基于业务流程和合同时间的业务外包策略模型研究

业务外包作为一种有效的企业合作模式，现被广泛地应用于增强企业的竞争能力。灵活的业务外包策略有助于提高业务外包的成功运作。本文基于业务流程维度，提出了三种外包策略：购进型外包、选择型外包和完全型外包；同时，基于外包合同时间维度，也提出了三种外包策略：长期外包、中期外包和短期外包。综合业务流程维度和合同时间维度，构建了业务外包策略的二维度模型。最后从外包原因、外包关系、合同特征、信任程度、控制模式、外包风险、承包商选择、绩效影响和管理控制九个方面对二维度模型的外包策略进行了定性分析，这对于指导企业进行业务外包具有十分重要的意义。     

风险矩阵方法在业务外包风险评估中的运用

风险评估是业务外包风险管理的重要环节,是成功实施业务外包的重要前提。本文在系统识别和分析业务外包风险及其影响因素的基础上,探讨了风险矩阵方法在外包风险评估中的运用,拓展了风险矩阵的应用领域,也为外包实践提供了一种简单易行的结构性风险管理方法。     

AHP在财务外包决策中的运用

一、引言财务外包是指企业通过合同或协议的形式,将全部或部分财务系统业务〔如财务报表编制、应付(应收)账款管理、纳税申报、管理会计、内部审计职能等等〕外包给承包商,由承包商替代企业执行会计信息的生产职能,并保证提供的会计信息的质量和保守有关的商业秘密,而企业向其支付相应的费用。目前,有关财务外包方面的理论研究多数侧重于定性分析、侧重于外包的利弊分析,较少涉及外包的定量分析及外包决策的分析,在此,笔者从企业角度出发,采用层次分析法(AHP分析法)对财务活动要不要外包、是部分外包还是全部外包进行决策。自T·L·Saaty…     

信息技术外包决策的对策分析方法

针对用户与单个承包商之间的信息技术外包决策问题,在给定假设的基础上,提出了-种对策分析方法.该方法是通过求解一个两人非合作对策问题,来得到用户的外包策略和承包商的承包策略,这对于用户进行信息技术外包提供了协商依据或决策依据.最后给出了一个算例.     

企业业务外包风险控制探讨

业务外包是指企业利用专业化分工优势,将日常经营中的部分业务委托给专业的服务机构或者经济组织完成的经营行为,以达到降低成本、强化核心竞争力、分担风险的目的。业务外包在实施过程中面临着许多风险点,诸如外包业务界定不准确、承包方选择不当、商业信息泄露等。本文通过福特公司物流外包案例,分析外包业务可能存在的风险,探讨相应的管控措施。     

论传统企业电子商务外包的过程及控制

电子商务外包是传统企业发展电子商务的有效手段.本文以外包理论为基础,结合传统企业电子商务的特点,对电子商务外包的过程及管理控制要点进行了分析.电子商务外包的过程可以分为电子商务外包业务确定、电子商务外包商选择、电子商务外包实施、电子商务外包绩效评估等4个阶段,企业首先要确定拟外包的电子商务业务,然后根据自身需要选择合适的电子商务外包商.在电子商务外包的实施过程中要考虑电子商务业务与企业线下业务的整合,同时要注意控制电子商务外包的风险.最后,企业要对电子商务外包的绩效进行评估,为下一步的决策提供依据.     

业务外包策略与外包关系研究

有效的企业业务外包关系能够有助于企业降低业务外包的风险,提高业务外包的收益.在综合分析业务外包策略和业务外包关系的基础上,本文提出了业务外包策略与业务外包关系之间关联的概念模型,该模型分析了外包策略和外包关系之间的关联,这对于企业有效地实施业务外包具有重要意义.     

对人力资源管理外包的探讨

人力资源管理外包是将企业人力资源管理的非核心部分业务外包出去,降低人力资源管理成本,实现效益最大化.本文对人力资源管理外包的含义、作用、风险及化解风险的对策进行了研究.     

我国软件外包业务的市场分析

目前在全球许多国家和地区,软件外包服务得到了极大的肯定和广泛的应用,并已经成为一种不可逆转的趋势。文章在对软件外包业务发展现状、竞争态势分析的基础上,研究了我国软件外包企业所面临的市场情况,同时根据不同地域的特点把软件外包业务细分为国内、东亚、北美和欧洲四类市场,并详细论述了这四类细分市场的客户需求特性。     

电子政务服务外包模式BOO和BOT的比较研究

采用交易成本理论对电子政务外包模式BOO和BOT进行了研究,分别构建了2种模式下的电子政务效益模型和承包商利润模型.在模型的基础上讨论了各自的合同期限、公众收益、最大电子政务效益和承包商的最大利润问题.然后,根据期望电子政务效益和承包商降低电子政务系统质量的风险概率之间的关系表达式,分析如何实现公众、承包商和政府部门的多赢的问题.最后,给出了相应的算例.     

IT服务供需双边匹配的模糊多目标决策方法

描述了IT服务外包中的供给方与需求方的双边匹配决策问题。为了解决该问题,针对IT服务的供给方和需求方分别给出的语言满意度评价信息,将语言评价信息转化为三角模糊数并进行多指标信息的集结运算。在此基础上,考虑以供给方和需求方双方满意度最大为目标,构建了IT服务供需双边匹配的模糊多目标优化模型,并采取将模糊多目标优化模型转化为单目标线性规划模型的方式进行求解得到匹配结果。实例计算表明,提出的方法具有可行性和实用性。     

The effect of supplier development on outsourcing performance: the mediating roles of opportunism and flexibility

Abstract

In this increasingly competitive business environment, firms utilise outsourcing as a strategic tool to leverage globally dispersed resources so that they may focus on their core competencies and improve efficiency. The more firms rely on outsourcing, the more they depend on their suppliers, and the more important it is to manage and develop suppliers in order to achieve and maximise the benefits of outsourcing. This paper explores the impact of supplier development on outsourcing performance. Structural equation modelling was used to analyse data collected from 213 manufacturing firms in China. The results indicate that supplier development has a strong direct positive impact on outsourcing performance, and that supplier development also leads to enhanced outsourcing performance through reducing outsourcing opportunism risk and improving outsourcing flexibility. In addition to making a contribution to current theories of outsourcing, our findings also provide outsourcing managers with practical understanding and insights about the role of supplier development in enhancing outsourcing performance.     

Sourcing Decisions with Competitive Suppliers and Imperfect Information

Manufacturers often must choose between outsourcing and producing internally. This choice is complex and influenced by a variety of factors, including the costs and capabilities of the potential suppliers. In addition, if the manufacturer outsources, he must design the sourcing process. We study the manufacturer's outsourcing decision, with a focus on the impact of the sourcing process on that decision. We consider a setting in which the manufacturer has imperfect information regarding the suppliers' costs and capabilities, and we assume that the manufacturer uses a two‐stage sourcing process. The first stage is the qualification stage, in which the manufacturer seeks to reduce the uncertainty regarding the suppliers' capabilities. The second stage is the supplier selection stage, in which the manufacturer selects among the qualified suppliers on the basis of price. We first characterize the optimal design of the two‐stage process, and then consider the outsourcing decision. We demonstrate several trade‐offs. Vertical integration enables the manufacturer to reduce uncertainty and extract all of the profits of production. However, outsourcing enables the manufacturer to take advantage of the (potentially) lower costs and higher capabilities of the suppliers, particularly if competition between suppliers can be encouraged. We find that the manufacturer is more likely to vertically integrate when the warranty cost and the cost of exerting effort during qualification are large, and when there is significant uncertainty regarding the suppliers' capabilities. The manufacturer is more likely to outsource when the suppliers' costs (capabilities) are low (high), and when the number of suppliers is large.     

Incentive issues in performance-based outsourcing contracts in the UK defence industry: a simulation study

Traditional outsourcing literature has claimed gains for the customer in terms of quality and costs. However, such gains are illusory in outsourcing of high-risk, complex tasks. The use of contracts and governance mechanisms for handling complex procurements is essential in obtaining rewards from outsourcing. Powerful incentives and risks are normally used in industrial service contracts to transfer risks to measure compliance with performance measures. The availability contracts for complex engineering services provision are forms of outsourcing contracts that transfer resources from government to external service providers on a substantial scale. The change moves the contractor role from creating resources to managing resources. Such role change mandates collaboration with customers and suppliers in supply/value chains. The management task is then perceived in terms of linking and optimising alignments rather than increasing service levels. Incentive design is one mechanism for linking the coordination of resources required in availability contracting to the business model. This article studies the impacts of agreed contract type and incentive mechanism on the customer and service provider profits using agent-based discrete event simulation model under multiple risk sharing scenarios.     

Managing dependency in China outsourcing relationships

Abstract

This paper examines manufacturing firms’ use of guanxi and formal control to address dependence on suppliers and achieve desired outsourcing performance in China. Using survey data collected from manufacturing firms operating in China, a structural equation model is used to test the research model. The results suggest that manufacturing firms with high dependence on suppliers build Chinese guanxi with those suppliers to overcome the dependence and enhance outsourcing performance. In addition, Chinese guanxi also appears to facilitate the use of formal control, which was also found to have a positive relationship with outsourcing performance. This paper contributes to the literature by illustrating the importance of guanxi in achieving desired outsourcing performance in the China context, particularly in the case where a manufacturer perceives high dependency on its major supplier.     

销售成本信息不对称下供应商风险规避的回购契约

在价格随机条件下,销售成本信息不对称且供应商规避风险时,本文探讨回购契约协调供应链的最优决策。在前提假设的基础上构建新的回购契约模型,求解并用算例进行仿真验证,考虑信息不对称与风险规避共同发生耦合作用后对供应链相关决策变量的影响。研究结果表明：在价格随机条件下,不管信息是否对称,只要供应商有风险规避意识,供应链相关决策变量均发生分岔突变;不管市场价格是否随机,也不管供应商是否风险规避,只要零售商隐瞒私人销售成本信息,就会给自己带来额外的收益,但会给供应商与整个供应链带来损害;供应链上的信息越不对称,在分岔突变区域,相关决策变量的振荡幅度越大。分岔突变现象是市场价格随机和供应商风险规避耦合作用后特有的现象;零售商能够利用信息不对称给自己带来额外的好处,但会损害供应商和供应链的利益;供应商防范零售商这种损人利己行为的最好对策,就是通过设计一种合作机制,以最低成本的方式来促使零售商将销售成本信息公开化;另外,供应商以平稳的心态(风险中性)应对外部风险,更有利于提高其自身决策的水平。     

Fit between sourcing capabilities and organisational structure on IT outsourcing performance

Thus far, relatively few studies on the supplier side of Information Technology (IT) outsourcing arrangements have been based on empirical quantitative research. Previous research identified a recurring supplier problem, a lack of sustainability in IT performance. The literature revealed that a supplier's capabilities and organisational structure affect the supplier performance. We hypothesise that realising a fit between the necessary sourcing capabilities and organisational structure on the IT supplier side will result in a sustainable sourcing performance. We executed a survey research among employees involved in sourcing activities of three different IT outsourcing suppliers (N?=?135). The results from our analysis provide evidence that these constructs can be used to analyse differences between the three types of service suppliers. Results indicate that suppliers who focus on establishing a fit are more willing or able to monitor if they achieve a sustainable performance.     

Sourcing Information Security Operations: The Role of Risk Interdependency and Competitive Externality in Outsourcing Decisions

Firms are increasingly outsourcing information security operations to managed security service providers (MSSPs). Cost reduction and quality (security) improvement are often mentioned as motives for outsourcing information security, and these are also the frequently cited reasons for outsourcing traditional information technology (IT) functions, such as software development and maintenance. In this study, we present a different explanation—one based on interdependent risks and competitive externalities associated with IT security—for firms' decisions to outsource security. We show that in the absence of competitive externalities and interdependent risks, a firm will outsource security if and only if the MSSP offers a quality advantage over in‐house operations, which is consistent with the conventional explanation for security outsourcing. However, when security risks are interdependent and breaches impose competitive externalities, although firms still have stronger incentive to outsource security if the MSSP offers a higher quality in terms of preventing breaches than in‐house management, a quality advantage of MSSP over in‐house management is neither a prerequisite for a firm to outsource security nor a guarantee that a firm will. In addition to MSSP quality, the type of externality (positive or negative), the degree of externality, whether outsourcing increases or decreases risk interdependency, and the breach characteristics determine firms' sourcing decisions. When security breaches impose a positive externality, the incentive to outsource is enhanced if the MSSP decreases the risk interdependency and diminished if the MSSP increases this interdependency. A negative externality has the opposite effect on firms' incentives to outsource. A high demand spillover to a competitor, together with a high loss in industry demand because of a security breach, enhances these incentives to outsource security operations when the externality is negative. Finally, we extend our base model in several dimensions and show that our main results regarding the impact of interdependent risks and competitive externalities on sourcing decisions are robust and generalizable to different specifications.     

多部件采购外包的两阶段均衡投标策略

本文考虑一个由单个制造商和多个供应商群体组成的供应链——该制造商需要采购多个部件,对于每个部件在市场上均存在多个供应商。不同于传统的从各供应商群体分别采购各个部件,制造商考虑将所有部件的采购整体外包给某个供应商。在第一阶段,制造商使用一级价格密封投标的逆向拍卖来确定赢得整体采购合约的供应商。接下来,第一阶段投标的获胜者生产其所能供应的部件,并使用逆向拍卖向第一阶段中未获胜的其他竞标者采购其余部件。我们分析了供应商在两个阶段的均衡竞价策略,并比较了制造商在亲自逐件采购和外包整体采购两种情况下的期望采购成本。我们证明了在两种机制下制造商的总的期望采购成本相等。     

Outsourcing Competition and Information Sharing with Asymmetrically Informed Suppliers

This paper studies an outsourcing problem where two service providers (suppliers) compete for the service contract from a client. The suppliers face uncertain cost for providing the service because they do not have perfect information about the client's type. The suppliers receive differential private signals about the client type and thus compete under asymmetric information. We first characterize the equilibrium of the supplier competition. Then we investigate two of the client's information sharing decisions. It is shown that less information asymmetry between the suppliers may dampen their competition. Therefore, the client does not necessarily have the incentive to reduce information asymmetry between the suppliers. We characterize the conditions under which leveling the informational ground is beneficial to the client. We also find that under the presence of information asymmetry (e.g., when the suppliers have different learning abilities), sharing more information with both suppliers may enhance the advantage of one supplier over the other and at the same time increase the upper bound of the suppliers' quotes in equilibrium. Consequently, the suppliers compete less aggressively and the client's payoff decreases in the amount of shared information. The findings from this study provide useful managerial implications on information management for outsourcing firms.