Causation Analysis of Risk Coupling of Gas Explosion Accident in Chinese Underground Coal Mines

The coal mine production industry is a complex sociotechnical system with interactive relationships among several risk factors. Currently, causation analysis of gas explosion accidents is mainly focused on the aspects of human error and equipment fault, while neglecting the interactive relationships among risk factors. A new method is proposed through risk coupling. First, the meaning of risk coupling of a gas explosion is defined, and types of risk coupling are classified. Next, the coupled relationship and coupled effects among risk factors are explored through combining the interpretative structural modeling (ISM) and the NK model. Twenty‐eight representative risk factors and 16 coupled types of risk factors are obtained through analysis of 332 gas explosion accidents in coal mines in China. Through the application of the combined ISM–NK model, an eight‐level hierarchical model of risk coupling of a gas explosion accident is established, and the coupled degrees of different types of risk coupling are assessed. The hierarchical model reveals that two of the 28 risk factors, such as state policies, laws, and regulations, are the root risk factors for gas explosions; nine of the 28 risk factors, such as flame from blasting, electric spark, and local gas accumulation, are direct causes of gas explosions; whereas 17 of the risk factors, such as three‐violation actions, ventilation system, and safety management, are indirect ones. A quantitative analysis of the NK model shows that the probability of gas explosion increases with the increasing number of risk factors. Compared with subjective risk factors, objective risk factors have a higher probability of causing gas explosion because of risk coupling.     

System of Systems Engineering and Risk Management of Extreme Events: Concepts and Case Study

The domain of risk analysis is expanded to consider strategic interactions among multiple participants in the management of extreme risk in a system of systems. These risks are fraught with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty, which pose challenges in how participants perceive, understand, and manage risk of extreme events. In the case of extreme events affecting a system of systems, cause‐and‐effect relationships among initiating events and losses may be difficult to ascertain due to interactions of multiple systems and participants (complexity). Moreover, selection of threats, hazards, and consequences on which to focus may be unclear or contentious to participants within multiple interacting systems (ambiguity). Finally, all types of risk, by definition, involve potential losses due to uncertain events (uncertainty). Therefore, risk analysis of extreme events affecting a system of systems should address complex, ambiguous, and uncertain aspects of extreme risk. To accomplish this, a system of systems engineering methodology for risk analysis is proposed as a general approach to address extreme risk in a system of systems. Our contribution is an integrative and adaptive systems methodology to analyze risk such that strategic interactions among multiple participants are considered. A practical application of the system of systems engineering methodology is demonstrated in part by a case study of a maritime infrastructure system of systems interface, namely, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.     

Methodology for the Calculation of Annualized Incremental Risks in Systems of Dams

In the past few years, the field of dam safety has approached risk informed methodologies throughout the world and several methodologies and programs are appearing to aid in the systematization of the calculations. The most common way of implementing these calculations is through the use of event trees, computing event probabilities, and incremental consequences. This methodology is flexible enough for several situations, but its generalization to the case of systems of several dams is complex and its implementation in a completely general calculation methodology presents some problems. Retaining the event tree framework, a new methodology is proposed to calculate incremental risks. The main advantage of this proposed methodology is the ease with which it can be applied to systems of several dams: with a single risk model that describes the complete system and with a single calculation the incremental risks of the system can be obtained, being able to allocate the risk of each dam and of each failure mode. The article shows how both methodologies are equivalent and also applies them to a case study.     

Lessons learned from Toulouse and Buncefield disasters: from risk analysis failures to the identification of atypical scenarios through a better knowledge management

The recent occurrence of severe major accidents has brought to light flaws and limitations of hazard identification (HAZID) processes performed for safety reports, as in the accidents at Toulouse (France) and Buncefield (UK), where the accident scenarios that occurred were not captured by HAZID techniques. This study focuses on this type of atypical accident scenario deviating from normal expectations. The main purpose is to analyze the examples of atypical accidents mentioned and to attempt to identify them through the application of a well-known methodology such as the bow-tie analysis. To these aims, the concept of atypical event is accurately defined. Early warnings, causes, consequences, and occurrence mechanisms of the specific events are widely studied and general failures of risk assessment, management, and governance isolated. These activities contribute to outline a set of targeted recommendations, addressing transversal common deficiencies and also demonstrating how a better management of knowledge from the study of past events can support future risk assessment processes in the identification of atypical accident scenarios. Thus, a new methodology is not suggested; rather, a specific approach coordinating a more effective use of experience and available information is described, to suggest that lessons to be learned from past accidents can be effectively translated into actions of prevention.     

Risk assessment based on a STPA–FMEA method: A case study of a sweeping robot

Despite rapid developments in the quality and safety of consumer products, the rise of intelligent household appliances, such as sweeping robots, has introduced new safety concerns. Considering “person–product–environment” elements and the complex systems of emerging consumer products, this study presents a new method of risk assessment for consumer products: systems theoretic process analysis (STPA)–failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). As a case study, this method is applied to the safety control of a sweeping robot. The results suggest that this method can identify all the possible failure modes and injury scenarios among the product components, and the safety constraints in the hierarchical control structure of the interactive system. Moreover, the STPA–FMEA method combines user and environmental factors with the value of product risk events, based on the risk priority number (RPN). This provides an accurate and orderly system to reduce or eliminate the root causes of accidents and injuries. Finally, analysis of unsafe control behavior and its causes can be used to suggest improved safety constraints, which can effectively reduce the risk of some injury scenarios. This paper presents a new method of risk assessment for consumer products and a general five-level complex index system.     

Monte Carlo Sensitivity Analysis of Unknown Parameters in Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Assessment

The US Department of Transportation was interested in the risks associated with transporting Hydrazine in tanks with and without relief devices. Hydrazine is both highly toxic and flammable, as well as corrosive. Consequently, there was a conflict as to whether a relief device should be used or not. Data were not available on the impact of relief devices on release probabilities or the impact of Hydrazine on the likelihood of fires and explosions. In this paper, a Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis of the unknown parameters was used to assess the risks associated with highway transport of Hydrazine. To help determine whether or not relief devices should be used, fault trees and event trees were used to model the sequences of events that could lead to adverse consequences during transport of Hydrazine. The event probabilities in the event trees were derived as functions of the parameters whose effects were not known. The impacts of these parameters on the risk of toxic exposures, fires, and explosions were analyzed through a Monte Carlo sensitivity analysis and analyzed statistically through an analysis of variance. The analysis allowed the determination of which of the unknown parameters had a significant impact on the risks. It also provided the necessary support to a critical transportation decision even though the values of several key parameters were not known.     

Quantitative Risk Assessment of the New York State Operated West Valley Radioactive Waste Disposal Area

This article is based on a quantitative risk assessment (QRA) that was performed on a radioactive waste disposal area within the Western New York Nuclear Service Center in western New York State. The QRA results were instrumental in the decision by the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority to support a strategy of in‐place management of the disposal area for another decade. The QRA methodology adopted for this first of a kind application was a scenario‐based approach in the framework of the triplet definition of risk (scenarios, likelihoods, consequences). The measure of risk is the frequency of occurrence of different levels of radiation dose to humans at prescribed locations. The risk from each scenario is determined by (1) the frequency of disruptive events or natural processes that cause a release of radioactive materials from the disposal area; (2) the physical form, quantity, and radionuclide content of the material that is released during each scenario; (3) distribution, dilution, and deposition of the released materials throughout the environment surrounding the disposal area; and (4) public exposure to the distributed material and the accumulated radiation dose from that exposure. The risks of the individual scenarios are assembled into a representation of the risk from the disposal area. In addition to quantifying the total risk to the public, the analysis ranks the importance of each contributing scenario, which facilitates taking corrective actions and implementing effective risk management. Perhaps most importantly, quantification of the uncertainties is an intrinsic part of the risk results. This approach to safety analysis has demonstrated many advantages of applying QRA principles to assessing the risk of facilities involving hazardous materials.     

A Flexible Hierarchical Bayesian Modeling Technique for Risk Analysis of Major Accidents

Safety analysis of rare events with potentially catastrophic consequences is challenged by data scarcity and uncertainty. Traditional causation‐based approaches, such as fault tree and event tree (used to model rare event), suffer from a number of weaknesses. These include the static structure of the event causation, lack of event occurrence data, and need for reliable prior information. In this study, a new hierarchical Bayesian modeling based technique is proposed to overcome these drawbacks. The proposed technique can be used as a flexible technique for risk analysis of major accidents. It enables both forward and backward analysis in quantitative reasoning and the treatment of interdependence among the model parameters. Source‐to‐source variability in data sources is also taken into account through a robust probabilistic safety analysis. The applicability of the proposed technique has been demonstrated through a case study in marine and offshore industry.     

Explosion Probability of Unexploded Ordnance: Expert Beliefs

This article reports on a study to quantify expert beliefs about the explosion probability of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Some 1,976 sites at closed military bases in the United States are contaminated with UXO and are slated for cleanup, at an estimated cost of $15–140 billion. Because no available technology can guarantee 100% removal of UXO, information about explosion probability is needed to assess the residual risks of civilian reuse of closed military bases and to make decisions about how much to invest in cleanup. This study elicited probability distributions for the chance of UXO explosion from 25 experts in explosive ordnance disposal, all of whom have had field experience in UXO identification and deactivation. The study considered six different scenarios: three different types of UXO handled in two different ways (one involving children and the other involving construction workers). We also asked the experts to rank by sensitivity to explosion 20 different kinds of UXO found at a case study site at Fort Ord, California. We found that the experts do not agree about the probability of UXO explosion, with significant differences among experts in their mean estimates of explosion probabilities and in the amount of uncertainty that they express in their estimates. In three of the six scenarios, the divergence was so great that the average of all the expert probability distributions was statistically indistinguishable from a uniform (0, 1) distribution—suggesting that the sum of expert opinion provides no information at all about the explosion risk. The experts' opinions on the relative sensitivity to explosion of the 20 UXO items also diverged. The average correlation between rankings of any pair of experts was 0.41, which, statistically, is barely significant (p= 0.049) at the 95% confidence level. Thus, one expert's rankings provide little predictive information about another's rankings. The lack of consensus among experts suggests that empirical studies are needed to better understand the explosion risks of UXO.     

Quantitative Risk Analysis on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Through a Bi‐Directional Road Tunnel

A quantitative risk analysis (QRA) regarding dangerous goods vehicles (DGVs) running through road tunnels was set up. Peak hourly traffic volumes (VHP), percentage of heavy goods vehicles (HGVs), and failure of the emergency ventilation system were investigated in order to assess their impact on the risk level. The risk associated with an alternative route running completely in the open air and passing through a highly populated urban area was also evaluated. The results in terms of social risk, as F/N curves, show an increased risk level with an increase the VHP, the percentage of HGVs, and a failure of the emergency ventilation system. The risk curves of the tunnel investigated were found to lie both above and below those of the alternative route running in the open air depending on the type of dangerous goods transported. In particular, risk was found to be greater in the tunnel for two fire scenarios (no explosion). In contrast, the risk level for the exposed population was found to be greater for the alternative route in three possible accident scenarios associated with explosions and toxic releases. Therefore, one should be wary before stating that for the transport of dangerous products an itinerary running completely in the open air might be used if the latter passes through a populated area. The QRA may help decisionmakers both to implement additional safety measures and to understand whether to allow, forbid, or limit circulation of DGVs.     

A Scale of Risk

This article proposes a conceptual framework for ranking the relative gravity of diverse risks. This framework identifies the moral considerations that should inform the evaluation and comparison of diverse risks. A common definition of risk includes two dimensions: the probability of occurrence and the associated consequences of a set of hazardous scenarios. This article first expands this definition to include a third dimension: the source of a risk. The source of a risk refers to the agents involved in the creation or maintenance of a risk and captures a central moral concern about risks. Then, a scale of risk is proposed to categorize risks along a multidimensional ranking, based on a comparative evaluation of the consequences, probability, and source of a given risk. A risk is ranked higher on the scale the larger the consequences, the greater the probability, and the more morally culpable the source. The information from the proposed comparative evaluation of risks can inform the selection of priorities for risk mitigation.     

Risk Management of Domino Effects Considering Dynamic Consequence Analysis

Domino effects are low‐probability high‐consequence accidents causing severe damage to humans, process plants, and the environment. Because domino effects affect large areas and are difficult to control, preventive safety measures have been given priority over mitigative measures. As a result, safety distances and safety inventories have been used as preventive safety measures to reduce the escalation probability of domino effects. However, these safety measures are usually designed considering static accident scenarios. In this study, we show that compared to a static worst‐case accident analysis, a dynamic consequence analysis provides a more rational approach for risk assessment and management of domino effects. This study also presents the application of Bayesian networks and conflict analysis to risk‐based allocation of chemical inventories to minimize the consequences and thus to reduce the escalation probability. It emphasizes the risk management of chemical inventories as an inherent safety measure, particularly in existing process plants where the applicability of other safety measures such as safety distances is limited.     

Regional Risk Assessment for Point Source Pollution Based on a Water Quality Model of the Taipu River,China

Point source pollution is one of the main threats to regional environmental health. Based on a water quality model, a methodology to assess the regional risk of point source pollution is proposed. The assessment procedure includes five parts: (1) identifying risk source units and estimating source emissions using Monte Carlo algorithms; (2) observing hydrological and water quality data of the assessed area, and evaluating the selected water quality model; (3) screening out the assessment endpoints and analyzing receptor vulnerability with the Choquet fuzzy integral algorithm; (4) using the water quality model introduced in the second step to predict pollutant concentrations for various source emission scenarios and analyzing hazards of risk sources; and finally, (5) using the source hazard values and receptor vulnerability scores to estimate overall regional risk. The proposed method, based on the Water Quality Analysis Simulation Program (WASP), was applied in the region of the Taipu River, which is in the Taihu Basin, China. Results of source hazard and receptor vulnerability analysis allowed us to describe aquatic ecological, human health, and socioeconomic risks individually, and also integrated risks in the Taipu region, from a series of risk curves. Risk contributions of sources to receptors were ranked, and the spatial distribution of risk levels was presented. By changing the input conditions, we were able to estimate risks for a range of scenarios. Thus, the proposed procedure may also be used by decisionmakers for long‐term dynamic risk prediction.     

Flood Risk Assessment in the Netherlands: A Case Study for Dike Ring South Holland

Large parts of the Netherlands are below sea level. Therefore, it is important to have insight into the possible consequences and risks of flooding. In this article, an analysis of the risks due to flooding of the dike ring area South Holland in the Netherlands is presented. For different flood scenarios the potential number of fatalities is estimated. Results indicate that a flood event in this area can expose large and densely populated areas and result in hundreds to thousands of fatalities. Evacuation of South Holland before a coastal flood will be difficult due to the large amount of time required for evacuation and the limited time available. By combination with available information regarding the probability of occurrence of different flood scenarios, the flood risks have been quantified. The probability of death for a person in South Holland due to flooding, the so‐called individual risk, is small. The probability of a flood disaster with many fatalities, the so‐called societal risk, is relatively large in comparison with the societal risks in other sectors in the Netherlands, such as the chemical sector and aviation. The societal risk of flooding appears to be unacceptable according to some of the existing risk limits that have been proposed in literature. These results indicate the necessity of a further societal discussion on the acceptable level of flood risk in the Netherlands and the need for additional risk reducing measures.     

Use of Risk Assessment Methods in the Certification of Decontaminated Buildings

Accidental events such as fires, explosions, and leaks often result in large-scale contaminations of buildings with toxic chemicals. After decontamination, the certification for original use requires testing for residual contamination. The two basic kinds of sampling plans in use up to recently both fall short of the required performance. Their deficiencies are analyzed in terms of the scientific questions implicit in both the sampling plan and the subsequent statistical evaluation. A sampling strategy of a new kind is proposed and discussed in the same context. It is motivated by concern for the long-term safety of the building's occupants and is, therefore, based on factors important in risk assessment. Three different sampling plans are derived in the framework of this methodology, two of which have already been used in actual certification proceedings.     

Managing Risk: A Joint U.S.-German Perspective

Ideas from a USA-FRG conference on risk management are presented. In general, the difficulties confronted by risk management authorities in the two countries are similar, from discovering important risks at an early stage to setting acceptable goals. Government regulation is overburdened and somewhat inefficient in both countries, leading to greater search for alternatives. The many differences in approach between the two countries can inform both. German risk management is done largely through negotiations among the affected parties; when this does not resolve a dispute, a specialized administrative court takes charge. In both countries nonregulatory methods of managing risk should be enhanced and given a larger role. A matrix of risk management method versus criteria proved stimulating in comparing and ranking approaches. The conceptual differences between managing discrete events (auto crashes, boiler explosions, etc.) and chronic exposures have not been appreciated. Although uncertainty and probability are involved in both, there are qualitative differences in both analysis and management. Public perceptions of risk and the role these should play have been characterized by "objectivist" and "subjectivist" positions. In the former view, risks are subject to analysis, are calculable, and the public must be educated to accept the conclusions of experts. In the latter view what people perceive is what is most important, both psychologically and politically, and the risk experts must understand public fears and desires. These are important opportunities for cross cultural studies.     

Ranking the Risks from Multiple Hazards in a Small Community

Natural hazards, human-induced accidents, and malicious acts have caused great losses and disruptions to society. After September 11, 2001, critical infrastructure protection has become a national focus in the United States and is likely to remain one for the foreseeable future. Damage to the infrastructures and assets could be mitigated through predisaster planning and actions. A systematic methodology was developed to assess and rank the risks from these multiple hazards in a community of 20,000 people. It is an interdisciplinary study that includes probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), decision analysis, and expert judgment. Scenarios are constructed to show how the initiating events evolve into undesirable consequences. A value tree, based on multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT), is used to capture the decisionmaker's preferences about the impacts on the infrastructures and other assets. The risks from random failures are ranked according to their expected performance index (PI), which is the product of frequency, probabilities, and consequences of a scenario. Risks from malicious acts are ranked according to their PI as the frequency of attack is not available. A deliberative process is used to capture the factors that could not be addressed in the analysis and to scrutinize the results. This methodology provides a framework for the development of a risk-informed decision strategy. Although this study uses the Massachusetts Institute of Technology campus as a case study of a real project, it is a general methodology that could be used by other similar communities and municipalities.     

The Return Period Analysis of Natural Disasters with Statistical Modeling of Bivariate Joint Probability Distribution

New features of natural disasters have been observed over the last several years. The factors that influence the disasters’ formation mechanisms, regularity of occurrence and main characteristics have been revealed to be more complicated and diverse in nature than previously thought. As the uncertainty involved increases, the variables need to be examined further. This article discusses the importance and the shortage of multivariate analysis of natural disasters and presents a method to estimate the joint probability of the return periods and perform a risk analysis. Severe dust storms from 1990 to 2008 in Inner Mongolia were used as a case study to test this new methodology, as they are normal and recurring climatic phenomena on Earth. Based on the 79 investigated events and according to the dust storm definition with bivariate, the joint probability distribution of severe dust storms was established using the observed data of maximum wind speed and duration. The joint return periods of severe dust storms were calculated, and the relevant risk was analyzed according to the joint probability. The copula function is able to simulate severe dust storm disasters accurately. The joint return periods generated are closer to those observed in reality than the univariate return periods and thus have more value in severe dust storm disaster mitigation, strategy making, program design, and improvement of risk management. This research may prove useful in risk‐based decision making. The exploration of multivariate analysis methods can also lay the foundation for further applications in natural disaster risk analysis.     

A Methodology for Risk Analysis Based on Hybrid Bayesian Networks: Application to the Regasification System of Liquefied Natural Gas Onboard a Floating Storage and Regasification Unit

This article presents an iterative six‐step risk analysis methodology based on hybrid Bayesian networks (BNs). In typical risk analysis, systems are usually modeled as discrete and Boolean variables with constant failure rates via fault trees. Nevertheless, in many cases, it is not possible to perform an efficient analysis using only discrete and Boolean variables. The approach put forward by the proposed methodology makes use of BNs and incorporates recent developments that facilitate the use of continuous variables whose values may have any probability distributions. Thus, this approach makes the methodology particularly useful in cases where the available data for quantification of hazardous events probabilities are scarce or nonexistent, there is dependence among events, or when nonbinary events are involved. The methodology is applied to the risk analysis of a regasification system of liquefied natural gas (LNG) on board an FSRU (floating, storage, and regasification unit). LNG is becoming an important energy source option and the world's capacity to produce LNG is surging. Large reserves of natural gas exist worldwide, particularly in areas where the resources exceed the demand. Thus, this natural gas is liquefied for shipping and the storage and regasification process usually occurs at onshore plants. However, a new option for LNG storage and regasification has been proposed: the FSRU. As very few FSRUs have been put into operation, relevant failure data on FSRU systems are scarce. The results show the usefulness of the proposed methodology for cases where the risk analysis must be performed under considerable uncertainty.     

Risk Analysis of the Vessel Traffic in the Strait of Istanbul

The Strait of Istanbul, the narrow waterway separating Europe from Asia, holds a strategic importance in maritime transportation as it links the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. It is considered as one of the world's most congested and difficult-to-navigate waterways. Over 55,000 transit vessels pass through the Strait annually, roughly 20% of which carry dangerous cargo. In this study, we have analyzed safety risks pertaining to transit vessel maritime traffic in the Strait of Istanbul and proposed ways to mitigate them. Safety risk analysis was performed by incorporating a probabilistic accident risk model into the simulation model. A mathematical risk model was developed based on probabilistic arguments regarding instigators, situations, accidents, consequences, and historical data, as well as subject-matter expert opinions. Scenario analysis was carried out to study the behavior of the accident risks, with respect to changes in the surrounding geographical, meteorological, and traffic conditions. Our numerical investigations suggested some significant policy indications. Local traffic density and pilotage turned out to be two main factors affecting the risks at the Strait of Istanbul. Results further indicate that scheduling changes to allow more vessels into the Strait will increase risks to extreme levels. Conversely, scheduling policy changes that are opted to reduce risks may cause major increases in average vessel waiting times. This in turn signifies that the current operations at the Strait of Istanbul have reached a critical level beyond which both risks and vessel delays are unacceptable.