不确定需求情境下的供应链预测契约设计

以报童模型为基础,研究了在由单一生厂商和零售商组成的供应链系统中,生产商如何通过契约设计来影响零售商的需求预测行为,使其收益最大化的问题。文章基于静态博弈模型对此问题进行了分析,发现在整合供应链情境下,当需求预测成本较小时选择预测能够获得更高的期望收益;在分散式供应链情境下,当生产商选择预测契约时,预测成本最终由生产商承担,且其期望收益为预测成本的减函数,而选择无预测契约时则为预测成本的非减函数;最后通过生产商期望收益对比,给出了最优策略。     

政府监管与隐形契约共同作用下集群企业创新合作的演化博弈研究

考虑政府监管下的正式契约与非正式组织监管下的隐形契约对集群企业间创新合作的约束作用，运用演化博弈方法，建立政府、非正式组织与集群企业的非对称博弈模型，分析了三方参与主体的演化稳定策略，并运用数值仿真分析进一步验证博弈研究。研究结果表明：无论是政府的正式规章制度还是非正式的集群隐形契约，都能够对集群企业的合作创新产生良好的约束作用，其中正式规章制度相较于隐形契约的约束强度更大，并且在集群发展初期对集群企业间的创新合作行为起到重要约束作用，而隐形契约对集群企业的约束效果更加稳定持久。通过探究集群企业创新合作的行为过程，进一步了解产业集群的监管与约束机制，以推动我国产业集群的转型升级，引导集群企业间的创新合作，增强我国产业发展的核心竞争力。     

风险规避供应链的回购契约安排

运用CVaR方法研究了具有促销效应且风险规避供应链的回购契约协调问题.探讨了促销效应和风险规避对最优订购量的影响,指出促销效应的存在增大了最优订购量,而销售商的风险规避减小了最优订购量.考察了两种能协调风险规避供应链的改进回购契约安排,表明当销售商不过于规避风险时,引入成本分摊机制的回购契约就能协调供应链;但当销售商非常规避风险时,需要对回购商品的数量进行限制且使回购价格不小于批发价格才能协调供应链.最后讨论了供应商对两类契约的选择问题,并考察了销售商的风险规避对回购价格的影响.     

双边道德风险下供应链质量协调契约研究

契约的公平性是契约有效性的前提,也是提高供应链协调效率的基本保证。本文基于外部市场变化对契约公平性影响,运用委托代理理论,同时考虑供应商和制造商质量失误的基础上,构建双边道德风险下二级供应链质量控制博弈模型,分析外部损失分担与内部惩罚质量契约协调下双方产品质量控制水平,研究外部市场及质量成本变化对两种契约的公平性和有效性的影响,并对模型分析结果进行仿真验证。结果显示：外部认证系统直接影响外部损失分担契约的公平性与有效性,而对内部惩罚契约无效;当供应商不必为制造商质量失误负责时,外部损失契约将实现对供应链的质量协调;随着供应商质量控制成本的提高,内部惩罚契约质量控制效果将高于外部损失分担契约,而当制造商质量控制成本下降时,外部损失分担契约较内部损失分担契更有效。因此,保证契约的公平性是实现供应链产品质量协调的根本前提。     

基于心理契约关系的IT外包项目控制模式建构:多案例研究

基于控制和心理契约理论,本论文研究IT外包项目中客户与供应商双方心理契约匹配情境对于控制模式的影响.本文是一个包括五个IT外包项目的多案例研究,对象是国内一家著名通信设备制造商,它在其中两个项目中以供应商的角色出现,在另外三个项目中则作为客户方.根据本文第一作者参与这些项目的亲身经历和多次追踪访谈以及其它相关资料,本研究识别出项目双方心理契约关系的四种匹配模式--相互交易、客户弱势、供应商弱势和相互忠诚,及其各自对应的关系特征.研究结果显示,在相互交易情境中,客户对供应商执行更多的结果控制;相反,相互忠诚的情境涉及更多的非正式控制.此外,在客户与供应商心理契约不匹配的情况下,客户倾向对供应商施加更多的行为控制.     

基于GNBS和正式固定价格契约的农产品供应链关系契约模型

将GNBS和正式固定价格契约引入企业和农户的二级供应链关系契约中,比较二者作为解决争议手段时,对农户专用投资激励的不同作用,考察关系专用投资对外部市场上农产品的价值不同影响下,正式价格契约的积极作用。研究结果表明,GNBS作为解决争议机制的前提下,关系契约的自我实施的条件与农产品价值、农产品专用性、双方对剩余分配的比例有关;在特定条件下,正式固定价格契约能够强化关系契约的自我实施。     

顾客参与的心理契约对顾客价值创造的影响

顾客在服务中扮演着越来越重要的角色,顾客参与的重要性逐渐被人们所关注.当前文献希望从顾客层面探讨在参与活动中顾客心理机制对价值创造结果的影响.本文将组织行为学中的心理契约概念引入到顾客价值理论中,试图建立一个整合性的框架,探讨顾客参与情境下心理契约对顾客价值创造的影响.本研究以美发行业为背景,通过问卷法共回收有效问誊414份,运用结构方程模型开展实证研究.实证结果表明,顾客的交易心理契约对功能价值有显著的正向影响,对象征价值和成本价值有显著的负向影响,对体验价值没有显著影响;此外,顾客的关系心理契约对功能价值、体验价值、象征价值均具有显著的正向影响,对成本价值有显著的负向影响.该结论为推行顾客创造性参与企业的实践经营有一定的借鉴意义,并为顾客参与价值创造的进一步研究做了铺垫.     

基于交叉销售的竞争供应链纵向契约研究

考虑市场上存在两个竞争性制造商和两个竞争性零售商,且每个制造商都由两个共同的零售商来分销产品,进而形成交叉销售的竞争供应链模型.研究该模型下制造商契约选择的动态演化过程.分析收益分享契约同时实现制造商与零售商利润改进的条件.结果显示:制造商的契约选择严重依赖于产品间的竞争强度,零售商间竞争强度只起到催化剂的作用.当产品间的竞争较弱,收益分享比例设置在合适范围内时,制造商由最初的批发价契约转化为收益分享契约,且此时收益分享契约为占优策略.否则,两者将因为收益分享比例无法达成一致,被迫以批发价契约进行交易.     

人际沟通与企业间关系:心理契约的中介作用

如何分析并揭示企业间关系质量的影响机制是管理学关心焦点。本文通过引入传统文献所忽视变量,形成以人际技能、心理契约和关系质量为核心的新企业间关系分析框架,并通过199个中国企业间采购关系数据进行了验证。结果表明:人际技能对心理契约的交易建构和关系建构具有显著正向影响,特别是移情和反馈;心理契约交易建构和关系建构对持续采购和采购比例具有显著正影响;心理契约对人际技能和关系质量具有一定的中介作用。研究结果对于相关的理论发展和管理实践具有一定的启示作用。     

绿色研发补贴、成本分担契约与收益共享契约研究

成本分担契约与收益共享契约是提高供应链整体协调的两大工具。基于绿色消费市场背景,本文引入绿色研发补贴政策,研究成本分担契约与收益共享契约对供应链的影响。研究表明,成本分担契约与收益共享契约对政府研发补贴政策具有一定的替代作用。同时,在绿色研发补贴政策下,成本分担契约的签订并不会带来产业链整体利润水平以及社会福利水平的提升,而收益共享契约则可以实现产业链利润水平以及社会福利水平提升的目的。进一步,当契约由供应链中企业通过谈判决定时,上述结果依然成立。     

Analyzing vendor and supplier contracts

Contracts increasingly govern the way medical groups operate their businesses. While physician employment contracts and contracts with HMOs and PPOs usually receive significant scrutiny and analysis, little attention has been paid to the myriad contractual relationships by which physicians secure services for their own practices.     

Information leakage and supply chain contracts

This paper investigates information leakage under different contract configurations in a supply chain. We consider two competing retailers, one of whom (incumbent) has private information about market demand while the other (entrant) has no access to acquire any market demand information. We assume that the supplier is the leader who may choose a wholesale price contract (WPC) or a revenue-sharing contract (RSC) with each retailer independently. We explore the effect of the supplier's and incumbent's incentives on non-leakage equilibrium and find out that there exists a non-leakage equilibrium only when the incumbent signs an RSC with the supplier under an appropriately given revenue-sharing rate in situations of high demand variation.     

Efficient and confidential reallocation of contracts

The first Danish exchange for sugar beet contracts was established in January 2008. It was also the world’s first major application of a new technology, secure multiparty computation (SMC), which ensures the security and cost-effectiveness of such exchanges. The technology can potentially be used in a number of other applications, including voting, negotiations, and benchmarking. SMC makes it possible to combine private knowledge from a large number of parties without ever revealing their individual knowledge. This provides unique opportunities for individual agents to collaborate despite conflicting interests and decentralized knowledge, which, in many contexts, constitute the primary obstacle to the creation of economic gains. The establishment of the Danish contract exchange was the culmination of a novel and successful collaboration between economists and cryptologists. It constitutes a successful operational research project using novel scientific methods to solve a real, large-scale problem. This article describes the background for and the implementation of the exchange and discusses some other potential applications.     

Important points in managed care contracts

Health care is increasingly managed through some contractual relationship. Such contracts vary and the contracting entities may be clinics, universities, health maintenance organizations, individual practitioner organizations, preferred provider organizations, corporate health plans, or other structures. It is estimated that within 10 years more than 70 percent of all health care will be provided through some type of managed care plan.     

多任务业务外包的激励契约

多任务业务外包有助于发包企业充分利用外部资源.通过设计面向多任务的激励契约,平衡接包企业在各项任务之间的投入,能够改善外包效率.运用均方效用函数方法,构建了多任务委托代理模型,通过敏感性分析讨论了外生参数的变化对激励契约的影响,并在任务无关、互补和替代三种情形下考察了模型的应用.研究发现对特定任务的激励,不仅受到接包企业风险偏好和与此任务有关的参数变化的影响,还受到与其它任务有关的参数变化的影响,其中影响的方向和强度分别依赖于任务之间的关联属性和关联程度.研究结论为发包企业利用各种属性指标,尤其是任务关联性质,加强对多任务外包的激励管理具有借鉴意义.     

New contracts: The key to change

Successfully managing change in an organization is very difficult. Paul Strebel sets out a new way of doing this, based on contract theory which states that stakeholders have both an explicit and implicit individual contract with their companies. These contracts must be modified if corporate change is to proceed.The author develops five propositions about the role of contracts in change management. Change can only succeed if these five propositions are satisfied and the operational implications fully understood and implemented.     

Trust and adaptive learning in implicit contracts

Trust is a phenomenon that still is quite rarely investigated in agency theory. According to a common intuitive reasoning, trust should develop over time and it should evolve even in finite implicit-contract relationships. However, if the contracting parties are fully rational, theory cannot explain this. We therefore extend the standard model and develop a model of a finite relationship where the principal promises to pay a voluntary period-by-period bonus if the agent has worked according to the implicit agreement. The agent is boundedly rational and unable to foresee the principal’s future bonus decisions. The principal is, with some probability, honest and pays a promised bonus even in situations where ex-post cheating would be optimal. Based on the agent’s adaptive learning process, we show how trust evolves depending on the principal’s bonus-payment strategy. Depending on different levels of the agent’s bounded rationality, we derive the principal’s optimal pure strategy as part of a unique equilibrium. In an extension we show that the results are robust if the agent has bounded recall. The optimal strategy pattern mirrors a subset of trigger strategies which is exogenous in the standard model. Our findings imply that subjective incentives are more effective with increasing tenure of employees, or, that the optimal level of trust depends on how fast work environments change.     

BOCOG's outsourcing contracts: The vendor's perspective

To date, most research on outsourcing is modeled from the client's perspective. In this paper, we approach the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) outsourcing contracts from the vendors’ perspective. Since a vendor always has the option to accept or not accept an outsourcing contract, we use the theory of options to analyze the vendor's decision making, i.e., the trigger point, which coincides with the optimal profit level, of the vendor's decision to pursue an outsourcing contract. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the model and its potential benefits for vendors’ decision making.     

Physician executive contracts: negotiating the future

Once viewed as a matter of standard protocol, physician executive contracts have become as complex as the health care industry itself. Historically, hospital administration and physicians negotiated a few key points, then sent the ideas to an attorney for insertion of standard legalize and boilerplate. Today, physician executive contracts are an important part of the changes in health care. They not only cover traditional hospital and physician relations, but increasingly apply to new types of relations (such as employment) between hospitals and physicians, physicians and physicians, and health plans and physicians. In this article, we will explore both the "content" and the "context" of physician executive contracts. Content will deal with the specific provisions typically included in contracts. Context will address issues associated with preparing for and negotiating a contract.     

IRS offers safe harbor in physician employment contracts

Last year, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Revenue Procedure 93-19 (Rev. Proc. 93-19), which provides guidelines regarding service and other contracts involving facilities financed with tax-exempt bonds. Rev. Proc. 93-19 creates four "safe harbors" for certain contracts signed by tax-exempt organizations that will not jeopardize the organizations' tax-exempt bond interest. Those guidelines and methods for complying with them are the subject of the following article. "Health Law" is a regular feature of Physician Executive contributed by Epstein Becker & Green. Mark Lutes of the law firm's Washington, D.C., offices serves as editor of the column.