ELECTED VERSUS APPOINTED REGULATORS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Because voters have only one vote to cast and regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, there are electoral incentives to respond to stakeholder interests. If regulators are elected, their stance on regulation is the only salient issue so that the electoral incentive is to run a pro‐consumer candidate. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find new evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro‐consumer in their regulatory policies. (JEL: H1, K2)     

The More You Give,the More You Get? The Impact of Corporate Political Activity on the Value of Government Contracts

Firms have been relying on corporate political activity (CPA) to achieve access and to affect public policy change for decades. Most research on CPA and public policy outcomes has implicitly assumed that access afforded by CPA results in an either‐ or (dichotomous) policy outcome such as votes or election outcomes. Based on recent research on how CPA can be a strategic signal to government agencies, however, it is possible that CPA may in fact, have a linear association with public policy outcomes as opposed to merely a dichotomous one, and we explore this relationship in the unique public policy context of government contract awards. We specifically analyze how higher levels of CPA impact the financial value of government contracts awarded to firms. Utilizing the S&P 1500 sample for 16 years (1997–2012) we find that CPA has a one to one association with the value of contract awards, indicating that CPA and public policy outcomes can be linked in ways that motivate firms to continuously invest in CPA, to maximize their political rents. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this finding in light of extant research on CPA and its direct impact on public policy outcomes.     

Risk,Process Maturity,and Project Performance: An Empirical Analysis of US Federal Government Technology Projects

In recent years, there has been increasing pressure on the US federal government to reduce spending and improve the management of its technology projects. Mitigating the adverse impact of risks on the performance of these projects presents a significant challenge for its stakeholders. Our research examines this challenge in two steps. First, we identify and define a set of salient risks in federal technology projects—specifically, complexity risk and contracting risk in the planning process, and execution risk in the execution process. Next, we investigate whether higher levels of process maturity, assessed by the Capability Maturity Model Integration (CMMI) framework, mitigate the negative effect of project risks on project performance. The analysis of time‐series data collected from 82 federal technology projects across 519 quarterly time periods indicates that each of the three types of risks has a significant negative effect on project performance. This finding highlights the practical significance of managing these risks in the federal technology project context. Further, we find that increasing levels of process maturity attenuate the negative effect of project risks on the performance of federal technology projects. However, the attenuation effects are consequential only at high levels of project risks; at low levels of project risk, increasing levels of process maturity can adversely affect project performance. To demonstrate the financial implications of increasing process maturity levels in federal technology projects, we examine the magnitude of project cost savings (and overruns) across different levels of CMMI and project risks. In summary, our study contributes to the sparse literature on public sector operations by addressing the understudied context of federal technology projects, and provides a nuanced examination of the implications of process maturity in managing the risk to performance relationship in such projects.     

The Politicization of Risk: Party Cues,Polarization, and Public Perceptions of Climate Change Risk

Previous research shows that public perceptions of climate change risk are strongly related to the individual willingness to support climate mitigation and adaptation policy. In this article, I investigate how public perceptions of climate change risk are affected by communications from political parties and the degree of polarization among them. Specifically, using survey data from Sweden, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, I study the relationship between party source cues, perceived polarization, and public perceptions of climate change risk. The results reveal a positive relationship between party cues and perceptions of climate change risk, indicating that individuals adjust their risk perceptions to align with their party preference. Furthermore, a negative relationship between perceived polarization and individual risk perceptions is also discovered, showing that individuals tend to be less concerned with climate change the more polarization they perceive. However, the effect of perceived polarization is found to be limited to more abstract perceptions of risk, while being unrelated to perceptions of concrete risks. Even with some contextual variance, the results generally hold up well across the four countries.     

DO BETTER PAID POLITICIANS PERFORM BETTER? DISENTANGLING INCENTIVES FROM SELECTION

The wage paid to politicians affects both the choice of citizens to run for office and the performance of those who are appointed. First, if skilled individuals shy away from politics because of higher opportunities in the private sector, an increase in politicians’ pay may change their mind. Second, if the re‐election prospects of incumbents depend on their in‐office deeds, a higher wage may foster performance. We use data on all Italian municipal governments from 1993 to 2001 and test these hypotheses in a quasi‐experimental setup. In Italy, the wage of mayors depends on population size and sharply rises at different thresholds. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the only threshold that uniquely identifies a wage increase: 5,000 inhabitants. Exploiting the existence of a two‐term limit, we further disentangle the composition from the incentive component of the effect of the wage on performance. Our results show that a higher wage attracts more‐educated candidates, and that better‐paid politicians size down the government machinery by improving efficiency. Importantly, most of this effect is driven by the selection of competent politicians, rather than by the incentive to be re‐elected.     

From Domination to Alliance: Shifting Strategies and Accumulation of Power by the Bureaucracy in Bangladesh

Traditionally, the bureaucrats on the Indian subcontinent were unaccustomed to perform under political supervision, and this mindset continued to affect their relationship with politicians in Bangladesh. In the early years of Bangladesh as an independent state, the bureaucracy came under pressure to operate under political supervision, but this phase did not last long. Subsequent phases of military rule reinstated the bureaucrats in their entrenched positions and strengthened their grip over the system. After the restoration of electoral democracy in 1991, the dominant role of bureaucrats continued, mainly due to the tendency to practice confrontational politics and disregard to the political institutions. The bureaucracy draws strength from its permanent stature, organization, expertise and experience in administering the country. Using the resources at their disposal, this institution has been able to exert considerable influence. A number of reforms have been introduced to enhance the accountability of the bureaucracy. The response has been the development of a symbiotic relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats. The bureaucracy has changed its stance from a dominating approach to one of alliance with other powerful groups in the system and continues to exercise power. This has resulted in increasing politicization of the bureaucracy which affects the performance of the critical components of the government.     

Bureaucratic Autonomy in the U.S. Separation of Powers: Evidence from Cabinet Departments

Theories of delegation posit that politicians have the incentive to decrease discretion when ideological conflict with an administrative agency increases. Yet agencies can use their expertise to appropriate informational benefits from delegation helping to increase bureaucratic autonomy. Such theories only indirectly address the impact of ideological conflict on bureaucrats’ perceptions about the extent of the discretion they are afforded on the job. Does the perception of discretion by bureaucrats depend on ideological conflicts between the legislative and executive branches? Statistical results from dynamic panel models provide evidence that that closer ideological alignment with the U.S. Congress than the president increases perceived discretion; that a negative relationship emerges between confirmation times and perceived discretion, but a small and opposite relationship exists among supervisory levels; that variance in the ideological portfolio of cabinet secretaries decreases perceived discretion overall, but has no effect on supervisory cadres; and that divergence between the goals and legal context of an agency and the president’s policy orientation are associated with lower perceived discretion.     

Federalism and the Implementation of Environmental Policy: Changing Trends in Canada and the United States

In a federal system of government, powers are shared by the national and sub-national units in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. However, the process of policy implementation may differ on the basis of allocation of power and the nature of the system. Canada and the United States of America adopted federal systems of government, and faced similar pressures for implementing policies on environmental issues. Yet, the degree of success and outcome appear to be different due to variations in the strength of the respective federalist systems. An analysis of the various aspects of the federal system in the two countries reveals noticeable differences in institutional configurations, relationship between national and sub-national units, and variances in intra-institutional relations. All these have contributed to a divergence in the past, but there is an emerging trend of convergence as both the Canadian and American governments are gradually moving away from their existing patterns of policy implementation toward a new approach involving private-sector initiatives and self-enforcement with strong inclinations toward voluntarization, corporatization and marketization.     

Joined-Up Government for Welfare Administration Reform in Norway

One of the largest public sector reforms in Norway is the welfare administrative reform of 2005. The aims are to get passive beneficiaries back into work and to make the administration more user-friendly, holistic and efficient. The aims are to be achieved by increasing the administration’s capacity to address “wicked issues” by cutting across existing policy fields and administrative levels. This joined-up-government approach poses three main challenges: 1) to get a merged central government agency to work, 2) to establish constructive cooperation between the central and local authorities and 3) to coordinate front-line services with user-oriented employment and welfare offices. The article shows that increasing the capacity of government to cut across existing policy fields and handle transboundary wicked issues are still struggling to be implemented. Cooperation between sectors is however easier to achieve than cooperation between levels. The joined-up-government-approach also tends to make accountability relations more ambiguous.     

A DRAWBACK OF ELECTORAL COMPETITION

In most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters. We provide an efficiency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties. In our model, the larger the number of parties, the greater the inefficiency of the outcome of electoral competition. The reason is that, when the number of parties increases, electoral incentives push each party to focus its electoral promises on a narrower constituency, and then special interest policies replace more efficient policies that have diffuse benefits. The analysis provides a possible explanation for the existence of institutional features that limit the extent of electoral competition: thresholds of exclusion, runoff electoral systems, and majoritarian two‐party political systems. (JEL: D82, L15)     

Strategic implications of consumer food safety preferences

This study examines the tradeoffs consumers are willing to make relative to food safety attributes and other product attributes, such as quality and price, and develops implications for both the government and private sector firms. Conjoint analysis was used to elicit consumers’ preferences for fresh Red Delicious apples. The attributes studied include price, product quality as depicted by the level of defects, a variable representing the level of pesticide usage and the associated cancer risk, and a variable representing different levels of government inspection.The results indicated that most consumers have a strong preference for increased food safety. Government policy options that are explored include stricter production standards, improved regulatory monitoring, and government-defined labels. Private industry options that are examined include grower labels, retailer labels, and third party labels.     

The Politics of ‘Social Accountability’ in England and Germany: Democratic Control and Moral Imperatives

This article investigates how politicians in England and Germany approach social accountability during the introduction of markets in the national health care systems. It analyses the discourse among members of parliament during the law making process of the 2012 NHS Health Care Act in England and the 2011 Act for Financing of Statutory Health Insurance in Germany. Generally, the new social accountability reform agenda is attractive to policy makers as it foregrounds public engagement and bottom-up participation (Peters 2001). Social accountability refers to institutional practices that favour participatory and horizontal mechanisms that depart from traditional hierarchical Principal-Agent forms.     

REDISTRIBUTION,PORK, AND ELECTIONS

Why might citizens vote against redistributive policies from which they would seem to benefit? Many scholars focus on ‘wedge’ issues such as religion or race, but another explanation might be geographically‐based patronage—or pork. We examine the tension between redistribution and patronage with a model that combines partisan elections across multiple districts with legislation in spatial and divide‐the‐dollar environments. The model yields a unique equilibrium that describes the circumstances under which poor voters support right‐wing parties that favor low taxes and redistribution, and under which rich voters support left‐wing parties that favor high taxes and redistribution. The model suggests that one reason standard tax and transfer models of redistribution often do not capture empirical reality is that redistributive transfers are a less efficient tool for attracting votes than are more targeted policy programs. The model also underlines the central importance of party discipline during legislative bargaining in shaping the importance of redistribution in voter behavior, and it describes why right‐wing parties should have an advantage over left‐wing ones in majoritarian systems.     

The AMA faces down FDR and wins

There are two types of change that can occur via federal health care legislation: expansion in access and cost containment. Without passing judgment on the advisability of legislative change, I will argue that federal legislation is unlikely to occur unless both the executive and the legislative branches of government are controlled by the Democratic party. I am not suggesting that the change is necessarily an "improvement," only that Democratic Party control is necessary, particularly as the change pertains to access.     

Industry-Dominated Science Advisory Boards Are Perceived To Be Legitimate…But Only When They Recommend More Stringent Risk Management Policies

In 2017, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was criticized for two controversial directives that restricted the eligibility of academic scientists to serve on the agency's key science advisory boards (SABs). The EPA portrayed these directives as necessary to ensure the integrity of the SAB. Critics portrayed them as a tactic by the agency to advance a more industry-friendly deregulatory agenda. With this backdrop, this research examined board composition and its effect on the perceived legitimacy of risk management recommendations by the SAB. In an experiment, we presented participants with hypothetical EPA SABs composed of different proportions of academic and industry scientists. We then asked participants to rate their satisfaction with, and the legitimacy of, these boards in light of their decisions in scenarios based on actual EPA SAB deliberations. Participants perceived higher levels of satisfaction and legitimacy when SABs made more stringent risk management recommendations. While SABs dominated by industry scientists were perceived to be more strongly motivated to protect business interests, we found no effect of board composition on perceptions of satisfaction and legitimacy. These results are consistent with prior research on decision quality that suggests people use normative outcomes as a heuristic for assessing the quality of deliberations. Moreover, these results suggest that members of the public are supportive of federal SABs regardless of their composition, but only if they take actions that are consistent with normative expectations.     

What is wrong with the Mission Dependency Index for US federal infrastructure decisions?

The Mission Dependency Index (MDI) is a risk metric used by US military services and federal agencies for guiding operations, management, and funding decisions for facilities. Despite its broad adoption for guiding the expenditure of billions in federal funds, several studies on MDI suggest it may have flaws that limit its efficacy. We present a detailed technical analysis of MDI to show how its flaws impact infrastructure decisions. We present the MDI used by the US Navy and develop a critique of current methods. We identify six problems with MDI that stem from its interpretation, use, and mathematical formulation, and we provide examples demonstrating how these flaws can bias decisions. We provide recommendations to overcome flaws for infrastructure risk decision making but ultimately recommend the US government develop a new metric less susceptible to bias.     

A WHITER SHADE OF PALE: ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

We consider an intertemporal policy game between changing governments that differ in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes, exemplified with environmental pollution. When in power, a government will choose policy instruments and set strictness of regulation with a view to influencing the policy of future, possibly different, governments. We demonstrate that a “brown” government favours emission quotas over effluent taxes, as quotas establish property rights that are costly to reverse. Conversely, a “green” government prefers to regulate by taxes, in order to limit the incentives of future brown governments to ease regulations. Strategic behaviour tends to exaggerate policy differences (making green governments greener and brown governments browner) compared to when such strategic considerations were not an issue. (JEL: D81, D9, H23, L51, Q28, Q38)     

Beneficiary participation as an instrument of downward accountability: A multiple case study

In this study, the focus is on nonprofit organizations’ (NPOs’) beneficiary participation mechanisms, a component of downward accountability, and surprisingly seldom studied in the NPO governance literature. We address this gap in a combined stakeholder/contingency framework by investigating, with a multiple case design, the perceived quality of beneficiary participation mechanisms (8 Belgian NPOs in 4 industries, 35 semi-structured interviews, 13 focus groups, organizational documents, and 713 questionnaires).The following conclusions can be drawn. In general, beneficiaries are recognized as very important stakeholders. Several of our observations document the positive image board, (middle) management and (nonpaid) employees have of beneficiary participation mechanisms in place. Also, all board members and managers are open to the idea of beneficiaries’/representatives’ participation in policy making. Other findings however indicate that their perceived value should not be overrated, especially when taking into consideration the perceptions of the beneficiaries themselves. From a theoretical point of view, it has become clear that a stakeholder theory without acknowledging interactions between stakeholder groups and their perceptions can only be partial.From an empirical point of view, we clearly demonstrate that surveying non-beneficiaries on NPOs’ organizational performance and the quality of participation mechanisms frequently results in measurement bias.     

政府奖惩机制下药品安全质量监管三方演化博弈及仿真分析

药品安全关乎人民群众生命健康、经济发展、社会稳定和国家安全，一直以来都是政府和全社会关注的热点问题之一。但是，近年来频发的各类药品安全事件，揭露了政府监管缺失、药品检测机制不完善、公众投诉失效等诸多问题。本文考虑了药品检测中存在寻租现象，构建了药品生产企业、第三方药品检测机构和政府监管部门之间的三方演化博弈模型，分析了各参与方策略选择的演化稳定性，探讨了各要素对三方策略选择的影响关系，进一步分析了三方博弈系统中均衡点的稳定性。研究结果表明：1)政府增强奖励、惩罚力度均有助于促进企业生产高药效药品、第三方药品检测机构拒绝寻租的规范行为，但是增大奖励力度将不利于政府自身履行监管职责；2)政府设定合理的奖惩机制必须符合对各方的奖惩之和大于其投机收益的条件，才能保障演化稳定市场环境下的药品安全；3)上级政府对监管部门失职的问责对增强企业生产高药效药品的稳健性具有重要意义；4)提升企业的药品销售收益、增加企业寻租成本也是避免企业生产低药效药品的有效途径。最后，利用Matlab 2020b进行了仿真分析，为政府完善药品监管机制提出了对策与建议。     

创新驱动下光伏产业供应链的竞协研究——基于政府竞争政策

将政府竞争政策与技术创新因素引入到两级多晶硅供应链博弈模型中,研究不同情形下政府竞争奖励与技术创新努力水平对于各级制造商最优利润的影响。构建关于硅片批发价与光伏系统销售量的利润博弈模型,求得了各级制造商的最优利润函数,并通过实证研究分析了竞争与协调两种情形下竞争政策与技术创新因素对于各级制造商最优与整体供应链总利润的影响。研究表明：(1)政府竞争政策有利于增加制造商的利润;(2)技术创新努力水平的升高可以较快的增加制造商的利润;(3)与竞争情形相比,协调情形下各制造商的利润及整个供应链总利润更高。