THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF THIRD‐DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN A DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY

This article examines the welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination under oligopolistic competition with horizontal product differentiation. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price discrimination to improve social welfare: the degree of substitution must be sufficiently greater in the “strong” market (where the discriminatory price is higher than the uniform price) than in the “weak” market (where it is lower). It is verified, however, that consumer surplus is never improved; social welfare improves solely owing to an increase in the firms' profits in the case of linear demands. (JEL D43, L11, L13)     

CREDIBLE SIGNALS OF THE RELEASE OF NEW VERSIONS

Prices can credibly signal whether a durable‐goods monopolist will offer an improved good in the future. When the future release of a new version is private information, a monopoly seller will reveal a failure to develop and market a new version with a lower price than he or she would charge in full information. A firm would be willing to pay more to innovate when consumers are uncertain than if they are informed ex ante because a failure to innovate is punished by a low equilibrium price. Consumers' uncertainty about innovation intensifies an unsuccessful innovator's Coasian problem and increases consumer welfare. (JEL D82, L12, L15)     

TRANSPARENCY IN MARKETS FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

We propose an experimental design to investigate the role of information disclosure in the market for an experience good. The market is served by a duopoly of firms that choose both the quality and the price of their product. Consumers differ in their taste for quality and choose from which firm to buy. We compare four different treatments in which we vary the degree to which consumers are informed about quality. Contrary to theoretical predictions, firms do not differentiate quality under full information. Rather, both tend to offer products of similar, high quality, entailing more intense price competition than predicted by theory. Under no information, we observe a “lemons” outcome where quality is low. At the same time, firms manage to maintain prices substantially above marginal cost. In two intermediate treatments, quality is significantly higher than the no‐information level, and there is evidence that prices become better predictors of quality. Taken together these findings suggest that information disclosure is a more effective tool to raise welfare and consumer surplus than theory would lead one to expect. (JEL L15, C91, D82)     

OPTIMAL PRICE OF ENTRY INTO A COMPETITION

A continuum of contestants are choosing whether to enter a competition. Each contestant has a type, and of those who enter, the ones with highest types receive prizes. A profit‐maximizing firm controls entry, and charges a price for it. I show that an increase in the value of each prize leads the firm to raise the price while keeping the intensity of entry fixed. Conversely, when the mass of prizes increases, the firm initially keeps the price constant while allowing entry to increase; and later—raises the price. (JEL C72, D82, D83)     

IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON FIRM‐LEVEL EXPORT DECISIONS

This article examines the impact of corruption on the self‐selection of firms into domestic and export markets. A heterogeneous firm model predicts that corruption decreases the probability that a firm only sells domestically, increases the probability that a firm exports indirectly through an intermediary, and decreases the probability that a firm exports directly. The propositions of the model are tested using a comprehensive dataset of over 23,000 firms in 80 developing countries. The results confirm both the self‐selection of firms according to their productivity and the anticipated impact of corruption. This indicates that in developing countries where corruption is especially severe, intermediaries provide a crucial link to global markets. (JEL F1, O1)     

HIERARCHICAL TRADE

Commodity trading is typically organized hierarchically: Large‐scale trade takes place at the global price system while individuals trade at local price systems within their countries. Agencies or trading houses establish the link between these different market places. In this paper, we devise a framework to study this type of hierarchical trade. We identify the free trade and the autarky equilibrium as polar cases. We show that no other two‐stage market equilibria exist if the commodity space is two‐dimensional. An example demonstrates that other, so‐called intermediate equilibria exist for three‐dimensional commodity spaces. We then provide an explicit construction of special classes of intermediate equilibria. Moreover, we study the consequences when some countries control the agency that organizes trade at the global level and we analyze the role of international goods arbitrage. Finally, we show that profit‐maximizing agencies may not promote free trade outcomes. (JEL D43, D50, F10)     

STRATEGIC EXCLUSION OF THE HIGHEST‐VALUED BIDDERS IN WHOLESALE AUTOMOBILE AUCTIONS

By restricting bidders to be qualified dealers, wholesale automobile auctions exclude the bidders who place the highest value on the vehicles: consumers. This article provides an explanation for this puzzling entry restriction by modeling the inventory‐management decisions of a firm. If an automobile dealer has more vehicles in inventory than is optimal, it cannot reduce its inventory by selling directly to consumers without impacting the demand for the automobiles that remain. However, if the dealer sells his/her excess inventory to a competitor, the demand for his/her remaining vehicles increases as the competitor responds by acquiring fewer additional vehicles. We demonstrate that for any market demand function and any cost of the competitor acquiring additional vehicles, a dealer with excess inventory does better by selling a subset of its vehicles to a competitor rather than directly to consumers. We discuss the market for wholesale automobiles in relation to other markets where goods are also auctioned but where entry is not restricted to qualified dealers. Doing so allows us to compare our inventory‐management explanation to common explanations provided by industry practitioners. We find that intuitive alternative stories do not consistently explain practices across markets. (JEL D44, L11, L62)     

IS THERE ADVERSE SELECTION IN LIFE INSURANCE MARKETS?

Adverse selection theory predicts people with a high risk of death are more likely to own life insurance. Using a unique data set merging administrative and survey records, we test this theory and find the opposite: people with high death risk are less likely to own life insurance. We postulate advantageous selection and price discrimination swamp adverse selection in individual life insurance markets. To determine which effect is more powerful, we analyze group life insurance markets, where insurance companies cannot price discriminate as well as in individual markets. Our data suggest that price discrimination has a stronger effect than advantageous selection. (JEL D8, G1, I1)     

MIXED OLIGOPOLY, SEQUENTIAL ENTRY, AND SPATIAL PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper is the first to examine the welfare consequences of a public firm in a traditional model of spatial price discrimination. It demonstrates that when a private firm acts as a Stackelberg location leader, the presence of a public firm always improves welfare. Moreover, when three firms locate sequentially, the presence of a public firm improves social welfare unless it locates last. Thus, despite examining a variety of location timings, including simultaneous location, privatization never improves welfare and usually harms welfare. This conclusion differs from several currently in the literature in which privatization often improves welfare. ( JEL L13, L32, L33, L52)     

AIRLINE PRICING BEHAVIOR UNDER LIMITED INTER‐MODAL COMPETITION

This paper empirically analyzes airline pricing for short‐haul flights in contexts with no credible threat of inter‐modal competition. To this end, we explore the southern Italian market since it is less accessible by other transport modes and thus fares are the direct outcome of air‐related competition. We show, in fact, that market power matters, depending on the level of intra‐modal competition, and that airlines apply differentiated mark‐ups. Besides, consistent with the implementation of inter‐temporal price discrimination (IPD), we find a non‐monotonic inter‐temporal profile of fares with a turning point included in the interval of the 43rd to 45th days before departure. Finally, we provide evidence that in more competitive markets, airlines are more likely to engage in IPD. (JEL L11, L13, L93)     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND MEDIA DIVERSITY

We estimate a mixed logit model of the demand for local news service. Results provide evidence that suggest the representative consumer values more diverse news, more coverage of multicultural issues, and more information on community news, and has a distaste for advertising. Demand estimates are used to calculate the impact on consumer welfare from a marginal decrease in the number of independent television stations that lowers the amount of diversity, multiculturalism, community news, and advertising. Consumer welfare decreases, but the losses are smaller in large markets. For example, small‐market consumers lose $45 million annually while large‐market consumers lose $13 million. (JEL C9, C25, L13, L82, L96)     

AUCTIONS WITH RESALE OPPORTUNITIES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

We study first price asymmetric private value auctions with resale opportunities presented in seller's and buyer's markets. We offer experimental evidence on bidding behavior, prices, and resource allocation. Building upon the Hafalir and Krishna (2008) model, we find that bidders will bid higher in an auction if the resale market is a seller's market than a buyer's market. There is a price/revenue‐efficiency trade‐off established theoretically between these two resale regimes. In equilibrium, however, final efficiency is high irrespective of the resale market structure. Evidence of bid symmetrization and higher final efficiency is found in the buyer‐advantaged resale case. (JEL D44, C92)     

SELECTION INTO AUCTIONS FOR RISKY AND AMBIGUOUS PROSPECTS

We study experimentally the selection into first‐price sealed‐bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect. Most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect, leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect. Transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller. Evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders. A control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes. (JEL C91, D44, D81)     

CAPACITY CONSTRAINED EXPORTERS: IDENTIFYING INCREASING MARGINAL COST

This study revisits a central assumption of standard trade models: constant marginal cost technology. The presence of increasing marginal costs for exporters introduces significant market interdependence across borders missing from traditional models of international trade that rely on constant marginal cost technology. Such market interdependence represents an additional channel through which local shocks are transmitted globally. To identify increasing marginal cost at the level of the firm, we build in flexible production assumptions that nest increasing, decreasing, and constant marginal cost technology to an otherwise standard international trade model. We derive an estimating equation that can be taken directly to the data. Our structural equation explicitly guides our inference on the shape of the marginal cost curve from estimated coefficients. The results suggest that increasing marginal cost is predominant at the firm level. Moreover, utilizing plant‐level information on physical and financial capacity constraints, we find that the degree of increasing marginal cost is significantly exacerbated by both types of constraints. The evidence suggests that access to larger markets through greater international integration may not have the expected welfare gains typically predicted in standard models. (JEL F12, F14)     

STACKELBERG, COURNOT AND COLLUSIVE MONOPOLY: PERFORMANCE AND WELFARE COMPARISONS

This article compares and evaluates performance and welfare in three classical oligopoly models: Stackelberg leader, Cournot, and collusive monopoly. Hahn's stability conditions render an unambiguous ranking of market price; the monopoly price is highest and the Stackelberg price is lowest. Welfare comparisons are less clear-cut due to additional effects coming from reallocation of outputs among sellers. Conditions under which these reallocation effects will enhance or offset the unambiguous price effects on welfare are discussed and examples are given. Possible implications for antitrust policy, regarding constraints on market share of large producers in noncompetitive markets, are examined.     

THE DURATION OF FIRM‐DESTINATION EXPORT RELATIONSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN, 1997–2006

This article uses survival analysis to investigate the duration of Spanish firms' trade relationships by destination over 1997–2006. Whereas firm export status is highly persistent, firms' destination portfolio is very dynamic: a typical firm‐country exporting relationship has a median duration of 2 years. Yet, if a firm manages to export to a country beyond 2 years the risk of exiting that market sharply falls afterwards. The results indicate that not only firm heterogeneity but also destination heterogeneity are crucial to explain survival in export markets. In particular, country (political) risk heavily shapes the effect of firm, product, and other destination characteristics on the length of trade relationships. Whereas firm productivity, comparative advantage, partners' GDP, and proximity enhance duration of trade with low‐risk countries, they have no effect on trade survival with high‐risk countries. On the contrary, information spillovers are particularly relevant to enhance survival of trade relationships with high‐risk countries. (JEL C41, F10, F14)     

BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS

This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)     

EXPERT OPINION AND PRODUCT QUALITY: EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK CITY RESTAURANTS

We analyze whether consumers' quality perception and/or producer investment of New York City restaurants, measured by Zagat scores, responds to newly appearing expert opinion, measured by Michelin scores. Answering this question is of general economic interest as it applies to all markets with information asymmetries. Employing a difference‐in‐differences approach as well as a propensity score matching approach we find significant Michelin treatment effects on food and décor quality. Based on these changes, we find a Michelin‐induced price increase of approximately 30% per Michelin star. To examine whether the improved food and nonfood quality is based on restaurant investments or is merely imagined, we analyze nonfood investments by referring to Wine Spectator wine list awards. Our analysis suggests that Michelin‐reviewed restaurants are significantly more likely to invest in their wine list than others. As a result, Michelin reviewed restaurants are more likely to improve food and nonfood (esp. décor) quality leading to significant price increases. However, while restaurants that increase prices only due to décor and service improvements are more likely to go out of business, food improvements appear to secure a restaurant's survival. (JEL D11, L15, L66)     

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES,POLITICAL INTERFERENCE,AND FIRM INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

Investment in network infrastructure is crucial for economic growth. This article studies the impact of the presence of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) on the investment of European regulated firms. We account for measurement error in formal independence of IRAs by exploiting cross‐country heterogeneity in the quality of political institutions. Results show that regulatory independence increases firms' investment rate by around 1.2%–3.3%. The positive effect survives when we control for social capital accumulation, investor protection, and market liberalization. However, the effect of IRAs is not immune to politics, as we find that political interference in regulatory functions persists in the European Union and is detrimental to firm investment. (JEL D78, L50, D92, H1)     

Global value chains in international knowledge work: networks,stratifications and labour markets

In this article, I aim to cast light on the arguably indeterminate phenomenon of the global labour market (GLM) by placing the focus on an industry that has sometimes been perceived as epitomizing homogeneity and ‘world flatness’ in its deployment of geographically dispersed knowledge workers, that of international software development. Engaging in a sanguine analysis of this industry with reference to an empirical study of outsourcing to Ukraine it is revealed that labour markets servicing ICT (Information and communication technology) are subject to deep, if fluctuating, social stratifications. With reference to the notion of the global value chain (GVC), 1 1 ¹GVC analysis focuses on the governance patterns and relational dynamics between lead and supplier firms at the sectoral level. The GVC and its predecessor, the global commodity chain (GCC) focus on the inter‐firm linkages and especially power relations between different actors (Feuerstein 2013). The similar concept of global production network (GPN) concerns the broader set of relations of power, positionality and value capture between all relevant firm and extra firm actors within a network (Thompson 2013). For this study on sourcing in the global software industry, the term GVC will be utilized throughout.
the significance of factors such as knowledge, language, citizenship and age as labour market differentiators for knowledge work is brought to the fore.