共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 10 毫秒
1.
We study equilibrium player ordering in a dynamic all-pay contest between two teams. The contest lasts two periods, and each team consists of two players who perform in different periods on behalf of their teams. The team with the higher aggregate output wins the prize, which is a public good to its players. Each team has one stronger player and one weaker player, and the two teams can differ in their values of the prize. The teams maximize their winning odds by strategically assigning their players to different periods. We find that when the intrateam heterogeneity in player ability is not excessive, the teams would allocate their stronger players to the late positions as the “anchormen.” When both the intrateam ability gap and interteam heterogeneity in teams' values become excessively large, the team with high value always places its stronger player in the early position, who will place a large bid to preempt late competition. (JEL C7, D7, D8) 相似文献
2.
CONTESTS WITH STOCHASTIC ABILITIES 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We consider the properties of perfectly discriminating contests in which players' abilities are stochastic, but become common knowledge before efforts are expended. Players whose expected ability is lower than that of their rivals may still earn a positive expected payoff from participating in the contest, which may explain why they participate. We also show that an increase in the dispersion of a player's own ability generally benefits this player. It may benefit or harm his rival but cannot benefit the rival more than it benefits himself. We also explore the role of stochastic ability for sequential contests with the same opponent (multibattle contests) and with varying opponents (elimination tournaments) and show that it reduces the strong discouragement effects and holdup problems that may otherwise emerge in such games. High own ability dispersion selects such players into the contest and favors them in elimination contests. ( JEL D72, D74) 相似文献
3.
We study two‐player contests in which each player hires a delegate, and the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort. First, we look closely at the delegates' decisions on when to expend their effort, given contracts between the players and the delegates, and look at the players' decisions on their contracts. Then, we compare the outcomes of the endogenous‐timing framework with those of the simultaneous‐move framework. We show that the higher‐valuation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation than her opponent, the delegate of the higher‐valuation player chooses his effort level after observing his counterpart's, the equilibrium expected payoff of the delegate of the higher‐valuation player is greater than that of his counterpart, and economic rent for each delegate exists. We show that, in the endogenous‐timing framework, each player offers her delegate better contingent compensation, each delegate's expected payoff is greater, and each player's expected payoff is smaller, as compared with the simultaneous‐move framework. (JEL D72) 相似文献
4.
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of distribution of abilities in the population. In particular, we identify conditions under which, even if punishment is costly, punishing the bottom is more effective than rewarding the top in eliciting effort input. If punishment is costless, we study the optimal number of punishments in the contest. (JEL D44, D82, J31, J41) 相似文献
5.
J. Atsu Amegashie 《Economic inquiry》2020,58(3):1233-1244
I consider a contest between scholars on the basis of three popular indices of citation. There exist equilibria in which there are more and better-quality papers in the total citations contest than in the h-index contest. In some cases, the total citations contest yields the same quality of papers but more papers than the Euclidean contest. As the cost of writing a paper increases,the h-index is inferior to the total citations index in both the quality and quantity of papers. This result is partly driven by how the number of papers constrains how the h-index counts citations. (JEL D72) 相似文献
6.
We analyze the effects of property rights and the resulting loss aversion on contest outcomes. We study three situations: in “gain” two players start with no prize and make sunk bids to win a prize; in “loss” both the players start with prizes and whoever loses the contest loses their prize; and in “mixed” only one player starts with a prize that stays with him if he wins, but is transferred to the rival otherwise. Since the differences among the treatments arise only from framing, the expected utility and the standard loss aversion models predict no difference in bids across treatments. We introduce a loss aversion model in which the property rights are made salient, and as a result the reference point varies across treatments. This model predicts average bids in descending order in the loss, the mixed, and the gain treatment; and higher bids by the player with property rights in the mixed treatment. The results from a laboratory experiment broadly support these predictions. There is no significant difference in bids in the loss (gain) treatment and bids by property rights holder (nonholder) in the mixed treatment. A model incorporating both loss aversion and social preferences explains this result. (JEL C91, C72, D23, D74) 相似文献
7.
SCOTT M. GILPATRIC 《Economic inquiry》2009,47(2):266-277
We study contests in which contestants choose both work effort and the variance of output (risk). Winner-take-all contests generate incentives for contestants to engage in costly risk taking, which is inefficient if the contest organizer values the aggregate output of all contestants. The addition of a penalty for ranking last (retaining a prize for ranking first) enables the organizer to independently control contestants' incentives to exert productive effort and to increase output variance. In this way, the organizer can eliminate risk-seeking behavior in settings where it is wasteful, but also control risk seeking when it is desirable, such as in research tournaments. ( JEL J33, C72) 相似文献
8.
This Symposium consists of five studies in the area of “Contests.” These peer‐reviewed papers were among a larger set of research presented at the 2016 conference “Contests: Theory and Evidence” at the University of East Anglia in Norwich, United Kingdom, and represent that research in terms of both the questions raised and the techniques used to address them. (JEL C7, C9, D9) 相似文献
9.
We present a labor market model that allows as special cases a market paying equilibrium wages, one paying disequilibrium efficiency wages, and a market combining the two. Our analysis indicates that industrial wage differentials are not necessarily evidence of efficiency wages. Such differentials may be explained by differences across industries in labor performance standards or in the accuracy with which worker effort can be measured. We do find, however, that the relationship between wages and dismissals can be used to distinguish a market paying equilibrium wages from one paying efficiency wages. 相似文献
10.
Game theorists typically assume that changing a game's payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. Although this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when “payoffs” are actually money amounts. Loss avoidance is a phenomenon where payoff‐level changes matter when they change the signs of payoffs: gains become losses or vice versa. We report the results of a human‐subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain‐loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible‐loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find strong evidence of behavior consistent with certain‐loss avoidance in the experiment. We also find evidence of possible‐loss avoidance, although weaker than that for certain‐loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for theorists modeling real‐life situations with game theory and for experimenters attempting to test theory and interpret observed behavior in terms of theory. (JEL D81, C72, C73) 相似文献
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12.
JAMIE BROWN KRUSE 《Economic inquiry》1993,31(4):631-646
Laboratory experiments compare the results of two different buyer rationing rules on Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly markets. The two rationing rules, a value queue and a random queue, specify the ordering of buyers and generate different predictions under otherwise identical conditions. These experiments show market outcome can chane significantly with a change in the ordering of buyers. The direction of these changes agrees with the predictions of the stage-game Nash equilibrium. Thus, the single-shot Nash equilibrium is show to have predictive power even in repeated games. 相似文献
13.
ELIZABETH D. WICKHAM 《Economic inquiry》1981,19(4):672-686
A theoretical explanation is given which resolves the relative price nonlinearity problem in household production models where the attributes are market produced. It is shown that in a Lancasterian framework with markets of a modified Chamberlin type kinked demand curves can be derived which, together with large scale economies, lead to a market equilibrium where all goods are just relevant commodities (JRC) and the characteristics frontier is linear (LCF). A simultaneous testing procedure is proposed to estimate the objective structure among inputs. 相似文献
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15.
CHARLES L. BALLARD 《Economic inquiry》1987,25(2):267-284
This paper presents a dynamic computational general equilibrium model in which expectations regarding future prices can be varied systematically. The model is employed to evaluate how expectations influence the effect of long-run tax policy changes. Under policies (like a consumption tax) that reduce rates of return over time, individuals with perfect foresight save less than individuals with myopic beliefs. This is because consumers with foresight are better able to anticipate the lower returns. Lower saving means that existing distortions due to capital taxes are not offset as much, so that welfare gains are smaller under perfect foresight. 相似文献
16.
RICHARD PORTES 《Economic inquiry》1981,19(4):559-578
17.
SHENG-CHENG HU 《Economic inquiry》1995,33(4):592-610
This paper investigates the economic effects of demographics and productivity growth in an intertemporal optimizing model with age-based heterogeneity and induced retirement. Our analysis reveals that the projected "population aging" is likely to increase the growth rate of output and to improve the welfare of the economy, especially if there are no distortional policies which prevent retirement decisions from adjusting endogenously to the demographic changes. The economy also displays different patterns of dynamic adjustment in the quantity and price variables depending upon whether retirement is endogenous. 相似文献
18.
A central tenet of supply-side economics is that a balanced-budget reduction in the marginal tax rate on wage income increases aggregate labor supply. In contrast, the orthodox Keynesian analysis concludes that the relationship between tax rates and the economy-wide supply of labor is theoretically ambiguous. Our analysis of a general model reveals that these two propositions are associated, respectively, with the special assumptions of "compensated independence" and "ordinary independence" between leisure and public spending. 相似文献
19.
This paper investigates the properties of industry equilibrium under price uncertainty given free entry and exit. For any form of risk-averse behavior, it is shown that an increase in demand uncertainty (as measured by a mean-preserving spread) increases mean output price and reduces output of firms in long-run equilibrium. 相似文献
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