Pay‐Back‐Revenue‐Sharing Contract in Coordinating Supply Chains with Random Yield

We consider coordination issues in supply chains where supplier's production process is subject to random yield losses. For a simple supply chain with a single supplier and retailer facing deterministic demand, a pay back contract which has the retailer paying a discount price for the supplier's excess units can provide the right incentive for the supplier to increase his production size and achieve coordination. Building upon this result, we consider coordination issues for two other supply chains: one with competing retailers, the other with stochastic demand. When retailers compete for both demand and supply, they tend to over‐order. We show that a combination of a pay back and revenue sharing mechanism can coordinate the supply chain, with the pay back mechanism correcting the supplier's under‐producing problem and the revenue sharing mechanism correcting the retailers' over‐ordering problem. When demand is stochastic, we consider a modified pay‐back‐revenue‐sharing contract under which the retailer agrees to not only purchase the supplier's excess output (beyond the retailer's order), but also share with the supplier a portion of the revenue made from the sales of the excess output. We show that this contract, by giving the supplier additional incentives in the form of revenue share, can achieve coordination.     

一个考虑回收契约的两级供应链库存决策模型研究

讨论了一个季节性商品销售环境下的两级供应链库存决策模型,在分析传统回收契约模型的基础上,引入了一个特殊的回收契约,讨论不同契约参数下供应链成员的最优决策.研究表明,在该契约下通过合理的契约参数设计,供应链可以实现帕累托改进.用一个算例对结论进行了说明.     

消费者低碳偏好下的供应链收益共享契约研究

在消费者对低碳产品存在偏好并且企业自愿减排的假定下,探讨了在由单个供应商与单个零售商构成的两级供应链中零售商确定最佳订货水平和供应商选择减少碳排放水平的决策问题。研究发现单位产品碳排放过大时,供应商不会选择减排;当单位排放较低时,选择减排战略会改善供应商和零售商的收益状况,可以实现供应链成员收益的帕累托改进;而当单位排放处于两者之间时,选择减排战略会使供应商的收益状况变差,使零售商的收益和供应链总体收益增加,虽然存在着改善供应链渠道收益状况的空间,但供应商没有减排动力,减排无法实施。针对这一问题,本文设计了收益共享契约来协调两者之间的关系,实现了帕累托改进。最后,利用Rubinstein讨价还价模型来分析分成比例在给定区间确定问题。     

Supply Contract Design for Competing Heterogeneous Suppliers under Asymmetric Information

This study considers a supply chain with two heterogeneous suppliers and a common retailer whose type is either low‐volume or high‐volume. The retailer's type is unknown to the suppliers. The flexible supplier has a high variable cost and a low fixed cost, while the efficient supplier has a low variable cost and a high fixed cost. Each supplier offers the retailer a menu of contracts. The retailer chooses the contract that maximizes its expected profit. For this setting, we characterize the equilibrium contract menus offered by the suppliers to the retailer. We find that the equilibrium contract menus depend on which supplier–retailer match can generate the highest supply chain profit and on how much information rent the supplier may need to pay. An important feature of the equilibrium contract menus is that the contract assigned to the more profitable retailer will coordinate the supply chain, while the contract assigned to the less profitable retailer may not. In addition, in some circumstances, the flexible supplier may choose not to serve the high‐volume retailer, in order to avoid excessive information rent.     

Push and Pull Contracts in a Local Supply Chain with an Outside Market*

Wholesale price contracts are widely studied in a single supplier‐single retailer supply chain, but without considering an outside market where the supplier may sell if he gets a high enough price and the retailer may buy if the price is low enough. We fill this gap in the literature by studying push and pull contracts in a local supplier–retailer supply chain with the presence of an outside market. Taking the local supplier's maximum production capacity and the outside market barriers into account, we identify the Pareto set of the push and/or pull contracts and draw managerial implications. The main results include the following. First, the most inefficient point of the pull Pareto set cannot always be removed by considering both the push and pull contracts. Second, the supplier's production capacity plays a significant role in the presence of an outside market; it affects the supplier's negotiating power with the retailer and the coordination of the supply chain can be accomplished only with a large enough capacity. Third, the import and export barriers influence the supply chain significantly: (i) an export barrier in the local market and the supplier's production capacity influence the supplier's export strategy; (ii) a low import (resp., export) barrier in the local market can improve the local supply chain's efficiency by use of a push (resp., pull) contract; and (iii) a high import (resp., export) barrier in the local market encourages the supplier (resp., retailer) to bear more inventory risk.     

Coordination of Supply Chains with Risk‐Averse Agents

The extant supply chain management literature has not addressed the issue of coordination in supply chains involving risk‐averse agents. We take up this issue and begin with defining a coordinating contract as one that results in a Pareto‐optimal solution acceptable to each agent. Our definition generalizes the standard one in the risk‐neutral case. We then develop coordinating contracts in three specific cases: (i) the supplier is risk neutral and the retailer maximizes his expected profit subject to a downside risk constraint; (ii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own mean‐variance trade‐off; and (iii) the supplier and the retailer each maximizes his own expected utility. Moreover, in case (iii), we show that our contract yields the Nash Bargaining solution. In each case, we show how we can find the set of Pareto‐optimal solutions, and then design a contract to achieve the solutions. We also exhibit a case in which we obtain Pareto‐optimal sharing rules explicitly, and outline a procedure to obtain Pareto‐optimal solutions.     

公平偏好和销售努力下供应链期权契约协调

考虑公平中性的供应商将报童类商品售给公平偏好的零售商,商品需求随机且受销售努力影响。刻画了期权契约下零售商关于实物和期权商品采购及销售努力的联合策略,设计了协调供应链的期权契约和促销成本分担机制。研究表明：在确保零售商参与供应链下,无论契约参数如何设计,零售商要么仅采购实物商品,要么同时购买实物商品和期权;且仅当设计的契约能诱导零售商购买期权时,供应链的协调才可能实现。探讨了公平偏好对零售商策略和协调契约的影响,结果表明：零售商越偏好公平,实物商品采购量和努力水平越低,但期权购买量依赖于契约参数之间的关系;协调契约可行域随公平偏好程度递减,但始终存在;在协调契约下,零售商的策略选择与公平偏好程度无关。最后实施了数值分析。     

Managing Slow‐Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry

We address the value of information and value of centralized control in the context of a two‐echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provide a single perishable product to consumers. Our analysis is relevant for managing slow‐moving perishable products with fixed lot sizes and expiration dates of a week or less. We evaluate two supply chain structures. In the first structure, referred to as decentralized information sharing, the retailer shares its demand, inventory, and ordering policy with the supplier, yet both facilities make their own profit‐maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, centralized control, incentives are aligned and the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company‐owned stores or vendor‐managed inventory. We measure the value of information and value of centralized control as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared and decision making is decentralized. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing and centralized control in the supply chain and identify conditions under which benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the value of information, the major benefit in our setting is driven by the supplier's ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto‐improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.     

Coordinating a Supply Chain System with Retailers Under Both Price and Inventory Competition

We investigate a supply chain system with a common supplier selling to downstream retailers who are engaged in both price and inventory competition. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium for the retailer game and study how a supplier can coordinate the system to achieve the best performance. Our main conclusions are as follows: First, a buyback contract can be used to coordinate retailers competing on both price and inventory in a sense that optimal retail prices and inventory levels arise as the Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. With symmetric retailers, the system optimum arises as the unique symmetric equilibrium. Second, the particular type of competition experienced by retailers (price versus inventory competition) affects the characteristics of the contract. Specifically, strong price competition leads to a coordination mechanism with a positive buyback rate, where the supplier subsidizes retailers for leftover inventories; however, strong inventory competition leads to a negative buyback rate, where retailers are punished for overstocking. Using a linear expected demand function, we further explore the impact of system parameters on the coordination contract and the competitive equilibrium. We also find that the performance of the supplier's optimal contract is asymptotic to the system optimal coordination contract as competition becomes fierce.     

供应商保鲜努力的生鲜农产品双渠道供应链协调决策研究

在互联网迅猛发展的时代,生鲜农产品双渠道营销模式是供应商的最佳选择,如何发挥双渠道优势,实现渠道共赢是目前研究的热点。以供应商主导的双渠道供应链为研究对象,考虑新鲜度衰减且扰动需求和供应商保鲜努力,对比分析集中和分散决策模型,论证构建协调模型的必要性。从渠道合作和利润最大化的角度出发,设计两部定价契约、批发价协调契约和由成本分担与补偿策略构成的混合协调契约,三种契约均能在一定范围内有效实现供应链协调,提高各成员的利润。最后,对比分析所设计协调契约以认识其本质,并通过数值分析验证其有效性。     

零售商主导型供应链绩效的行为博弈分析

零售商主导型供应链中供应商与零售商的矛盾日益加深,为对该类型供应链作出Pareto改进,研究强势零售商压低供应商批量价格的行为对零售商主导型供应链绩效的影响。首先分别应用经典博弈论和行为博弈论的工具建立完全理性和有限理性背景下供应商和零售商决策的博弈模型,据此将零供双方的交易行为划分为4个不同的演进阶段,最后根据模型的均衡解计算不同演进阶段供应链中各方的绩效,并将结果进行比较。研究结果表明,无论处于交易行为演进的哪个阶段,供应商的绩效都不会优于公平交易下的绩效,零售商和供应链的绩效也不会一直优于公平交易下的绩效。因此,消除零售商对供应商批量价格的打压行为、恢复供应链上下游公平的交易状态是对该类型供应链进行Pareto改进的重要途径之一。     

混合碳政策下两产品供应链的协同研究

本文在碳税-碳交易并行的混合碳政策下，面对存在低碳偏好的市场，以单一制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链为研究对像，考虑其生产和销售存在一定竞争关系或替代关系的两种不同产品时，供应链企业的最优定价和减排决策，并改进收益共享契约，提出通过构造同解方程进行契约设计的新思路。研究发现，制造商和零售商采用改进的收益共享契约可以使得自身利益实现帕累托改进，并确保供应链的整体利润达到帕累托最优，而契约中的收益共享金额主要取决于双方的溢价能力和其在供应链中的地位，只要它在特定范围内波动，供应链就可以实现协同。最后，利用数值例子验证了上述结论。     

基于收益共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制

研究了单个供应商和单个零售商构成的供应链中,零售商采用收益共享契约对供应链成员质量控制决策的协调作用。分析了使用收益共享契约、供应商与零售商合作、使用批发价格契约三种情况下供应链成员的博弈均衡,并进一步通过比较讨论了收益共享契约对于供应链成员质量控制的优势和局限。研究表明,当销售量的变化对产品质量改进的敏感程度较高时,收益共享契约的协调效果较好,但对于零售商来说,虽然其利润高于采用批发价格契约,可利润份额却有所下降,这意味着收益共享契约对供应商更有利。     

价格柔性合同下的原材料采购策略及风险分析

为了降低原材料价格波动给采购-供应双方企业带来的风险,供应链企业通常采用签订价格合同的方式来共同分担原材料价格波动的风险。本文通过设计价格柔性合同,利用Stackelberg主从博弈模型研究了由一个供应商和一个制造商组成的采购系统的最优采购策略及原材料价格波动风险的分担机制。研究表明,通过实施价格柔性合同可以降低供应双方的风险,且通过设置合理的价格柔性系数可以提高双方的收益。     

三级供应链应对突发事件的价格折扣契约研究

针对一个供应商-制造商-零售商构成的三级供应链,在考虑随机性需求基础上,探讨突发事件对三级供应链的影响,同时改进了协调供应链的价格折扣契约,使之具有抗突发事件性,并讨论利润分配情况,最后通过仿真给出具体的算例.     

考虑初创企业的供应链融资与期权交易策略

考虑单供应商、单零售商组成的二级供应链，零售商作为初创企业面临资金短缺，但可以通过供应商贷款获得资金。除了提供资金支持，供应商还为零售商提供期权合约供其采购产品。通过对供应商期权价格和贷款利率，以及零售商的采购和融资策略进行分析，结论显示当产品生产成本较高时，供应商会设置较高的期权价格和贷款利率，获取整个供应链的利润。零售商期望利润为0并且面临较高的破产风险，而此时的博弈均衡是不稳定的。为了获得稳定博弈均衡，供应商需要稍微降低期权价格或贷款利率，以使零售商获得正的期望利润，此时零售商采购量会趋近于一个固定值。当生产成本较低时，供应商和零售商之间能够达到稳定的均衡解，且双方均有正的期望利润。     

Coordinating contracts for a financially constrained supply chain

We consider a financially constrained supply chain in which a supplier (leader) sells products to a retailer (follower) who has no access to bank financing due to her low credit rating. However, the supplier can borrow from a bank and offer trade credit to the retailer to alleviate her financial constraint. Failure to pay off a bank loan or trade credit incurs a variable default cost. We analyze the centralized version of the supply chain to obtain new coordination requirements. We then examine whether revenue-sharing, buyback, and all-unit quantity discount contracts can coordinate our supply chain. We show that the all-unit quantity discount contract fails to coordinate. However, the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts can coordinate the supply chain, but only when the supply chain has a sufficient total working capital. Moreover, they cannot allocate profit flexibly unless the supplier has a large enough working capital. Finally, we design a generalized revenue-sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain with flexible profit allocation, and also show by numerical examples its superiority over the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts.     

销售商费用信息不完全下的回收合约

回收合约是一种非常流行的合约。但是,到目前为止,大多数的文献都假定合约的提出者知道供应商和销售商的费用结构。本文考虑不完全信息下的回收合约。供应商提出合约,但不知道零售商的费用结构。在这种情况下,我们研究回收合约的设计及对供应商、销售商和供应链的影响。我们的结论显示,如果合约的设计者不知道销售商的费用结构,他就不可能设计出使供应链达到合作的合约。这就说明共享销售商的费用信息是有价值的。     

物流联合外包下库存管理模式对供应链运作的影响

针对由供应商、第三方物流服务商和零售商组成的供应链,考虑供需双方将物流服务联合外包给第三方物流服务商、共同承担运费的情形,探究供应商管理库存和寄售库存两类库存管理模式的引入对供应链运作及合同设计的影响。分别在传统的零售商管理库存、仅引入寄售库存的零售商管理寄售库存以及同时引入供应商管理库存和寄售库存的供应商管理寄售库存三种模式下,构建了第三方物流服务商主导、供应商和零售商跟随的序贯非合作博弈模型,证明了所有模式下均衡的订购量/寄售量均存在且唯一,并探讨了均衡结果随零售商运费分摊比例、转移支付价格两个关键参数的变化。横向对比三种模式下的均衡结果和集中决策下的最优结果,发现：零售商管理库存模式下的均衡订购量总是低于零售商管理寄售库存模式以及集中决策下的结果,而其他库存管理模式下的订购量并非一定低于集中决策下的结果;不同库存管理模式下,均衡状态下的订购量/寄售量及供应链总的期望收益大小关系取决于供应商和零售商的类边际(毛利)贡献率,从而表明,供应链环境下,上下游成员企业的收益结构、盈利水平等对于库存决策及库存模式的选取有重要影响。此外,在绝大多数情形下,不同库存管理模式下的均衡订购量与集中决...     

基于报童模型的两级供应链回购契约协调研究

研究具有单一供应商和单一销售商的供应链系统回购契约协调机制。分析了报童模型下两级供应链双边际化效应,建立了基于报童模型的分散式系统、集中式系统的供应商、销售商利润模型,讨论了如何通过回购契约来消除"双边际化效应"。结果表明:回购契约的采用使批发价格比不采用契约时的批发价格低,且使订货量增加,从而使供应链的总利润增加,并且减少了缺货带来的损失,同时更好的满足了顾客需要。最终实现了独立个体最优决策与系统最优决策一致化的供应链协调。