Lies and slander: truth-telling in repeated matching games with private monitoring

Incentives for cooperation may be enhanced substantially if a player can rely on the entire community to punish a partner who failed to cooperate. The ability of a player to report a defection to others can constitute a strong deterrent against defection if this report triggers a punishment imposed by the whole community. This paper studies the truth-telling problem in such a context. The paper presents a sequential equilibrium that supports cooperation in which a player unilaterally reports the play of a partner with strict incentives for truth-telling. It is shown, however, that desirable properties of equilibria described in the previous literature that assume truth-telling no longer exist. The implications of the results for practical examples, such as trading on eBay, are discussed.     

Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets

We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results of Blum and Rothblum (J Econ Theory 103(2):429–443, 2002) and Cechlárová (Randomized matching mechanism revisited. Mimeo, Safarik University, 2002) for the marriage model. We also discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation based on the NTU Shapley value. We thank Peter Biró and Utku ünver for their advice on the related literature. We also thank an anonymous referee for comments.     

Tensions of Marriage: Love, Cooperation, Capitulation, Annihilation

This paper addresses the inevitable conflicts endemic to couple relationships. These conflicts are a manifestation of the mutual subjugation experienced by all couples engaged in an ongoing intimate relationship. The author describes this universal dimension of the life of a couple, applying what Ogden (1994a) calls “the subjugating intersubjective third”—a third subject co-created through mutual projective identification, binding them together as a couple. The unconscious and conscious relationship between each partner and “the third” generates a spectrum of primitive emotions from bliss to entrapment. Consequently, an identical situation in a relationship can evoke feelings of love and cooperation or capitulation and annihilation in one or both partners, depending on what is occurring in “the third,” of which the members are both creators and captives. A clinical case illustrates this dynamic.     

Incomplete property rights and overinvestment

I consider a model in which an asset owner must decide how much to invest in his asset mindful of the fact that an encroacher??s valuation of the asset is increasing in the asset owner??s investment. Due to incomplete property rights, the encroacher and asset owner engage in a contest over the control of the asset after investment has taken place. A standard result is that the asset owner will underinvest in the asset relative to the first-best level of investment when property rights are complete. Contrary to this standard result, I find that when the interaction between the asset owner and the encroacher is infinitely repeated and the encroacher has some bargaining power over the size of the transfer from the asset owner to him, then there is a cooperative equilibrium in which the asset owner finds it optimal to overinvest in the asset when property rights are incomplete relative to the first-best level of investment when property rights are complete. Overinvestment is used to induce cooperation. However, this result depends on the encroacher??s bargaining power or, more generally, whether the transfer is an increasing function of investment.     

Die Umzugsentscheidung von Paaren als Verhandlungsproblem

Recently bargaining models became a popular theoretical concept within family research. Especially compared to household economic theory, bargaining models are less abstract and provide a tool for analysis of conflicting interests and their consequences in family relationships. However, although there are many different topics which can be tackled with this kind of theory, there is still a lack of direct empirical tests concerning this concept. The aim of this article is to provide such a test by using a special type of a quasi-experimental research design. With a so-called factorial design we vary systematically incentives for a household move in order to model different structural conditions of a relationship like earning possibilities or chances for a career of a partner. This allows us to observe varying power allocations within the relationship. The empirical results support the hypotheses derived from the bargaining model: the respondent anticipates a loss of his or her bargaining power as well as an increasing power of the partner. Consequently they answer such a change with a reduced tendency for a household move and a higher perceived potential for conflicts within the relationship. However, due to our limited knowledge about the validity of the quasi-experimental design these results need to be validated by future research.     

AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION FOR ROTTEN KIDS

We explore how natural selection acts upon genes for cooperation, altruism and selfishness in an prisoner's dilemma played by family members. A key parameter determining behavior is that parents and children have different expectations of future offspring. Examining asexual and sexually reproducing populations we show that which strategy of cooperation and defection proves be stable depends on the relative reproduction potential of the players and what proportion of the population is young. "Rotten kids" with altruistic parents can be a stable outcome where reproductive success is the goal, and natural selection may lead individuals to care about their unborn progeny. (JEL D10, H31)     

An instrumental perspective on apologizing in bargaining: The importance of forgiveness to apologize

Although very little research in bargaining has addressed how perpetrators should deal with the aftermath of unfair allocations, it has been proposed that an apology may help the reconciliation process. Prior research, however, only focused on whether apologies can reveal positive effects on the reconciliation process but did not focus yet on whether perpetrators are actually willing to apologize. In this paper we investigate perpetrator’s willingness to apologize for a trust violation in a bargaining setting. We hypothesized that perpetrators willingness to apologize would be a function of the extent to which the victim of the trust violation is willing to forgive. This effect, however, was expected to emerge only among those perpetrators who are low in dispositional trust. The results from a laboratory study with actual transgressions and actual apologetic behavior supported our predictions and thus emphasize an instrumental view on apologizing in bargaining situations.     

Validation of Fear of Partner Scale

Therapists have a responsibility to ascertain if psychological aggression, physical aggression, sexual aggression exist, and if there is fear of the partner. A fear of partner measure was evaluated in 100 couples who sought relationship feedback. Fear of partner's psychological, physical, and sexual aggression was related to actual reports of such behavior. For both men and women, fear of speaking in front of partner and fear of being in therapy with partner were related to reports of psychological aggression perpetrated by the partner, dominance, and isolation by the partner, and one's own marital dissatisfaction. Among respondents who were aggressed against, more men than women reported fear of participating in therapy with their partner. The measure herein can be used to determine the extent of fear of aggression by partners and to assist in the decision‐making about the appropriateness of marital therapy and divorce mediation.     

The communication of anger and disappointment helps to establish cooperation through indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is cooperation through reputation: third parties cooperate with those known to cooperate and defect against those known to defect. Defection, then, can have the unjust motive of greed or the just motive of retaliation. To establish cooperation, observers should distinguish both motives for defection and respond more cooperatively to the latter. We propose that the expression of emotions may facilitate this inferential process. Indeed, in two laboratory studies participants inferred that defection out of anger or disappointment was a just response to a defector and they responded more cooperatively than when no emotion was communicated. Moreover, participants inferred that defectors who evoked disappointment instead of anger had a relatively positive reputation. We conclude that emotions help establish cooperation through indirect reciprocity.     

Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games

Riker's size principle for n-person zero-sum games predicts that winning coalitions that form will be minimal in that any player's defection will negate the coalition's winning status. Brams and Fishburn (1995) applied Riker's principle to weighted-majority voting games in which players have voting weights w ₁≥w ₂≥...≥w _n,and a coalition is winning if its members' weights sum to more than half the total weight. We showed that players' bargaining power tends to decrease as their weights decrease when minimal winning coalitions obtain, but that the opposite trend occurs when the minimal winning coalitions that form are “weight-minimal”, referred to as least winning coalitions. In such coalitions, large size may be more harmful than helpful. The present paper extends and refines our earlier analysis by providing mathematical foundations for minimal and least winning coalitions, developing new data to examine relationships between voting weight and voting power, and applying more sophisticated measures of power to these data. We identify all sets of minimal and least winning coalitions that arise from different voting weights for n≤6 and characterize all coalitions that are minimal winning and least winning for every n. While our new analysis supports our earlier findings, it also indicates there to be less negative correlation between voting weight and voting power when least winning coalitions form. In this context, players' powers are fairly insensitive to their voting weights, so being large or small is not particularly important for inclusion in a least winning coalition.     

Cohabitation and Marriage in a Risky World

Different couples are analyzed in presence of income uncertainty and precautionary saving. Married couples have legal restrictions on their relationship that force them to act cooperatively, while cohabitants with limited commitment act non-cooperatively. This makes risk sharing different for different couples; married couples share risk completely, while cohabitants share risk to a lesser extent due to their lack of commitment and cooperation. This makes precautionary savings greater for cohabitants than for married couples. However, cohabitants also tend to undersave to possibly increase assistance from their partner. However, mutual altruism mitigates the inefficiencies and enforces time consistent risk sharing among cohabitants.I am thankful to Jonas Agell, Sophia Grahn-Voorneveld, Peter Kooreman and to Mats Persson for valuable comments on an earlier version. I have also received useful comments from the editor and from two anonymous referees. Generous financial support from the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation and from Knut and Alice Wallenbergs Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

PARENTAL DEATH AS A PRECIPITANT OF MARITAL CONFLICT IN MIDDLE AGE*

When a long-standing marriage suddenly becomes conflictual, one precipitant can be the recent death of the parent of one of the partners. The bereaved spouse can identify with the deceased parent, attacking or withdrawing from his or her partner; or he/she can become irrationally angry because the partner cannot replace an idealized parent. The main goal of therapy is to facilitate the bereaved partner's mourning of the dead parent. Choosing an effective therapeutic method depends on the couple's capacity for mutual empathy and support and their need for insight. Without marital therapy, unrecognized mourning may contribute to the breakdown of long-standing marriages.     

Collective Bargaining and the Gender Pay Gap in the Printing Industry

This paper considers the effect of collective bargaining on the gender pay gap in the printing industry. This sector was subject to multi‐employer bargaining for around 90 years, until 2010. The article analyses gendered collective bargaining processes through the mechanism of symbolic power, that is, the power of interpretation and definition, and utilizes Walton and McKersie's seminal work on bargaining behaviour to understand the processes that have prevented the closing of the pay gap. It finds that symbolic power operates within the sub‐processes of attitudinal structuring and intra‐organizational bargaining to de‐legitimize women's role in equal pay bargaining, alongside distributive bargaining tactics that preclude equal pay bargaining, thereby creating the impression that women are irrelevant to bargaining processes and ensuring relative invisibility for issues of importance to equality bargaining.     

Eternal legitimacy of New Zealand trade unions: An update

This paper examines the current state of play in New Zealand’s industrial relations policy following the first general election under a system of proportional representation. The implications of the new Coalition Government’s policy statements are examined in light of the current outcomes under the Employment Contracts Act. It is concluded that radical reforms, and therefore radical changes, are unlikely. With the exception of the role of the Employment Court, institutional arrangements and bargaining outcomes under the Employment Contracts Act have become reasonably stable and are unlikely to be radically altered. The role of the Employment Court and to a lesser extent the Employment Tribunal is under threat and a more gradual move towards further liberalization of the labor market through changes to personal grievance procedures and bargaining process requirements cannot be ruled out. This research was funded by a grant from Public Good Science Fund administered by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology (FRST Contract: VUW F514).     

Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation

“Strategy-proofness” is one of the axioms that are most frequently used in the recent literature on social choice theory. It requires that by misrepresenting his preferences, no agent can manipulate the outcome of the social choice rule in his favor. The stronger requirement of “group strategy-proofness” is also often employed to obtain clear characterization results of social choice rules. Group strategy-proofness requires that no group of agents can manipulate the outcome in their favors. In this paper, we advocate “effective pairwise strategy-proofness.” It is the requirement that the social choice rule should be immune to unilateral manipulation and “self-enforcing” pairwise manipulation in the sense that no agent of a pair has the incentive to betray his partner. We apply the axiom of effective pairwise strategy-proofness to three types of economies: public good economy, pure exchange economy, and allotment economy. Although effective pairwise strategy-proofness is seemingly a much weaker axiom than group strategy-proofness, effective pairwise strategy-proofness characterizes social choice rules that are analyzed by using different axioms in the literature.     

SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTIMERGER RELIEF IN THE UNITED STATES

The extent of structural relief obtained by the government in a Section 7 settlement is modeled as an outcome of a bargaining game between the antitrust agency and parties to the merger. This framework is applied to data from 73 Section 7 cases settled during 1990–2000. The fraction of competitive overlap subject to divestiture is shown to depend on the extent of merger-specific efficiencies, the anticompetitive potential of the merger, and the hostage effect facing the merging firms, as well as the degree of media coverage of the case, the workload of the agency, and the partisan composition of Congress.(JEL L44 , C24 )     

Who joins unions in the public sector? The effects of individual characteristics and the law

Analysis of a large micro-data set shows that state public-sector bargaining laws significantly influence state and local government union membership in several ways. Membership probability is lowest where a right-to-work law is present; it is greatest when there are mandatory agency shop provisions. Compulsory arbitration leads to a significantly greater probability of membership than does the right-to-strike. Simulations based on model estimates indicate that policy changes along the lines of proposed national public bargaining laws could lead to major changes in public-sector union density. Among individual and demographic characteristics, membership probability is significantly affected by full-time/part-time status and the statewide extent of private-sector unionism. Although non-whites and males are more likely to be union members, race and gender membership differentials are shown to be relatively small. The author thanks Jack Fiorito, Paul Jarley, Joe Stone, and Rob Valletta for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors are his sole responsibility.     

Gender,work and childbearing: couple analysis of work adjustments after the transition to parenthood

This study focuses on Swedish couples' work adjustments following the transition to parenthood. Specifically, we ask whether couples' gender role attitudes influence whether they make adjustments to their work situations after the end of the parental leave. Using couple data from the Young Adult Panel Study, we find that both partners are more likely to make work adjustments when both partners hold egalitarian attitudes. It is also more likely that only the male partner will make work changes when both partners are egalitarian. When one partner holds more egalitarian attitudes than the other partner, it tends to have a stronger impact on the work adjustments of the more egalitarian partner. For example, couples with egalitarian male partners are more than three times as likely to have the male partner change his work situation as couples in which neither partner holds egalitarian attitudes. While less consistent, there is some evidence that female egalitarian attitudes increase the likelihood of female work changes.     

试论阿盟决策制度与阿拉伯一体化的发展

阿盟采取国家间合作与协商来防止冲突的决策制度。理论上,这种决策模式只有在某些合作收益大于单方面行动成本的政策领域才会产生共同政策,但缺乏纯粹的区域层面上的有效运作;实践上,即使在共同利益较多的经济和安全领域,阿盟一体化也只在既定的制度框架下徘徊,仅能达成各国有限的、最低的共同愿望。本文用制度主义和一体化理论来透视阿盟决策制度的本质功能及其对阿拉伯一体化发展的影响,并进一步指出未来的阿盟选择何种决策制度决定着其一体化发展的方向和水平。     

Labor’s inequality of bargaining power: Changes over time and implications for public policy

A major justification for enacting the Wagner Act and encouraging collective bargaining was that in the wage-determination process individual workers suffer from an inequality of bargaining power vis-á-vis employers. This critical review of this justification examines the analytical meaning of the concept of an inequality of bargaining power, the factors responsible for this inequality, the change that has taken place in labor’s disadvantage since the 1930s, and the implications for national labor policy. It is concluded that some employers continue to have significant market power over wages but that the extent and degree of labor’s disadvantage in bargaining has diminished substantially since World War II. The implication is that the Wagner Act’s protection of the right to organize remains in the social interest but that the bargaining power of labor unions should be further circumscribed to preserve a balance of power in wage determination. The author thanks Paul Swiercz for helpful comments.