Fairness as a constraint on reciprocity: Playing simultaneously as dictator and trustee

The dictator and trust games are two common games used to identify the existence of social preferences. However, in many social interactions, individuals face the environments in both games simultaneously: for example we are often engaged in charitable donations to strangers, as well as reciprocal exchange with family members and colleagues. As giving in one game could be prioritised over giving in the other, it is important to have participants play both as a dictator in the dictator game and as a trustee in a trust game simultaneously. The results indicate that when the recipient in the dictator game is significantly poorer relative to the dictator, the dictator tends to return an amount to the trustor such that the trustor neither makes a loss nor profit from trusting. This suggests that the presence of a sufficiently strong incentive to make transfers as a dictator may completely crowd-out any monetary returns to trust.     

Eliciting Donor Preferences

Most charity organizations depend on contributions from the general public, but little research is conducted on donor preferences. Do donors have geographical, recipient, or thematic preferences? We designed a conjoint analysis experiment in which people rated development aid projects by donating money in dictator games. We find that our sample show strong age, gender, regional, and thematic preferences. Furthermore, we find significant differences between segments. The differences in donations are consistent with differences in donors’ attitudes toward development aid and their beliefs about differences in poverty and vulnerability of the recipients. The method here used for development projects can easily be adapted to elicit preferences for other kinds of projects that rely on gifts from private donors.     

Ex-post blindness as excuse? The effect of information disclosure on giving

People passing by beggars without leaving a penny are not necessarily pure money-maximizers. In the world of sincere and dishonest recipients, some donors might anticipate the disutility they will suffer at the moment they realize their help is misdirected and reduce their willingness to donate to avoid these psychological costs. I employ a dictator game with ex-ante uncertainty about recipient’s endowment and requests from recipients to study how donors react to ex-post revelation of recipient’s type. I observe no difference in donations with and without ex-post information about recipient’s endowment. However, if donors could choose if they want to receive such information themselves, nearly a third of dictators choose to remain ignorant. Those dictators who choose to ex-post reveal the endowment of the recipient give significantly more.     

Warm glow of giving collectively – An experimental study

We report on an experiment to test for a warm glow of giving collectively. Comparing subjects’ affective state before and after the experiment, we find that individual charitable donations create a feeling of warm glow while collective donations do not. Proposing to donate the full endowment collectively improves subjects’ affective state significantly, though the behavioral data suggests that this result cannot be explained by the notion of expressive voting. We also find that subjects who consider Kant’s Categorical Imperative to be an important guideline for individual decisions are more likely to donate the full endowment to charity. This result supports the notion of Kantian thinking as an independent factor explaining cooperative behavior (Roemer, 2014).     

Reward the lucky? An experimental investigation of the impact of agency and luck on bonuses

We examine the impact of agency and luck on bonuses in a two player, two stage controlled laboratory experiment. In the first stage, Player A makes an investment decision on behalf of Player B. In the second stage, Player B makes a dictator allocation for each possible outcome from the investment. We compare dictator giving (bonuses) across outcomes and with a control treatment in which the stage 1 outcomes are determined randomly. We do not find that luck is rewarded with higher bonuses. However, we do find a general tendency to respond to agency with reduced bonuses and, in particular, a significant tendency to reduce bonuses to agents who are unlucky. Additionally, we find that those who are more risk tolerant are less likely to give no bonus under agency but not in the control.     

Image concerns in pledges to give blood: Evidence from a field experiment

We use a field experiment to study how social image concerns affect a commonly used strategy to attract new donors: pledges to engage in a charitable activity. While waiting for their appointment, visitors to a local government office are offered sign-ups for blood donations in a crowded waiting room. We randomly vary the visibility of the pledge to donate and the organization for which blood donations are solicited (charitable vs. commercial). Our setting provides natural variation in who observes the pledge. We do not find that visibility increases pledges to donate. Exploring heterogeneity in treatment effects, we find that visibility increases pledges when participants are observed by friends or family. Almost all subjects renege on their pledge.     

Somebody may scold you! A dictator experiment

In this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and observation with feedback from a third-party in a one-shot dictator game (DG). In addition to a baseline condition (DG), a third-party anonymous subject was introduced who either silently observed or observed and got to give feedback by choosing one of seven messages consisting of varying degree of (dis)satisfaction. We found that observation coupled with feedback increased significantly dictators’ propositions, while no significant effect is found for observation-only. We conclude that regard by others matters only if it linked to social factors such as communication. This complements the literature arguing that altruistic behavior is instrumental in serving other selfish (or non-purely altruistic) ends such as self-reputation or social approval. This experiment also contributes to the growing literature that aims at decreasing the artificiality of dictator game designs by increasing their practicability and external validity.     

Dictator game variants with probabilistic (and cost-saving) payoffs: A systematic test

Driven by methodological concerns, theoretical considerations, and previous evidence, I systematically test the validity of common dictator game variants with probabilistic payoffs. Using a unified experimental framework, I include four approaches and compare them to a standard dictator game: involving fewer receivers than dictators, paying only some players, paying only some decisions, and role uncertainty. I also relate transfers in the dictator game variants to established complementary individual difference measures of prosociality: social value orientation, personal values, a donation to charity, and the Big Five personality factor agreeableness. My data shows that the standard dictator game presents the expected correlations with the complementary measures of prosociality. Involving fewer receivers yields comparably valid results. By contrast, when only some players or decisions are paid or, particularly, when subjects face role uncertainty, the expected associations with complementary prosociality measures are distorted. Under role uncertainty, generosity is also significantly biased upward. I conclude that the validity of dictator game outcomes is highly sensitive to the applied methods. Not all dictator game variants can be recommended for the valid measurement of social preferences.     

Does Who Decides Really Matter? Causes and Consequences of Personal Financial Management in the Case of Larger and Structural Charitable Donations

We study causes and consequences of financial management in households in the specific case of charitable giving. We test hypotheses using couples in the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (n = 1,101). We find that more relationship specific investments lead to deciding on charitable giving as one economic actor. Furthermore, we find that the partner with the highest relative educational resources has most decision making power over charitable donations. Separately deciding couples are smallest charitable donors. Households in which the male partner decides are largest charitable donors when only larger and more structural donations are considered. This can be explained by their more conservative religious denomination.     

Does perceived unfairness affect charitable giving? Evidence from the dictator game

We use a modified version of the dictator game to study whether perceived unfairness affects giving. To earn money, dictators first had to take a test. Our treatment group had participants taking tests of different difficulty levels while the control group had all participants taking a test of the same difficulty level. We found that participants who were in an environment where everyone faced the same challenge to earn money were less generous than participants in an environment where some people had an advantage while others had a disadvantage.     

Does meeting standards affect charitable giving? An empirical study of New York metropolitan area charities

Charitable donations constitute a significant revenue source for many nonprofit organizations. To help donors decide which nonprofits to support, watchdog organizations such as the Better Business Bureau (BBB) Wise Giving Alliance have developed standards to promote wise giving. The effectiveness of these guides in channeling limited resources to the best‐managed nonprofits is not widely studied. This research attempts to empirically investigate the effects of standards on public giving, controlling for factors that have documented effects on donations. Specifically, it regresses public support on the extent to which local nonprofits meet the standards of the Better Business Bureau Serving Metropolitan New York, Mid‐Hudson and Long Island Regions, controlling for organization size, board size, service category, government funding, fundraising expense, and giving price. The study found that BBB standards have a positive effect on giving behavior. Meeting BBB standards is associated with higher levels of public support. Participating in assessment programs and striving to meet the standards are recommended for nonprofits seeking to improve funding through charitable contributions. Further study that extends the search for the mechanism that links meeting standards to improved donations is recommended.     

SELECTIVE RECOGNITION: HOW TO RECOGNIZE DONORS TO INCREASE CHARITABLE GIVING

Recognizing donors by revealing their identities is important for increasing charitable giving. Using a framed field experiment, we show that all forms of recognition that we examine increase donations relative to the baseline treatment, and recognizing only the highest or only the lowest donors has the strongest and significant effect. We argue that selective recognition creates tournament‐like incentives. Recognizing the highest donors activates the desire to seek a “positive prize” of prestige, while recognizing the lowest donors activates the desire to avoid a “negative prize” of shame. We discuss how selective recognition can be used by charities to increase donations. (JEL C93, D64)     

ENDOWMENTS,PERCEIVED SIMILARITY,AND DICTATOR GIVING

A common assumption of money is that it is fungible. An implication of this assumption is that the source of money does not affect economic decision making. We find evidence contradicting this fungibility assumption. Specifically, we explore how the perception of an endowment source influences amounts sent in a dictator game. We find perceived similarity to the endowment provider to be negatively correlated with dictator offers. Dictators who consider themselves relatively more similar to their endowment provider send significantly smaller amounts to their partners. Our results demonstrate that economic decision making can be influenced by the provider of income shocks. (JEL C78, C91, C99, D31, D64, D74)     

WARM‐GLOW GIVING: EARNED MONEY AND THE OPTION TO TAKE

Giving in dictator games has been shown to vary with the nature of the endowment (earned vs. house money) and the action space (give only vs. the option to give or take). This article is the first to test if these factors similarly affect warm‐glow giving alone. There is no reason that one would expect the same outcomes given that the motivations for warm‐glow giving are different from the motivations for total (warm‐glow plus purely altruistic) giving. We find that warm‐glow giving to charity or philanthropic institutions in a real‐donation experiment increases when the endowment is earned. The option to take does reduce warm‐glow giving to charity, but significant giving remains. Our results suggest that donating earned income creates greater utility than donating an equal amount from a windfall gain, and that warm glow comes not merely from the act of giving, but also from the characteristics of the recipient. (JEL C90, D64, H41)     

The Effect of Social Information on Giving from Lapsed Donors: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Using data from an experiment carried out by a large nonprofit organization, this paper finds that lapsed donors who received a solicitation letter referencing a relatively high donation made by another donor (high social information) were more generous in giving, but overall less likely to make a donation, relative to the baseline (low social information) group. After using the propensity score matching to correct for pretreatment differences in the two experimental groups, the estimated effect of high social information on the average donation amount is an increase of $14.95 (45 %). However, high social information is also found to reduce the probability a lapsed donor will give by 4.1 %. Thus, high social information can have potentially offsetting effects when applied to lapsed donors. Nonprofits should consider this trade-off when employing social information fundraising techniques to solicit donations from lapsed donors.     

The antecedents of donor commitment to voluntary organizations

The past decade has seen a rapid growth in the number of regular or so‐called committed giving schemes. Charities have been increasingly eager to solicit donors onto a low‐value monthly donation, collected automatically from their bank account or credit card. Although the initial costs of donor acquisition are higher than for cash donations, charities find that committed givers are less likely to lapse and therefore offer substantially higher lifetime values over time. In this article, we examine to what extent these individuals are truly committed, that is, whether they are more committed than occasional cash givers and the factors that might drive that commitment. The results of a series of ten focus groups conducted on behalf of five large national charities are reported and a model of the antecedents of commitment hypothesized. Implications for fundraising strategy are explored.     

Charity and Gift Exchange: Cultural Effects

Our intent in this paper was to provide experimental evidence for the Gift Exchange Mechanism in the context of charitable donations in Pakistan. We chose a simple and elegant experiment of Falk as the basis for our experiment. Due to institutional differences, we replaced his postal campaign for charitable donations by a door-to-door campaign. The additional opportunity for social interaction, and cultural differences, led to substantial and unexpected variation in the results. Most importantly, in direct contrast to results of Falk, both frequency and average size of donations declined with increasing gift size. Thus the GEM failed to operate in this experiment. We provide some potential explanations for this surprising result. Our experiment also provides some information on gender and income effects on charitable donations, which vary from main findings in the literature. In particular, we find that females contribute more in frequency and size, and that the share of giving declines with income.     

The importance of moral reflection and self-reported data in a dictator game with production

This article studies how individual behavior is affected by moral reflection in a dictator game with production. We make individuals reflect on fairness, in a structured way, before they play the dictator game. Our results suggest that moral reflection not only increases the weight people attach to fairness in distributive choices, but also has a strong effect on what people consider fair. Furthermore, we study the informational value of self-reported data. We find that self-reported data have substantial informational value, but do not add explanatory power to a random utility model estimated on purely behavioral data. Finally, we study whether there is a self-serving bias in the participants’ fairness perceptions, but do not find much evidence of this phenomenon in the data.     

Testing models of information avoidance with binary choice dictator games

Standard social choice experiments generally force subjects to make decisions about giving money to another person, but the ability to avoid information outside of the lab could lead to less altruistic or fair behavior than such experiments tend to suggest. I expand on the design of Dana, Weber, and Kuang (2007) to better study information avoidance in an experimental setting. Subjects are given the chance to avoid information about a recipient’s payoffs in a dictator game. I vary the probability that a dictator’s payoffs will be aligned with the recipient’s in order to assess the role of beliefs on avoidance and test contradictory models. The within-subjects approach shows that even people who are generous in a stark choice will make self-serving decisions when they can avoid knowing the recipient’s outcome. People avoid information more often when the self-serving choice is unlikely to hurt the recipient, which supports Rabin’s model (1995) of moral rules and moral preferences.     

Personality preferences in laboratory economics experiments

Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following one-shot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner's dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type for explaining subjects’ decisions. With controls for personality preferences, we find little evidence of behavioral differences between males and females. Furthermore, we conclude that seniority breeds feelings of entitlement—seniors at USNA generally exhibited the least cooperative or other-regarding behavior.