找到缺口 打开市场

<正> 研究表明,最先打开某种商品或服务市场的企业相对于那些后来者而言,有着很明显的优势。这些市场先行者很容易找到市场制高点,占据较高的市场份额。简单归纳此种情形发生的原因有三:第一,一般说来,消费者都属于风险规避类型。如果一种产品或一项服务一开始就已经给顾客带来了足够的满足感,那么他们将不愿意冒险去尝试新产品。第二,最先开辟某种市场的厂商所提供的产品     

电信客户服务知识管理刍议

随着经济的不断发展及经济一体化不断加速,电信市场的竞争也不断加强,企业的竞争已经转化为客户服务方面的竞争,而传统的商业模式已经不能够适应当期市场的需求,如何提高服务质量,增加服务种类和服务渠道,提高客户满意度和忠诚度,是电信行业当前客户服务的首要工作。     

企业经营的创新思路

企业在竞争激烈的市场中应该如何竞争？这是企业生存和发展的关键问题。特别是在今天的经营环境和市场特征正在发生巨大变化的背景下，企业唯有重塑竞争新理念，才能适应这种新变化从而持续健康地发展。不要只管价格，而要创造“价值”企业的一切经营活动都是围绕如何满足顾客需求而进行的，正如菲利普·科特勒所指出的“顾客是价值最大化者”。企业既然是以为顾客服务为宗旨，而顾客对满足其需求的产品又是有所选择的，那么，企业就必须为顾客创造出有“比较价值优势”的产品，即对顾客来说是有更多的实际用处、更完备的使用功能和更完善的…     

对竞争对手的再认识

由于竞争带来的后果有时是竞争对手夺取自己的市场份额 ,对于崇尚高市场份额的企业来说 ,竞争对手必须予以遏制乃至消灭。但是从战略角度上看 ,竞争对手的存在不仅不会削弱企业的市场地位 ,反而能使之得到加强。我们把这类竞争对手称之为有利的竞争对手。一、有利的竞争对手带来的战略好处有利的竞争对手至少在四个方面给企业带来战略好处 :１ 增强企业竞争优势。竞争对手可作为比较标准 ,显示企业特色化经营的能力。因为在缺少竞争对手的情况下 ,买方难以真正认识到企业创造的价值 ,及对其产品的价格和售后服务的比较。这样 ,买方会在产品…     

浅析人性视角下的政府绩效评估

一布雷德拉普说过“,竞争将由于全球化和顾客需求的日益深化而不断加剧。随着消费者面对着更多的产品和服务,他们对质量、服务和商品内在价值的期望也会相应地变得越来越高.只有不断改善组织的绩效,才能满足这种更高的期望,使得顾客满意。”企业要屹立于激烈的竞争中必然要时时     

丰田的市场竞争战略选择

企业战略是一种过程,处在不同时期的企业,对外部环境和企业内部资源、能力会有不同的认知,不同的战略选择是与企业当时的市场环境紧密联系的。在卖方经济中,大多数行业的产品供不应求,企业只要能生产出来产品它便能生存、发展,顾客关注的是产品的数量而非质量,使用价值而非价值,因此可以说,卖方经济中的企业是不需要竞争的。在买方经济中,随着人们收入和生活水平的提高,社会财富的不断增加,人们追求产品或服务的多样化和个性化,更加注重产品或服务提供的价值,企业之间的竞争日益激烈,要想在这样的环境中生存下来,企业就不得不考虑竞争,制定…     

提升顾客的忠诚度

利润是企业生存的前提,而顾客则是利润的源泉。在企业竞争的环境发生变化后,争取和保持顾客就成了企业生存和发展的使命。企业既要不断争取新顾客,开辟新市场,提高市场占有率,又要努力保持现有顾客培育忠诚顾客群,稳定市场占有率顾客忠诚对企业经营绩效所产生的巨大贡献日益成为人们关注的焦点企业要保持长期的竞争优势,就要充分认知顾客忠诚的价值,积极培育忠诚的顾客群体。顾客忠诚度是指顾客对企业产品和服务的认可和信赖,坚持长期购买和使用该企业的产品和服务,并在此过程中表现出的在心理和情感上的一种高度信任和忠诚的程度,是顾客对…     

卓越体验才能赢得顾客忠诚

在非垄断行业里,当代企业间竞争实质已转变为:无论企业采取何种竞争策略、构建何种竞争优势,归根结底都须围绕能否实现为消费者创造卓越的消费体验为核心,唯有此,才能真正赢得客户的认可和忠诚,并最终真正赢得市场竞争的胜利成果.忠诚顾客是盈利保证 实践表明,在消费者主导的市场条件下,顾客的品牌忠诚对企业的底线收益比市场份额、成本、盈利能力等因素相比具有更强的效应,顾客品牌忠诚是现代企业最宝贵、最可靠、最稳定的资产,其直接关系到企业的生死存亡. 研究也显示,保留顾客和公司利润率之间有着非常高的相关性,顾客保留的时间越长,从企业购买的商品和服务也越多,带给企业的价值也就越大;顾客不履约率下降5％,则公司利润率将上升25％-85％,而且开发一个新的顾客所花费的费用是保留一个顾客费用4-6倍左右.不仅如此,忠诚的顾客愿意接受溢价,而且经常通过向潜在顾客进行口碑推荐而为企业带来新的生意.     

制造商引入在线渠道的双渠道价格与服务竞争策略

为了削弱传统零售商在渠道博弈中的强势地位,制造商尝试引入直接在线渠道与传统零售商竞争。针对零售商价格领导权的渠道结构,本文在分析双渠道竞争时考虑了服务在战略决策中的价值,并将消费者区分为高服务偏好的消费者和低服务偏好的消费者。研究表明,仅当产品在线适合度足够高时,在零售商占主导权的渠道中,制造商引入在线渠道的战略效果才能实现,能导致制造商利润的增加,产品在线的适合度越高,利润提高越显著。当产品在线适合度足够高时,制造商引入在线渠道能够激励零售商提高服务质量,而且产品在线的适合度越高,服务质量提高越明显;在线渠道的引入能达到制造商和零售商双赢的效果;制造商利润和零售商利润都会随着高服务偏好消费者比例和服务的边际效用的提高而增加。     

浅谈供应链与企业采购管理

当今社会,企业要想占据市场竞争的有利地位必须了解顾客的需求,生产满足顾客需要的产品。发展现有的顾客、挖掘潜在的顾客是企业提升市场竞争力的有效手段,而在生产经营活动中如期、高效的向顾客提供产品,并向顾客提供优质的服务是企业获得市场竞争力的有力保障。企业的繁荣发展离不开供应商的支持与合作,企业需要在供应链的管理模式下做好企业的采购管理工作,以获得更多的市场份额。     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case

When firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for a competitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what happens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is used: exclusive capacity and first‐priority capacity. We model firms' investment and production decisions, and analyze the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one firm taps into the other firm's invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually discourages firms' investment. We also characterize the firms' and supplier's preference about the capacity type. While the non‐investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first‐priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to shut off the other firm's access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to invest. The supplier's preference depends on the trade‐off between over‐investment and flexibility.     

Quality‐Speed Competition in Customer‐Intensive Services with Boundedly Rational Customers

We consider a system in which two competing servers provide customer‐intensive services and the service reward is affected by the length of service time. The customers are boundedly rational and choose their service providers according to a logit model. We demonstrate that the service provider revenue function is unimodal in the service rate, its decision variable, and show that the service rate competition has a unique and stable equilibrium. We then study the price decision under three scenarios with the price determined by a revenue‐maximizing firm, a welfare‐maximizing social planner, or two servers in competition. We find that the socially optimal price, subject to the requirement that the customer actual utility must be non‐negative, is always lower than the competition equilibrium price which, in turn, is lower than the revenue‐maximizing monopoly price. However, if the customer actual utility is allowed to be negative in social optimization, the socially optimal price can be higher than the other two prices in a large market.     

竞争环境下的以旧换新策略

企业通过对拥有旧产品的老消费者提供以旧换新补贴能够提升自身销量与利润。然而，面临竞争对手时企业的以旧换新决策是否会受到影响?本文求解了先后进入市场的双寡头竞争企业所面临的以旧换新与定价博弈均衡，并分析了竞争存在与否对于企业以旧换新策略产生的影响。研究结果表明，第一，面对竞争时企业的定价决策受到市场中老消费者比例、两家竞争企业各自新产品的创新提升水平、老产品的使用残值这四个因素的共同影响。第二，当老产品残值相对较低而市场中老消费者数量适中时，两企业均不提供以旧换新可能成为博弈均衡，而其他条件下，两企业均提供以旧换新为博弈均衡。第三，先进入的企业没有动机单独为消费者提供以旧换新补贴。第四，竞争对手的存在对于先进入企业自身的以旧换新决策与相应的定价策略都产生了显著的影响。     

劣势耐用品厂商的产品质保期与质保服务投入策略研究

在实际中，消费者购买耐用品时均同时获得厂商提供的质保服务，由于产品质保服务影响着消费者的产品使用效用，因此耐用品定价、质保期和产品质保服务投入是影响厂商利润的主要因素。考虑双寡头市场环境下，建立微分博弈模型讨论单位产品质保服务投入和产品质保期对双寡头厂商均衡价格的影响。结论表明双寡头厂商的单位产品质保服务投入越高、质保期越长，均衡价格越高；但单位产品保服务投入与质保服务对消费者效用影响系数的关系影响着竞争对手在均衡价格的变化趋势；劣势的低质量厂商可以通过增加单位产品质保服务投入策略或延长质保期的策略实现在均衡下与高质量厂商以同等价格销售耐用品，但劣势厂商增加单位产品质保服务投入策略要优于延长质保期策略。最后，利用数值分析进一步验证了所得结论的有效性。     

Compliance Strategies under Permits for Emissions

We characterize the trade‐offs among firms' compliance strategies in a market‐based program where a regulator interested in controlling emissions from a given set of sources auctions off a fixed number of emissions permits. We model a three‐stage game in which firms invest in emissions abatement, participate in a share auction for permits, and produce output. We develop a methodology for a profit‐maximizing firm to derive its marginal value function for permits and translate this value function into an optimal bidding strategy in the auction. We analyze two end‐product market scenarios independent demands and Cournot competition. In both scenarios we find that changing the number of available permits influences abatement to a lesser extent in a dirty industry than in a cleaner one. In addition, abatement levels taper off with increasing industry dirtiness levels. In the presence of competition, firms in a relatively clean industry can, in fact, benefit from a reduction in the number of available permits. Our findings are robust to changes in certain modeling assumptions.     

基于产品安全责任的供应链激励与竞争策略

从产品安全责任入手，基于批发价格合同，运用博弈论的基本思想，对四种情景中供应链的均衡进行分析："非竞争与非激励协调"、"非竞争与激励协调"、"竞争与非激励协调"和"竞争与激励协调"。结果显示：适度的批发价格合同激励协调措施能够提升制造商履行产品安全责任水平、市场需求量、供应链及其各成员的期望收益，但过度激励会降低市场需求量与分销商的期望收益，进而阻滞供应链总期望收益的增加；竞争将降低市场需求量、供应链及其各成员的期望收益；低度激励时竞争将降低制造商履行产品安全责任水平，高度激励时竞争将提升制造商履行产品安全责任水平；供应链采用批发价格合同激励协调机制能够增强其对外部的竞争能力，但过度竞争将降低制造商履行产品安全责任水平，进而对供应链及其各成员的利益造成损害。研究成果对供应链的产品安全责任管理实践有重要的指导意义。     

The Effect of Competition on R&D Portfolio Investments

Although project portfolio management has been an active research area over the past 50 years, budget allocation models that consider competition are sparse. Faced with the competition, firms contemplating budget allocation for their project portfolio cannot limit their attention to the returns from their projects' target markets, as is the case for monopoly firms, but must also anticipate the competitive effects on these returns. Assuming firms allocate their budgets between projects offering incremental innovation targeting a mature market and projects offering radical innovation targeting an emerging market, we show that while the monopoly firm bases its budget allocation decision solely on the marginal returns of the markets, competing firms—as they take into account their counterparts' investment decisions—need to also consider the projects' average returns from their respective markets. This drives competing firms into incrementalism: faced with competition, firms invest larger portions of their budgets into projects targeting mature markets. This effect is amplified as the number of competing firms increases and firms allocate an even greater share of their budget into projects targeting a mature market. We further demonstrate the effects that changes to firms' individual budgets, as well as to market characteristics, have on firms' budget allocation decision.     

电子商务市场特征对产品创新影响的实证研究

根据电子商务价值理论,电子商务企业进行产品创新能有效提升或创造客户价值,但电子商务市场环境因素可能会影响电子商务企业的产品创新,而已有关于产品创新的研究大多聚焦于传统市场。依据电子商务客户价值、从众行为、多重创新、组织学习和信息过载等理论,以电子商务市场的两个主要特征市场信息和竞争强度为前导变量,构建它们对于电子商务企业产品创新倾向和电子商务企业绩效的影响模型,并提出变量间关系假设。通过收集中国最大B2C平台天猫商城内309家电子商务企业的数据,应用多元回归分析方法实证检验电子商务市场特征对产品创新的影响。研究结果表明,电子商务企业产品创新正向影响企业绩效;市场信息促进电子商务企业产品创新,但其效用受竞争强度的反向调节;竞争强度显著加强电子商务企业的产品创新倾向且不会影响企业创新绩效,因为在当前电子商务发展阶段和电子商务市场特性的作用下,产品创新能获得熊彼得租金,主导产品创新的是竞争脱离效应而非熊彼得效应。本研究结论对电子商务企业实践具有一定的指导意义。     

A real options model of market entry: Endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty

We develop a real options model of market entry that focuses on the dueling growth and deferral options by differentiating between endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty. While exogenous uncertainty influences the growth option market value or price, it is endogenous uncertainty that influences the value of the growth option through the ability to create a competitive advantage from preemptive market entry. First, the firm can decrease the exercise price of the growth option (i.e., the cost of the follow-on investment) through experiential learning that reduces endogenous uncertainty. Second, the firm can increase the relative discounted cash flows of the follow-on investment due to its ability to influence market demand that reduces endogenous uncertainty. On the other hand, the value of the deferral option increases with exogenous uncertainty as firms cannot influence exogenous uncertainty, and therefore, should invest elsewhere while waiting for the exogenous uncertainty to subside. As such, we provide a solution to the conundrum that the value of both the growth option and the deferral option increase with uncertainty. Finally, we demonstrate how the model addresses sequential market entry; irreversibility and market entry mode; competition; scarce strategic resources; host country development level; and industry life cycle stage.