EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONAL CONTRACTS IN SOVEREIGN BANK LENDING

This paper presents direct evidence for relational contracts in sovereign bank lending. Unlike the existing empirical literature, its instrumental variables method allows for distinguishing a direct influence of past repayment problems on current spreads (a “punishment” effect in prices) from an indirect effect through higher expected future default probabilities (“loss of reputation”). Such a punishment provides positive surplus to lenders after a default and decreases the borrower's present discounted value of the net benefits of future borrowing, which create dynamic incentives. Using data on bank loans to developing countries for 1973–1981 and constructing continuous variables for credit history, we find evidence that most of the influence of past repayment problems is through the direct, punishment channel.     

Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint

There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing shrinks as demand variability or the retailer's internal capital level increases.     

随机需求条件下的P2P网络借贷拍卖机制

在P2P网络借贷契约中，提供了一种关于随机借款需求的两阶段关闭式降价拍卖，并构成了借款人的一个最优机制。对此，首先设计借贷契约以确定初始借款需求；随后以事前对称贷款人为基准建立相应的拍卖模型，并进行一次标准的关闭式降价拍卖，再从中标贷款人中获得一个额外的借款需求；最后将这个机制拓展到事前非对称贷款人的情形，以分析非对称情形下的拍卖过程，并通过算例加以说明。这个机制对借款人是最优的，而且借款人和贷款人都比较熟悉这种简单拍卖，因此可以用于改进中国P2P网络借贷市场的交易机制。     

VERTICAL RELATIONS UNDER CREDIT CONSTRAINTS

We model the impact that credit constraints and market risk have on the vertical relationships between firms in the supply chain. Firms which might face credit constraints in future investments become endogenously risk averse when accumulating pledgable assets. In the short run, the optimal supply contract involves risk sharing, so inducing double marginalization. Credit constraints thus result in higher retail prices, and this is true whether the firm is debt or equity funded. Further, we offer a new theory of supplier finance arms as we show an intrinsic complementarity between supply and lending which reduces financing inefficiencies created by informational asymmetries. The model offers: a theory of countervailing power based on credit constraints; a transmission mechanism linking the cost of borrowing with retail prices; and a motive for outsourcing supply (or distribution) in the face of market risk.     

The Roles of Bank and Trade Credits: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Evidence

This study investigates the roles of bank and trade credits in a supply chain with a capital‐constrained retailer facing demand uncertainty. We evaluate the retailer's optimal order quantity and the creditors' optimal credit limits and interest rates in two scenarios. In the single‐credit scenario, we find the retailer prefers trade credit, if the trade credit market is more competitive than the bank credit market; otherwise, the retailer's preference of a specific credit type depends on the risk levels that the retailer would divert trade credit and bank credit to other risky investments. In the dual‐credit scenario, if the bank credit market is more competitive than the trade credit market, the retailer first borrows bank credit prior to trade credit, but then switches to borrowing trade credit prior to bank credit as the retailer's internal capital declines. In contrast, if the trade credit market is more competitive, the retailer borrows only trade credit. We further analytically prove that the two credits are complementary if the retailer's internal capital is substantially low but become substitutable as the internal capital grows, and then empirically validate this prediction based on a panel of 674 firms in China over the period 2001–2007.     

多重关联关系下供应链上关联信用风险的传染效应

供应链企业之间的多重关联关系导致其信用风险传染愈加复杂。本文基于供应链双渠道融资模式,针对供应链上同时存在交易关联、资产关联和人际关联等三重关联关系的情景,揭示了关联信用风险微观传染机理,构建了关联信用风险传染强度模型,分别探讨了三种关联关系以及链外市场对传染效应的影响。为研究关联信用风险传染的外溢效应,在银行未识别出供应链上关联关系时,探讨了银行面临的期望损失。结合仿真分析发现,相较于单一商业信用融资,双渠道融资模式下传染效应更弱;在最优交易关联强度下,商业信用额度和成本（反映了供应链上的一种资产关联关系）在不同方向上对传染效应产生影响,人际关联关系以及链外市场均负向影响传染效应;银行期望损失则与贷款利率和贷需比相关,人际关联关系将导致银行更大的潜在损失。     

信息可信与贷款利率确定问题的供应链鲁棒模型分析

提供真实可信的企业信息是企业申请银行贷款时的必要条件,但银行可以选择相信这些信息的部分或者全部,从而提供不同的利率水平。本文研究可信信息与银行贷款利率制定之间的关系以及相应决策对借款企业所在供应链的影响问题。通过构建银行参与的由供应商和零售商组成二级供应链模型刻画了零售商存在资金货款需求的供应链金融情景。针对银行采用零售商提供的全部信息或部分信息情况,从供应链管理视角考察了鲁棒的报童方法和极大极小方法分别获得了银行的最优利率决策及其对供应链运营所造成的影响。研究表明,银行采用部分信息并不能有效增加其收益,但其利率决策对供应链整体运作效率有非常显著的影响。     

考虑供应链信用水平的存货质押率研究

供应链融资可以提高中小企业的信用水平和贷款能力。考虑单一核心企业和单一零售商构成的二级供应链,产品市场需求为典型的报童模型,给出了供应链信用和信用乘数的概念,建立了考虑供应链信用水平的银行质押率决策模型,得到供应链存货质押融资情况下银行的最优质的押率,研究了信用乘数、存货质押量、回购价、回购率、银行的损失规避程度等诸多要素对银行质押率的影响。研究表明:供应链融资情况下的最优质押率高于零售商单独融资情况下的最优质押率;一定条件下,银行质押率与核心企业信用乘数、回购参数正相关;质押率和存货质押量、银行风险厌恶程度负相关;举例并进行了灵敏度分析。     

公司上市、关系贷款与中国银企关系的重建

银行与企业签订的贷款合同可以是标准贷款合同 ,也可以是关系贷款合同。导致产生不同类型合同的原因与银行掌握的关于企业的信息有关 ,而这又涉及资产专用性问题。企业的信息显示越充分 ,银行的信息成本越低 ,银行与企业在签订贷款合同中的地位会有所改变 ,从而影响了银企关系的程度与方式。在我国 ,上市作为重要的信息显示机制可以有效改善信贷市场的资源配置。     

基于资本监管要求和还款意愿的贷款定价研究

在借款人有道德风险的情况下,如何合理地确定贷款价格是一个理论界及实务界面临的共同难题。本文分析了企业的还款意愿对商业银行贷款定价的影响,并将还款意愿融入到信用风险定价的结构化模型中,建立了资本监管下商业银行贷款定价模型。研究表明,贷款占用银行的监管资本越多或银行吸收存款的利率越高,贷款价格也越高;企业的还款意愿越弱,则银行给企业的贷款价格越高;反之,企业的还款意愿越强,则银行给企业的贷款价格越低。     

基于信号博弈的中外资银行信贷竞争行为分析

在银行业全面开放及贷款利率市场化条件下,异,对中外资银行信贷舍约竞争行为的影响。结果表明：本文利用信号博弈模型,讨论了信息差异及经营成本差1）中资银行的竞争优势是老借款人。2）外资银行提供分离合约时,在中资银行的新借款人市场上将出现“柠檬效应”;外资银行提供混同合约时,中资银行将失去所有新借款人。     

基于EOQ模型的存货质押融资业务模式选择研究

委托监管模式、物流银行模式和统一授信融资模式是存货质押融资的几种主要模式,本文采用EOQ模型研究了这三种融资模式下供应链成员的决策和收益情况,并分析了这三种融资模式中制造商与物流企业参与融资的条件。通过对融资模式进行比较分析,论文指出了融资模式对供应链成员收益的影响。主要研究结论指出,在质押率和融资利率的特定区域内,物流企业和制造商同时愿意参与质押融资。由于在统一授信模式中,银行的日常的运营成本比委托监管模式低,银行获得比委托监管模式更多的利润。在选择融资模式时,银行更偏好于统一授信模式。对于物流企业来说,若统一授信模式中物流企业的沉淀资金收益率大于银行的利率,它的利润要比委托监管模式更多,否则要少于委托监管模式。本文的研究结论为存货质押融资业务的模式选择提供了一些的理论参考。     

考虑风险规避的资金约束供应链最优信用契约设计

本文针对零售商的资金约束问题,研究了风险规避的供应商如何通过设计信用契约影响零售商的融资结构。构建了包含供应商、零售商以及银行在内的供应链融资模型,给出了供应商的最优信用契约决策、零售商的最优库存决策以及银行的最优利率决策。进一步分析了供应商的风险规避程度对最优信用契约决策的影响。研究表明：当供应商的风险规避程度低于某个临界值时,供应商偏好提供全额信用,从而零售商的融资结构为单一的交易信用融资;而当供应商的风险规避程度高于该临界值时,供应商偏好提供部分信用,从而零售商的融资结构为组合融资。最后,通过数值算例验证了本文的结论。本研究一定程度上丰富了现有供应链金融的理论研究,为供应链核心企业与银行的决策提供了依据与参考。     

资金约束供应链RFID投资决策与融资优化

本文以一个供应商和一个存在库存错放的资金约束零售商组成的两级供应链为研究对象,探讨了供应链成员采用无线射频识别（Radio Frequency Identification,RFID）技术的决策及融资选择问题。基于报童模型构建了供应链成员是否采用RFID技术、以及零售商选择贸易信贷融资或银行融资四种情景下的收益模型,求解出链上各成员的最优收益并探讨了RFID采用决策及融资选择策略。研究发现：资金约束零售商通过银行借贷融资可以获得更多的融资金额,但是其选择贸易信贷融资的意愿随着自有资金的减少而增强;当零售商自有资金适中时,随着错放率的上升或RFID成本的降低,零售商从银行融资向贸易信贷融资转变;银行融资在一定程度上能够缓解零售商的库存错放问题。     

Coordinating contracts for a financially constrained supply chain

We consider a financially constrained supply chain in which a supplier (leader) sells products to a retailer (follower) who has no access to bank financing due to her low credit rating. However, the supplier can borrow from a bank and offer trade credit to the retailer to alleviate her financial constraint. Failure to pay off a bank loan or trade credit incurs a variable default cost. We analyze the centralized version of the supply chain to obtain new coordination requirements. We then examine whether revenue-sharing, buyback, and all-unit quantity discount contracts can coordinate our supply chain. We show that the all-unit quantity discount contract fails to coordinate. However, the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts can coordinate the supply chain, but only when the supply chain has a sufficient total working capital. Moreover, they cannot allocate profit flexibly unless the supplier has a large enough working capital. Finally, we design a generalized revenue-sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain with flexible profit allocation, and also show by numerical examples its superiority over the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts.     

基于税盾效应的供应链贸易信用融资优化决策研究

针对中小企业融资困境的现实,本文基于贸易信用融资模式,引入税盾效应,建立了由单一核心供应商和单一经销商组成的含税盾的贸易信用模型,探讨有融资需求的经销商进行订货、核心供应商定价的决定策略,探究不同计息方式的价值实现和融资模式优选。通过stackbelberg博弈、比较分析和算例验证,研究发现以订货量确定为基准,融资需求出现的时点对供应链企业计息方式的选择均有影响。税法关于利息抵扣上限、贸易信用贷款利率、订货量等均影响经销商计息方式的选择,融资额度影响其订货策略;生产成本的差额、定价策略影响供应商的计息方式。     

模糊厌恶下关系型借贷定价和最优贷款利率

考虑决策者是模糊厌恶的,利用实物期权方法,解析地给出了银行价值,企业价值和最优停贷水平。分析了模糊厌恶和基准波动率对最优贷款利率,最优停贷水平,企业价值和银行价值的影响。数值分析表明：模糊厌恶提高了贷款利率,降低了企业和银行价值。在基准波动率水平较小时,模糊厌恶推迟了停贷水平;在基准波动率较大时,模糊厌恶加速了停贷水平。此外,在模糊中性下,企业价值是基准波动率凸函数,银行价值是基准波动率凹函数。而在模糊厌恶下,企业价值和银行价值都随着基准波动率的增加而递减。本文从行为金融角度为中小企业"融资贵"提供了新的解释。     

Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?

We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk‐taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two‐stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time‐varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long‐term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects.     

Local Banks Efficiency and Employment

Abstract. This work analyses the links between credit and labour markets highlighting the influence of credit market inefficiencies on employment. We argue that if banks are not efficient in monitoring the borrowers in the presence of asymmetric information, credit market imperfections have real effects. We estimate dynamic equations using system generalized method of moments (GMM) for bank loans and employment on panel data for Italian firms. The system GMM estimates indicate that the impact of credit market on employment is higher where the local financial market is less developed, asymmetric information is widespread, bank managers are less efficient in assessing the firms' solvency and do not use appropriate methods to evaluate the borrowers' payback capacity.     

基于零膨胀分位数两部模型的银行贷款违约预测研究

贷款信用风险评估是银行风控的重要内容。贷款逾期天数作为常见的风险度量指标,具有典型的零膨胀特征。对于零膨胀数据,传统的线性回归不再适用,两部模型是常用的代表方法。考虑到贷款数据具有偏态分布特征,本文构建了一个分位数两部模型—logit-quantile模型。该模型由Logistic回归和分位数回归构成,为了进行风险因素的选择,在模型的两个回归中添加了Lasso惩罚。为了求解模型,本文采用了坐标下降法和线性规划法相结合的迭代算法。模拟分析显示,对比逐步法和常用的logit-linear两部模型,新模型表现出了最好的变量选择效果,尤其在零膨胀比例为80%及高维情形时,该模型的表现仍然最优。最后对某银行的贷款数据实证分析显示,新模型具有更精简的结构,采用交叉验证技术进行预测显示新模型的预测和分类表现最好。