Kulturelle Variablen, organisatorische Netzwerke und demokratische Staatsstrukturen als Determinanten der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich

The article focuses on the determinants of economic growth in modern democratic industrial societies. The investigation is led by the idea that the traditional theory of growth must be extended in two directions: towards the micro-level, i.e. towards the field of microeconomic attitudes and values, and towards the macro-level, i.e. towards the field of institutional and political conditions. The study makes an attempt to develop such an integrative perspective and to explain the growth rate in the 1980s and 1990s with cultural, political-institutional and economic factors. Empirical analyses show that economic expansion is limited by three factors: the distribution of post-materialist values, the size of economic interest organizations and consensus forms of democracy. Furthermore, the results confirm the assumption of conditional convergence of economic growth.     

World Culture,Uncoupling, Institutional Logics,and Recoupling: Practices and Self‐Identification as Institutional Microfoundations of Political Violence

This study proposes a micro‐institutional theory of political violence, according to which citizens' participation in political violence is partially an outcome of tight coupling of persons' practices and self‐identifications with institutional logics opposed to dominant logics associated with world culture, such as the nation‐state and gender equality. The study focuses on two types of institutional carriers through which persons adopt institutional logics: routine practices and self‐identifications associated with three institutional logics: the familial, the ethnic, and the religious logics. Using a 15‐country survey data from early twenty‐first‐century sub‐Saharan Africa, the study finds evidence in support of the theory. Reported participation in political violence is associated with practices and self‐identifications uncoupled from dominant world‐culture logics but tightly coupled with the patriarchal familial logic, with an oppositional ethnic logic, and with a politicized oppositional religious logic.     

Before the Emergence of Critical Citizens: Economic Development and Political Trust in China

Political trust has been declining among the publics of almost all advanced industrial societies in recent years. This has been attributed to a Materialist–Postmaterialist value shift, which has given rise to a public that is less deferential to authority and increasingly ready to challenge government. This phenomenon has been interpreted as a ‘crisis of democracy’. Although one might expect to find low level of political trust in repressive authoritarian societies, survey data indicates that political trust in China is actually very high. Does this simply mean that people are afraid to express any opinions that might be viewed as critical of authority? As this article will demonstrate, this does not seem to be the case. The Chinese public expresses fairly strong criticism of some aspects of Chinese society – but they express high levels of confidence in the national government. Although rich democracies provide both a higher standard of living and more personal freedom than is available to the average Chinese citizen, the Chinese public expresses higher levels of confidence in government than those found in most advanced industrial societies. We conclude that economic development has the immediate effect of enhancing public support for the government – but in the long run it also leads to value changes that promote critical citizens. At least for now, the regime-enhancing effect of economic development still dominates the regime-eroding effect. The effect of changing values on distrust of government is largely overwhelmed by the support for government brought by the increased level of affluence.     

The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism 1

This essay examines the relationship between Islam and economy through a case study of Islamic entrepreneurs in Turkey. It analyzes the cultural politics of Islamic entrepreneurs and examines the Islamization of capitalism and the construction of entrepreneurial Islam by probing the interpretative activities of Islamic actors who deconstruct and reconstruct the relationship between Islam, economy and entrepreneurship. The construction of Islam as incompatible with and antagonistic to capitalism has a long history. Vestiges of such thinking still continue to be reflected in contemporary accounts that depict the encounter between Islamic societies and forces of global capital as a hostile battle, each trying to outdo the other. It can be argued that this confrontational scenario is not limited to Islamic world, but also displayed in other accounts that study the meeting of forces of capital with those of local cultures at a global scale. This essay attempts to challenge such dualist accounts that oppose “global capital” and “local culture”, and shows how such dualisms fail to see how capitalism and culture interpenetrate and transform each other. The essay attempts to show that a new synthesis between religion and capitalism is unfolding where culture has not been outdone but is creatively transformed and integrated to capitalism, while capitalism is made a part of “one’s culture”.     

Explaining Asian economic organization

Conclusion Social theorists are challenged to explain an increasingly complex economic order. It is clear that old theories that posited a developmental sequence from undeveloped to industrialized cannot explain the diverse patterns of industrialization that exist. Certainly, Japan is as developed as Western nations but its patterns of development, its economic norms, and its industrial practices are substantially different from the United States and even its Asian neighbors in Taiwan and South Korea. For example, the fact that Japan has the largest banks in the world, and Taiwan relatively few and weak ones (despite the world's largest per capita foreign reserve holdings), cannot be explained only by recourse to market or state factors, although each play a role. Both countries were literally awash in money in the 1980s, and both countries are clearly capitalist societies where banking institutions are assumed to be critical to economic development, as they have been in the West. But more than market and political economy factors are at work here.In Japan, historically developed institutional factors, dating from before the Meiji Restoration and industrial revolution, created conditions for business group self-financing. Modern-day keiretsu, such as Sumitomo and Mitsui, with their huge banks as centerpieces, trace their origins to pre-industrial merchant houses under family ownership. Inheritance practices in Japan are based on primogeniture, inheritance of the entire fortune by the eldest son. This practice allowed merchant family fortunes to remain intact under the stewardship of the heir. Successful families thus had huge sums of money available to finance the businesses of affiliated branches operating under the badge of the mother house. The descendents of the zaibatsu merchant houses, the keiretsu, continue to rely on their own sources of finance, now institutionalized in banks that serve their credit and other financial needs. To see large banks encapsulated within business networks as only the outcome of distorted market conditions, or as only the result of a powerful business class, misses the institutional origins and overlooks the contemporary institutional underpinnings of the Japanese banking system. Ironically, the weakness of Taiwanese banks can also be traced to a strong family system. Chinese societies practice partible inheritance, that is, division of a family estate equally among all sons. As a result, families divide their fortunes every generation, mitigating against the development of large sums of money. Instead, there is great pressure within families to develop multiple businesses so that at the death of the family head, each son can claim an independent enterprise. Because all Chinese families face the problem of setting up children in business (being an employee is not a desirable status in Taiwan as it is in Japan), a range of informal lending arrangements have arisen within families and among friends to generate investment capital. Strong social norms dictate that one assist financially a kin member or close friend. Banks play a relatively minor role in Taiwan because alternative institutional arrangements, also with preindustrial origins, have obviated the need for banks for some financial functions. Again, market factors are important to understanding the strong curb market and weak formal banking system in Taiwan, and political economy factors, notably the absence of a strong central bank, are also significant. But an institutional explanation integrates these factors into an explanation that begins with the character of the society being explained. We need theories that can account for difference without reducing cases to unique instances, that do not presume the individualistic character of Western social orders, and that are sensitive to an array of ideal as well as material factors operating in different locations. Although political economy, market, and culture theories each have contributions to make, an institutional perspective of the type I outline may be especially suited to the comparative analysis of emerging world economic organization. I think, ironically, that a sensitivity to institutional factors may yield better theories of the West. Rather than assume that the United States and Europe are the exemplars of advanced capitalism, the closest empirical instances of the idealized competitive market, Japan and other Asian nations are suggesting that the West is simply one form of capitalist economic development, an expression no doubt, of the West's own institutional heritage. When we relinquish ethnocentric perspectives we can begin to look at ourselves and our own institutional heritage more clearly.     

Economic development and political transformation

Conclusion Social structure and economic development largely influence the nature of social conflicts and political transformation. A combination of low political and economic integration and a high level of consolidation results in reformist conflicts. Low state intervention in the allocation and accumulation of capital reduces the probability that class conflict will be directed against the state. When state intervention is low, depoliticized, abstract market forces determine capital allocation and accumulation. In addition, low political and economic integration may give the state the appearance of serving societal interests rather than the interests of the upper class. This appearance of autonomy is reinforced by the institutions of formal democracy. As a consequence, class conflict is contained within civil society and deflected from the state. When consolidation is high, reformist conflicts against holders of capital may emerge. The United States experienced such movements in the 1930s. During the Great Depression, the state was drawn into some conflicts, but was not attacked by the working class. Today, the United States, like other advanced industrial societies, is less receptive to consolidation because of moderate levels of economic polarization, greater economic resilience, and high social differentiation. When state intervention and consolidation are low, organized groups with resources may gain economic benefits through segmented class conflict, whereas collectivities with weak solidarity and few resources remain inactive. Such is the case in the United States today.The combination of a high level of state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation with a high level of consolidation increases the likelihood of revolutionary conflict. High state intervention in capital allocation and accumulation has crucial social consequences. First, it politicizes other-wise abstract market relations. Second, it clearly reveals the state to be allied with a small circle of upper-class entrepreneurs, thereby discrediting the state's claim to serve societal interest. As a consequence, class conflict can readily assume a political character, expanding its target to include the state. A high level of consolidation enhances the capacity of challenging groups to act collectively to resist repression and seize power. Consolidation is more likely in societies with a high level of economic polarization, highly dependent economies, and low social differentiation. Russia in 1917 and Iran and Nicaragua in 1979 are revealing examples. The Russian and Nicaraguan revolutions were carried out primarily by workers and peasants, which helps explain the socialist orientation of the new leadership. In contrast, in Iran, the revolution was largely based on the conflicts and struggles of the traditional middle class, which eventually led to the formation of the theocratic state. A combination of high state intervention and low consolidation generates segmented conflict directed against the state. Many Third World societies are experiencing such a conflict today.To conclude, Marx's analysis focused primarily on social classes underemphasizing the significance of the state and its relation to society and economy. Skocpol's analysis, on the other hand, primarily focused on the state and the upper class, and failed to specify the proper, determining variables. If the analysis presented here is useful in specifying the conditions and forms of social conflicts, we must pay greater attention to social structural analysis, the nature of the relationship between the state, economy, social classes, and solidarity structures.     

BUSINESS RESOURCES AND TAXATION: A CROSS-SECTIONAL EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

Many writers have speculated about the connection between economic resources of corporations and their ability to dominate politics in democratic societies with advanced capitalist economies. Using a cross-sectional analysis of business taxes in the American states, this study examines the political impact of four economic resources that are plausibly related to heightened business political influence. With seven factors held constant, I find that states with larger enterprises are most likely to have lower taxes on manufacturing, but concentrated sales do not have any effect on these taxes. The degree to which the organizational efforts of firms are handicapped because industry products are diverse also has an independent relationship with state and local taxes paid by manufacturers, but this relationship does not hold when the least industrial states are excluded from the equations. I also find that where competition between political parties is most intense, tax policies will be less likely to favor business interests. It follows that the evidence in this study is consistent with a hypothesis that firms can translate their formidable economic resources into political influence at the state and local level.     

POSTMODERNISM; OR,THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF POST-FORDISM?

This article examines attempts by Marxist thinkers such as Fredric Jameson and David Harvey to explain the cultural transition from modernism to postmodernism by the economic transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. They argue that the movement of advanced industrial societies from standardized mass production to diverse flexible production has created a new culture that stresses difference, superficiality, and ahistoricality. But in their attempts to portray a synchronous development of economy and culture, these thinkers ignore the uneven developments between and within each realm. I argue that in the United States the popular arts like automobile design developed postmodern traits long before the high arts like architecture. Instead of this change in popular culture resulting from post-Fordism, it dialectically influenced this economic change.     

Contradictory tendencies in the political culture of Croatian youth: unexpected anomalies or an expected answer to the social crisis?

A successful democratic consolidation of post-socialist societies depends, among other things, on their citizens’ political culture, younger generations included. Moreover, youth civic engagement today and in the future is a guarantee of the continuity and development of democracy, which means that scientists need to gain insight into young people’s political culture. In this paper we look at political values, institutional trust and participation as relevant components of the civic political culture. The analysis is based on quantitative data collected in the empirical studies of Croatian youth, carried out between 1999 and 2013. Based on longitudinal study results, a downward trend is identified regarding selected political culture indicators: acceptance of liberal-democratic values, trust in social and political institutions, interest in politics and party preference. However, there is a simultaneous increase in participation in various types of organizations, especially political parties. The interpretation of established tendencies is placed in a broader context of an inherited democratic deficit, economic recession and social crisis. Current trends are both indicators and consequences of young people’s inadequate political socialization as well as weaknesses of political institutions and various actors during the transition and consolidation period.     

Rethinking ‘Rethinking Convergence/Culture’

Responding to the September 2011 special issue on ‘Rethinking Convergence Culture’, this essay seeks to identify ways that the author's thinking about convergence and participatory culture have shifted over time, often in ways that are closely aligned with the issue's contributors. Throughout the essay, the author addresses the links between cultural and political participation, the challenges in using new media in support of democratic change, the ways that institutional power structures continue to exert strong influence on our culture despite or perhaps because of significant expansion of who has access to the means of cultural production and distribution and the challenges and opportunities for doing cultural theory in an era of neo-liberal capitalism.     

西方青年的“先进性”初探——以青年在新社会运动中的角色为视角考察

2008年起席卷全球的经济危机为资本主义制度下的普通民众套上了沉重的枷锁,在这一背景下,不少西方国家的工人、群众甚至包括大量青年发起了多次社会运动,旨在表达对资本主义制度的不满,为自己的权益进行斗争。本文通过分析青年在"阿拉伯之春"、"占领华尔街"运动、法国"反对养老金改革"运动等社会运动中的角色,认为西方青年已经成为当代社会运动的重要参与者,并发挥着积极作用,体现了一定的先进性,具体表现为:通过合理利用网络媒体为传统左翼政党和组织进一步开展社会运动提供新的思路;反抗资本主义制度;在社会运动过程中目标明确等。此外,青年参与社会运动对资本主义社会价值观的重建也具有一定意义。     

Class Structure and Intergenerational Mobility from a Marxian Perspective*

Four mobility and attainment propositions are extracted from a theoretical discussion relating class mobility and attainment processes to the development of capitalism. These propositions are evaluated empirically using United States Labor Statistics, General Social Survey data, and primary data collected from a SMSA. The first proposition maintains that paralleling the development of capitalism will be a structural decrease in the relative size of the capital-owning classes resulting in mobility. In the second proposition, it is asserted that with the development of capitalism, the likelihood of downward mobility will be significantly greater than the probability of upward mobility. The third proposition stated that in advanced capitalist societies, circulation class mobility will be substantially constrained by structural change. Lastly, it is proposed that in advanced capitalist societies, attained class positions will depend significantly on an unmediated (by educational attainment) origin class effect. Empirical support is uncovered for all propositions.     

Deciphering the modern Janus: societal multiplicity and nation-formation

ABSTRACT

How to theorize the nation’s Janus-like form, its simultaneous modernity and antiquity? This paper provides an original answer to this longstanding question. It argues that nations arise from the interaction of ‘societal multiplicity’ and the expansionist tendency of historical capitalism. The emergence of capitalism super-adds a modern inflection to the inherently relational process of collective identity formation by generating modern sovereignty as an abstract form of rule. Crucially however, just like its emergence, capitalism’s expansion also refracts through societal multiplicity. Non-capitalist societies are therefore pressured into ‘nationalist’ projects of emulative self-preservation in which the nation’s political form (i.e. the sovereign state) is forged before its sociological content (i.e. primitive accumulation). Thus, the original site of this process, France, produced the modular nation-form that unlike Britain’s imperial nationhood could be globalized. The paper therefore shows that IR’s premise of multiplicity may be the key to one of social sciences’ most enduring puzzles.     

Economic Transition,Class Formation,and the Superintendent State in the Midwest: 1850‐1900

This article outlines and clarifies the complex relationship between economic development, the formation of classes, political movement responses to these changes, and state institutional capacity building in response to these movements in the Midwestern US. It seeks to remedy views of the transition to capitalism in America that focus too narrowly on a moment of transition, positing instead a long, politically contested process of class formation by elucidating the specific interactions between agrarian and union movements and state‐building processes. Our research reveals the substantial role of the state in forcing through acceptance of economic changes and shifting class locations through a co‐developmental process of political resistance movements and state‐building.     

Bandits,Brigands and Militants: The Historical Sociology of Outlaws

Outlaws have been prominent actors in a social context which is characterized by collective dissent, conflict, and violence. Bandits, brigands, and militants emerged in societies with the decline of social justice, political stability, and economic prosperity. Their emergence and social networks with different actors and agencies provide us principal motives to deconstruct the social identity of outlaws and determine the factors that fostered collective dissent, conflict, and violence in different societies. This special issue covers a vast geography and different time periods to theoretically and methodologically advance our knowledge in the historical sociology of outlaws. In doing so, we address complex social, political, and cultural issues that rendered outlaws inextricable part of social problems. Exploring the power and activities of outlaws in different social geographies offers us new perspectives to tackle the origins and outcomes of social, political, and cultural dissent across the world.     

Fundamental references from the Western culture

This article presents theoretical elements concerning the ‘nature versus culture’ confrontation as a particular aspect of the worldwide expansion of Western civilization. Several speculations are made concerning the philosophical foundations which have provided the base for the current political and economic mega-scenarios in the contemporary world. We turn our attention to the articulations of the concept of nature with the processes of mondialization of Western culture and with the history of universal culture. Finally, several considerations are made on the dynamics of economic processes on a world scale and projections on the impact of science and technology in the social and political frames that are taking place in the contemporary world.     

Reassessing Welfare Capitalism:

This paper develops the argument that a communitarian regime of capitalism might contribute to a society in which economic power is democratically controlled and where full participation is guaranteed, especially for those social groups lacking access to jobs and/or sufficient income. The paper analyzes community- based approaches to social policy in Switzerland and the United States, two western countries with a federalistic political system relying on local and functional communities. It explains the role played by municipalities and trade unions in improving the performance of welfare capitalism when dealing with unemployment and poverty. The examples of community-based approaches to social policy lead to the conclusion that both in addition and complementary to government intervention, modern capitalist societies have to rely on strong local communities and functional associations in order to establish a just social order and to ensure full employment and income security for all.     

Materials for an exploratory theory of the network society1

This article aims at proposing some elements for a grounded theory of the network society. The network society is the social structure characteristic of the Information Age, as tentatively identified by empirical, cross-cultural investigation. It permeates most societies in the world, in various cultural and institutional manifestations, as the industrial society characterized the social structure of both capitalism and statism for most of the twentieth century.
Social structures are organized around relationships of production/consumption, power, and experience, whose spatio-temporal configurations constitute cultures. They are enacted, reproduced, and ultimately transformed by social actors, rooted in the social structure, yet freely engaging in conflictive social practices, with unpredictable outcomes. A fundamental feature of social structure in the Information Age is its reliance on networks as the key feature of social morphology. While networks are old forms of social organization, they are now empowered by new information/communication technologies, so that they become able to cope at the same time with flexible decentralization, and with focused decision-making. The article examines the specific interaction between network morphology and relationships of production/consumption, power, experience, and culture, in the historical making of the emerging social structure at the turn of the Millennium.     

Historical approach to environmental sociology

Focusing on the problem of the so‐called exploitative or pillage economy (Raubwirtschaft in German), the article explores the potential and the limitations of sociology as a method of environmental research. The term ‘exploitative economy’ designates the over‐exploitation of nature and natural resources by industrial societies, in disregard of the interests of future life and future needs. Traditional sociology has responded inadequately to environmental problems, and attempts to develop a new, environmental sociology have remained sporadic and marginal. The present article has addressed the problem of exploitative economy in the context of the tradition of historical sociology and suggested that this tradition would gain from environmental sociology, environmental history, and institutional environmental economics, with their new views of economic and industrial development.     

Beyond economic insecurity and cultural backlash: Economic nationalism and the rise of the far right

Far‐right parties gain in electoral support across the globe. Studies describe this phenomenon either as a cultural backlash or as a reaction to growing economic inequality. The economic inequality perspective suggests that the transforming workforce in post‐industrial societies gives rise to economic insecurity among those who feel left behind. In contrast, the cultural backlash thesis argues that the increasing support for far‐right parties represents a rejection of values such as cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. More recent scholarship sought to show how economic and cultural factors combined increase the support for the far right. Most of these studies investigate public opinion polls, voting behaviour, and voters´ socio‐economic contexts. This paper reviews these studies and argues that the way in which far‐right political parties construct an interconnection of economic and cultural ideas in discourse is largely neglected in the existing body of literature. The paper concludes that the concept of economic nationalism captures how these two components are intertwined; economic nationalist discourse in far‐right political manifestos and speeches provides a more complete comprehension how public opinion is being shaped. This contribution offers a starting point for future studies to examine how cultural values, such as nationalism, reconstruct and influence articulation of economic policy.