Wage and Productivity Differentials in Japan: The Role of Labor Market Mechanisms

This paper aims at explaining two stylized facts of the Lost Decade in Japan: rising wage inequalities and increasing firm‐level productivity differentials. We build a model where firms can choose between efficiency wages with endogenous effort and competitive wages, and show that it can replicate those facts. Using Japanese microeconomic data, we find support for the existence of efficiency wages in one group of firms and competitive wages in the other group. Based on those results, a simulation shows that the share of firms using efficiency wages has declined, within sectors, during the Lost Decade, as predicted by the model.     

Firm‐level Consequences of Large Minimum‐wage Increases in the Czech and Slovak Republics

Abstract. After an initial decline in the level of real minimum‐wage rates, there were series of unusually large increases in their levels — 70 and 50 per cent — during the years 1999–2002 in the Czech and Slovak Republics, respectively. Using information from matched employee–employer data sets, we look at the impact of minimum‐wage hikes on both wages and employment. Our results suggest that there are some, but not substantial, job losses in reaction to minimum‐wage hikes and that the impact on firm wages is rather large, implying that further increases of similar magnitude might very well have negative consequences for employment.     

Does Future PC Use Determine Our Wages Today? — Evidence from German Panel Data

Abstract. Using 1985–99 data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) we confirm the hypothesis that existing computer wage premiums are determined by ability or other unobserved individual characteristics rather than by productivity effects. In addition to the conventional longitudinal regression analysis, the two competing hypotheses were tested by employing future PC variables in the wage regressions in order to obtain a further control for worker heterogeneity. The finding that future PC variables have a statistically significant effect on current wages leads us to conclude that computer wage differentials can be attributed to worker heterogeneity rather than to computer‐induced productivity.     

Does Rent‐sharing Profit Female and Male Workers? Evidence from Israeli Matched Employer–Employee Data

This paper analyses the impact of workplace characteristics on individual wages based on a unique cross‐section matched employer–employee data set for the Israeli private manufacturing sector in 1995. Specifically, we examine the effects of the interaction between profit‐sharing and wages on the gender wage gap. The empirical findings show that individual compensation is significantly and positively correlated with firms’ profits‐per‐employee, even when controlling for all of the following: group effects in the residuals, individual and firms’ characteristics, industry wage differentials and endogeneity of profits. Wage–profit elasticity is found to be 11 per cent and it does not significantly differ between genders. With respect to the overall gender wage gap (on average women earn 28 per cent less than men), the results show that within firms there is no gender discrimination and that 12 per cent of this gap can be explained by the wage–profits profile and by the fact that women are more likely to be employed in less profitable firms than men.     

Profit Sharing and the Firm‐Size Wage Premium

This study analyzes the relationships among wages, firm size, and profit sharing schemes. We develop a simple theoretical model and explore the relationship empirically using high‐quality panel data. The theoretical model shows that the firm‐size wage premium decreases in the presence of profit sharing. The empirical results based on rich matched employee‐employer data for private sector wage earners in Finland show that the firm‐size wage premium is modest, and it becomes negligible when we account for profit sharing and covariates describing assortative matching and monopsony behavior. The analysis suggests that profit sharing schemes embody effects of firm‐specific unobservables that raise productivity, support rent sharing, and boost wages.     

On the Use of Incentive Pay in Chinese State‐owned Enterprises: The Role of Hierarchy

Abstract. This paper looks at the wage system in Chinese state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1980s. While wages remained compressed, there is evidence for the use of incentive mechanisms. Wages were quite sensitive to firm performance, especially at higher levels of the hierarchy. One of the reform measures — the Internal Salary System, a system of intra‐firm contracts — has contributed significantly to this sensitivity. There is also some direct evidence that it enhanced the effectiveness of the bonus system, and that it helped to increase productivity. This goes towards explaining how the Chinese bonus system was able to overcome the free‐rider problems typical of team compensation.     

High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms

We study a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers from more than five hundred thousand employing firms. We decompose real total annual compensation per worker into components related to observable employee characteristics, personal heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and residual variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. At the level of the individual, we find that person effects, especially those not related to observables like education, are a very important source of wage variation in France. Firm effects, while important, are not as important as person effects. At the level of firms, we find that enterprises that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more profitable. They are also more capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that pay higher wages, controlling for person effects, are more productive and more profitable. They are also more capital intensive but are not more high-skilled labor intensive. We find that person effects explain about 90% of inter-industry wage differentials and about 75% of the firm-size wage effect while firm effects explain relatively little of either differential.     

The Determinants of Blue CollarWage Rates: An Analysis of a DataSet Incorporating Observed Job Characteristics

There is wide agreement that one of the major problems in the estimation of wage equations, and in testing theories of wages, is the quality of the data available. In particular, the data used in almost all studies involve indirect or unsatisfactory measures of a variety of relevant factors, including working conditions. In this paper we exploit an unusual data set that includes measures of characteristics of jobs generated by observation (rather than self report, or through inference from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles). With these data we estimate a wage equation in which compensating differentials play a significant role in wage determination and, once working conditions and other characteristics are effectively controlled, all but one measure of previous labour market experience had no effect on the wage rate.     

Why Do Women's Wages Increase So Slowly Throughout Their Career? A Dynamic Model of Statistical Discrimination

Abstract. The aim of this paper is to explain the growing wage differentials between men and women during their working careers. We provide a dynamic model of statistical discrimination, which integrates specific human capital decisions: on‐the‐job training investment and wages are endogenously determined. We reveal a small wage differential at the beginning of women's career, but women's wages increase more slowly; this is partly due to a lower level of human capital investment by women and partly because firms smooth training costs between different periods.     

The Gender Wage Gap in the Turkish Labor Market

Abstract. This paper examines the sources of the gender wage gap in the Turkish labor market by using matched employer–employee data and the standard wage regression estimations as well as the Oaxaca decomposition method. The extensive number of variables in the data set enables a thorough quantitative analysis of the role of various individual‐ as well as firm‐related factors leading to wage differentials between men and women, namely human capital endowments including job tenure, occupational and industrial segregation, private/public sector location, coverage of the workplace under collective labor bargaining, and firm size. It also examines the extent of gender‐based industry and occupational segregation within the confines of data set and computes the Duncan & Duncan segregation index. We find that a large portion of the gender wage gap is attributable to women's considerably lower levels of work experience and job tenure. Other important variables that lead to pay differentials are women's lower concentration in jobs covered by collective labor bargaining and a substantial degree of occupational and industrial segregation. The differential rates of return to many of the wage determinant variables are also found to be significant in the formation of the gender wage gap.     

Price Effects of the Minimum Wage: A Survey Data Analysis for the German Construction Sector

Utilizing the link between employment and price changes as a result of minimum wages, we use firm‐level data to evaluate the effect of minimum wage introduction in the German construction sector. In East Germany we find significant positive price effects that exclude the possibility of rising employment. Rather, the results indicate the existence of a competitive sector‐specific labour market, and thus declining employment. In contrast, we cannot find any significant price reaction for West Germany. This suggests that the implemented minimum wage in West Germany is too low in comparison to the predominantly paid wages and is hence not binding.     

Wage Bargaining with On‐the‐Job Search: Theory and Evidence

Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between‐employer competition for labor services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on‐the‐job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productivity, competition between employers resulting from on‐the‐job search, and the workers' bargaining power. We find that between‐firm competition matters a lot in the determination of wages, because it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining à la Nash in raising wages above the workers' “reservation wages,” defined as out‐of‐work income. In particular, we detect no significant bargaining power for intermediate‐ and low‐skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high‐skilled workers.     

Wage Dispersion and Equilibrium Search Models: Some Evidence from Italy

This paper provides a structural estimation of an equilibrium search model with on‐the‐job search and heterogeneity in firms' productivities using a sample of Italian male workers. Results indicate that arrival rates of offers for workers are higher when unemployed than when employed and firms exploit their monopsony power when setting wages. As a result, workers earn far less than their marginal product. The model is then used to study regional labour market differentials in Italy. Wide variation in frictional transition parameters across areas helps to explain persistent unemployment and wage differentials.     

Technology Effects on Wages in Finnish Manufacturing

In this paper we study the effect of technology on establishment‐level wages using a classification of manufacturing industries based on four technology levels. The technology wage premiums are estimated separately for non‐manual and manual workers using wage equations with available control variables for plant and workforce characteristics (human capital) over the time period 1974–93. The results do not show a straightforward increasing relationship between a plant’s average wages and its technology at higher technology levels. However, establishments with the lowest technology level paid the lowest wages during the whole period. We also find that the relative non‐manual to manual wage ratio increased over the time period in the highest technology levels. These findings are consistent with technology wage premiums and skill‐biased technological change found in studies for other countries     

Firm Size or Firm Age? The Effect on Wages Using Matched Employer–Employee Data

Abstract. This paper uses matched employer–employee data set for Sweden to study the relationship between firm age and wages, systematically addressing a variety of possible explanations for observing a firm age–wage effect. Results show considerable heterogeneity across years, along segments of the firm age distribution and across industries. For 1995, a positive relationship is found between firm age and wages. This relationship is robust to inclusion of variables that might affect results. Taking into account that larger firms are also older firms, results show that inclusion of firm age does not alter the positive effect of firm size on wages.     

Endogenous Contracts in Unionized Oligopoly

We study the endogenous determination of contracts in a unionized oligopoly and the welfare implications thereof. Alternative contracts specify the sequencing in the selection of R&D and wages. They can be classified as ‘fixed’ when the unions set wages before the firms make their R&D decisions or ‘floating’ when the sequencing of these choices is reversed. If the unions are highly employment‐oriented, we find that either all firm–union pairs choose floating‐wage contracts or both contract types may coexist depending on the degree of technological spillovers. However, when the unions have stronger preference over attaining a good wage deal, then it becomes very likely that fixed‐wage contracts will endogenously emerge because they can serve as an insurance device against oppor tunistic wage increases. Our welfare analysis suggests that welfare‐improving contracts may nevertheless not always arise in equilibrium.     

The UK National Minimum Wage's Impact on Productivity

Low pay poses issues for managers internationally. We examine productivity in low‐paying sectors in Britain, since the introduction of the National Minimum Wage (NMW). We use a multiple channel analytical strategy, emphasizing the wage incentives channel and linking it to a model of unobserved productivity. We estimate firm‐specific productivity measures and aggregate them to the level of low‐paying sectors. Difference‐in‐differences analysis illustrates that the NMW positively affected aggregate low‐paying sector productivity. These findings highlight increased wage incentive effects with implications for management practice and public policy since ‘living’ wages may be productivity enhancing.     

Noncontractible Heterogeneity in Directed Search

This paper provides a directed search model designed to explain the residual part of wage variation left over after the impact of education and other observable worker characteristics have been removed. Workers have private information about their characteristics at the time they apply for jobs. Firms value these characteristics differently and can observe them once workers apply. They hire the worker they most prefer. However, the characteristics are not contractible, so firms cannot condition their wages on them. This paper shows how to extend arguments from directed search to handle this, allowing for arbitrary distributions of worker and firm types. The model is used to provide a functional relationship that ties together the wage distribution and the wage–duration function. This relationship provides a testable implication of the model. This relationship suggests a common property of wage distributions that guarantees that workers who leave unemployment at the highest wages also have the shortest unemployment duration. This is in strict contrast to the usual (and somewhat implausible) directed search story in which high wages are always accompanied by higher probability of unemployment.     

Inequality and Unemployment in a Global Economy

This paper develops a new framework for examining the determinants of wage distributions that emphasizes within‐industry reallocation, labor market frictions, and differences in workforce composition across firms. More productive firms pay higher wages and exporting increases the wage paid by a firm with a given productivity. The opening of trade enhances wage inequality and can either raise or reduce unemployment. While wage inequality is higher in a trade equilibrium than in autarky, gradual trade liberalization first increases and later decreases inequality.