Efficacy Foundations for Risk Communication: How People Think About Reducing the Risks of Climate Change

Believing action to reduce the risks of climate change is both possible (self‐efficacy) and effective (response efficacy) is essential to motivate and sustain risk mitigation efforts, according to current risk communication theory. Although the public recognizes the dangers of climate change, and is deluged with lists of possible mitigative actions, little is known about public efficacy beliefs in the context of climate change. Prior efficacy studies rely on conflicting constructs and measures of efficacy, and links between efficacy and risk management actions are muddled. As a result, much remains to learn about how laypersons think about the ease and effectiveness of potential mitigative actions. To bring clarity and inform risk communication and management efforts, we investigate how people think about efficacy in the context of climate change risk management by analyzing unprompted and prompted beliefs from two national surveys (N = 405, N = 1,820). In general, respondents distinguish little between effective and ineffective climate strategies. While many respondents appreciate that reducing fossil fuel use is an effective risk mitigation strategy, overall assessments reflect persistent misconceptions about climate change causes, and uncertainties about the effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies. Our findings suggest targeting climate change risk communication and management strategies to (1) address gaps in people's existing mental models of climate action, (2) leverage existing public understanding of both potentially effective mitigation strategies and the collective action dilemma at the heart of climate change action, and (3) take into account ideologically driven reactions to behavior change and government action framed as climate action.     

The Interplay Between Knowledge,Perceived Efficacy,and Concern About Global Warming and Climate Change: A One‐Year Longitudinal Study

If the long‐term goal of limiting warming to less than 2°C is to be achieved, rapid and sustained reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are required. These reductions will demand political leadership and widespread public support for action on global warming and climate change. Public knowledge, level of concern, and perceived personal efficacy, in positively affecting these issues are key variables in understanding public support for mitigation action. Previous research has documented some contradictory associations between knowledge, personal efficacy, and concern about global warming and climate change, but these cross‐sectional findings limit inferences about temporal stability and direction of influence. This study examines the relationships between these three variables over a one‐year period and three waves with national data from New Zealand. Results showed a positive association between the variables, and the pattern of findings was stable and consistent across the three data points. More importantly, results indicate that concern mediates the influence of knowledge on personal efficacy. Knowing more about global warming and climate change increases overall concern about the risks of these issues, and this increased concern leads to greater perceived efficacy and responsibility to help solving them. Implications for risk communication are discussed.     

Indiscriminate,Irrelevant, and Sometimes Wrong: Causal Misconceptions about Climate Change

Prior research demonstrates widespread persistence of beliefs about climate change causes and risks that are arguably misconceptions. They include believing pollution causes climate change, believing ozone depletion causes climate change, the combination of these two “green beliefs,” referred to as environmental problems, and believing natural climate variation significantly contributes to current climate trends. Each of these causal beliefs has the potential to weaken or divert support away from effective climate change risk mitigation policies. To assess this potential, we explore the nature and prevalence of these beliefs in the United States with a national sample of interviews (N = 77) and two national surveys (N = 1,013, N = 1,820), and apply regression and mediation analyses to explore whether they explain any of the variation in individuals’ concern or support for policy to mitigate climate change. Adherence to these beliefs—which reflect a variety of misconceptions illustrated in the interviews—differs by political ideology but is common, with over a third of interviewees mentioning one or more. Controlling for general knowledge, political ideology, and other factors, misconceptions about environmental problems are still associated directly with support for climate change policies. On average adherence to the belief that environmental problems cause climate change is associated with a 25% higher probability of policy support. In contrast, believing natural climate variability is a major recent cause of climate change is associated with a 7% lower probability of supporting climate policy, even after controlling for political ideology and other knowledge about climate change.     

Climate change knowledge influences attitude to mitigation via efficacy beliefs

Theories proposing climate change apathy is explained by inadequate knowledge do not account for why many informed and concerned Americans fail to act. While correlations between knowledge, efficacy for climate change, and attitude to mitigation have been observed, few studies have examined efficacy for climate change as a mediator. This study aimed to investigate the influence of specific climate change knowledge on attitude to mitigation via efficacy beliefs. A cross-sectional survey of 205 US adults recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk assessed participants’ climate change knowledge, efficacy for climate change, and attitude to mitigation. Indirect effects of self-efficacy for climate change were observed in three mediation models, suggesting efficacy for climate change explains some of the relationship between specific climate change knowledge and attitude to mitigation. The findings suggest risk communication can motivate pro-environmental attitudes with interventions that deliver information about climate change and develop efficacy for mitigation behavior.     

Attenuating Initial Beliefs: Increasing the Acceptance of Anthropogenic Climate Change Information by Reflecting on Values

Anthropogenic climate change information tends to be interpreted against the backdrop of initial environmental beliefs, which can lead to some people being resistant toward the information. In this article (N = 88), we examined whether self‐affirmation via reflection on personally important values could attenuate the impact of initial beliefs on the acceptance of anthropogenic climate change evidence. Our findings showed that initial beliefs about the human impact on ecological stability influenced the acceptance of information only among nonaffirmed participants. Self‐affirmed participants who were initially resistant toward the information showed stronger beliefs in the existence of climate change risks and greater acknowledgment that individual efficacy has a role to play in reducing climate change risks than did their nonaffirmed counterparts.     

Risk or Efficacy? How Psychological Distance Influences Climate Change Engagement

Construal-level theory suggests that high-level abstract features weigh more in people's decision-making at farther distance, while low-level concrete features weigh more at closer distance. Based on this, we propose that psychological distance will influence the effect of risk versus efficacy framing on climate change engagement. In particular, risk perception related to the end-state expectancy of climate change mitigation should influence people's climate change engagement at farther distance. In contrast, efficacy perception related to the perceived feasibility of attaining end-state goals should influence engagement at closer distance. Results from an experimental survey based on a national sample that is both demographically and geographically representative (N = 1,282) supported our proposition. At closer spatial distance, perceived efficacy boosted by efficacy framing increased participants’ intention to perform climate mitigation behaviors. In contrast, at farther distance, risk framing increased behavioral intention through heightened risk perception. Based on these findings, we suggest that when communicating distant and abstract risks, highlighting their disastrous impacts may better motivate action. In contrast, when communicating impending and concrete risks, stressing the feasibility of action may have stronger motivational potential.     

Weighing the Risks of Nuclear Energy and Climate Change: Trust in Different Information Sources,Perceived Risks,and Willingness to Pay for Alternatives to Nuclear Power

We examined how individuals perceive nuclear energy in the context of climate change mitigation and how their perceptions are associated with trust in different risk information sources. We analyzed the interrelationships between trust, perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, perception of nuclear energy as an acceptable way to mitigate climate change, and willingness to pay (WTP) for alternatives to nuclear power. A nationwide survey (N = 967) collected in Finland was analyzed with structural equation modeling. The associations between trust and perceived risk of nuclear power, climate change concern, and perception of nuclear power as a way to mitigate climate change varied by the type of information source. Political party support and other background variables were associated with trust in different information sources. The effect of trust in information sources on WTP was mediated by perceived risks and benefits. The results will increase our understanding of how individuals perceive nuclear energy as a way to cut CO₂ emissions and the role of trust in different information sources in shaping nuclear risk perceptions and energy choices.     

The Politicization of Risk: Party Cues,Polarization, and Public Perceptions of Climate Change Risk

Previous research shows that public perceptions of climate change risk are strongly related to the individual willingness to support climate mitigation and adaptation policy. In this article, I investigate how public perceptions of climate change risk are affected by communications from political parties and the degree of polarization among them. Specifically, using survey data from Sweden, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand, I study the relationship between party source cues, perceived polarization, and public perceptions of climate change risk. The results reveal a positive relationship between party cues and perceptions of climate change risk, indicating that individuals adjust their risk perceptions to align with their party preference. Furthermore, a negative relationship between perceived polarization and individual risk perceptions is also discovered, showing that individuals tend to be less concerned with climate change the more polarization they perceive. However, the effect of perceived polarization is found to be limited to more abstract perceptions of risk, while being unrelated to perceptions of concrete risks. Even with some contextual variance, the results generally hold up well across the four countries.     

Climate Change Beliefs and Perceptions of Weather‐Related Changes in the United Kingdom

Public perception research in different countries has suggested that real and perceived periods of high temperature strengthen people's climate change beliefs. Such findings raise questions about the climate change beliefs of people in regions with moderate climates. Relatively little is known about whether public concerns about climate change may also be associated with perceived changes in other weather‐related events, such as precipitation or flooding. We examine the relationship between perceived changes in weather‐related events and climate change beliefs among U.K. residents at a time of below‐average winter temperatures and recent flooding. National survey data (n = 1,848) revealed that heat waves and hot summers were perceived to have become less common during respondents’ lifetimes, while flooding, periods of heavy rainfall, coastal erosions, and mild winters were perceived to have increased in frequency and cold winters were perceived to be unchanged. Although perceived changes in hot‐weather‐related events were positively associated with climate change beliefs, perceived changes in wet‐weather‐related events were found to be an even stronger predictor. Self‐reported experience of “flooding in own area” and “heat‐wave discomfort” also significantly contributed to climate change beliefs. These findings highlight the importance of salient weather‐related events and experiences in the formation of beliefs about climate change. We link our findings to research in judgment and decision making, and propose that those wishing to engage with the public on the issue of climate change should not limit their focus to heat.     

Values,Perceived Risks and Benefits,and Acceptability of Nuclear Energy

We examined how personal values and perceptions of risks and benefits are associated with the acceptability of nuclear energy (NE). A theoretical model is tested in which beliefs about the risks and benefits of NE mediate the relationship between values and acceptability. The results showed that egoistic values are positively related to the perceived benefits and acceptability of NE. In contrast, altruistic and biospheric values were positively related to the perceived risks of NE. Although it has been argued that NE may help to combat climate change through lower CO₂ emissions, these environmental benefits were not acknowledged by people with strong biospheric values. Furthermore, results confirmed that the more risks respondents perceived, the less they were inclined to accept NE. In contrast, the more a person believed that NE has beneficial consequences, the more acceptable NE was. Finally, as expected, perceived risks and benefits were found to partly mediate the relationship between personal values and acceptability. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.     

Risk Perceptions,General Environmental Beliefs,and Willingness to Address Climate Change

The research reported here examines the relationship between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change. The data are a national sample of 1225 mail surveys that include measures of risk perceptions and knowledge tied to climate change, support for voluntary and government actions to address the problem, general environmental beliefs, and demographic variables. Risk perceptions matter in predicting behavioral intentions. Risk perceptions are not a surrogate for general environmental beliefs, but have their own power to account for behavioral intentions. There are four secondary conclusions. First, behavioral intentions regarding climate change are complex and intriguing. People are neither nonbelievers who will take no initiatives themselves and oppose all government efforts, nor are they believers who promise both to make personal efforts and to vote for every government proposal that promises to address climate change. Second, there are separate demographic sources for voluntary actions compared with voting intentions. Third, recognizing the causes of global warming is a powerful predictor of behavioral intentions independent from believing that climate change will happen and have bad consequences. Finally, the success of the risk perception variables to account for behavioral intentions should encourage greater attention to risk perceptions as independent variables. Risk perceptions and knowledge, however, share the stage with general environmental beliefs and demographic characteristics. Although related, risk perceptions, knowledge, and general environmental beliefs are somewhat independent predictors of behavioral intentions.     

Does Size Matter? A Study of Risk Perceptions of Global Population Growth

The global human population now exceeds 7 billion and is projected to reach 10 billion around 2060. While population growth has been associated with certain benefits (e.g., economies of scale, technological advancements), theoretical models, probabilistic projections, and empirical evidence also indicate that this growth could increase the likelihood of many adverse events (e.g., climate change, resource shortages) and the impact of these events, as more people are exposed to the outcomes. While concerns about these issues are well‐documented in the academic literature, there is little evidence concerning the public's perceptions of the risks associated with global population growth (GPG) and how these perceptions are likely to influence related decisions. To address these issues, we conducted a U.K.‐based study that examined respondents’ risk perceptions of GPG, their willingness to embrace mitigation/precautionary behaviors, and reasons for variations in these two factors. We found that GPG is perceived as a moderate‐to‐high risk, with concerns about the increased likelihood of resource shortages, ecological damage, and violent conflict being foremost. Respondents believed that the worst effects of GPG would arrive around 2050 and would be experienced by the world's poorest people. Respondents who perceived greater levels of risk from GPG were generally those who indicated a greater willingness to embrace mitigation behaviors (e.g., reduce resource consumption) and preventative actions (e.g., support political action to limit growth). We discuss how our findings might be utilized to better manage the potential challenges associated with GPG and we suggest several directions for further research.     

Nostalgia and the Narrativization of Identity: A Turkish Case Study

This paper offers an interpretation of the collective identity‐narrative of a Turkish faculty of vocational education. Particular attention is focused on the importance of nostalgia in acts of collective self‐authorship. Nostalgia, it is argued, is key to the understanding of the dynamics of individual and organizational identity‐construction in several ways: it can be a means of maintaining a collective sense of socio‐historic continuity, a source of resistance to hegemonic influence and a defence against anxiety. The research contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it illustrates how groups assemble shared storylines that subjectively constitute their collective identity. Second, it analyses the different ways in which acts of collective nostalgia can inform the stories by which individuals and groups understand their present circumstances, preserve self‐esteem, and react to perceived threats. Third, it theorises nostalgia as giving access to a shared heritage of apparently authentic and identity‐relevant values and beliefs, as an emotional support during periods of organizational change, and as a form of uniqueness claim central to processes of individual‐organization identification.     

Assessing the Effects of Information About Global Population Growth on Risk Perceptions and Support for Mitigation and Prevention Strategies

The human population is forecast to increase by 3–4 billion people during this century and many scientists have expressed concerns that this could increase the likelihood of certain adverse events (e.g., climate change and resource shortages). Recent research shows that these concerns are mirrored in public risk perceptions and that these perceptions correlate with a willingness to adopt mitigation behaviors (e.g., reduce resource consumption) and preventative actions (e.g., support actions to limit growth). However, little research has assessed the factors that influence risk perceptions of global population growth (GPG). To contribute to this important goal, this article presents three studies that examined how risk perceptions of GPG might be influenced by textual‐visual representations (like those in media and Internet articles) of the potential effects of GPG. Study 1 found that a textual narrative that highlighted the potential negative (cf. positive) consequences of GPG led to higher perceived risk and greater willingness to adopt mitigation behaviors, but not to support preventative actions. Notably, the influence of the narratives on perceived risk was largely moderated by the participant's prior knowledge and perceptions of GPG. Contrary to expectations, studies 2 and 3 revealed, respectively, that photographs depicting GPG‐related imagery and graphs depicting GPG rates had no significant effect on the perceived risk of GPG or the willingness to embrace mitigation or preventative actions. However, study 3 found that individuals with higher “graph literacy” perceived GPG as a higher risk and were more willing to adopt mitigation behaviors and support preventative actions.     

Personal Values, Beliefs, and Ecological Risk Perception

A mail survey on ecological risk perception was administered in the summer of 2002 to a randomized sample of the lay public and to selected risk professionals at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). The ranking of 24 ecological risk items, from global climate change to commercial fishing, reveals that the lay public is more concerned about low-probability, high-consequence risks whereas the risk professionals are more concerned about risks that pose long-term, ecosystem-level impacts. To test the explanatory power of the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory for risk perception, respondents were questioned about their personal values, spiritual beliefs, and worldviews. The most consistent predictors of the risk rankings are belief in the new ecological paradigm (NEP) and Schwartz's altruism. The NEP and Schwartz's altruism explain from 19% to 46% of the variance in the risk rankings. Religious beliefs account for less than 6% of the variance and do not show a consistent pattern in predicting risk perception although religious fundamentalists are generally less concerned about the risk items. While not exerting as strong an impact, social-structural variables do have some influence on risk perception. Ethnicities show no effect on the risk scales but the more educated and financially well-off are less concerned about the risk items. Political leanings have no direct influence on risk rankings, but indirectly affect rankings through the NEP. These results reveal that the VBN theory is a plausible explanation for the differences measured in the respondents' perception of ecological risk.     

LONG‐TERM PERSISTENCE

We study whether a positive historical shock can generate long‐term persistence in development. We show that Italian cities that achieved self‐government in the Middle Ages have a higher level of civic capital today than similar cities in the same area that did not. The size of this effect increases with the length of the period of independence and its intensity. This effect persists even after accounting for the fact that cities did not become independent randomly. We conjecture that the Middle‐Age experience of self‐government fostered self‐efficacy beliefs—beliefs in one's own ability to complete tasks and reach goals—and this positive attitude, transmitted across generations, enhances civic capital today. Consistently, we find that fifth‐graders in former free city‐states exhibit stronger self‐efficacy beliefs and that these beliefs are correlated with a higher level of civic capital. (JEL: O43, P16, O10)     

Is There Any Hope? How Climate Change News Imagery and Text Influence Audience Emotions and Support for Climate Mitigation Policies

Using a national sample, this study experimentally tests the effects of news visuals and texts that emphasize either the causes and impacts of climate change or actions that can be taken to address climate change. We test the effects of variations in text and imagery on discrete emotions (i.e., hope, fear, and anger) and, indirectly, on support for climate mitigation policies. Political ideology is examined as a moderator. The findings indicate that news images and texts that focus on climate‐oriented actions can increase hope and, in the case of texts, decrease fear and anger, and these effects generally hold across the ideological spectrum. In turn, the influence of emotions on policy support depends on ideology: Hope and fear increase support for climate policies for all ideological groups but particularly conservatives, whereas anger polarizes the opinions of liberals and conservatives. Implications for climate change communication that appeals to emotions are discussed.     

Media exposure,threat processing,and mitigation behaviors in Gulf Coast residents facing the co-occurring threats of COVID-19 and hurricanes

The 2020 hurricane season threatened millions of Americans concurrently grappling with COVID-19. Processes guiding individual-level mitigation for these conceptually distinct threats, one novel and chronic (COVID-19), the other familiar and episodic (hurricanes), are unknown. Theories of health protective behaviors suggest that inputs from external stimuli (e.g., traditional and social media) lead to threat processing, including perceived efficacy (self- and response) and perceived threat (susceptibility and severity), guiding mitigation behavior. We surveyed a representative sample of Florida and Texas residents (N = 1846) between April 14, 2020 and April 27, 2020; many had previous hurricane exposure; all were previously assessed between September 8, 2017 and September 11, 2017. Using preregistered analyses, two generalized structural equation models tested direct and indirect effects of media exposure (traditional media, social media) on self-reported (1) COVID-19 mitigation (handwashing, mask-wearing, social distancing) and (2) hurricane mitigation (preparation behaviors), as mediated through perceived efficacy (self- and response) and perceived threat (susceptibility and severity). Self-efficacy and response efficacy were associated with social distancing (p = .002), handwashing, mask-wearing, and hurricane preparation (ps < 0.001). Perceived susceptibility was positively associated with social distancing (p = 0.017) and hurricane preparation (p < 0.001). Perceived severity was positively associated with social distancing (p < 0.001). Traditional media exhibited indirect effects on COVID-19 mitigation through increased response efficacy (ps < 0.05), and to a lesser extent self-efficacy (p < 0.05), and on hurricane preparation through increased self-efficacy and response efficacy and perceived susceptibility (ps < 0.05). Social media did not exhibit indirect effects on COVID-19 or hurricane mitigation. Communications targeting efficacy and susceptibility may encourage mitigation behavior; research should explore how social media campaigns can more effectively target threat processing, guiding protective actions.     

Salient Beliefs About Earthquake Hazards and Household Preparedness

Prior research has found little or no direct link between beliefs about earthquake risk and household preparedness. Furthermore, only limited work has been conducted on how people's beliefs influence the nature and number of preparedness measures adopted. To address this gap, 48 qualitative interviews were undertaken with residents in three urban locations in New Zealand subject to seismic risk. The study aimed to identify the diverse hazard and preparedness‐related beliefs people hold and to articulate how these are influenced by public education to encourage preparedness. The study also explored how beliefs and competencies at personal, social, and environmental levels interact to influence people's risk management choices. Three main categories of beliefs were found: hazard beliefs; preparedness beliefs; and personal beliefs. Several salient beliefs found previously to influence the preparedness process were confirmed by this study, including beliefs related to earthquakes being an inevitable and imminent threat, self‐efficacy, outcome expectancy, personal responsibility, responsibility for others, and beliefs related to denial, fatalism, normalization bias, and optimistic bias. New salient beliefs were also identified (e.g., preparedness being a “way of life”), as well as insight into how some of these beliefs interact within the wider informational and societal context.