MULTIPLE-MEASURE ASSESSMENT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Recent research has focused attention on the importance of accountingfor measurement error in party identification when modelingthe stability of partisanship and the determinants of the vote.Measurement error estimates have in the past been based on asingle measure of partisanship observed at multiple points intime, a test-retest methodology that requires fairly strongassumptions about the character of change over time. This articleassesses the reliability of the Michigan party identificationscale using multiple measures of partisanship at a single pointin time. Our data not only corroborate previous test-retestresults but also suggest that the accuracy with which partisanshippredicts candidate preferences can be enhanced using multiplemeasures. One measure in particular, a labeled 7-point self-placementcontinuum, is found to hold significant potential to supplementand illuminate the Michigan scale.     

The Partisan Paradox: Religious Commitment and the Gender Gap in Party Identification

A large body of scholarly literature points to the growing influenceof religious devotion on U.S. partisanship. This article attemptsto reconcile the growing religious commitment cleavage in theAmerican party system with the commensurate growth in the gendergap. If women are, on average, more religiously devout thanmen, and if contemporary shifts in partisanship are disproportionatelyfounded on religious and cultural cleavages, then why are womenmore likely to identify with the Democratic Party? I pose threepossible explanations for this apparent paradox: (1) that theinfluence of religion is only considerable among the most committed;(2) that men and women politicize their religious beliefs indifferent ways; and (3) that gender differences in opinion onnonreligious issues sustain the partisan gap, over and abovethe conservative influence of religiosity. Findings from structuralequation analyses demonstrate that religious devotion affectsthe politics of men and women in similar ways. Religious commitmentaffects partisan choices but does not override the powerfuleffects of gender. Gender differences in support for the socialwelfare state and the preeminence of social welfare opinionin the partisan calculus of men and women largely explain thepersistence of the gender gap.     

THE BUILDING OF A REPUBLICAN REGIONAL BASE IN THE SOUTH THE ELEPHANT CROSSES THE MASON-DIXON LINE

Changes in party identification are examined from 1952 to 1988,with a special emphasis on the findings from the 1988 CPS SuperTuesday Study. It is found that in 1988 Republicans clearlyoutnumbered Democrats among southern whites for the first timeever. Demographic patterns of partisanship in 1988 are comparedto those from the 1950s. Most important is the relationshipwhich now exists between age and party identification. Republicansnow have a 29 percent lead over the Democrats among southernwhites under 30 years of age. While firm black support of theDemocratic party should prevent the South from becoming as solidlyRepublican as it once was Democratic, there is good reason toexpect further Republican gains in the South throughout theremainder of the twentieth century.     

Gender Differences in the Effects of Personality Traits on Party Identification in the United States

This study examines whether the Big Five personality traits have different effects on male and female party identification in the United States. Research has found associations between personality traits and partisanship in the United States. However, there is solid evidence of gender differences in personality traits, and past studies have not yet considered whether personality-partisanship relationship might be gender-differentiated. This study finds that with the increase of agreeableness, women tend to be Republicans, but men tend to be Democrats. Furthermore, as openness to experience increases, women are more likely to be strong partisans, but men are more likely to be independents or leaning partisans. To sum up, this study provides evidence that the effects of the Big Five personality traits on party identification vary by gender and suggests that it is wrong to assume that the Big Five personality traits have the same impacts on male and female party identification.     

Why is Collective Violence Collective?

A theory of collective violence must explain both why it is collective and why it is violent. Whereas my earlier work addresses the question of why collective violence is violent, here I apply and extend Donald Black's theory of partisanship to the question of why violence collectivizes. I propose in general that the collectivization of violence is a direct function of strong partisanship. Strong partisanship arises when third parties (1) support one side against the other and (2) are solidary among themselves. Such support occurs when third parties are socially close to one side and remote from the other and when one side has more social status than the other. Third parties are solidary when they are intimate, culturally homogeneous, and interdependent. I focus in particular on lynching: Lynching is a joint function of strong partisanship toward the alleged victim and weak partisanship toward the alleged offender. Unequal strong partisanship appears in both classic lynchings (of outsiders) and communal ynchings (of insiders) across societies and history. Where partisanship is weak or strong on both sides, lynching is unlikely to occur. Evidence includes patterns of lynching in various tribal societies, the American South, imperial China, and medieval Europe.     

MEASURING LEVELS OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION DOES QUESTION ORDER MATTER?

This article examines whether asking the vote question beforeparty identification alters the strength of partisanship andits relationship to vote choice. It employs the 1992 BritishElection Survey, which included a random split half-sample experiment,and the 1992–93 American Election Study Panel, where thequestion order for party identification and the vote were changed.The results show that altering the question ordering had verylittle effect in Britain and no significant effect in the UnitedStates. These results are consistent with the notion that partyidentification is one of the more enduring and stable componentsof mass political behavior in both presidential and parliamentarysystems.     

Children's Partisan Loyalties in a New Nation: A Research Note Using Indian Data

Using a sample of Indian high school students, this articlefinds that party identification remains relatively stable overa period of two years. The largest component of change is developmentalin that many respondents change from nonpartisan to partisan.Predictors of partisan stability are examined, and knowledgeof parental partisanship is found to be the most significant.     

Change and Stability in Presidential Popularity at the Individual Level

This article employs a three-wave panel to examine change andstability in the popularity of the president. By survey standards,the item is found to be quite reliable, approaching the reliabilityof party identification. Change in the item can be predictedusing measures of political interest and sophistication, partisanship,and strength of presidential approval or disapproval.     

Macropartisanship in California

Political scientists have devoted considerable, well-justifiedattention to changes in macropartisanship at the national levelbut have generally ignored movement in aggregate party identificationat the American state level. The case of California is especiallyinteresting for a number of reasons, most notably because ofthe potential impact of rapid ethnic change on aggregate politicalattitudes. In this article we assess macropartisanship in theGolden State from 1980 through 2001, drawing on Field Pollsof California adults. We find that essentially there have beentwo eras in recent state history: a period of increasing Republicanidentification up to 1991 and an era of increasing Democraticidentification thereafter. Some of this apparent movement tothe Democrats among Californians as a whole is attributableto the increasing Latino share of the Field Poll samples andthe decision to offer the survey in Spanish. However, therehas also been movement toward the Democratic Party within ethnicand racial subgroups. This movement can be found to some degreein all major groups (except for African Americans, who werealready overwhelmingly identified with the Democratic Party),but it has been especially pronounced among Latinos and AsianAmericans. We consider possible reasons and discuss potentialimplications.     

THE POLITICIZATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S VIEWS OF GLOBAL WARMING, 2001–2010

We examine political polarization over climate change within the American public by analyzing data from 10 nationally representative Gallup Polls between 2001 and 2010. We find that liberals and Democrats are more likely to report beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus and express personal concern about global warming than are conservatives and Republicans. Further, the effects of educational attainment and self‐reported understanding on global warming beliefs and concern are positive for liberals and Democrats, but are weaker or negative for conservatives and Republicans. Last, significant ideological and partisan polarization has occurred on the issue of climate change over the past decade.     

Service gratuities and tipping: A motivational framework

In many countries around the world, consumers leave voluntary payments of money (called “tips”) to service workers who have served them. Since tips are an expense that consumers are free to avoid, tipping is an anomalous behavior that many economists regard as “irrational” or “mysterious”. In this paper, I present a motivational framework that offers plausible explanations for: (1) why people tip, (2) how tipping norms came into existence and evolve over time, (3) why tipping varies across individuals and situations, (4) why tipping is more common for some occupations than others, and (5) why tipping varies across nations. Many hypotheses generated from this framework are supported by existing research, but many other implications of the framework have yet to be adequately tested. Thus, the framework provides a promising and much needed theoretical guide for future research on a fascinating consumer behavior.     

More than ideology: perceived unfairness differentiates supporters of a new anti-austerity party from supporters of traditional left-wing parties / Más que ideología: la injusticia percibida diferencia a los simpatizantes de un nuevo partido antiausteridad de los simpatizantes de los partidos tradicionales de izquierda

After the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008, anti-austerity parties in South Europe have gained prominence and dramatically transformed the political landscape. In Spain, the emergence of PODEMOS, a left-wing, anti-austerity party, has jeopardized the traditional two-party system. However, little is known about the psychological reasons that prompted more than one million Spaniards to vote for a newly created party in its first elections. To fill this gap the present study examines why people intend to vote for PODEMOS as opposed to traditional left-wing parties. We found that in addition to conventional predictors of voting behaviour (ideological orientation and party identification), perceived unfairness — a key variable within the collective action theory — critically influenced the preference for PODEMOS as opposed to traditional left-wing parties. A qualitative analysis of the reasons that participants reported in an open question yielded similar results. These findings suggest that supporting an anti-austerity party might be considered a collective action aimed at promoting social change.     

What Drives the Voting on Abortion Policy? Investigating Partisanship and Religion in the State Legislative Arena

Abstract

Much of the public policy debate on abortion now centers in the nation's state capitals. This research assesses the impact of partisanship and religiosity on the voting behavior of state legislators. Recent research indicates that a legislator's religious affiliation and the religiosity of their home districts can be a powerful predictor of votes on abortion bills, but this research uses a unique data set developed to analyze voting in the Florida House of Representatives to re-test those ideas and test several new ones. This work challenges the notion that member religion or district religiosity is more influential than partisanship in predicting votes on abortion. Ordered probit techniques show partisanship, gender and legislator religion (for Catholic and Jewish members only), to be the most significant predictors of abortion voting behavior. A number of district characteristics are found to be less significant. Theoretically, this suggests that legislators fulfill their party obligations as trustee on the floor of the House, more so than following constituent interests in the classic delegate role, as originally noted by Burke.     

Contextual Models of Party Identification: A Critical Examination

A growing number of papers have appeared which report that the partisanship of the local context influences the party attachments of individual residents. The present paper criticizes this finding and the contextual approach to the study of partisan choice. First, the general mathematical model of contextual partisanship is derived from existing research. Next, a multiple data file, consisting of survey and aggregate evidence, is used to examine the generality of certain specific models. Finally, the same data file is employed to consider the effects of two assumptions common to contextual models, "random mixing" and nonselection. Only one of four specific models is initially found to fit observations. Further analysis reveals that individuals' party allegiances are spuriously attributed to contextual influences as a result of assuming random mixing and nonselection.     

Economic Influences on Presidential Popularity

Gallup data indicating presidential popularity from 1950 to1974 are analyzed in a distributed lag model which tests theimportance of key economic influences. Results indicate thatinflation and military expenditures are statistically significantand politically important influences on presidential popularity.The success of this model in revealing hitherto undetected economicinfluence calls into question the nonfindings of previous simplelinear analyses and suggests the need for more sophisticatedmodels which provide, through the use of time lags and cumulativeimpacts, a more complex pattern of economic influence on presidentialpopularity.     

Comparative Evaluation of the Local Police

Gallup data indicating presidential popularity from 1950 to1974 are analyzed in a distributed lag model which tests theimportance of key economic influences. Results indicate thatinflation and military expenditures are statistically significantand politically important influences on presidential popularity.The success of this model in revealing hitherto undetected economicinfluence calls into question the nonfindings of previous simplelinear analyses and suggests the need for more sophisticatedmodels which provide, through the use of time lags and cumulativeimpacts, a more complex pattern of economic influence on presidentialpopularity.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSISTENCE IN RESPONDENT SELECTION FOR PREELECTION SURVEYS

Different techniques for respondent selection can affect dataquality. These differences can result in variations in the distributionof partisans in preelection surveys, which in turn can havean effect on the distribution of candidate preference. Persistencein trying to interview designated respondents in telephone householdsincreased the number of Republicans in a 1984 sample, and thereforeReagan's margin over Mondale. Such differences in interviewingtechniques might account for some of the variations in nationalpreelection estimates of the outcome of the presidential election,and they suggest that caution be used in comparing marginalsfor party identification from different surveys employing differentrespondent selection techniques.     

Trade unionism in Canada and the United States: a reply to Bowden

Gary Bowden's (1989) comprehensive report on opinion poll questions bearing on Canadian trade unionism is presented in the context of a criticism of my earlier comparative discussion of the reasons why union density in Canada is much higher than in the United States. He contends that my emphasis on value differences in trying to account for the greater strength of unionism (and socialism) in Canada is wrong since, countering my expectations, survey findings do not demonstrate that Canadians are more sympathetic to unions than Americans. These results, however, do not surprise me or serve as a basic challenge to my analysis (Lipset, 1986). In my recent effort to evaluate the many differences in institutions and values in the two countries, I, too, indicate:
Curiously, given the large difference in union strength across the border, questions inquiring about attitudes toward unions, their power, and the outcomes of strikes that have been posed by the Gallup polls, Decima and CRI, Harris, NORC, and the Wright-Myles studies do not show Canadians as more pro-union than Americans. Some even find the population in the north less approving of unions and more concerned about union power, which in fact is much greater there than in the northern [sic] nation. (Lipset, 1989; 1990a: 69). [I must apologize here for an obvious error, northern clearly should have read southern].     

PATERNITY LEAVE AND FATHERS’ INVOLVEMENT WITH THEIR YOUNG CHILDREN

Unlike many European countries, the US has no national paternity leave policy giving fathers the right to take paid time off work following the birth (or adoption) of a child. Despite this, prior research suggests that many fathers do take some time off work after a child is born. However, little is known about the determinants, circumstances or consequences of paternal leave-taking. In this paper, we use the first wave of data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study–Birth Cohort (ECLS–B), a new nationally representative panel study of over 10,000 children born in 2001, to examine these questions. We make use of ECLS–B questions asked directly of resident fathers pertaining to their participation in a range of child care-taking activities, as well as a rich set of measures about the father, mother and child. We find that the overwhelming majority of fathers take at least some leave at the birth of their child, but that the length of that leave varies a good deal. Our results also indicate that fathers who take longer leave are more involved in child care-taking activities nine months later.