A demographic perspective on the Muslim world

A demographic perspective is relevant to understanding the position of Muslims in today’s world. This paper examines the size and growth of Muslim populations, and whether most Muslims live in overwhelmingly Muslim countries. It also examines indices of poverty and human development for Muslimmajority countries, and the growth of the youth population; finally, it examines the key components of population growth: mortality and fertility. Mortality has declined sharply over the past 15 years in many Muslim countries, though not in all, and Muslim countries are no longer prominent among the ‘outliers’ with higher mortality than expected on the basis of their income levels. Fertility rates are also declining sharply in a number of major Muslim-majority countries, raising interesting issues about attitudes of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence, village-level religious leaders and ordinary Muslims towards contraception and abortion, as well as the role of socio-economic development and family planning programs in fertility declines. Despite these declines, past high fertility in many Muslim-majority countries leaves as a legacy a rapidly growing adolescent population and a burgeoning, inadequately educated labour force.     

Understanding Global Demographic Convergence since 1950

Is the world converging to a single demographic regime? Or are groups of countries following distinct paths through the process of demographic transition? The answers to these questions are pivotal to our understanding of the nature and mechanisms of population change. They are also key elements for deriving the assumptions that should underlie population projections. There has been considerable interest in global demographic convergence during the last decade, with most work drawing on statistical methods that are widely used in economics. This article takes a different approach to most of the existing literature, examining the fertility and mortality trajectories over time that various appropriately defned world regions have followed. The data suggest that five distinct regional histories can be traced in mortality, and three in fertility, and that global convergence has moved more rapidly and unambiguously in fertility than in mortality.     

On the distribution of completed parities when fertility is heritable

"Over the last one hundred years, there has been, in many developed countries, a demographic convergence towards the two child family. The possible implications for population growth of such a tendency are considered in this paper in terms of both family limitation and also the intergenerational transmission of fertility. These two effects interact so that as the proportion of two-child families increases, the possible influence of mother-daughter fertility associations on population growth decreases, though even now it could override otherwise significant changes in either or both of the birth and death intensities. In particular, it is shown that according...to how fertility is transmitted through generations, it is still possible to have zero growth rates consistently with a widely dispersed stable distribution of family size as well as a typical mortality regime." (SUMMARY IN FRE)     

On the distribution of completed parities when fertility is heritable

Over the last one hundred years, there has been, in many developed countries, a demographic convergence towards the two child family. The possible implications for population growth of such a tendency are considered in this paper in terms of both family limitation and also the intergenerational transmission of fertility. These two effects interact so that as the proportion of two‐child families increases, the possible influence of mother‐daughter fertility associations on population growth decreases, though even now it could override otherwise significant changes in either or both of the birth and death intensities. In particular, it is shown that according as to how fertility is transmitted through generations, it is still possible to have zero growth rates consistently with a widely dispersed stable distribution of family size as well as a typical mortality regime.     

Demographers’ Involvement in Twentieth-Century Population Policy: Continuity or Discontinuity?

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the development of a crusading spirit and massive technical aid aimed at reducing fertility levels and rates of population growth in developing countries, and also the involvement of demographers in these events. The demographers at Princeton University’s Office of Population Research, Frank Notestein and his colleagues, have been singled out by recent authors as playing a unique role in bringing about these changes, and they have been criticized for encouraging demographers to become involved, so eroding their scientific objectivity. This paper examines the development of relevant population thought and theory in the English-language literature over the first half of the twentieth century. It concludes that in the circumstances of the second half of the twentieth century, it was inevitable that developed countries and their demographers would become involved in controlling fertility levels in developing countries. The OPR story should be seen largely in terms of how the world’s leading demographic center and its demographic transition theory were swept along by global changes. As those developments started, attitudes to population change in densely settled Asia became Malthusian, even as population growth accompanied by mortality decline in Asia demonstrated that, at least in the short term, the positive checks were disappearing.     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.     

Stages of the Demographic Transition from a Child's Perspective: Family Size,Cohort Size,and Children's Resources

This article provides a new characterization of stages of the demographic transition from the perspective of children competing for resources within families and cohorts. In Stage 1 falling mortality increases the size of both families and birth cohorts. In Stage 2 falling fertility overtakes falling mortality to reduce family size, but population momentum causes continued growth in cohort size. In Stage 3 falling fertility overtakes population momentum to produce declining cohort size. We apply our framework to census microdata for eight countries and to United Nations population projections for a larger set of countries. The results suggest that most countries spend two to three decades in Stage 2, with declining family size offset by increasing cohort size. From the perspective of children aged 9–11, many countries enter Stage 3 between 2000 and 2010. Other countries, especially in Africa, will continue to experience increasing cohort size for several more decades.     

Below-replacement fertility: Determinants and prospects in South Asia

Although 10 countries and two of China’s special administrative areas, totalling 1,528 million people or 44 per cent of Asia’s total population, are now characterized by fertility rates below long-term replacement levels, no such countries are yet found in South Asia. This paper first examines the characteristics of 12 Asian administrations with very low fertility at various stages of their fertility declines and then compares the findings with the present situation in three South Asian countries, Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. This allows a prediction of when the South Asian countries will reach replacement fertility in accord with the trends in two key criteria, the percentage of girls in secondary school and the infant mortality rate. These conclusions are then buttressed for each country by the findings of anthropological demographic research programs in which the authors were involved. The predictions are that all three countries will attain a total fertility rate of 2.1 within the next 30 years and that the UN2000 Revision of the medium population projection is plausible in that regard. However, the authors part company with the UN projection in their assessment that the nature of these societies means that they will all subsequently fall to still lower fertility levels.     

Completing the Demographic Transition

Despite ongoing declines in fertility in many countries, the population of the world is experiencing a period of rapid expansion, and its size is expected to reach 10 billion by the end of the demographic transition. Three causes of this growth are identified and quantified: 1) fertility above the replacement level of two surviving children per woman, 2) continuing declines in mortality, and 3) population momentum resulting from a young age structure. A set of simple analytic expressions is proposed for estimating these factors from standard demographic indicators. Population momentum is shown to be the main cause of future growth in most countries and regions.     

Global Demographic Convergence? A Reconsideration of Changing Intercountry Inequality in Fertility

This research challenges the notion that the second half of the twentieth century was a period of global demographic convergence. To be sure, fertility rates fell substantially during the period, but with considerable un‐evenness. The declines in total fertility across population‐weighted countries were sufficiently disproportionate that intercountry fertility inequality, estimated using standard measures of inequality, did not begin to decline until at least 1995. Regression analysis also shows that only very recently did lagging countries begin to catch up with countries that began the transition to low fertility earlier. Contrary to findings on changing intercountry health inequality, sub‐Saharan Africa has had a greater impact on changes in fertility inequality than China. The trend in fertility inequality, where convergence is a relatively new phenomenon, stands in contrast to trends in inequality in other domains, such as income, education, and health.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Bridewealth and Birth Control: Low Fertility in the Indonesian Archipelago, 1500–1900

Before the onset of the present demographic transition, population growth in Indonesia had reached unprecedentedly high levels. This article demonstrates that such high levels were a recent phenomenon. Prior to 1900 rates of natural population increase were low to very low in most areas in Indonesia. This runs counter to expectations based on Hajnal's “Eastern marriage pattern,” which could imply high growth levels in extended family areas, such as most Indonesian regions outside Java in the past. Usually, the low population growth rates in Southeast Asia are attributed to high mortality owing to high levels of violent conflict. It is argued that other factors contributing to such high levels of mortality should receive more attention. In this article it is also argued that low fertility rates, too, played a role in generating low rates of natural increase. The article discusses the influence of marriage patterns, household structure, methods of birth control, adoption, and slavery on fertility.     

The United Nations on World Population in 2300

The Population Division of the United Nations biennially issues detailed population estimates and projections covering the period 1950–2050. The most recent revision of these estimates and projections, the 2002 assessment, was released in February 2003. At irregular intervals, the Population Division also publishes long‐range projections. The most recent of these, covering the period up to 2150, was issued in 2000, based on the 1998 assessment. On 9 December 2003, the Population Division released the preliminary report on a new set of long‐range projections, dovetailing with the 2002 assessment, that extend over a much longer time span: up to 2300 ( http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/longrange2.htm ). Unlike previous long‐range projections, which, apart from China and In‐dia, were prepared for large regional groupings only, the new projections are elaborated separately for 192 countries. Given the enormous uncertainties of the character of demographic trends over such an extended period, the information content of these projections is somewhat elusive. However, they are expected to be used to provide the demographic input for long‐range models of global climate change. Long‐range population projections also serve to demonstrate the unsustainability of certain seemingly plausible assumptions as to the future course of particular demographic parameters. In the present case, for example, the high‐fertility projection, reflecting a sustained total fertility rate at the relatively modest level of 2.35, by 2300 would yield a population of some 32 billion in the countries now classified as less developed. Or, in a yet more extreme exercise 0/reductio ad absurdum, maintaining constant fertility at present rates would result in a population size of some 120 trillion in the countries now classified as least developed. Apart from the “high fertility” and “constant fertility” models just cited, the projections are calculated for three additional instructive variants: “low fertility,”“medium fertility,” and “zero growth.” Underlying each of the five variants is a single assumption on mortality change: expectation of life at birth creeping up, country‐by‐country, to a 2300 level ranging between 88 and 106 years. International migration is set at zero throughout the period 2050‐2300 in each variant. Thus the projections are unabashedly stylized and surprise‐free, providing a simple demonstration of the consequences, in terms of population size and age structure, of clearly stated assumptions on the future course of demographic variables. Reproduced below is the Executive Summary of the preliminary report on the UN long‐range projections presented to a UN technical working group on long‐range projections at its December 2003 meeting in New York and slightly revised afterward. A full final report on this topic by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat will be published later in 2004.     

Effects of Childhood Mortality and Morbidity on the Fertility Transition in sub‐Saharan Africa

Child mortality rates have fallen substantially in developing countries since 1960. The expected fertility decline has followed only weakly in sub‐Saharan Africa compared to other recent and historic demographic transitions. Disease and anthropometric data suggest that morbidity remains prevalent in Africa despite child survival improvements. The uniquely high infectious disease burden among children in Africa reduces population health and diminishes the returns to human capital investment, thwarting the quantity–quality tradeoff for children that typically accompanies the mortality transition. Individual‐level data from the Demographic and Health Surveys are used to show that persistent morbidity has weakened the positive relationship between child mortality and total fertility rates throughout the region, slowing Africa's demographic transition.     

China’s Demographic Future Under the New Two-Child Policy

China implemented the two-child policy in 2016, however, potential impacts of this new policy on its population reality have not been adequately understood. Using population census data and 1% population sampling data during the period of 1982–2015, this study develops a fertility simulation model to explore the effects of the two-child policy on women’s total fertility rate, and employs Cohort Component Method in population projections to examine China’s demographic future with different fertility regimes. The fertility simulation results reveal that the two-child policy will make significantly positive effects on China’s total fertility rate through increasing second births, leading to a sharp but temporary increase in the first 5 years after the implementation of the new policy. In addition, population projections using simulated total fertility rates show that the Chinese population would reach its peak value around the middle 2020s and be faced with the reduction of labor force supply and rapid aging process, featured with remarkable increases in both size and share of the elderly population. The findings suggest that the two-child policy would undoubtedly affect China’s fertility rates and demographic future; however, the effects are mild and temporary.

     

Population Futures for the Next Three Hundred Years: Soft Landing or Surprises to Come?

The long‐range population projections of the United Nations issued in 2003 span three centuries and are elaborated for all countries of the world according to the present‐day political map. This note discusses the merits and limitations of this ambitious enterprise. The numerical implications of various contrasting assumptions concerning fertility, in combination with single hypothetical future schedules of mortality and international migration, provide a valuable frame of reference for contemplating possible long‐range demographic trajectories. The dominant suggestion of these projections of a surprise‐free convergence to a stationary or slowly declining population is, however, questionable: with respect to global numbers, relative magnitudes of the constituting units of the global total, and the time pattern of change the demographic future is likely to be far less orderly.     

The evaluation of China's population policy]

China's population policy has had tremendous effects on the reduction of fertility. The impact of the population policy is manifested in the following aspects. 1) Reducing the size of the total population by 200 million in 17 years. If the population growth rate had remained at its 1970 level of 2.6/1000, the total population would have been 1.28 billion in 1987. 2) The implementation of the population policy accelerated the process of demographic transition. The mortality decline which began in the early 1950s initiated the demographic transition. The Fertility decline began after the birth control policy was implemented and shifted the transition to a low population growth stage even before the socioeconomic conditions which are considered to be the determinants of fertility decline appeared. The fertility decline, in turn, promoted the socioeconomic development of the country. 3) Solving the problem of food; feeding 21.6% of the world's population on 7.1% of the world's farm land is no easy task. The success of population control, no doubt, played an important role in lowering the population growth rate so that the growth of food production could keep pace with the needs of the population. 4) A decline in the dependency ratio is a favorable condition to socioeconomic development. China's dependency ratio of 59.7 is among the lowest in developing countries and is close to the level in developed countries. Therefore, more production output can be used in investment rather than consumption. 5) The fertility decline facilitated a balanced economic growth. The ratio of population growth as compared to the growth of major economic indicators should be considered an important issue in maintaining macroeconomic control. The population policy made it possible for economic growth to surpass population growth.     

Population dynamics in Germany: the role of immigration and population momentum

The effects of changes in rates of mortality, fertility, and migration depend not only on the age-specific patterns and levels of these rates, but on the age structure of the population. In order to remove the influences of the age structure and concentrate on the effects of the demographic rates themselves, a common practice is to analyze the influences of the rates for a standard age structure. This paper analyzes current and future population changes in Germany, using a stationary population equivalent model (SPE) that shows long-term effects of current fertility, mortality, and international migration patterns. Results indicate that the German population will eventually decline because of below replacement fertility, if net immigration does not counteract this decrease. This means, for instance, that the long-term stationary population levels for Germany will decrease by approximately 6.5 million during a decade in which current fertility, mortality, and international migration levels prevail. The paper also reports how various other assumptions for mortality, fertility, and international migration affect the SPE model for Germany.     

Sweden faces zero population growth

In this discussion of Sweden as it approaches zero population growth, focus is on the following: population growth in perspective, fertility trends (childbearing concentrated and cohort versus period fertility), marital status (non-marital cohabitation, out-of-wedlock births, and divorce), women's changing status (increasing education and increasing employment), constraints and supports for women's dual role (family allowances and housing), birth control (contraceptive methods and practice and abortion), mortality trends, changing age structure and the elderly (average population age and proportion of elderly and cost of elderly support), international migration (from emigration to immigration and demographic impact of immigration), immigration policy, recent population debate (immigration issues and facing zero population growth). Since 1900 the primary features of Sweden's demographic history are a continuing decline in the birth rate to very low levels -- relieved by some upward movement in the 1940s and 1960s -- and a marked shift in the migration balance from emigration to immigration. It is almost entirely because of immigration that Sweden's population growth rate has not yet turned negative. If Swedish women were to continue to bear children at the rate that all women in the reproductive ages actually did in 1978, each women would end up with an average well below the level necessary to exactly replace each adult in the population leaving migration out, an annual total fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman would have to be sustained for births and deaths to be in balance under the low mortality conditions prevaling in Sweden.