Maximum <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-regular induced subgraphs

Independent sets, induced matchings and cliques are examples of regular induced subgraphs in a graph. In this paper, we prove that finding a maximum cardinality k-regular induced subgraph is an NP-hard problem for any fixed value of k. We propose a convex quadratic upper bound on the size of a k-regular induced subgraph and characterize those graphs for which this bound is attained. Finally, we extend the Hoffman bound on the size of a maximum 0-regular subgraph (the independence number) from k=0 to larger values of k.     

The Ultimate Uncertainty — Intergenerational Planning

The philosophic and practical aspects of intergenerational planning for a 50-100-year time frame are reviewed, with recognition of its speculative quality. Society's near term choice of future physical pathways based on comparative quantitative benefit/cost/risk analyses of alternatives is usually modified by the intervention of a variety of time-dependent, nontechnical value systems. Further, the continuous competition among society's disparate technical systems, capital investment choices, and planning objectives all contribute to the uncertainty of the intergenerational outcome of any plan. Nevertheless, the quantitative planning process provides an essential base. Benefit/cost/risk projections are discussed for both the case with a historical database and the case without such a historical base. The end-objectives and continuous nature of such benefit/cost/risk analyses are described.     

On the distance paired domination of generalized Petersen graphs <Emphasis Type="Italic">P</Emphasis>(<Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>,1) and <Emphasis Type="Italic">P</Emphasis>(<Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>,2)

Let G=(V,E) be a graph without an isolated vertex. A set D⊆V(G) is a k -distance paired dominating set of G if D is a k-distance dominating set of G and the induced subgraph 〈D〉 has a perfect matching. The minimum cardinality of a k-distance paired dominating set for graph G is the k -distance paired domination number, denoted by γ _p ^k (G). In this paper, we determine the exact k-distance paired domination number of generalized Petersen graphs P(n,1) and P(n,2) for all k≥1.     

The densest <Emphasis Type="Italic">k</Emphasis>-subgraph problem on clique graphs

The Densest k-Subgraph (DkS) problem asks for a k-vertex subgraph of a given graph with the maximum number of edges. The problem is strongly NP-hard, as a generalization of the well known Clique problem and we also know that it does not admit a Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (PTAS). In this paper we focus on special cases of the problem, with respect to the class of the input graph. Especially, towards the elucidation of the open questions concerning the complexity of the problem for interval graphs as well as its approximability for chordal graphs, we consider graphs having special clique graphs. We present a PTAS for stars of cliques and a dynamic programming algorithm for trees of cliques. M.L. is co-financed within Op. Education by the ESF (European Social Fund) and National Resources. V.Z. is partially supported by the Special Research Grants Account of the University of Athens under Grant 70/4/5821.     

Regional rail planning; a study of the importance of ‘steering’ and ‘pragmatism’ in stakeholder networks

This paper investigates the significance of networks in regional rail planning and how these networks can help regional planners meet the needs of local stakeholders. The research question focuses on the identification of the relative importance of three core factors in regional planning – communicative discourse, steering and environment. A case study of the Highlands and Islands region of Scotland was studied, with qualitative data analysed by triangulation through semi-structured interviews and social network analysis (SNA).     

Wage Bargaining with On‐the‐Job Search: Theory and Evidence

Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between‐employer competition for labor services and attribute all of the workers' rent to their bargaining power. In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on‐the‐job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productivity, competition between employers resulting from on‐the‐job search, and the workers' bargaining power. We find that between‐firm competition matters a lot in the determination of wages, because it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining à la Nash in raising wages above the workers' “reservation wages,” defined as out‐of‐work income. In particular, we detect no significant bargaining power for intermediate‐ and low‐skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high‐skilled workers.     

Biographical Notes - James H. Reynierse; Dennis Ackerman; Alexis A. Fink; John B. Harker; James T. Scarnati; David Boyd; Jay A. Halfond; Barbara A. Edwards; Tomas Brytting; Claes Trollestad; Margaret Ryan

Biography

Biographical Notes - James H. Reynierse; Dennis Ackerman; Alexis A. Fink; John B. Harker; James T. Scarnati; David Boyd; Jay A. Halfond; Barbara A. Edwards; Tomas Brytting; Claes Trollestad; Margaret Ryan     

Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information

This paper analyzes equilibrium and welfare for a tractable class of economies (games) that have externalities, strategic complementarity or substitutability, and heterogeneous information. First, we characterize the equilibrium use of information: complementarity heightens the sensitivity of equilibrium actions to public information, raising aggregate volatility, whereas substitutability heightens the sensitivity to private information, raising cross‐sectional dispersion. Next, we define and characterize an efficiency benchmark designed to address whether the equilibrium use of information is optimal from a social perspective; the efficient use of information reflects the social value of aligning choices across agents. Finally, we examine the comparative statics of equilibrium welfare with respect to the information structure; the social value of information is best understood by classifying economies according to the inefficiency, if any, in the equilibrium use of information. We conclude with a few applications, including production externalities, beauty contests, business cycles, and large Cournot and Bertrand games.     

A tighter formulation of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis>-median problem

Given a set of clients and a set of potential sites for facilities, the p-median problem consists of opening a set of p sites and assigning each client to the closest open facility to it. It can be viewed as a variation of the uncapacitated facility location problem. We propose a new formulation of this problem by a mixed integer linear problem. We show that this formulation, while it has the same value by LP-relaxation, can be much more efficient than two previous formulations. The computational experiment performed on two sets of benchmark instances has showed that the efficiency of the standard branch-and-cut algorithm has been significantly improved. Finally, we explore the structure of the new formulation in order to derive reduction rules and to accelerate the LP-relaxation resolution.     

Multi‐Echelon Inventory Management under Short‐Term Take‐or‐Pay Contracts

We extend the Clark–Scarf serial multi‐echelon inventory model to include procuring production inputs under short‐term take‐or‐pay contracts at one or more stages. In each period, each such stage has the option to order/process at two different cost rates; the cheaper rate applies to units up to the contract quantity selected in the previous period. We prove that in each period and at each such stage, there are three base‐stock levels that characterize an optimal policy, two for the inventory policy and one for the contract quantity selection policy. The optimal cost function is additively separable in its state variables, leading to conquering the curse of dimensionality and the opportunity to manage the supply chain using independently acting managers. We develop conditions under which myopic policies are optimal and illustrate the results using numerical examples. We establish and use a generic one‐period result, which generalizes an important such result in the literature. Extensions to cover variants of take‐or‐pay contracts are included. Limitations are discussed.     

EXPECTATIONS‐BASED REFERENCE‐DEPENDENT PREFERENCES AND ASSET PRICING

This paper explores the quantitative asset‐pricing implications of expectations‐based reference‐dependent preferences, as introduced by Koszegi and Rabin (2009, American Economic Review, 99(3), 909–936), in an otherwise traditional Lucas‐tree model. I find that the model easily succeeds in matching the historical equity premium and its variability when the preference parameters are calibrated in line with micro evidence. The equity premium is high because expectations‐based loss aversion makes uncertain fluctuations in consumption more painful. Additionally, loss aversion introduces variation in returns because unexpected cuts in consumption are particularly painful, and the agent wants to postpone such cuts to let his reference point decrease. This variation generates strong predictability. However, it also causes counterfactually high volatility in the risk‐free rate, which I address by allowing for variation in expected consumption growth, heteroskedasticity in consumption growth, time‐variant disaster risk, and sluggish belief updating.