Fostering Risk Taking in Research and Development: The Importance of a Project's Terminal Value

Large firms face a conflict in managing a portfolio of high-risk projects. When an ongoing project is thought to have a low likelihood of success, project team members take risks to improve its chances of success. However, upper-level managers who allocate resources tend to withhold resources from a project with a low likelihood of success in favor of others in the portfolio that look more promising. Because this paucity of resources influences project team members to avoid risk, the total effect of success likelihood on risk taking is conflicted. The influence on risk taking of a project's terminal value—defined as the value that remains in the firm in the event of project failure—is unequivocally positive, because both senior management resource allocation and project team risk-taking propensity are encouraged by terminal value. Thus, firms can override the ambivalent effect of likelihood of success on project decision making by focusing attention on a project's terminal value.     

The Effects of Information Overload on Software Project Risk Assessment*

Managers are responsible for providing effective information technology governance of the software development process. Ineffective governance leads to serious resource misallocations and negative consequences concerning Sarbanes‐Oxley compliance. In order for managers to make informed decisions about software development projects, they often need more information than is available through normal information channels, that is, they need an in‐depth review of the at‐risk project. Such in‐depth reviews, however, are costly. Hence, accurate identification of at‐risk projects for in‐depth review is critical to management's ability to govern. This research considers how two factors, information load and time pressure, affect the quality of the project‐selection process. We examine quality by observing the decision strategies involved and then relating these strategies to subsequent decision making. An experiment was conducted with experienced information systems auditors using a combination of policy‐capturing and computerized process‐tracing techniques. The participants in our study cope with information overload by accelerating their decision‐making process and adopting noncompensatory decision processes. Contrary to prior research, our process‐tracing analysis suggests that participants rarely filter information, thus implying that decision makers are unable to process all the information. Coping by resorting to noncompensatory strategies did not decrease decision quality unless combined with accelerated information processing. Participants also increase their weight on the software project risk factors that they repeatedly access and that they view for longer periods of time. The theoretical contributions and practical implications regarding what actions managers can take to reduce the negative impact of information overload are discussed.     

Opt‐Out Options in New Product Co‐development Partnerships

We study three contractual arrangements—co‐development, licensing, and co‐development with opt‐out options—for the joint development of new products between a small and financially constrained innovator firm and a large technology company, as in the case of a biotech innovator and a major pharma company. We formulate our arguments in the context of a two‐stage model, characterized by technical risk and stochastically changing cost and revenue projections. The model captures the main disadvantages of traditional co‐development and licensing arrangements: in co‐development the small firm runs a risk of running out of capital as future costs rise, while licensing for milestone and royalty (M&R) payments, which eliminates the latter risk, introduces inefficiency, as profitable projects might be abandoned. Counter to intuition we show that the biotech's payoff in a licensing contract is not monotonically increasing in the M&R terms. We also show that an option clause in a co‐development contract that gives the small firm the right but not the obligation to opt out of co‐development and into a pre‐agreed licensing arrangement avoids the problems associated with fully committed co‐development or licensing: the probability that the small firm will run out of capital is greatly reduced or completely eliminated and profitable projects are never abandoned.     

MORAL HAZARD AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DYNAMICS

We base a contracting theory for a startup firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in the realized profit of the firm. All message game contracts with pure strategy equilibria (and no third parties) are considered. Within this class of contracts/equilibria, and regardless of who has the renegotiating bargaining power, debt and convertible debt maximize the entrepreneur's incentives to exert effort. These contracts are optimal if the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in renegotiation. If the investor has the bargaining power, the same is true unless debt induces excessive effort. In the latter case, a nondebt simple contract achieves efficiency—the noncontractibility of effort does not lower welfare. Thus, when the noncontractibility of effort matters, our results mirror typical capital structure dynamics: an early use of debt claims, followed by a switch to equity‐like claims. (JEL: D820, L140, O261)     

Managing Cost Salience and Procrastination in Projects: Compensation and Team Composition

The rising trend of projects with high‐skilled and autonomous contributors increasingly exposes managers to the risk of idiosyncratic individual behaviors. In this article, we examine the effects of an important behavioral factor, an individual's cost salience. Cost salience leads individuals to perceive the cost of immediate effort to be larger than the cost of future effort. This leads to procrastination in early stages and back‐loaded effort over the course of the project. We model the problem confronting the manager of a project whose quality is adversely impacted by such distortion of individual effort over time. Complementary to prior works focused on the planning and scheduling tasks of project management in the absence of human behavior, we find that managers should reward contributions made in earlier stages of a project. Our analysis also yields interesting insights on the project team performance: teams with diverse levels of cost salience will perform better than homogeneous teams. We also address another important facet of team composition, namely, the choice between stable and fluid teams, and find that the practice of creating fluid teams might have previously unrecognized benefits when behavioral aspects of projects are considered. We conclude with insights and organizational implications for project managers.     

Consumer Effort in Promotional Incentives

Consumers need to exert effort to use the incentives provided in a promotion campaign. This effort is critical in the consumers’ decision process and for the success of the campaign. We develop a model of consumer redemption effort that is general in nature and is applicable to coupons, rebates, and other price‐discrimination devices. We find that the impact of redemption effort is quite intricate on a firm’s profit and consumers’ surplus. We find that there are cases where a firm would like to operate in a low redemption cost environment while consumers would be better off with higher costs. We identify cases where price can remain the same with or without the promotion. In these cases, it is possible that the surplus for each individual consumer is higher when a firm price discriminates and improves its profit. Our results indicate that a firm would rather have variation in consumer redemption costs than to have variation in consumer valuations. However, in a market with low valuation variability, consumer redemption cost variability is essential for an efficient promotion campaign. Therefore, the markets that naturally have a lot of variability in consumer valuations should be the ones targeted for online promotion programs that reduce consumer effort levels, not the markets with low variability.     

DRIVE AND TALENT

We analyze ways in which heterogeneity in responsiveness to incentives (“drive”) affects employees' incentives and firms' incentive systems in a career concerns model. On the one hand, because more driven agents work harder in response to existing incentives than less driven ones—and therefore pay is increasing in perceived drive—there is a motive to increase effort to signal high drive. These “drive‐signaling incentives” are strongest with intermediate levels of existing incentives. On the other hand, because past output of a more driven agent will seem to the principal to reflect lower ability, there is an incentive to decrease effort to signal low drive. The former effect dominates early in the career, and the latter effect dominates towards the end. To maximize incentives, the principal wants to observe a noisy measure of the agent's effort—such as the number of hours he works—early but not late in his career. (JEL: C70, D82, D23)     

All You Need Is Trust? An Examination of Inter‐organizational Supply Chain Projects

This study examines the antecedents of supply chain project success. We first propose and test a model that describes the role of relationship‐level factors (trust and asymmetric dependence) and project‐level factors (between‐firm communication and within‐firm commitment) in determining supply chain project success. We find that project‐level factors completely mediate the effect of trust on project success. We conclude that trust, despite being a stronger predictor compared to asymmetric dependence, is necessary but not sufficient for supply chain project success. We then proceed to further explore the role of these factors by introducing a categorical scheme that differentiates supply chain projects based on the decision rights configuration of each project. This categorization enables us to explore how relationship‐level and project‐level factors can have different impact on performance based on the characteristics of a supply chain project. The findings offer insights into how to effectively manage supply chain projects and inter‐firm alliances.     

Work Design and Integration Glitches in Globally Distributed Technology Projects

In a technology project, project integration represents the pooling together of complete, interdependent task modules to form a physical product or software delivering a desired functionality. This study develops and tests a conceptual framework that examines the interrelationships between the elements of work design, project integration challenges, and project performance. We identify two distinct elements of work design in technology projects: (i) the type of project organization based on whether a technology project spans a firm boundary (Domestic‐Outsourcing) or a country boundary (Offshore‐Insourcing) or both boundaries (Offshore‐Outsourcing) or no boundaries (Domestic‐Insourcing), and (ii) the joint coordination practices among key stakeholders in a technology project—namely, Onsite Ratio and Joint‐Task Ownership. Next, we measure the effectiveness of project integration using integration glitches that capture the incompatibility among interdependent task modules during project integration. Based on analysis of data from 830 technology projects, the results highlight the differential effects of distributed project organizations on integration glitches. Specifically, we find that project organizations that span both firm and country boundaries (Offshore‐Outsourcing) experience significantly higher levels of integration glitches compared to domestic project organizations (Domestic‐Outsourcing and Domestic‐Insourcing). The results further indicate that the relationship between project organization type and integration glitches is moderated by the extent of joint coordination practices in a project. That is, managers can actively lower integration glitches by increasing the levels of onsite ratio and by promoting higher levels of joint‐task ownership, particularly in project organization types that span both firm and country boundaries (Offshore‐Outsourcing). Finally, the results demonstrate the practical significance of studying integration glitches by highlighting its significant negative effect on project performance.     

基于实物期权的研发项目动态投资决策模型

本文基于实物期权理论,针对研发项目阶段性特点,结合博弈论的思想,分析了多个研发项目组成的投资状态组合,构建了研发项目动态选择模型。首先,根据研发项目多阶段的特征,利用孪生证券的思想,基于实物期权理论,建立了项目中止决策准则;在此基础上分析研发项目的投资决策状态,建立了二十五个状态的切换场景;然后通过实际算例对模型进行验证和分析,得出了研发项目投资的影响范围概念图,最终实现两个项目的最优投资决策目标。     

HYBRID R&D

We develop a model of R&D collaboration in which individual firms carry out in‐house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non‐core activities with other firms. We develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which R&D investments in different projects of a firm are complementary. We show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models. We then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investments and profits. In this context, we identify a second aspect of complementarity: Equilibrium investments in in‐house as well as in each joint project are increasing in the number of projects. However, we find that an increase in number of joint projects of all firms lowers collective profits, suggesting the presence of excessive incentives for conducting research. (JEL: L13, L14, L22, O31, O32)     

Economic Evaluation of Scale Dependent Technology Investments

We study the effect of financial risk on the economic evaluation of a project with capacity decisions. Capacity decisions have an important effect on the project̂s value through the up‐front investment, the associated operating cost, and constraints on output. However, increased scale also affects the financial risk of the project through its effect on the operating leverage of the investment. Although it has long been recognized in the finance literature that operating leverage affects project risk, this result has not been incorporated in the operations management literature when evaluating projects. We study the decision problem of a firm that must choose project scale. Future cash flow uncertainty is introduced by uncertain future market prices. The firm's capacity decision affects the firm's potential sales, its expected price for output, and its costs. We study the firm's profit maximizing scale decision using the CAPM model for risk adjustment. Our results include that project risk, as measured by the required rate of return, is related to the inverse of the expected profit per unit sold. We also show that project risk is related to the scale choice. In contrast, in traditional discounted cash flow analysis (DCF), a fixed prescribed rate is used to evaluate the project and choose its scale. When a fixed rate is used with DCF, a manager will ignore the effect of scale on risk and choose suboptimal capacity that reduces project value. S/he will also misestimate project value. Use of DCF for choosing scale is studied for two special cases. It is shown that if the manager is directed to use a prescribed discount rate that induces the optimal scale decision, then the manager will greatly undervalue the project. In contrast, if the discount rate is set to the risk of the optimally‐scaled project, the manager will undersize the project by a small amount, and slightly undervalue the project with the economic impact of the error being small. These results underline the importance of understanding the source of financial risk in projects where risk is endogenous to the project design.     

项目经理激励报酬机制与企业监督博弈分析

项目经理的投机行为可以通过监督或激励来缓解。本文建立了有关项目管理中的国有企业监督与项目经理行为之间的模型,并运用此模型分析了项目经理的激励机制、项目经理的行为和企业监督之间的关系,并为如何有效地避免项目经理的投机行为,改进当前激励报酬形式提供了一种分析工具。     

How Provider Selection and Management Contribute to Successful Innovation Outsourcing: An Empirical Study at Siemens

It is becoming increasingly common to involve external technology providers in developing new technologies and new products. Two important phases involved in working with technology vendors are vendor selection and vendor management. Because for both steps theory development of key decision guidelines is still immature, we use detailed case studies of 31 innovation outsourcing projects at Siemens to develop grounded theory on provider selection criteria and on project management success drivers. A selection criterion often associated with successful outsourcing is the provider's “track record” or previous experience. Our cases suggest that there is no standard “track record” for success but that a “match” between the client firm's outsourcing motivation and the provider's strengths appears to be a necessary condition for a successful outsourcing collaboration. As to the second phase—managing the vendor—we identify a number of operational project success drivers. There seems to be no universal checklist, but the most important drivers seem to be contingent on the type of vendor chosen and on the maturity of the technology. We compare five provider types—universities, competitors, customers, start‐up companies, and component suppliers—and find that some success drivers are common to all providers, while others are relevant only for certain types of provider. Moreover, drivers in the case of a mature technology are more focused on successful transfer to manufacturing than on development itself. Our findings offer guidelines for innovation managers on how to select innovation providers and how to manage them during the project.     

Organizational Integration for Product Development: The Effects on Glitches,On‐Time Execution of Engineering Change Orders,and Market Success

Deviations from requirements during the product development process can be considered as glitches. Fixing glitches, or problems, during the product development process consumes valuable resources, which may adversely affect product development time and hamper the firm's goal to pursue a first‐mover advantage. It is posited that an integrated organizational response can diminish incidences of glitches and improve the ability of the firm to respond to engineering changes, subsequently leading to improved market success. This organizational response frequently includes heavyweight product development managers who are seen as essential catalysts for internal integration. Though internal integration is vital, it is equally important to integrate with customers and suppliers alike because such network partners can provide access to information, knowledge, and unique and complementary resources that are otherwise unavailable to the firm. Findings, which are based on a sample of 191 product development projects in the automotive industry, suggest that some integration routines have a positive impact on product development outcomes and market success, while other routines can in fact hamper the collective effort.     

Idea Generation and the Role of Feedback: Evidence from Field Experiments with Innovation Tournaments

In many innovation settings, ideas are generated over time and managers face a decision about if and how to provide in‐process feedback to the idea generators about the quality of submissions. In this article, we use design contests allowing repeated entry to examine the effect of in‐process feedback on idea generation. We report on a set of field experiments using two online contest websites to compare the performance of three different feedback treatments—no feedback, random feedback, and directed feedback (i.e., in‐process feedback highly correlated with the final quality rating of the entry). We posted six logo design contests for consumer products and accepted submissions for 1 week. We provided daily feedback during the contest period using one of the three treatments. We then used a panel of target consumers to rate the quality of each idea. We find that directed feedback is associated positively with agent participation. For outcome, while directed feedback benefits the average quality of entries submitted, we don't find that relationship for the best entries—indeed, no feedback or random feedback may produce better top‐end entry quality. We also find that, under directed feedback, the variance in quality declines as the contest progresses.     

Managing Technology Selection and Development Risk in Competitive Environments

Managing development decisions for new products based on dynamically evolving technologies is a complex task, especially in highly competitive industries. Product managers often have to choose between introducing an incrementally better, safe new product early and a superior, yet highly risky, product later. Recommendations for managing such performance vs. time‐to‐market trade‐offs often ignore competitive reactions to development decisions. In this paper, we study how a firm could incorporate the presence of a strategic competitor in making technology selection and investment decisions regarding new products. We consider a model in which an innovating firm and its rival can introduce a new product immediately or pursue a more advanced product for later launch. Further, the firm can reduce the uncertainty surrounding product development by dedicating more resources; the effectiveness of this investment depends on the firm's innovative capacity. Our model generates two sets of insights. First, in highly competitive industries, firms can adopt different technologies and effectively use introduction timing to mitigate the effects of price competition. More importantly, the firm could strategically invest in the advanced product to influence its rival's technology choice. We characterize equilibrium development and investment decisions of the firms, and derive innovative capacity hurdles that govern a firm's choice between the risky and safe alternatives. The effects of development flexibility—where firms might have the option to revert to the safe product if the advanced product fails—are also considered.     

Effort Observability,Incentive Systems,and Organizational Forms

This paper analyses the choice between a centralized and a decentralized organizational structure focusing on the relationship existing between the allocation of decision rights, the degree of observability of effort and the use of different compensation systems. Profitable production is realized thanks to good information being available during the project selection stage and hard work being performed in the implementation stage. Selection of projects may be made by the principal (hierarchy) or by the agent (delegation). Under the hierarchical system, the principal's participation in the design of projects allows her to gather useful information for the design of a more accurate compensation system. Therefore, we analyse the trade‐off between optimal use of available information and accuracy of incentive systems, which emerges in the choice of organizational form.     

Developing strategic thinking

This paper looks at the problem of getting managers to contribute effectively to strategic planning, and focuses on the role of management development approaches in ensuring that this happens. A number of formal, and less formal, management development techniques are discussed in the light of their relevance for developing strategic awareness. The importance of providing exposure to strategic issues at an early stage in managers' careers is stressed, and also the need to encourage managers to take initiatives in obtaining their own development. Some of the most fruitful techniques involve taking full advantage of the ‘natural learning’ that takes place on the job, and those which provide a close integration between management development and the planning process—such as projects and ‘task forces’. Finally the role of senior managers in helping to create and maintain a climate in which strategic abilities can develop is discussed.     

Do Shareholders Really Prefer Their Executives to Maximize the Equity Value? A Newsvendor Case*

In this article, we study how the operational decisions of a firm manager depend on her own incentives, the capital structure, and financial decisions in the context of the newsvendor framework. We establish a relationship between the firm’s cost of raising funds and the riskiness of the inventory decisions of the manager. We consider four types of managers, namely, profit, equity, firm value, and profit‐equity maximizers, and initially assume that they may raise funds to increase the inventory level only by issuing debt. We show that the shareholders are indifferent between the different types of managers when the coefficient of variation (CV) of demand is low. However, this is not the case when the CV of demand is high. Based on the demand and the firm’s specific characteristics such as profitability, leverage, and bankruptcy costs, the shareholders might be better off with the manager whose compensation package is tied to the firm value as opposed to the equity value. We, then, extend our model by allowing the manager to raise the required funds by issuing both debt and equity. For this case we focus on the equity and firm value maximizer managers and show that our earlier results (for the debt only case) still hold subject to the cost of issuing equity. However the benefit of the firm value maximizer manager over the equity maximizer manager for shareholders is considerably less in this case compared to the case where the manager can only issue debt. The Board of Directors can take these factors into consideration when establishing/modifying the right incentive package for the managers. We also incorporate the notion of the asymmetric information to capture its impact on the board of directors’ decision about the managers’ incentive package.