FISCAL STABILIZATION WITH PARTIAL EXCHANGE RATE PASS‐THROUGH

This article examines the role of fiscal stabilization policy in a two‐country framework that allows for partial exchange rate pass‐through. Analytical solutions for optimal monetary and fiscal policy rules depend on the degree of pass‐through. Each country unilaterally uses its fiscal instrument to stabilize the costs facing exporters. The welfare effects differ strongly depending on the degree of pass‐through. For high levels, both countries are better off with the fiscal instrument and welfare is closer to the benchmark flex‐price level. For low levels, however, the unilateral equilibrium policy rules lead to high volatility in taxes, and fiscal policy ends up being destabilizing by transmitting exchange rate fluctuations. Because these results stem from strategic considerations by the two countries, the fiscal instrument is not used under policy coordination. In addition, imposing a monetary union increases welfare when pass‐through is low, including the case of local currency pricing. (JEL E52, E63, F41, F42)     

RISK ASSESSMENT UNDER A NONLINEAR FISCAL POLICY RULE

In the aftermath of the recent debt crisis, many countries are implementing nonlinear fiscal policy rules, whereby the government's responsiveness to debt strengthens at higher levels of debt. This paper examines how a nonlinear fiscal policy rule affects the possibility of future insolvency in a small open economy. We find that (1) the criteria for a nonlinear fiscal rule to eliminate explosive behavior should be tighter than the ones proposed by Bohn (1998); (2) a country that adopts a nonlinear fiscal rule could substantially reduce the probability of a solvency crisis; and (3) a nonlinear fiscal rule allows a country to reduce the possibility of insolvency without large initial responsiveness. (JEL C63, E62, E63, F34, H63)     

FISCAL STRUCTURES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

Our paper systematically examines the effects of fiscal structure on economic growth. We find that for developing countries, debt-financed increases in government expenditure retard growth and tax-financed increases stimulate growth, while for developed countries, debt-financed increases in government expenditure do not affect growth and tax-financed increases lower growth. We impose the government budget constraint on the regression equations so that the precise changes in fiscal policy can be identified (e.g., the effect of a debt-financed increase in health expenditure), employing a pooled cross-section, time-series sample and fixed- and random-effect methods. (JEL 04, E6)     

DESPERATE TIMES CALL FOR DESPERATE MEASURES: GOVERNMENT SPENDING MULTIPLIERS IN HARD TIMES

We investigate state-dependent effects of fiscal multipliers and allow for endogenous sample splitting to determine whether the U.S. economy is in a slack state. When the endogenized slack state is estimated as the period of the unemployment rate higher than about 12%, the estimated cumulative multipliers are significantly larger during slack periods than nonslack periods and are above unity. We also examine the possibility of time-varying regimes of slackness and find that our empirical results are robust under a more flexible framework. Our estimation results point out the importance of the heterogenous effects of fiscal policy and shed light on the prospect of fiscal policy in response to economic shocks from the current COVID-19 pandemic. (JEL C32, E62, H20, H62)     

Net impact of government funding on nonprofit fiscal health: burden or benefit?

This study examines the impact of federal grant awards on the financial health of recipient nonprofits. Although a modest body of research finds that government grants are beneficial to nonprofit fiscal health, a large Urban Institute study (2010, 2013, 2015) found that nonprofit managers receiving government grants consistently report fiscal harm due to awards that do not cover all program costs, late payments, and significant administrative burden. Those findings raise the question of whether government funding leads to net benefits or net harm for organizations given the administrative and fiscal burdens identified. This study tests that question using a large panel of federal grants to estimate the impact of government awards on three measures of nonprofit financial health. We find that government grants promote an increase in nonprofit size, improve operating margins, and increase financial reserves for recipient organizations. These benefits endure after the receipt of the award.     

THE IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY ON PROFITS

This paper investigates the impact of fiscal policy on profits using panel data for 18 high‐income OECD countries during the period 1975–1999. We estimate a profit equation allowing a consistent treatment of the government budget constraint, and we try to disentangle the effects of different spending and taxation items. As far as public spending is concerned, our results strongly suggest that capital expenditures are associated with higher profits, while expenditures on goods and services and in particular on wages and salaries deteriorate profits. In general, “productive” expenditures seem to increase profits while the effect of “unproductive” expenditures is insignificant. Transport and communication expenditures seem to have a positive impact on profits. On the revenue side, we find that both direct and indirect taxation has a negative impact on profits. (JEL E62, H32, H54)     

MULTICOINTEGRATION AND SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL PRACTICES

Using multicointegration methodology, we develop criteria for testing sustainability of fiscal budgeting processes across all states of nature. Criteria are derived from the optimal control literature where levels and rates of change of a system of variables are determinants of policy response. The appropriate policy response mechanisms are outlined and linked to the multicointegration methodology. We then test government spending and revenue systems of 15 industrialized countries for the presence of such mechanisms. We find that only Norway and the United Kingdom exhibit policy responses that are consistent with our criteria.(JEL H6 , E62 , C22 )     

RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES

The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus the issue of how to improve upon the time-consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. We present a model with three players (the central bark, the fiscal authority, and wage setters) in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled. We show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated. We also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank.     

QUASI‐EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS ON THE EFFECTS OF ADOPTION OF A VALUE ADDED TAX

Value added taxes (VATs) have become an important source of government funding in past decades, but little empirical work has been carried out on their macroeconomic impacts. As the decision to implement a VAT is endogenous, regression methods analyzing the impact of the policy choice will yield biased estimates. To solve this problem, I first model the VAT adoption decision for 192 countries using survival analysis. I then match adopters to non‐adopters using propensity score matching. I find that VAT adoption is associated with an increase in growth and investment as well as lower inflation and government spending as a share of GDP. (JEL H20, H21)     

INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION AND THE DEFICIT BIAS

I analyze the dynamic effects of tax competition on public budget deficits. I find that stronger tax competition leads to a fiscal deficit bias at the early stages of financial liberalization. When countries differ in terms of capital mobility, further liberalization leads to external imbalances and diverging fiscal deficits while corporate tax rates converge. Consistent with theory, I find that stronger tax competition increases deficits in a sample of OECD countries, controlling for tax revenues and other standard determinants of fiscal deficits. (JEL E62, F62)     

Policy Streams and Immigration to Russia: Competing and Complementary Interests at the Federal and Local Levels

This article uses Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework to explain forms of national‐ and region‐level governance used in the Russian Federation to manage unprecedented levels of international immigration. First, we identify the ways that the Russian federal government has legislated and governed international migration from 1991 through 2010. We then compare the federal level to the case of the Krasnodar region, an ethnically diverse region in the North Caucasus. We find that that migration policy adoption in Russia at the federal level is relatively immune to economic trends or labour needs but more sensitive to foreign and domestic political objectives. At the regional level, local socio‐political and economic concerns predominate and political objectives are secondary. Finally, we argue that migration policy changes or adopted policy at the regional level may be explained by an interaction effect between changes in political leadership, federal level policy adoption, and regional level context.     

ELASTIC CAPITAL SUPPLY AND THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY

Existing analyses of the effects of fiscal policy in general equilibrium models have typically been conducted under the assumption that the long-run supply of capital is perfectly elastic at a fixed rate of time preference. These analyses have shown that the long-run response of the capital stock to changes in fiscal policy is crucial to generating the potential for “multiplier” effects in these models. In this paper we ask, what are the implications of relaxing the assumption of perfectly elastic capital supply for the analysis of fiscal policy? We show that with less than perfectly elastic capital supply, the potential for multipliers is actually enhanced. (JEL E62, D90)     

FISCAL POLICY AND LENDING RELATIONSHIPS

This paper studies how fiscal policy affects loan market conditions in the United States. First, it conducts a structural vector‐autoregression analysis showing that the bank spread responds negatively to an expansionary government spending shock, while lending increases. Second, it illustrates that these results are mimicked by a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the bank spread is endogenized via the inclusion of a banking sector exploiting lending relationships. Third, it shows that lending relationships represent a friction that generates a financial accelerator effect in the transmission of the fiscal shock. (JEL E44, E62)     

POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL

This paper tests various political business cycle theories in a New Keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix. All the policy coefficients, the target levels of inflation and the budget deficit, the firms' frequency of price setting, and the standard deviations of the structural shocks are allowed to depend on “political” regimes: a preelection versus postelection regime, a regime that depends on whether the president (or the Fed chairman) is a Democrat or a Republican, and a regime under which the president and the Fed chairman share party affiliation in preelection quarters or not. The results provide evidence that several coefficients are influenced by political variables. The best‐fitting specification, in fact, is one that allows coefficients to vary according to a regime that depends on whether the economy is in the few quarters before a presidential election or not. Monetary policy becomes considerably more inertial before elections and fiscal policy deviations from a simple rule are more common. There is some evidence that policies become more expansionary before elections, but this evidence disappears for monetary policy in the post‐1985 sample. (JEL C11, D72, E32, E52, E58, E63)     

DIVIDEND POLICY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU

We study the dividend policy of firms in regulated network industries, focusing on the impact of different regulatory regimes and government control. We link payout and smoothing decisions to different regulatory mechanisms (cost‐based vs. incentive regulation) and state versus private ownership. We test our predictions on a panel of listed European electric utilities, accounting for potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory and ownership patterns. We find that incentive‐regulated firms smooth their dividends less than cost‐based regulated firms and that they report higher target payout ratios. Consistent with the interest group theory of regulation, we find that incentive regulation schemes are less likely when the state is still an important shareholder in the sector. Additionally, our results show that government control undermines the efficiency‐enhancing effects of incentive regulation on dividend policy, for example, lower smoothing is only due to private firms. (JEL G35, L51, L32, L9)     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY DESIGN AT THE ZERO LOWER BOUND: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

The global economic crisis of 2007–2008 has pushed many advanced economies into a liquidity trap. We design a laboratory experiment on the effectiveness of policy measures to avoid expectation‐driven liquidity traps. Monetary policy alone is not sufficient to avoid liquidity traps, even if it preventively cuts the interest rate when inflation falls below a threshold. However, monetary policy augmented with a fiscal switching rule succeeds in escaping liquidity trap episodes. We measure the effect of fiscal policy on expectations, and report larger‐than‐unity fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound. Experimental results in different treatments are well explained by adaptive learning. (JEL E70, C92, D83, D84, E52, E62)     

MONETARY POLICY AND ANTI‐CYCLICAL BANK CAPITAL REGULATION

The financial crisis of 2008–2009 revived attention given to booms and busts in bank credit, and their effects on real activity. This interest sparked two different strands of research in macro. The first one focuses on monetary policy in the context of financial frictions. The second studies capital regulation in banking. To the best of our knowledge, so far these two topics have mostly been studied in isolation from each other. Thus, we still lack an understanding of how monetary policy and bank capital regulation interact in the presence of financial fragility. This paper aims to contribute to furthering this understanding. Specifically, we ask how the monetary policy rule should look like in the presence of cyclical capital requirements. We extend the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with bank capital in Aliaga‐Díaz and Olivero by introducing price rigidities in the spirit of the New‐Keynesian literature. We find that: First, anti‐cyclical requirements have important stabilization properties relative to the case of constant requirements. This is true for all types of fluctuations that we study, which include those caused by productivity, preference, fiscal, monetary, and financial shocks. Second, output and consumption volatilities present in the no regulation economy can be recovered with anti‐cyclical requirements as long as the policy rate responds only slightly to credit spreads. Third, monetary policy rules that respond to credit conditions also perform better in terms of welfare. (JEL E32, E44)     

The Macro Content of PRSPs: Assessing the Need for a More Flexible Macroeconomic Policy Framework

This article analyses the content of 15 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers from a growth and poverty reduction perspective. Contrary to new trends in developed and middle‐income countries, their policy frameworks lack the necessary flexibility to deal with external shocks and address macroeconomic volatility appropriately. Their fiscal and monetary policies are too narrowly focused on fiscal balance and price stability and consequently pay too little attention to economic fluctuations arising from external shocks, which have major effects on poverty and growth. To address these issues, the article proposes a set of policy measures, including avoidance of excessively tight inflation and fiscal targets (with provisions for fluctuations in commodity prices), more room for countercyclical policy and the adoption of permanent safety nets.     

THE EFFECT OF LEGALIZING RETAIL MARIJUANA ON HOUSING VALUES: EVIDENCE FROM COLORADO

Does legalizing retail marijuana generate more benefits than costs? This paper provides a first step toward addressing that question by measuring the benefits and costs that are capitalized into housing values. We exploit the time‐series and cross‐sectional variations in the adoption of Colorado's municipality retail marijuana laws (RMLs) and examine the effect on housing values with a difference‐in‐differences strategy. Our estimates show that the legalization leads to an average 6% increase in housing values, indicating that the capitalized benefits outweigh the costs. In addition, we find suggestive evidence that this relatively large housing value appreciation is likely due to RMLs inducing strong housing demand while having no discernible effect on housing supply. Finally, we show that the effect of RMLs is heterogeneous across locations and property types. (JEL K20, R28)     

推出市政债券为新型城镇化建设融资

新型城镇化建设的融资需求已引起各方主体的高度重视,探索推出市政债券是其中一个重要举措。为此,当前应加快立法,加强法制建设,健全法律法规体系,完善相关法律制度;规范地方政府举债行为,强化对地方政府举债的市场约束,构建多元化的城镇化建设融资体系,建立可持续的城镇化建设融资机制;严格执行财经纪律,构建地方政府的财政信用,强化地方财政预算约束,提高地方财政预算执行的透明度;完善信用风险管理制度,加强信用风险管理,有效防范和控制市政债券的信用风险;制定市政债券投资的税收优惠政策,增强对投资者的吸引力,发展壮大投资者队伍。