price and high frequency of purchase.     

Environmental Performance as a Basis for Competitive Strategy: Opportunities and Threats

Increasingly, companies are considering environmental differentiation as a basis for their competitive strategy. As they formulate and implement their strategy, these companies must decide upon an appropriate device to signal a superior environmental performance to consumers and other stakeholders. This article examines three of these devices: Corporate environmental reports (CER), eco-labeling programs, and the ISO 14001 environmental management systems (EMS) standard. Specific challenges and limits associated with their use are discussed and insight into ways to overcome potential barriers are offered. One of these challenges relates to skepticisms, whereas another resides with the risk of imitation from competitors. Hence, companies must both build trusting relationships, and continuously maintain and develop resources and competencies that will enable them to sustain their competitive advantage over competitors.