Vygotsky,Wittgenstein, and sociocultural theory

This paper considers the use made of Vygotsky's work by many who take a sociocultural perspective and, in particular, by those who use his work to advance a particular view of second language acquisition and the ‘silent period’. It is argued that Vygotsky's account as represented in Thought and Language (Vygotsky, 1986 ) needs to be thought of as consisting of two distinct aspects: first, the observations he made (or claimed to have made) and, second, the theoretical account he proposed to explain them. It is shown that some of Vygotsky's observations are problematic but that, even if they are accepted, Vygotsky's theoretical account suffers from fundamental difficulties. Thus the support claimed from Vygotsky in accounts of second language acquisition is misplaced, first because of those difficulties and, second, because many who claim support from Vygotsky, do not need or even use his theory but instead focus their attention on his empirical observations and assume incorrectly that if their own empirical observations match Vygotsky's, then Vygotsky's theory can be accepted. Wittgenstein's later philosophy is shown to provide a perspective which dispels confusions about, and gives us a clearer insight into, the issues.     

Karl Marx's sociological theory of democracy: Civil society and political rights

This essay reconstructs Marx's relationship to democracy and liberalism through an examination of his early work which was directly concerned with the issues of understanding democracy as a kind of society. Only with an analysis of the dynamics of civil society—a political economic, sociological, and historical understanding—could the true nature of citizenship be discerned. In contradistinction to liberal political theory, he would argue that political theory could not stand on its own if it analyzed only the state. Marx came to understand the contradiction between the liberal state and civil society as what he called a sophistry because it undermined the possibility of the democratic agency of workers. This was a sophistry, not because he opposed political democracy, but because the development of capitalism undermined the possibility of democratic agency. Citizenship could be nothing but a “lion's skin” of politics concealing the nature of civil society beneath it. This contradiction would drive Marx's thought forward as he moved from liberalism to democratic socialism with his developing understanding of the structure and dynamics of capitalism from 1843 until the end of his life. The essay illustrates two closely related claims about Marx's thought regarding liberalism and democracy. First, I argue that Marx engaged in a democratic critique of liberalism; second, and as a response to his democratic critique of liberalism, Marx developed a more sociological understanding of democracy, and hence believed that political democracy was a necessary condition of freedom, though not a sufficient condition.     

Toward a theory of myth

James Cresswell provides a thoughtful critique of my essay on a theory of myth (Mills) with a specific focus on the nature of theorizing that challenges the dogma of empirical frames of reference, concluding that scientific theories themselves are contemporary myths. Insofar as myth is an attempt to provide a narrative or discourse about phenomena, Cresswell's argument could apply to any theory. But he takes this point further: theory is synonymous with myth. In order to unpack this evocative claim, it may prove useful to revisit how theory and myth relate to the concepts of logos, truth, ontology and identity. In the end, I suggest theory is not myth because theory sets out to describe, interpret and explain phenomena and is scrutinized for its validity, generalizability and applied consequences, while the premises of myth are often historically and culturally presupposed or simply devolve into belief that may or may not be defensible.     

Shedding Some (More) Light in Bourdieu's Habitus and Doxa: A Socio-Phenomenological Approach

In this paper, I attempt to shed more light in Bourdieu's habitus and doxa, by drawing on phenomenological and Bourdieusian-based literature, social theory and some findings from sociological research. Despite the fact that there is a vast work concerning the examination of these two concepts, there are still some misunderstandings about them. For that reason, I have tried to draw a clearer picture of habitus, by linking it with phenomenological “being-in-the-world” and describing its elements. As for doxa, I discuss its conceptual relation with habitus and phenomenology's natural attitude. Also, attention is given to some aspects of both habitus and doxa, which have not addressed in detailed fashion yet, but they are nevertheless theoretically useful for empirical qualitative research.     

Abstracts

The concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ as the means by which individuals interpret the ‘rules’ of social interaction occupies a central role in all the major contemporary theories of action and social structure. The major reference point for social theorists is Wittgenstein's celebrated discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. Focusing on Giddens' incorporation of tacit knowledge and rules into his ‘theory of structuration’, I argue that Wittgenstein's later work is steadfastly set against the ‘latent cognitivism’ inherent in the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules. I also argue that the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules is either incoherent or explanatorily vacuous. Scholars of the emotions maintain that all anger requires an object of blame. In order to be angry, many writers argue, one must believe than an actor has done serious damage to something that one values. Yet an individual may be angered without blaming another. This kind of emotion, called situational anger, does not entail a corresponding object of blame. Situational anger can be a useful force in public life, enabling citizens to draw attention to the seriousness of social or political problems, without necessarily vilifying political officials. In the first half of this paper I show how H. L. A. Hart's theory of rules can resolve, or at least clarify, a central methodological problem in legal anthropology that was first posed in Llewellyn and Egebel's The Cheyenñe Way In the second half I explore and develop Hart's theory (a) of rules, and apply it to problems of agency and behaviourism in legal anthropology, and (b) of legal development, and apply it to the problem of rule-scepticism in legal anthropology as it is posed in Roberts and Comaroffs Rules and Processes and elsewhere. As human beings, we share many historically developed, language-game interwoven, public forms of life. Due to the joint, dialogically responsive nature of all social life within such forms, we cannot as individuals just act as we please; our forms of life exert a normative influence on what we can say and do. They act as a backdrop against which all our claims to knowledge are judged as acceptable or not. As a result, it is not easy to articulate their inadequacies in a clear and forceful manner. However, within most of our forms of life, we have a first-person right to express how our individual circumstances seem to us. And by the use of special forms of poetic, gestural talk—talk that can originate new language-games—we can offer to make our own ‘inner lives’ public. In this paper, I want to claim that this is just what Wittgenstein is attempting to do in his later philosophy: by use of the self-same methods that anyone might use to express aspects of their own world picture, he is offering us his attempts to make the background ‘landscape’ of our lives more visible to us. These methods are explored below. Proponents of the view that social structures are ontologically distinct from the people in whose actions they are immanent have assumed that structures can stand in causal relations to individual practices. Were causality to be no more than Humean concomitance correlations between structure and practices would be unproblematic. But two prominent advocates of the ontological account of structures, Bhaskar and Giddens, have also espoused a powers theory of causality. According to that theory causation is brought about by the activity of particulars, in the social psychological case, individuals of some sort. Consistence would demand that structure be those individuals. But neither Giddens nor Bhaskar wish to reify structure to the extent that would fit it for a role as a powerful particular. If only human beings can be powerful particulars in these contexts, the only way that structures can be real must be as properties of conversational (symbolic) interactions. Human action is social just in so far as people direct themselves to engage well in joint activities with others.     

Microfinance Participation and Women's Decision-Making Power in the Household in Bangladesh

ABSTRACT

This study draws from bargaining theory to examine whether microfinance, a range of financial instruments such as micro-loans to support micro-enterprises, affects women's participation in household decision-making operationalized by whether women play a role in household decisions about large purchases, small purchases, going out to meet friends and family, and health care among a nationally representative sample of 6,150 women between the ages of 15 and 49 years in Bangladesh. Bargaining theory suggests that decision-making in households is conflictual but conflict can be mitigated through bargaining. Central to bargaining power of women is control over resources, assuming that household decision-making involves making economic decisions. Logistic regression analysis was used to test the interaction effect of microfinance and control over resources on decision-making power in the household utilizing the nationally representative Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2011. Results revealed that microfinance participants with control over resources reported higher odds of decision-making power (OR = 4.3, p < 0.05) when compared to microfinance participants without control over resources (OR = 1.22, p < 0.05) but less than women who did not participate in microfinance but had control over resources (OR = 5.2; p < 0.05). In conclusion, control over resources play an important role in bargaining that increases odds of having decision-making power in the household, even for women who do not participate in microfinance. The study findings contribute to both social work practice and research on low-income populations as it allows an understanding of the importance financial access and financial know-how while it sheds light on how precarious women's lives can be as they navigate income-generating financial systems that interfere with gender norms, which may have negative consequences. These findings are particularly important for practitioners working in the area of women's empowerment who would do well to emphasize the need for building financial capability so that women are able to garner control over their own and familial resources, whether or not they participate in empowerment programs like microfinance, which in turn gives women voice and agency. Meanwhile, future researchers are well positioned to examine the kinds of specific skills that best predict increases in women's decision-making power in the household as well how gender dynamics play into the decision-making process.     

Badiou and the philosophy of social work: a reply to Stephen Webb

Imre R. Badiou and the philosophy of social work: a reply to Stephen Webb Int J Soc Welfare 2010: 19: 253–258 © 2010 The Author, Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the International Journal of Social Welfare. Stephen Webb's recent article ‘Against diversity and difference in social work’ claims that the work of Alain Badiou has the potential to be of great use in social work practice. Webb is faced with the problem of a discourse that has eroded any practical meaning attached to notions of diversity and difference, he laments the ‘ethical turn’ in social work practice and blames post‐modernism. Webb views the work of Badiou as a way to reinvigorate social work practice. I claim that Badiou's Being and Event is exclusive to ontology. Connections between Being and Event and possible ‘uses’ of Badiou's subtractive ontology, as an instrumentalisation, are not worthwhile. Critiquing Badiou's non‐ontological philosophies and political polemics is a better way to assess the practicality of his thought outside of his ontology. Webb's conflation of post‐modernism, neoliberalism and the difference, diversity and ethics discourse is also problematic and is critiqued here.     

Developing creative solutions to the problems of children and their families: communicative reason and the use of forum theatre

The paper represents a further development of work previously reported in this journal by Spratt & Houston (1999) and Spratt et al. (2000) . The authors have sought to develop ways of understanding current social work with children and families in line with the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas. This analysis has been complemented by an adoption of the methodology of the radical dramatist, Augusto Boal. In synthesizing Habermas's analysis of communicative discourses with the consciousness raising methodology of Boal, the authors have already demonstrated the effectiveness of this hybrid in problem‐solving exercises with social workers. The present paper reports on an application of this developing theory to practice, utilizing the centrepiece of Boal's method, forum theatre. A forum theatre project, concerned with the issue of bullying, is described and evaluated. It is argued that the project provides an exemplar of an innovative, democratizing and effective methodology that might profitably be utilized in social work with children and families. Finally, suggestions are made as to how these ideas could be developed in practice.     

Micro‐situational Foundations of Social Structure: An Interactionist Exploration of Affective Sanctioning

Micro‐interaction dynamics of affective sanctioning have been widely acknowledged but rarely related to the emergence of social phenomena. This paper aims to highlight the constitutive force of interaction activity by critically analysing two sociological models, Bourdieu's theory of practice and Barnes's Performative Theory of Social Institutions (PTSI). Such a comparison allows me to reveal two differing models of social phenomena currently operating in sociological debates: an extrinsic structuralist model which tacitly conveys macro‐structural phenomena as prior and determinant of individuals and their micro‐interactions, and an intrinsic structuralism model which prioritizes individuals’ interactions and conceives them as constituting both the individual and the structural. I argue that the latter's emphasis on the dynamics of mutual susceptibility to affective sanctioning as underpinning consensus among inherently heterogeneous individuals provides a platform to further support the tenets of Interactionism and helps to expose Bourdieu's over‐deterministic methodological individualism prevalent in most sociological theory. I conclude that by conceiving emotions as causal, rather than the effect of social forces, sociological theory can provide an explanation of both individual practices and systemic phenomena which resolves macro‐structural tensions. In doing so, I suggest an ontological understanding of the “social” which supports the Interactionist central tenet that the local takes priority over wider structural phenomena.     

Conceptualizing and Theorizing About the Idea of a “Post‐Racial” Era

I critically examine the eliminativist theories of race or racism, and the behavioral theory of racism, which provide the theoretical foundation, respectively, for the nominalist and substantive conceptualizations of the idea of a post‐racial era. The eliminativist theories seek to eliminate the concepts of “race” or “racism” from our discourse. Such elimination indicates a nominalist sense of the idea of a post‐racial era. The behavioral theory of racism argues that racism must be manifested in obviously harmful actions. And because such harmful actions are not prevalent today, this implies that we are in a post‐racial era in a substantive sense. I conceptualize some subtle forms of racism that are prevalent today, which cannot be captured by the behavioral theory, but can best be captured by doxastic theories of racism. I conceptualize a substantive idea of a post‐racial era, and then argue based on such conceptualization, that we are not in a post‐racial era because subtle forms of racism are still prevalent today.     

A personal reflective account: The impact of the collation and sharing of information during the course of a child protection investigation

This paper provides a subjective, personal account of the impact and effect which the collation and sharing of information had and continues to have on my family during the course of a child protection investigation. By sharing my story I hope to preserve my unique, subjective experience in the midst of an impersonal and highly invasive bureaucratic process in an attempt to bridge the power divide between the professional and parent. I do not attempt to analyse theory but rather feelings, and identify the differing perceptions of those involved. The importance of the professional maintaining an open mind and challenging any preconceived assumptions or judgements about a family is also stressed. Child protection work must ensure that policies and practice comply with the rights laid down in the Human Rights Act (1998) and the professionals involved must be seen to promote and protect the rights of all vulnerable individuals.     

On the potential cost effectiveness of scientific audits

The rationale for the routine performance of scientific audits has been previously discussed, and it has been proposed that independent professionals audit scientific data just as certified public accountants in independent public accounting firms audit financial data (1–4). Scientific audits would typically require the examination of data in laboratory notebooks and other work sheets, upon which research publications are based. Examples of such audits have been publicized recently, although these represent audits which have been conducted relatively inefficiently, over periods of several years per audit, and which have only been conducted due to the persistence of whistleblowers suspecting scientific fraud (5, 6). A detailed report has also appeared on the results of an audit of the research activities of a particular individual, where the audit was limited solely to an examination of the research publications themselves for errors and discrepancies (7). It should be emphasized that the purpose of conducting scientific audits is not only to detect fabrication of experimental results but also to monitor presumably more prevalent, non‐fraudulent, inappropriate practices, such as misrepresentation of data, inaccurate reporting, and departure from institutional guidelines for handling hazardous materials, working with human subjects, etc.

Two concerns which have been raised concerning the performance of scientific audits relate to cost. What would they cost, and who would pay for them? These questions, however, may be turned around. What does it cost not to conduct such audits, and who pays for that? An assumption often made is that science is self‐correcting, that sooner or later the truth will be revealed because of the need to replicate experiments of others for independent verification of novel findings (8). Testimony recently presented at a U.S. congressional hearing suggests that the self‐correcting manner in which science advances represents a very slow and inefficient process for uncovering scientific fraud (5, 6, 9). Data from a survey of university scientists was also presented, indicating “. . . a reluctance to take prompt, corrective action not only when an investigator suspects another of misconduct but also should the investigator discover flaws in his or her own published reports‐whether the flaws were the result of honest error or fraud”; (10).

The uncritical acceptance by established scientists that the self‐correcting process works compounds the problem. The Editor of Science has written that”;. . . 99.9999 percent of reports are accurate and truthful. . .”; (8). If indeed only 0.0001% of published reports were inaccurate or untruthful, there would be little justification for scientific audits. However, congressional testimony from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) revealed that”;. . . the NIH Director's office has handled an average of 15–20 allegations and reports of misconduct annually in its extramural programs, which supports the work of approximately 50,000 scientists”; (11). As I shall attempt to demonstrate, since NIH alone receives fraud‐related complaints concerning the work of at least 0.03% of scientists it supports in other institutions, and since evidence indicates that the incidence of fraud is considerably greater than 0.03% (10, 12), the need to audit data is justifiable on the basis of being cost effective.     

Seeing touch and touching sight: a reflection on the tactility of vision

ABSTRACT

The article explores the reciprocal relationship between images and viewers by considering the relationship between the senses of sight and touch. I argue that images touch viewers at the same time that viewers touch images. Taking Casilda Sánchez video work, As Inside as the Eye can See as a point of departure, this article explores the ways in which a viewer’s encounter with the work can be understood as tactile rather than merely visual. Precisely because the work is visibly obsessed with the sense of sight it provides an intriguing entry point into discussions around the tactility of visual experience. Even though a person does not physically interact with this video by means of actual touch, our relationship with it is fundamentally tactile. In order to make this argument, I draw on theoretical positions that deal with the embodiment of perception, phenomenology and haptic visuality. Finally, with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s theories on vision as touch, I show how a viewer’s embodied response to the video contributes to its critical potential which unfolds from this rich experiential and tactile encounter.     

Differences between resource control types revisited: A short term longitudinal study

Hawley's influential resource control theory (RCT) posits that both coercive and prosocial strategies may yield social dominance, as indexed by resource control. Based on differences in youths’ relative use of these strategies, RCT a priori defines five distinct subtypes. Several studies by Hawley and colleagues have revealed substantial differences between subtypes in terms of obtained resource control and various social characteristics (e.g., agreeableness). The present longitudinal study (N = 394; M _age = 10.3; SD = 0.5) expands on previous work. Firstly, because several items used to assess strategies in RCT appear to confound strategy use with the resulting benefits (resource control), we disentangled between strategy use as such and obtained resource control. Secondly whereas previous work has been exclusively cross‐sectional, the present study was longitudinal. ANOVAs comparing subgroups provided support for some core tenets of RCT, but not for others. For instance, bistrategic children scored high on both resource control and perceived popularity. However, bistrategics engaged in elevated bullying, and whereas Hawley asserts that they are proficient in balancing ‘getting ahead’ with ‘getting along’, their behavior appeared to evoke clear negative reactions in the peer group at large. Findings also showed that non‐controllers did not experience more negative outcomes than their peers across all domains.     

II. Patients of the department of psychological medicine,guy's hospital,london 1

Abstract

Harvey Dean (1998) rejects my (Wakefield, 1988a; 1988b) argument that minimal distributive justice is the essential mission of social work and that treatment of mental disorder is not part of the profession's essential mission but rather a derived task. He argues that social work has broader ethical aims that encompass both pursuit of justice and treatment of mental disorder. In this article, 1 review my earlier position and respond to Dean's objections. I argue that Dean's narrativist account of the profession's ethical aims is overly broad and that he confuses non‐disordered psychological problems with mental disorders. I conclude that neither my “minimal distributive justice” view of social work's mission nor my exclusion of treatment of mental disorder from the profession's essential mission are disconfirmed by Dean's arguments.     

The Concept(s) of Trust in Late Modernity,the Relevance of Realist Social Theory

In this paper, we argue that trust is an important aspect of social reality, one that realist social theory has paid little attention to but which clearly resonates with a realist social ontology. Furthermore, the emergence of an interest in trust in specific subject fields such as organization theory indicates the growing significance of issues of trust as market liberalism has developed. As such, the emergence of an interest in trust provides support for Archer's characterisation of late modernity in The Reflexive Imperative (2012) as a period of heterogeneity and greater incongruity. Commenting on this provides an opportunity to discuss the issue of habit in relation to trust and also the importance of the analysis of integration as a means to explain problems of trust. The commentary draws on examples from finance.     

Backing Barack Because He's Black: Racially Motivated Voting in the 2008 Election*

Objective. If racial considerations influenced the outcome of the 2008 presidential election, then how did they shape the campaign, why did race matter, and for whom were such considerations important? I hypothesize that various racial attitudes exert unique influences on voters' support of Obama and that the effects of these attitudes differ by race. Methods. Using a Time Magazine poll, I distinguish between “attitudes regarding Obama's ‘Blackness’” and “opinions about race relations,” and I examine such sentiments among White and African‐American respondents. Results. Regardless of race, Obama support was highest among voters who were “comfortable” with Black candidates. However, increased optimism with racial progress had no effect on Blacks' voting intentions, and it actually lowered Obama support among Whites. Conclusion. The conventional wisdom is that African Americans “backed Barack because he is Black”; I demonstrate that Obama's race mattered more to White voters than it did to Blacks.     

Social Psychology from Flat to Round: Intersubjectivity and Space in Peter Sloterdijk's Bubbles

In this paper I describe the relevance of philosopher Peter Sloterdijk's (1998/2011) book Bubbles for social psychology. Bubbles offers the opportunity for the development of what I call a round social psychology. This is in contrast to the flatness characteristic of some of the more influential contemporary varieties of social psychology. Flat social psychology stays close to the ground, and is focused on the coordination of action. Round social psychology describes the atmosphere that surrounds and makes interaction possible in the first place. It requires a theory that links intersubjectivity with spatiality. To describe flat social psychology I analyze the assumptions of three contemporary versions of social psychology: social cognition theory, Goffman's dramaturgy, and Gergen's relational psychology. I then describe in greater detail Sloterdijk's bubble philosophy and the characteristics of round social psychology.     

The Soviet 'wife-activist' down on the farm

Parties independent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) were not formally permitted and non-party groups and movements needed the CPSU's approval to be allowed to form and survive. This was the situation up to Gorbachev's process of democratization. However, the CPSU had occasionally allowed the existence of social organizations which served the party and socialism and were perceived as ideologically non-threatening. One such was the 'movement of wives' ( dvizhenie zhen ) formed in the 1930s but not part of the party structure, but at best the wives could work within the boundaries of party policies. They tried to make daily life better for themselves, their husbands, children and the local community. Analyses have focused mainly on the movement as an urban phenomenon but they spread to farms and the rural sector. This article discusses their role in this context.