On the Complex Definition of Risk: A Systems-Based Approach

The premise of this article is that risk to a system, as well as its vulnerability and resilience, can be understood, defined, and quantified most effectively through a systems-based philosophical and methodological approach, and by recognizing the central role of the system states in this process. A universally agreed-upon definition of risk has been difficult to develop; one reason is that the concept is multidimensional and nuanced. It requires an understanding that risk to a system is inherently and fundamentally a function of the initiating event, the states of the system and of its environment, and the time frame. In defining risk, this article posits that: (a) the performance capabilities of a system are a function of its state vector; (b) a system's vulnerability and resilience vectors are each a function of the input (e.g., initiating event), its time of occurrence, and the states of the system; (c) the consequences are a function of the specificity and time of the event, the vector of the states, the vulnerability, and the resilience of the system; (d) the states of a system are time-dependent and commonly fraught with variability uncertainties and knowledge uncertainties; and (e) risk is a measure of the probability and severity of consequences. The above implies that modeling must evaluate consequences for each risk scenario as functions of the threat (initiating event), the vulnerability and resilience of the system, and the time of the event. This fundamentally complex modeling and analysis process cannot be performed correctly and effectively without relying on the states of the system being studied.     

On the Complex Quantification of Risk: Systems‐Based Perspective on Terrorism

This article highlights the complexity of the quantification of the multidimensional risk function, develops five systems‐based premises on quantifying the risk of terrorism to a threatened system, and advocates the quantification of vulnerability and resilience through the states of the system. The five premises are: (i) There exists interdependence between a specific threat to a system by terrorist networks and the states of the targeted system, as represented through the system's vulnerability, resilience, and criticality‐impact. (ii) A specific threat, its probability, its timing, the states of the targeted system, and the probability of consequences can be interdependent. (iii) The two questions in the risk assessment process: “What is the likelihood?” and “What are the consequences?” can be interdependent. (iv) Risk management policy options can reduce both the likelihood of a threat to a targeted system and the associated likelihood of consequences by changing the states (including both vulnerability and resilience) of the system. (v) The quantification of risk to a vulnerable system from a specific threat must be built on a systemic and repeatable modeling process, by recognizing that the states of the system constitute an essential step to construct quantitative metrics of the consequences based on intelligence gathering, expert evidence, and other qualitative information. The fact that the states of all systems are functions of time (among other variables) makes the time frame pivotal in each component of the process of risk assessment, management, and communication. Thus, risk to a system, caused by an initiating event (e.g., a threat) is a multidimensional function of the specific threat, its probability and time frame, the states of the system (representing vulnerability and resilience), and the probabilistic multidimensional consequences.     

Workforce/Population,Economy, Infrastructure,Geography, Hierarchy,and Time (WEIGHT): Reflections on the Plural Dimensions of Disaster Resilience

The concept of resilience and its relevance to disaster risk management has increasingly gained attention in recent years. It is common for risk and resilience studies to model system recovery by analyzing a single or aggregated measure of performance, such as economic output or system functionality. However, the history of past disasters and recent risk literature suggest that a single-dimension view of relevant systems is not only insufficient, but can compromise the ability to manage risk for these systems. In this article, we explore how multiple dimensions influence the ability for complex systems to function and effectively recover after a disaster. In particular, we compile evidence from the many competing resilience perspectives to identify the most critical resilience dimensions across several academic disciplines, applications, and disaster events. The findings demonstrate the need for a conceptual framework that decomposes resilience into six primary dimensions: workforce/population, economy, infrastructure, geography, hierarchy, and time (WEIGHT). These dimensions are not typically addressed holistically in the literature; often they are either modeled independently or in piecemeal combinations. The current research is the first to provide a comprehensive discussion of each resilience dimension and discuss how these dimensions can be integrated into a cohesive framework, suggesting that no single dimension is sufficient for a holistic analysis of a disaster risk management. Through this article, we also aim to spark discussions among researchers and policymakers to develop a multicriteria decision framework for evaluating the efficacy of resilience strategies. Furthermore, the WEIGHT dimensions may also be used to motivate the generation of new approaches for data analytics of resilience-related knowledge bases.     

Confidence deficits and reducibility: Toward a coherent conceptualization of uncertainty level

Outside of the field of risk analysis, an important theoretical conversation on the slippery concept of uncertainty has unfolded over the last 40 years within the adjacent field of environmental risk. This literature has become increasingly standardized behind the tripartite distinction between uncertainty location, the nature of uncertainty, and uncertainty level, popularized by the “W&H framework.” This article introduces risk theorists and practitioners to the conceptual literature on uncertainty with the goal of catalyzing further development and clarification of the uncertainty concept within the field of risk analysis. It presents two critiques of the W&H framework's dimension of uncertainty level—the dimension that attempts to define the characteristics separating greater uncertainties from lesser uncertainties. First, I argue the framework's conceptualization of uncertainty level lacks a clear and consistent epistemological position and fails to acknowledge or reconcile the tensions between Bayesian and frequentist perspectives present within the framework. This article reinterprets the dimension of uncertainty level from a Bayesian perspective, which understands uncertainty as a mental phenomenon arising from “confidence deficits” as opposed to the ill-defined notion of “knowledge deficits” present in the framework. And second, I elaborate the undertheorized concept of uncertainty “reducibility.” These critiques inform a clarified conceptualization of uncertainty level that can be integrated with risk analysis concepts and usefully applied by modelers and decisionmakers engaged in model-based decision support.     

Systems Resilience for Multihazard Environments: Definition,Metrics, and Valuation for Decision Making

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction reported that the 2011 natural disasters, including the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan, resulted in $366 billion in direct damages and 29,782 fatalities worldwide. Storms and floods accounted for up to 70% of the 302 natural disasters worldwide in 2011, with earthquakes producing the greatest number of fatalities. Average annual losses in the United States amount to about $55 billion. Enhancing community and system resilience could lead to massive savings through risk reduction and expeditious recovery. The rational management of such reduction and recovery is facilitated by an appropriate definition of resilience and associated metrics. In this article, a resilience definition is provided that meets a set of requirements with clear relationships to the metrics of the relevant abstract notions of reliability and risk. Those metrics also meet logically consistent requirements drawn from measure theory, and provide a sound basis for the development of effective decision‐making tools for multihazard environments. Improving the resiliency of a system to meet target levels requires the examination of system enhancement alternatives in economic terms, within a decision‐making framework. Relevant decision analysis methods would typically require the examination of resilience based on its valuation by society at large. The article provides methods for valuation and benefit‐cost analysis based on concepts from risk analysis and management.     

A Factor Analysis Approach Toward Reconciling Community Vulnerability and Resilience Indices for Natural Hazards

The concepts of vulnerability and resilience help explain why natural hazards of similar type and magnitude can have disparate impacts on varying communities. Numerous frameworks have been developed to measure these concepts, but a clear and consistent method of comparing them is lacking. Here, we develop a data-driven approach for reconciling a popular class of frameworks known as vulnerability and resilience indices. In particular, we conduct an exploratory factor analysis on a comprehensive set of variables from established indices measuring community vulnerability and resilience at the U.S. county level. The resulting factor model suggests that 50 of the 130 analyzed variables effectively load onto five dimensions: wealth, poverty, agencies per capita, elderly populations, and non–English-speaking populations. Additionally, the factor structure establishes an objective and intuitive schema for relating the constituent elements of vulnerability and resilience indices, in turn affording researchers a flexible yet robust baseline for validating and expanding upon current approaches.     

An Integrated Risk Assessment Model of Township‐Scaled Land Subsidence Based on an Evidential Reasoning Algorithm and Fuzzy Set Theory

Land subsidence risk assessment (LSRA) is a multi‐attribute decision analysis (MADA) problem and is often characterized by both quantitative and qualitative attributes with various types of uncertainty. Therefore, the problem needs to be modeled and analyzed using methods that can handle uncertainty. In this article, we propose an integrated assessment model based on the evidential reasoning (ER) algorithm and fuzzy set theory. The assessment model is structured as a hierarchical framework that regards land subsidence risk as a composite of two key factors: hazard and vulnerability. These factors can be described by a set of basic indicators defined by assessment grades with attributes for transforming both numerical data and subjective judgments into a belief structure. The factor‐level attributes of hazard and vulnerability are combined using the ER algorithm, which is based on the information from a belief structure calculated by the Dempster‐Shafer (D‐S) theory, and a distributed fuzzy belief structure calculated by fuzzy set theory. The results from the combined algorithms yield distributed assessment grade matrices. The application of the model to the Xixi‐Chengnan area, China, illustrates its usefulness and validity for LSRA. The model utilizes a combination of all types of evidence, including all assessment information—quantitative or qualitative, complete or incomplete, and precise or imprecise—to provide assessment grades that define risk assessment on the basis of hazard and vulnerability. The results will enable risk managers to apply different risk prevention measures and mitigation planning based on the calculated risk states.     

Representation,Propagation, and Decision Issues in Risk Analysis Under Incomplete Probabilistic Information

This article tries to clarify the potential role to be played by uncertainty theories such as imprecise probabilities, random sets, and possibility theory in the risk analysis process. Instead of opposing an objective bounding analysis, where only statistically founded probability distributions are taken into account, to the full‐fledged probabilistic approach, exploiting expert subjective judgment, we advocate the idea that both analyses are useful and should be articulated with one another. Moreover, the idea that risk analysis under incomplete information is purely objective is misconceived. The use of uncertainty theories cannot be reduced to a choice between probability distributions and intervals. Indeed, they offer representation tools that are more expressive than each of the latter approaches and can capture expert judgments while being faithful to their limited precision. Consequences of this thesis are examined for uncertainty elicitation, propagation, and at the decision‐making step.     

A Bayesian Method to Mine Spatial Data Sets to Evaluate the Vulnerability of Human Beings to Catastrophic Risk

Vulnerability of human beings exposed to a catastrophic disaster is affected by multiple factors that include hazard intensity, environment, and individual characteristics. The traditional approach to vulnerability assessment, based on the aggregate‐area method and unsupervised learning, cannot incorporate spatial information; thus, vulnerability can be only roughly assessed. In this article, we propose Bayesian network (BN) and spatial analysis techniques to mine spatial data sets to evaluate the vulnerability of human beings. In our approach, spatial analysis is leveraged to preprocess the data; for example, kernel density analysis (KDA) and accumulative road cost surface modeling (ARCSM) are employed to quantify the influence of geofeatures on vulnerability and relate such influence to spatial distance. The knowledge‐ and data‐based BN provides a consistent platform to integrate a variety of factors, including those extracted by KDA and ARCSM to model vulnerability uncertainty. We also consider the model's uncertainty and use the Bayesian model average and Occam's Window to average the multiple models obtained by our approach to robust prediction of the risk and vulnerability. We compare our approach with other probabilistic models in the case study of seismic risk and conclude that our approach is a good means to mining spatial data sets for evaluating vulnerability.     

A risk science perspective on liability/guilt and uncertainty judgements in courts

This article aims to provide new insights about risk and uncertainty in law contexts, by incorporating ideas and principles of contemporary risk science. The main focus is on one particular aspect of the law: its operation in courts where a defendant has been charged with a violation of civil or criminal law. Judgements about risk and uncertainty—typically using the probability concept—and how these relate to the evidence play a central role in such situations. The decision on whether the defendant is liable/guilty or not may strongly depend on how these concepts are understood and communicated. Considerable work has been conducted to provide theoretical and practical foundations for the risk and uncertainty characterizations in these contexts. Yet, it can be argued that a proper foundation for linking the evidence and the uncertainty (probability) judgements is lacking, the result being poor communication in courts about risk and uncertainties. The present article seeks to clarify what the problems are and provide guidance on how to rectify them.     

A Resilience-Based Approach to Risk Assessments—Building Resilient Organizations under Arctic Conditions

Reliability and higher levels of safety are thought to be achieved by using systematic approaches to managing risks. The assessment of risks has produced a range of different approaches to assessing these uncertainties, presenting models for how risks affect individuals or organizations. Contemporary risk assessment tools based on this approach have proven difficult for practitioners to use as tools for tactical and operational decision making. This article presents an alternative to these assessments by utilizing a resilience perspective, arguing that complex systems are inclined to variety and uncertainty regarding the results they produce and are therefore prone to systemic failures. A continuous improvement approach is a source of reliability when managing complex systems and is necessary to manage varieties and uncertainties. For an organization to understand how risk events occur, it is necessary to define what is believed to be the equilibrium of the system in time and space. By applying a resilience engineering (RE) perspective to risk assessment, it is possible to manage this complexity by assessing the ability to respond, monitor, learn, and anticipate risks, and in so doing to move away from the flawed frequency and consequences approach. Using a research station network in the Arctic as an example illustrates how an RE approach qualifies assessments by bridging risk assessments with value-creation processes. The article concludes by arguing that a resilience-based risk assessment can improve on current practice, including for organizations located outside the Arctic region.     

Toward Disaster‐Resilient Cities: Characterizing Resilience of Infrastructure Systems with Expert Judgments

Resilient infrastructure systems are essential for cities to withstand and rapidly recover from natural and human‐induced disasters, yet electric power, transportation, and other infrastructures are highly vulnerable and interdependent. New approaches for characterizing the resilience of sets of infrastructure systems are urgently needed, at community and regional scales. This article develops a practical approach for analysts to characterize a community's infrastructure vulnerability and resilience in disasters. It addresses key challenges of incomplete incentives, partial information, and few opportunities for learning. The approach is demonstrated for Metro Vancouver, Canada, in the context of earthquake and flood risk. The methodological approach is practical and focuses on potential disruptions to infrastructure services. In spirit, it resembles probability elicitation with multiple experts; however, it elicits disruption and recovery over time, rather than uncertainties regarding system function at a given point in time. It develops information on regional infrastructure risk and engages infrastructure organizations in the process. Information sharing, iteration, and learning among the participants provide the basis for more informed estimates of infrastructure system robustness and recovery that incorporate the potential for interdependent failures after an extreme event. Results demonstrate the vital importance of cross‐sectoral communication to develop shared understanding of regional infrastructure disruption in disasters. For Vancouver, specific results indicate that in a hypothetical M7.3 earthquake, virtually all infrastructures would suffer severe disruption of service in the immediate aftermath, with many experiencing moderate disruption two weeks afterward. Electric power, land transportation, and telecommunications are identified as core infrastructure sectors.     

Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-VAM)

Quantifying vulnerability to critical infrastructure has not been adequately addressed in the literature. Thus, the purpose of this article is to present a model that quantifies vulnerability. Vulnerability is defined as a measure of system susceptibility to threat scenarios. This article asserts that vulnerability is a condition of the system and it can be quantified using the Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Model (I-VAM). The model is presented and then applied to a medium-sized clean water system. The model requires subject matter experts (SMEs) to establish value functions and weights, and to assess protection measures of the system. Simulation is used to account for uncertainty in measurement, aggregate expert assessment, and to yield a vulnerability (Omega) density function. Results demonstrate that I-VAM is useful to decisionmakers who prefer quantification to qualitative treatment of vulnerability. I-VAM can be used to quantify vulnerability to other infrastructures, supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA), and distributed control systems (DCS).     

Risk Communication,Public Engagement,and Climate Change: A Role for Emotions

This article discusses the potential role that emotions might play in enticing a lifestyle that diminishes climate change. Climate change is an important challenge for society. There is a growing consensus that climate change is due to our behavior, but few people are willing to significantly adapt their lifestyle. Empirical studies show that people lack a sense of urgency: they experience climate change as a problem that affects people in distant places and in a far future. Several scholars have claimed that emotions might be a necessary tool in communication about climate change. This article sketches a theoretical framework that supports this hypothesis, drawing on insights from the ethics of risk and the philosophy of emotions. It has been shown by various scholars that emotions are important determinants in risk perception. However, emotions are generally considered to be irrational states and are hence excluded from communication and political decision making about risky technologies and climate change, or they are used instrumentally to create support for a position. However, the literature on the ethics of risk shows that the dominant, technocratic approach to risk misses the normative‐ethical dimension that is inherent to decisions about acceptable risk. Emotion research shows that emotions are necessary for practical and moral decision making. These insights can be applied to communication about climate change. Emotions are necessary for understanding the moral impact of the risks of climate change, and they also paradigmatically provide for motivation. Emotions might be the missing link in effective communication about climate change.     

Resilience Analysis of a Remote Offshore Oil and Gas Facility for a Potential Hydrocarbon Release

Resilience is the capability of a system to adjust its functionality during a disturbance or perturbation. The present work attempts to quantify resilience as a function of reliability, vulnerability, and maintainability. The approach assesses proactive and reactive defense mechanisms along with operational factors to respond to unwanted disturbances and perturbation. This article employs a Bayesian network format to build a resilience model. The application of the model is tested on hydrocarbon‐release scenarios during an offloading operation in a remote and harsh environment. The model identifies requirements for robust recovery and adaptability during an unplanned scenario related to a hydrocarbon release. This study attempts to relate the resilience capacity of a system to the system's absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capacities. These factors influence predisaster and postdisaster strategies that can be mapped to enhance the resilience of the system.     

An Empirical Model of Perceived Mortality Risks for Selected U.S. Arsenic Hot Spots

Researchers have long recognized that subjective perceptions of risk are better predictors of choices over risky outcomes than science‐based or experts’ assessments of risk. More recent work suggests that uncertainty about risks also plays a role in predicting choices and behavior. In this article, we develop and estimate a formal model for an individual's perceived health risks associated with arsenic contamination of his or her drinking water. The modeling approach treats risk as a random variable, with an estimable probability distribution whose variance reflects uncertainty. The model we estimate uses data collected from a survey given to a sample of people living in arsenic‐prone areas in the United States. The findings from this article support the fact that scientific information is essential to explaining the mortality rate perceived by the individuals, but uncertainty about the probability remains significant.     

Integrating Risk and Resilience Approaches to Catastrophe Management in Engineering Systems

Recent natural and man‐made catastrophes, such as the Fukushima nuclear power plant, flooding caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Haiti earthquake, and the mortgage derivatives crisis, have renewed interest in the concept of resilience, especially as it relates to complex systems vulnerable to multiple or cascading failures. Although the meaning of resilience is contested in different contexts, in general resilience is understood to mean the capacity to adapt to changing conditions without catastrophic loss of form or function. In the context of engineering systems, this has sometimes been interpreted as the probability that system conditions might exceed an irrevocable tipping point. However, we argue that this approach improperly conflates resilience and risk perspectives by expressing resilience exclusively in risk terms. In contrast, we describe resilience as an emergent property of what an engineering system does, rather than a static property the system has. Therefore, resilience cannot be measured at the systems scale solely from examination of component parts. Instead, resilience is better understood as the outcome of a recursive process that includes: sensing, anticipation, learning, and adaptation. In this approach, resilience analysis can be understood as differentiable from, but complementary to, risk analysis, with important implications for the adaptive management of complex, coupled engineering systems. Management of the 2011 flooding in the Mississippi River Basin is discussed as an example of the successes and challenges of resilience‐based management of complex natural systems that have been extensively altered by engineered structures.     

Expressing Economic Risk—Review and Presentation of a Unifying Approach

Risk related to economic values is treated by many disciplines, including safety and production engineering, business, and project management. Within each of these and across these disciplines different nomenclature and principles are adopted for describing and communicating risk. The situation is rather confusing. In this article, we review various approaches and concepts that are used to express risk. We present and discuss a unifying approach for dealing with economic risk, with uncertainty being the key risk concept. The approach represents a rethinking on how to implement the Bayesian paradigm in practice to support decision making.     

Evolutionary Resilience and Strategies for Climate Adaptation

The aim of this study is to develop a framework by drawing on three broad perspectives on resilience, engineering, ecological and evolutionary, and to use this framework to critically examine the approach adopted by the draft London climate change adaptation strategy. The central argument of the study is that the Strategy's emergency planning-centred approach to climate adaptation veers between a standard ecological understanding of resilience and the more rigid engineering model. Its emphasis is on identifying ‘exposure’ and ‘vulnerability’ to risk from climate events and on bouncing back from the consequences of such exposures to a normal state, rather than on the dynamic process of transformation to a more desirable trajectory. The study concludes that fostering resilience involves planning for not only recovery from shocks but also cultivating preparedness, and seeking potential transformative opportunities which emerge from change.     

Uncertain Numbers and Uncertainty in the Selection of Input Distributions—Consequences for a Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Contaminated Land

Risks from exposure to contaminated land are often assessed with the aid of mathematical models. The current probabilistic approach is a considerable improvement on previous deterministic risk assessment practices, in that it attempts to characterize uncertainty and variability. However, some inputs continue to be assigned as precise numbers, while others are characterized as precise probability distributions. Such precision is hard to justify, and we show in this article how rounding errors and distribution assumptions can affect an exposure assessment. The outcome of traditional deterministic point estimates and Monte Carlo simulations were compared to probability bounds analyses. Assigning all scalars as imprecise numbers (intervals prescribed by significant digits) added uncertainty to the deterministic point estimate of about one order of magnitude. Similarly, representing probability distributions as probability boxes added several orders of magnitude to the uncertainty of the probabilistic estimate. This indicates that the size of the uncertainty in such assessments is actually much greater than currently reported. The article suggests that full disclosure of the uncertainty may facilitate decision making in opening up a negotiation window. In the risk analysis process, it is also an ethical obligation to clarify the boundary between the scientific and social domains.