Weighing the Risks of Nuclear Energy and Climate Change: Trust in Different Information Sources,Perceived Risks,and Willingness to Pay for Alternatives to Nuclear Power

We examined how individuals perceive nuclear energy in the context of climate change mitigation and how their perceptions are associated with trust in different risk information sources. We analyzed the interrelationships between trust, perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, perception of nuclear energy as an acceptable way to mitigate climate change, and willingness to pay (WTP) for alternatives to nuclear power. A nationwide survey (N = 967) collected in Finland was analyzed with structural equation modeling. The associations between trust and perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, and perception of nuclear power as a way to mitigate climate change varied by the type of information source. Political party support and other background variables were associated with trust in different information sources. The effect of trust in information sources on WTP was mediated by perceived risks and benefits. The results will increase our understanding of how individuals perceive nuclear energy as a way to cut CO₂ emissions and the role of trust in different information sources in shaping nuclear risk perceptions and energy choices.     

Values,Perceived Risks and Benefits,and Acceptability of Nuclear Energy

We examined how personal values and perceptions of risks and benefits are associated with the acceptability of nuclear energy (NE). A theoretical model is tested in which beliefs about the risks and benefits of NE mediate the relationship between values and acceptability. The results showed that egoistic values are positively related to the perceived benefits and acceptability of NE. In contrast, altruistic and biospheric values were positively related to the perceived risks of NE. Although it has been argued that NE may help to combat climate change through lower CO₂ emissions, these environmental benefits were not acknowledged by people with strong biospheric values. Furthermore, results confirmed that the more risks respondents perceived, the less they were inclined to accept NE. In contrast, the more a person believed that NE has beneficial consequences, the more acceptable NE was. Finally, as expected, perceived risks and benefits were found to partly mediate the relationship between personal values and acceptability. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

Politics and Scientific Expertise: Scientists, Risk Perception, and Nuclear Waste Policy

To study the homogeneity and influences on scientists'perspectives of environmental risks, we have examined similarities and differences in risk perceptions, particularly regarding nuclear wastes, and policy preferences among 1011 scientists and engineers. We found significant differences ( p 0.05)in the patterns of beliefs among scientists from different fields of research. In contrast to physicists, chemists, and engineers, life scientists tend to: (a)perceive the greatest risks from nuclear energy and nuclear waste management; (b)perceive higher levels of overall environmental risk; (c)strongly oppose imposing risks on unconsenting individuals; and (d)prefer stronger requirements for environmental management. On some issues related to priorities among public problems and calls for government action, there are significant variations among life scientists or physical scientists. We also found that–independently of field of research–perceptions of risk and its correlates are significantly associated with the type of institution in which the scientist is employed. Scientists in universities or state and local governments tend to see the risks of nuclear energy and wastes as greater than scientists who work as business consultants, for federal organizations, or for private research laboratories. Significant differences also are found in priority given to environmental risks, the perceived proximity of environmental disaster, willingness to impose risks on an unconsenting population, and the necessity of accepting risks and sacrifices.     

Social Influence,Risk and Benefit Perceptions,and the Acceptability of Risky Energy Technologies: An Explanatory Model of Nuclear Power Versus Shale Gas

Risky energy technologies are often controversial and debates around them are polarized; in such debates public acceptability is key. Research on public acceptability has emphasized the importance of intrapersonal factors but has largely neglected the influence of interpersonal factors. In an online survey (N = 948) with a representative sample of the United Kingdom, we therefore integrate interpersonal factors (i.e., social influence as measured by social networks) with two risky energy technologies that differ in familiarity (nuclear power vs. shale gas) to examine how these factors explain risk and benefit perceptions and public acceptability. Findings show that benefit perceptions are key in explaining acceptability judgments. However, risk perceptions are more important when people are less familiar with the energy technology. Social network factors affect perceived risks and benefits associated with risky energy technology, hereby indirectly helping to form one's acceptability judgment toward the technology. This effect seems to be present regardless of the perceived familiarity with the energy technology. By integrating interpersonal with intrapersonal factors in an explanatory model, we show how the current “risk–benefit acceptability” model used in risk research can be further developed to advance the current understanding of acceptability formation.     

How a Nuclear Power Plant Accident Influences Acceptance of Nuclear Power: Results of a Longitudinal Study Before and After the Fukushima Disaster

Major nuclear accidents, such as the recent accident in Fukushima, Japan, have been shown to decrease the public's acceptance of nuclear power. However, little is known about how a serious accident affects people's acceptance of nuclear power and the determinants of acceptance. We conducted a longitudinal study (N= 790) in Switzerland: one survey was done five months before and one directly after the accident in Fukushima. We assessed acceptance, perceived risks, perceived benefits, and trust related to nuclear power stations. In our model, we assumed that both benefit and risk perceptions determine acceptance of nuclear power. We further hypothesized that trust influences benefit and risk perceptions and that trust before a disaster relates to trust after a disaster. Results showed that the acceptance and perceptions of nuclear power as well as its trust were more negative after the accident. In our model, perceived benefits and risks determined the acceptance of nuclear power stations both before and after Fukushima. Trust had strong effects on perceived benefits and risks, at both times. People's trust before Fukushima strongly influenced their trust after the accident. In addition, perceived benefits before Fukushima correlated with perceived benefits after the accident. Thus, the nuclear accident did not seem to have changed the relations between the determinants of acceptance. Even after a severe accident, the public may still consider the benefits as relevant, and trust remains important for determining their risk and benefit perceptions. A discussion of the benefits of nuclear power seems most likely to affect the public's acceptance of nuclear power, even after a nuclear accident.     

Living with Nuclear Power: A Q-Method Study of Local Community Perceptions

The issue of new nuclear power is once again high up on the public policy agenda in many countries, and candidate sites for new civilian stations are likely to include those that have existing nuclear facilities. A common assumption is that existing nuclear communities will be more accepting of new build because of the direct economic and other benefits nuclear power already makes to a local area. Surprisingly, there is a dearth of contemporary data on perceptions of the risks, benefits, and values associated with nuclear power within such communities. This study uses Q-methodology to investigate the perspectives on living with nuclear risk among people ( n  = 84) drawn from communities near to two nuclear power stations in the United Kingdom. Both stations, at Bradwell-on-Sea and Oldbury-on-Severn, had been in operation for over 40 years. The Q-analysis identified four main perspectives, or points of view, accounting for 53% of total variance. These were interpreted as: Beneficial and Safe; Threat and Distrust; Reluctant Acceptance; and There's No Point Worrying. We conclude that the "landscape of beliefs" about nuclear power in such communities is both subtle and complex, avoiding simplistic bipolar dichotomies such as "for" or "against," and that there is a need for extensive and meaningful dialogue with such communities over any new build plans. The usefulness of Q-methodology for investigating the ways in which people live with risk is highlighted, as are the implications of the results for theories of risk and trust.     

Perceived Risk and Benefit of Nuclear Waste Repositories: Four Opinion Clusters

Local public resistance can block the site‐selection process, construction, and operation of nuclear waste repositories. Social science has established that the perception of risks and benefits, trust in authorities, and opinion on nuclear energy play important roles in acceptance. In particular, risk and benefit evaluations seem critical for opinion formation. However, risks and benefits have rarely been studied independently and, most often, the focus has been on the two most salient groups of proponents and opponents. The aim of this exploratory study is to examine the often‐neglected majority of people holding ambivalent or indifferent opinions. We used cluster analysis to examine the sample (N = 500, mailed survey in German‐speaking Switzerland) in terms of patterns of risk and benefit perception. We reveal four significantly different and plausible clusters: one cluster with high‐benefit ratings in favor of a repository and one cluster with high‐risk ratings opposing it; a third cluster shows ambivalence, with high ratings on both risk and benefit scales and moderate opposition, whereas a fourth cluster seems indifferent, rating risks and benefits only moderately compared to the ambivalent cluster. We conclude that a closer look at the often neglected but considerable number of people with ambivalent or indifferent opinions is necessary. Although the extreme factions of the public will most probably not change their opinion, we do not yet know how the opinion of the ambivalent and indifferent clusters might develop over time.     

Perception of Nuclear Energy and Coal in France and the Netherlands

This study focuses on the perception of large scale application of nuclear energy and coal in the Netherlands and France. The application of these energy-sources and the risks and benefits are judged differently by various group in society. In Europe, France has the highest density of nuclear power plants and the Netherlands has one of the lowest. In both countries scientists and social scientists completed a questionnaire assessing the perception of the large scale application of both energy sources. Furthermore, a number of variables relating to the socio cultural and political circumstances were measured. The results indicate that the French had a higher risk perception and a more negative attitude toward nuclear power than the Dutch. But they also assess the benefits of the use of nuclear power to be higher. Explanations for these differences are discussed.     

Perceived Risk and Uncertainty of Nuclear Waste: Differences Among Science,Business, and Environmental Group Members1

This paper presents survey results on perceived risk regarding the management of nuclear waste. Using data taken from random mail surveys of members of scientific, business, and environmental groups in Colorado and New Mexico in the summer of 1990, we examine differences between the groups in their expressed perceptions of risk and also their assessments of the certainty of their beliefs. We consider whether (a) greater uncertainty is associated with greater perceived risks and (b) whether there is greater responsiveness to new information for those whose beliefs are least certain. We find that there are connections between perceived risk and uncertainty, and there is a greater tendency to update risk assessements from a position of greater initial uncertainty. There are, however, differences between the groups as well as asymmetries in their responses to new information. The latter suggests that perceived risks will ratchet upward over time even when information is not biased toward more or less risk.     

The Risks of Using Nuclear Energy Sources in Space: Some Lay Activists'Perceptions

A combination of directive and nondirective techniques was used to study the mental models of 30 lay activists regarding the risks of nuclear energy sources in space. Respondents'perceptions were compared with an "expert model" of the processes generating and controlling these risks, in terms of both the substance of their beliefs and several statistical measures of their performance. These analyses revealed a complex pattern of strengths and weaknesses. Their details are used to derive recommendations for formulating messages about these risks.     

The Future of Nuclear Power: Value Orientations and Risk Perception

Since the turn of the 21st century, there has been a revival of interest in nuclear power. Two decades ago, the expansion of nuclear power in the United States was halted by widespread public opposition as well as rising costs and less than projected increases in demand for electricity. Can the renewed enthusiasm for nuclear power overcome its history of public resistance that has persisted for decades? We propose that attitudes toward nuclear power are a function of perceived risk, and that both attitudes and risk perceptions are a function of values, beliefs, and trust in the institutions that influence nuclear policy. Applying structural equation models to data from a U.S. national survey, we find that increased trust in the nuclear governance institutions reduces perceived risk of nuclear power and together higher trust and lower risk perceptions predict positive attitudes toward nuclear power. Trust in environmental institutions and perceived risks from global environmental problems do not predict attitudes toward nuclear power. Values do predict attitudes: individuals with traditional values have greater support for, while those with altruistic values have greater opposition to, nuclear power. Nuclear attitudes do not vary by gender, age, education, income, or political orientation, though nonwhites are more supportive than whites. These findings are consistent with, and provide an explanation for, a long series of public opinion polls showing public ambivalence toward nuclear power that persists even in the face of renewed interest for nuclear power in policy circles.     

Risk Knowledge and Risk Attitudes Regarding Nuclear Energy Sources in Space

A series of four studies examined the relationship between how much people know about the risks of using nuclear energy sources in space and how they feel about the technology. We found that the more people know, the more favorable they are—except for two groups of people selected from organizations with strong pro-industry or pro-environment positions. These results suggest that a technology will get a more favorable hearing if it can get its message out—providing that it has a legitimate story to tell and that the situation has not become too polarized already. The limits to these conclusions are discussed.     

Confluence and Contours: Reflexive Management of Environmental Risk

Government institutions have responsibilities to distribute risk management funds meaningfully and to be accountable for their choices. We took a macro‐level sociological approach to understanding the role of government in managing environmental risks, and insights from micro‐level psychology to examine individual‐level risk‐related perceptions and beliefs. Survey data from 2,068 U.K. citizens showed that lay people's funding preferences were associated positively with beliefs about responsibility and trust, yet associations with perception varied depending on risk type. Moreover, there were risk‐specific differences in the funding preferences of the lay sample and 29 policymakers. A laboratory‐based study of 109 participants examined funding allocation in more detail through iterative presentation of expert information. Quantitative and qualitative data revealed a meso‐level framework comprising three types of decisionmakers who varied in their willingness to change funding allocation preferences following expert information: adaptors, responders, and resistors. This research highlights the relevance of integrated theoretical approaches to understanding the policy process, and the benefits of reflexive dialogue to managing environmental risks.     

Efficacy,Action, and Support for Reducing Climate Change Risks

A growing body of research demonstrates that believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts. Despite this potentially critical role of efficacy beliefs, measures and their use vary wildly in climate change risk perception and communication research, making it hard to compare and learn from efficacy studies. To address this problem and advance our understanding of efficacy beliefs, this article makes three contributions. First, we present a theoretically motivated approach to measuring climate change mitigation efficacy, in light of diverse proposed, perceived, and previously researched strategies. Second, we test this in two national survey samples (Amazon's Mechanical Turk N = 405, GfK Knowledge Panel N = 1,820), demonstrating largely coherent beliefs by level of action and discrimination between types of efficacy. Four additive efficacy scales emerge: personal self‐efficacy, personal response efficacy, government and collective self‐efficacy, and government and collective response efficacy. Third, we employ the resulting efficacy scales in mediation models to test how well efficacy beliefs predict climate change policy support, controlling for specific knowledge, risk perceptions, and ideology, and allowing for mediation by concern. Concern fully mediates the relatively strong effects of perceived risk on policy support, but only partly mediates efficacy beliefs. Stronger government and collective response efficacy beliefs and personal self‐efficacy beliefs are both directly and indirectly associated with greater support for reducing the risks of climate change, even after controlling for ideology and causal beliefs about climate change.     

Energy Choices and Risk Beliefs: Is It Just Global Warming and Fear of a Nuclear Power Plant Accident?

A survey of 3,200 U.S. residents focused on two issues associated with the use of nuclear and coal fuels to produce electrical energy. The first was the association between risk beliefs and preferences for coal and nuclear energy. As expected, concern about nuclear power plant accidents led to decreased support for nuclear power, and those who believed that coal causes global warming preferred less coal use. Yet other risk beliefs about the coal and nuclear energy fuel cycles were stronger or equal correlates of public preferences. The second issue is the existence of what we call acknowledged risk takers, respondents who favored increased reliance on nuclear energy, although also noting that there could be a serious nuclear plant accident, and those who favored greater coal use, despite acknowledging a link to global warming. The pro‐nuclear group disproportionately was affluent educated white males, and the pro‐coal group was relatively poor less educated African‐American and Latino females. Yet both shared four similarities: older age, trust in management, belief that the energy facilities help the local economy, and individualistic personal values. These findings show that there is no single public with regard to energy preferences and risk beliefs. Rather, there are multiple populations with different viewpoints that surely would benefit by hearing a clear and comprehensive national energy life cycle policy from the national government.     

Flood Risk Perceptions and Insurance Choice: Do Decisions in the Floodplain Reflect Overoptimism?

In the presence of rare disasters, risk perceptions may not always align with actual risks. These perceptions can nevertheless influence an individual's willingness to mitigate risks through activities such as purchasing flood insurance. In a survey of Maryland floodplain residents, we find that stated risk perceptions predict voluntary flood insurance take‐up, while perceptions themselves varied widely among surveyed residents, owing in large part to differences in past flood experience. We use a formal test for overoptimism in risk perceptions and find that, on aggregate, floodplain residents are overly optimistic about flood risks.     

Trust,confidence, familiarity,and support for land-based recirculating aquaculture facilities

Surveys in three U.S. localities (n = 523) with proposed or existing land-based aquaculture facilities probed trust's relationship with perceived net benefits and public intentions to cooperate with siting of this novel technology. The trust, confidence, and cooperation (TCC) model posits that shared values shape willingness to be vulnerable to others (trust), while past performance shapes certainty that others will behave as expected (confidence). Trust affects confidence given moral outweighs performance information, possibly varying by familiarity. Other research suggests that trust shapes benefit and risk perceptions, which drive cooperation (defined here by potentially observable behavior: voting on siting, trying to influence government decisions directly or through citizen groups, and buying or eating facility fish). Confirmatory factor analyses suggested that a two-factor model fit the trust/confidence measures better than a one-factor model or a two-factor model without inter-factor correlation, indicating (despite a strong association of trust and confidence) that they are empirically distinct. Path analyses suggested that trust had stronger direct effects on cooperation than did confidence, reflecting the TCC notion that moral information underlying trust judgments is more influential, and stronger indirect effects through benefit-risk judgments. Model fit was better than if the benefit-risk mediator was omitted. Trust in government had a small direct effect on cooperation and confidence, but a large effect on trust in the corporation, and model fit was much worse if any of these paths was omitted. Low familiarity with the project lowered both model fit and trust–confidence association. We discuss implications for risk analysis theory and practice.     

Risk Perceptions,General Environmental Beliefs,and Willingness to Address Climate Change

The research reported here examines the relationship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. The data are a national sample of 1225 mail surveys that include measures of risk perceptions and knowledge tied to climate change, support for voluntary and government actions to address the problem, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables. Risk perceptions matter in predicting behavioral intentions. Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral intentions. There are four secondary conclusions. First, behavioral intentions regarding climate change are complex and intriguing. People are neither nonbelievers who will take no initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they believers who promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that promises to address climate change. Second, there are separate demographic sources for voluntary actions compared with voting intentions. Third, recognizing the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Finally, the success of the risk perception variables to account for behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk perceptions as independent variables. Risk perceptions and knowledge, however, share the stage with general environmental beliefs and demographic characteristics. Although related, risk perceptions, knowledge, and general environmental beliefs are somewhat independent predictors of behavioral intentions.     

Reaping the Benefits and Avoiding the Risks: Unrealistic Optimism in the Health Domain

People's perceptions of benefits and risks play a key role in their acceptance or rejection of medical interventions, yet these perceptions may be poorly calibrated. This online study with N = 373 adults aged 19–76 years focused on unrealistic optimism in the health domain. Participants indicated how likely they were to experience benefits and risks associated with medical conditions and completed objective and subjective numeracy scales. Participants exhibited optimistic views about the likelihood of experiencing the benefits and the side effects of treatment options described in the scenarios. Objective and subjective numeracy were not associated with more accurate ratings. Moreover, participants’ underestimation of the risks was significantly greater than their overestimation of the benefits. From an applied perspective, these results suggest that clinicians may need to ensure that patients do not underestimate risks of medical interventions, and that they convey realistic expectations about the benefits that can be obtained with certain procedures.     

Morality De-Kanted or the Biological Roots of Moral Behavior

The ethical and moral behavior of Homo sapiens is no longer the exclusive domain of religion and philosophy because we recognize that such behavior affects the reproductive success of individuals within the species. We are a social species and therefore our survival is influenced by our capacity for cooperation and our willingness to take risks for kin. Emotions, some of which are found in other species, help to mediate our altruistic behavior. The reproductive benefits of helping kin, especially offspring, are readily seen. Helping non-kin can be beneficial if individuals can differentiate between ‘reciprocators’ and ‘non-reciprocators’ and direct altruistic behavior toward reciprocators. Also, if third parties are favorably impressed by observing altruistic behavior, the rewards need not come from the recipient of the altruistic behavior. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.