中国电力市场长期产业组织架构与电价趋势研究

为了分析售电侧电力市场化改革背景下中国电力市场长期产业组织架构形态和均衡电价变动趋势,本文根据售电公司在电力批发市场和零售市场的双边讨价还价博弈行为,构建了长期模式下独立售电公司、寄生公司和电力批发商三者之间的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,结合博弈的均衡状态,比较分析了长期和短期改革效果,并进一步讨论了均衡电价的影响因素和变动情况。结果表明：（1）长期电力市场的均衡批发电价低于完全垄断时期的均衡批发电价,售电侧放开对于降电价效果明显。（2）在改革效果方面,相较于短期改革而言,竞争性的长期改革形态更加有效,长期均衡电价和均衡批发电价随贴现率的波动小于短期,市场更加稳定。（3）在政策实施层面,随着改革推进和竞争程度增加,调整对象从电力批发商逐步过渡到售电公司,有助于保障售电市场竞争的公平和效率。     

售电侧改革初期基于Stackelberg-Bertrand博弈的电力市场价格形成机理研究

本文通过构建等剩余曲线和Stackelberg-Bertrand博弈模型，分析我国售电市场放开后不同类型售电公司之间的博弈行为和电价的形成机理。研究表明：(1)独立售电公司与寄生售电公司为争取用户而提供相等经济剩余是目前市场出现电价分叉效应的内在原因；(2)寄生售电公司的存在会导致不稳定的市场调整博弈，电价的无规律波动将增加交易成本，阻碍售电公司的市场参与，但发电商为获得更大利润又将促进两类售电公司共存，这为目前独立售电公司不断进入和退出市场的不稳定状态提供了解释；(3)对批发电价进行上限规制，有利于市场形成稳定均衡；(4)售电市场的放开能引导电价的下降，独立售电公司能起到降低电价的作用，同时均衡电价也受到目录电价、固定成本等因素的影响，各因素导致的变动存在一定差异。     

售电侧改革后电力市场远期产业组织演化及其对电价的影响研究

本文通过构建等剩余曲线和售电公司价格博弈模型,分析售电侧放开后远期均衡电价的变化和电力市场的产业组织演化,并探讨集中度规制对均衡的影响。研究表明:(1)批发电价所处的区间会影响售电市场的均衡,发电商具有挤出独立售电公司进而间接垄断市场的动机和激励;(2)如果独立售电公司不具备足够的降价空间,那么市场会陷入无休止的价格调整博弈,过高的交易成本和难以预期的价格将阻碍独立售电公司参与市场;(3)随着改革的深化,某一限定区域内的售电市场将由一家售电公司垄断,但却是高效率的限制性定价垄断;(4)对售电公司集中度的规制能调节远期电价,进而权衡公平与效率。     

电力市场中关于直购电力价格的讨价还价博弈模型

运用鲁宾斯坦的轮流出价讨价还价模型的思想,构造发电公司与大用户之间关于直购电力价格的不完全信息轮流出价的讨价还价博弈模型,求解模型并对所得的结果进行分析,得出双方达成协议主要取决于双方的“谈判成本”以及它们关于对方实时电力价格预期的估计。最后提出应提高实时电力市场透明度的政策建议。文中的模型及其结论同样也适用于发电公司和配电公司之间的讨价还价博弈。     

基于独立售电公司双角色的Stackelberg博弈模型分析

在新一轮电力市场化改革初期，电力市场输配售还处于未完全分开的状态。独立售电公司作为一种双角色主体首先要与电力批发商针对批发价进行博弈，然后与寄生公司进行市场博弈，形成了两阶段的Stackelberg博弈。本文采用逆推法，先用以价格为博弈策略的Bertrand博弈和以零售电量为博弈策略的Cournot博弈对第二阶段的最优目标进行求解，再通过Rubinstein博弈对第一阶段的均衡批发价进行求解。结果表明：在线性需求曲线假定下，独立售电公司如果采用单一的价格博弈手段参与市场，会陷入无限循环的价格调整，最终被迫退出市场；而若采用零售电量为博弈策略，则即使在改革初期寄生公司具有绝对价格优势时，电力市场化依然可以降低均衡电价，提高市场竞争性。     

基于社会福利的可再生能源R&D激励政策评价

可再生能源发电新技术的R&D投资策略通常对企业价值和消费者剩余起到作用相反的不同影响,从而对基于社会福利的可再生能源电力R&D激励政策的科学制定带来挑战。针对旨在通过研发可再生能源发电新技术从而垄断清洁能源新兴市场的两非对称企业,结合投资时机选择期权博弈和社会福利模型,通过数值模拟以分析社会福利与影响其变化的补贴政策及其它诸多因素间的动态变化特征并提出相应的可再生能源电力R&D激励政策建议。结果表明：若以社会福利最大化为目标,在发电新技术R&D补贴和上网电价补贴政策的各组合应用中,企业间的R&D能力差距越大、可再生能源发电新技术的初始价值越大以及R&D成本越高,政府越应该鼓励可再生能源企业进行合作研发,反之则应鼓励竞争;随着电价补贴的提高,企业间的R&D竞争应受到鼓励;一定范围内,R&D补贴和电价补贴均能提高社会福利。论文创新性地揭示出可再生能源电力R&D投资的最优投资时机选择、电价补贴政策组合与社会福利三者间应有的内在联动关系,为政府对可再生能源电力的有效激励和管理提供富有价值的决策参考。     

双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型

考虑单电网公司与双发电商所组成的渠道结构,构建了发电商投资减排、电网公司投资消纳的优势互补的异质型垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型,先后考察并比较了分散决策和集成决策下的反馈均衡结果。在此基础上,讨论了利润共享契约下系统增量利润的分配问题。研究表明：对于分散决策,电网公司选择性承担发电商的减排费用;两种决策下的发电商减排和电网公司购电价格以及分散决策下的减排补贴与发电商之间的减排竞争强度相关;在一定条件和范围内,合作博弈有利于提高电网公司购电电价,同时为此所带来的风险增大。     

发电企业售电组合问题研究

电力体制改革使发电企业可以在多个市场进行电力交易.如何在多个市场合理分配售电量,使发电收益和售电风险达到满意,这是发电企业亟待解决的问题.本文立足发电企业的实际情况,考虑到企业决策者决策时必须同时兼顾到收益和风险,根据决策者对售电收益和售电风险的不同偏好,建立了售电收益最大和售电风险最小的双目标规划模型.通过引入收益和风险满意度的概念,化双目标规划为单目标线性规划,给出了一种交互式多目标决策方法,并进行了实例计算.     

考虑范围经济与转换成本的混合捆绑竞争

产业融合促进了多产品竞争.基于扩展的两维Hotelling模型,研究了范围经济和转换成本对网络产业中多产品捆绑销售竞争均衡的影响,并分析了捆绑销售和线性定价下公司利润和社会福利的差异.研究表明转换成本导致企业不对称的细分市场结构并对新产品设定低价策略,但捆绑定价与转换成本无关.范围经济增加则公司捆绑产品价格较大幅度下降,一站式用户获益较多;成本随之下降但公司利润减少.与线性定价相比,捆绑销售导致单件产品价格较低,提高了消费者转换率,削弱了转换成本对忠实用户的不利影响;捆绑销售下公司利润较低,消费者剩余增加;不考虑范围经济则捆绑销售的社会福利较低,但当范围经济效应足够大时,捆绑销售不仅提高消费者剩余而且增加社会福利.     

发电成本垂直差异电力市场概率发电——基于大用户电量偏好视角

针对碳减排后普遍存在的发电成本垂直差异电力市场及其显著的大用户电量偏好差异,本文提出概率性电量供给以及与之对应的概率发电,并利用价格杠杆调控发电商低碳发电尤其高发电成本发电机会与供给效能不足.先后构建发电成本内、外生选择下的概率发电模型,求解发电商的电量供给均衡并分析概率发电策略的最优性.最后,将发电成本内生选择模型拓展到分解市场需求不确定性的概率发电模型.研究发现:相比基准发电,概率发电可以作为一种有利可图的发电容量过剩的解决方法,即使在发电成本内生选择时也是可行的;当发电商采用“强”成本差异的发电策略时,引入折中的概率发电会让产品线上成本水平相互更接近,且大用户的消费者剩余得到提高;与此相反,在市场中实施“弱”成本差异发电,发电商利用概率发电则增大成本分离并降低大用户的消费者剩余;在不确定性市场需求下,当偏好低发电成本电量的大用户对单位发电成本的估价相对于偏好高发电成本电量的大用户对单位发电成本的估价足够高时,概率发电可以以一种管理不利需求状况工具的身份出现.     

考虑消费者预期的电动汽车分时租赁市场价格竞争模型

分时租赁平台作为电动汽车推广的主要方式，其特征与打车软件类似，在风险资本的推动下极易引发价格战。各租车公司的市场需求量不仅与自己的定价有关，也与竞争对手的定价策略相关，目标都是各自利润的最大化。本文在考虑消费者预期的基础上，研究了需求函数为线性情形下的多人博弈，证明了此博弈是超模博弈以及Nash均衡的存在性和唯一性。并进一步揭示了降价幅度、交叉价格和价格敏感消费群体占比对均衡价格、均衡需求量和利润的影响关系，讨论了价格竞争过程中各租车公司的决策过程与利弊关系。结果表明：任意租车公司的降价行为都会引发整个市场的降价反应，且降价幅度随着博弈阶段的推进逐渐减小，最终收敛于均衡价格；动态定价博弈存在最优组合策略，市场竞争时应当把握好降价幅度，避免过度的价格竞争；均衡价格是关于消费者预期的单调减函数，价格敏感的消费群体占比越大，租车公司间价格竞争越激烈，降价幅度会越大，均衡价格越低；对于市场份额大的租车公司利润是关于价格敏感型消费者占比的单调增函数，但对中小租车公司而言则是单调减函数，价格敏感的消费者越多，对大公司有利，对中小公司不利。     

政府补贴下制造/再制造竞争机理研究

以政府“以旧换再”补贴政策为背景,建立了原始制造商、再制造商与零售商两阶段博弈模型.基于此博弈模型,考虑政府不采取补贴政策、政府补贴给再制造商及政府通过零售商补贴购买再制造产品消费者3种情况,对比分析了政府不同补贴策略对两种产品单位批发价格、零售价格、销售量、利润、消费者剩余及环境的影响.结果表明:当再制造产品的需求不受废旧产品回收量限制,政府补贴可以降低两种产品单位零售价格,增加再制造商和零售商的利润,提高消费者的剩余;当再制造产品的需求受到废旧产品回收量限制时,政府补贴可以增加两种产品的单位批发价格和两种产品制造商的利润,但是会降低零售商的销售利润.     

Supply Chain Contracting Under Competition: Bilateral Bargaining vs. Stackelberg

We analyze contracting behaviors in a two‐tier supply chain system consisting of competing manufacturers and competing retailers. We contrast the contracting outcome of a Stackelberg game, in which the manufacturers offer take‐it‐or‐leave‐it contracts to the retailers, with that of a bargaining game, in which the firms bilaterally negotiate contract terms via a process of alternating offers. The manufacturers in the Stackelberg game possess a Stackelberg‐leader advantage in that the retailers are not entitled to make counteroffers. Our analysis suggests that whether this advantage would benefit the manufacturers depends on the contractual form. With simple contracts such as wholesale‐price contracts, which generally do not allow one party to fully extract the trade surplus, the Stackelberg game replicates the boundary case of the bargaining game with the manufacturers possessing all the bargaining power. In contrast, with sophisticated contracts such as two‐part tariffs, which enable full surplus extraction, the two games lead to distinct outcomes. We further show that the game structure being Stackelberg or bargaining critically affects firms' preferences over contract types and thus their equilibrium contract choices. These observations suggest that the Stackelberg game may not be a sufficient device to predict contracting behaviors in reality where bargaining is commonly observed.     

Improving Valuation Under Consumer Search: Implications for Pricing and Profits

There is a growing trend in the retail industry to improve customer experience. In this article, we study retailer‐initiated strategies to increase consumer valuation for a product under duopoly. In such a setting, it is possible that a consumer's valuation may be increased by one retailer; however, the consumer may decide to buy the product from the competitor. We consider a two‐stage game where retailers first decide whether to invest in improvements in customer valuation and then engage in price competition. We computationally explore the Nash equilibria in terms of both investment and pricing. We find that in the majority of cases retailers price in a manner to discourage their local customers to buy from the competitor. Next, we focus on the pricing game and theoretically characterize the pricing Nash equilibrium. We find that a retailer could overcome competitive effects by improving consumer valuation beyond a certain threshold. We also find that a retailer who does not invest could benefit from competition in situations where his competitor increases consumer valuation beyond a threshold. Finally, we explore through a computational study the Nash equilibria of the two‐stage game using an alternate model to establish the robustness of our findings.     

多再制造商回收定价竞争博弈

多个再制造商在同一回收市场中获取废旧产品并进行再制造,他们之间存在回收竞争.每个再制造商回收废旧产品的数量取决于自身付出的回收价格,同时和对手们的回收价格相关.目标是最大化各自的期望利润.本文首先利用优化理论和非合作博弈理论,证明了该博弈作为超模博弈,存在唯一的Nash均衡.然后通过比较发现竞争下的Nash均衡价格高于串谋下的合作均衡价格.最后通过数值仿真探讨了再制造商的数目和再制造成本对博弈的影响.     

考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道闭环供应链决策研究

双渠道闭环供应链存在制造商网络直销渠道和零售商实体店零售渠道。消费者会对购买不满意的产品进行退货，由于网上商店购买的产品缺乏现场体验故退货率较高。相比线下实体商店，线上退货流程更为复杂，这往往容易影响消费者购物体验。因此本文设计考虑跨渠道退货的双渠道闭环供应链结构，并分析跨渠道退货率以及渠道消费偏好对供应链的决策影响，基于Stackelberg博弈和Nash均衡博弈理论，从集中式决策与分散式决策两方面研究不同闭环供应链结构下的定价决策与利润分配，并结合数值算例进行分析。研究结果表明，跨渠道退货率以及消费者渠道偏好对闭环供应链的定价策略以及利润分配等决策具有显著影响。     

On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer

This study investigates a supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM), in which the CM acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to the OEM. The two parties can engage in one of three Cournot competition games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the CM as the Stackelberg leader. On the basis of these three basic games, this study investigates the two parties' Stackelberg leadership/followership decisions. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are exogenously given, either party may prefer Stackelberg leadership or followership. For example, when the wholesale price or the proportion of production outsourced to the CM is lower than a threshold value, both parties prefer Stackelberg leadership and, consequently, play a simultaneous game in the consumer market. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are decision variables, the competitive CM sets a wholesale price sufficiently low to allow both parties to coexist in the market, and the OEM outsources its entire production to this CM. This study also examines the impact of the supply chain parties' bargaining power on contract outcomes by considering a wholesale price that is determined via the generalized Nash bargaining scheme, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium to be sustained when the CM's degree of bargaining power is great and the non‐competitive CM's wholesale price is high.     

Co‐Op Advertising in Dynamic Retail Oligopolies

We study a supply chain in which a consumer goods manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. The retailer undertakes promotional expenditures, such as advertising, to increase sales and to compete against other retailer(s). The manufacturer supports the retailer’s promotional expenditure through a cooperative advertising program by reimbursing a portion (called the subsidy rate) of the retailer’s promotional expenditure. To determine the subsidy rate, we formulate a Stackelberg differential game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and a Nash differential subgame between the retailer and the competing retailer(s). We derive the optimal feedback promotional expenditures of the retailers and the optimal feedback subsidy rate of the manufacturer, and show how they are influenced by market parameters. An important finding is that the manufacturer should support its retailer only when a subsidy threshold is crossed. The impact of competition on this threshold is nonmonotone. Specifically, the manufacturer offers more support when its retailer competes with one other retailer but its support starts decreasing with the presence of additional retailers. In the case where the manufacturer sells through all retailers, we show under certain assumptions that it should support only one dominant retailer. We also describe how we can incorporate retail price competition into the model.