AMBIGUITY ABOUT AUDIT PROBABILITY, TAX COMPLIANCE, AND TAXPAYER WELFARE

We show that an increase in uncertainty about the probability of being audited (ambiguity) increases tax compliance for ambiguity-averse taxpayers but reduces compliance for ambiguity lovers. Because experimental evidence reveals considerable heterogeneity with respect to ambiguity preferences, we conclude that fostering uncertainty about the probability of being audited may not be an effective policy for increasing taxpayer compliance. Moreover, because the tax authority can neither categorize nor screen taxpayers on the basis of their preferences for ambiguity, it is not likely to be either a useful or a desirable instrument for increasing taxpayer welfare. (JEL H26 , D81 )     

PRICE LEVEL UNCERTAINTY, SAVING, AND LABOR SUPPLY

This paper derives the implications, for individual saving and labor supply, of increased uncertainty about the future price level. The framework for the analysis is a two-period model in which saving and labor supply are alternative sources of both present disutility and future income. The individual is assumed to make simultaneously his saving and labor supply decisions prior to the resolution of the uncertainty about the future price level. We find that, under theoretically plausible and empirically relevant assumptions about attitudes toward risk, an increase in future price level uncertainty increases individual saving and labor supply. These results imply that, for the economy as a whole, increased uncertainty about the future price level increases output and employment, while decreasing the real rate of interest, the present price level, and economic welfare.     

THE OPTIMAL TAXATION OF ASSET INCOME WHEN GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IS ENDOGENOUS: THEORY,ESTIMATION AND WELFARE

This paper derives the Ramsey optimal fiscal policy for taxing asset income in a model where government expenditure is a function of net output or the inputs that produce it. Extending work by Kenneth L. Judd, I demonstrate that the canonical result that the optimal tax on capital income is zero in the medium to long term is a special case of a more general model. Employing a vector error correction model to estimate the relationship between government consumption and net output or the factor inputs that generate it for the United States between 1948Q1 and 2015Q4, I demonstrate that this special case is empirically implausible, and show how a cointegrating vector can be used to determine the optimal tax schedule. I simulate a version of the model using the empirical estimates to measure the welfare implications of changing the tax rate on asset income, and contrast these results with those generated in a version of the model where government consumption is purely exogenous. The shifting pattern of welfare measurements confirms the theoretical results. I calculate that the prevailing effective tax rate on net asset income in the United States between 1970 and 2014 averaged 0.449. Hence abolishing the tax completely does generate welfare improvements, though only by the equivalent of between 1.103% and 1.616% permanent increase in consumption—well under half the implied welfare benefit when the endogeneity of the government consumption is ignored. The maximum welfare improvement from shifting part of the burden of tax from capital to labor is the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption of between only 1.491% and 1.858%, and is attained when the tax rate on asset income is lowered to between 0.148 and 0.186. Allowing the tax rate to vary over time raises the maximum welfare benefit to 1.865%. All the results are very robust to a wide range of elasticities of labor supply. (JEL E62, H21, H50)     

Tax differentiation,lobbying, and welfare

To what extent a taxing authority should be granted the power to impose different tax schedules to different groups of taxpayers? Although the policy maker aims at maximizing social welfare, her tax policy may be distorted by the lobbying activity of taxpayers. In this political environment we characterize the conditions under which social welfare can be increased by restricting the set of tax instruments available to the policy maker; i.e., the scope of tax differentiation. We show that full differentiation is more costly, in terms of welfare distortions, when the lobbies are asymmetric in size, while minimal differentiation is more costly when the tax bases are asymmetric across different groups.     

Cost analysis of the strengthening families program in reducing time to family reunification among substance-affected families

Decision makers typically face uncertainty in determining whether the outcomes of promising child welfare interventions justify the investment. Despite repeated calls for cost analysis in child welfare, original studies that evaluate the costs and effects of child welfare programs have been limited. Moreover, no cost analyses have focused on family reunification programs that address the needs of substance-affected families. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the costs and effects of a federally funded implementation of the Strengthening Families Program (SFP), a 14-week family training curriculum, on time to reunification with a substance-involved child welfare population. Based on event history analysis, we find the typical child participating in SFP spends 190 fewer days in out of home care when compared to a propensity score matched comparison group of children in out-of home care receiving treatment as usual. Re-entry rates between the two groups were not significantly different at follow-up. At an average out-of-home care rate of $86 per child per day in this state, SFP saves approximately $16,340 per participating child in out-of-home care costs. From a cost–benefit perspective, every $1 invested in SFP yields an average savings of $9.83 in this Midwestern demonstration.     

Impacts of Long-Range Increases in the Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standard

This work models the impact of higher CAFE standards on producer and consumer welfare, gasoline consumption, externalities from increased driving, and the emissions of traditional pollutants. In particular, a long-run 3.0 MPG increase in the CAFE standard is estimated to impose welfare losses of about $4 billion per year and save about 5.2 billion gallons of gasoline per year, for a hidden tax of $0.78 per gallon conserved. An 11-cent-per-gallon increase in the gasoline tax would save the same amount of fuel at a welfare cost of about $290 million per year, or about one-fourteenth the cost. (JEL L51 , Q30 )     

Redistributing wealth to families: the advantages of the MYRIADE model

This study aims to shed light on the main characteristics of the French system for redistributing wealth to families through tax revenues and social transfers. For the purposes of this exercise, the authors used the MYRIADE microsimulation model, which covers most of the redistribution system, though it is limited to monetary flows such as family benefits, housing allowances, minimum social welfare payments, income tax, and tax on furnished accommodation. The authors used a particular methodology to highlight the way this redistribution works; rather than calculate the difference between each family's disposable income and their gross primary income, they opted to isolate the variation in disposable income that could be attributed to the youngest member of each family where there is at least one child under the age of 25. The average increase in disposable income that this child contributes to his or her family amounts to in200 per month.     

Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis of a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy

In this paper, both a conjoint analysis and a lab experiment are conducted to analyze the influence of changes in the tax rate and the tax base on the perceived tax burden. Our results show that the majority of individuals do not make rational tax decisions based on the actual tax burden but rather use simple decision heuristics. This leads to an irrationally high impact of changes in nominal tax rates on the perceived tax burden. Taxpayers favor tax options that apply a lower tax rate on their gross income over a higher tax rate applied on their net income despite the lower actual tax burden of the latter option. This result suggests that politicians could combine increasing fiscal revenues and decreasing subjects’ tax perception. Furthermore, overestimation of tax rate changes increases considerably when information on tax rate is considered first (framing effect).     

Taxation and tax resistance

In recent years social and behavioral sciences have extended their interest to topics not normally thought to be within their province. One of these topics of current interest is tax resistance, an old problem indeed that continues to plague the modern welfare state. People are perfectly willing to benefit from government services but increasingly restive about paying for them. How to cope with this tax-welfare backlash is a crucial problem for all democratic governments. Growing government deficits, for example, may in part be due to the erosion of the tax base which results from a shift to unobserved activities. The main purpose of this article is to offer a theoretical framework for the definition and explanation of tax resistance. To this end, research findings about tax compliance and tax mentality as well as theoretical work on free-riding, exchanging and gift-giving will be presented and discussed.     

Can strategic uncertainty help deter tax evasion? An experiment on auditing rules

This paper adds to the economic-psychological research on tax compliance by experimentally testing a simple auditing rule that induces strategic uncertainty among taxpayers. Under this rule, termed the bounded rule, taxpayers are informed of the maximum number of audits by a tax authority, so that the audit probability depends on the joint decisions among the taxpayers. We compare the bounded rule to the widely studied flat-rate rule, where taxpayers are informed that they will be audited with a constant probability. The experimental evidence shows that, as theoretically predicted, the bounded rule induces the same level of compliance as the flat-rate rule when strategic uncertainty is low, and a higher level of compliance when strategic uncertainty is high. The bounded rule also induces distinctive tax evasion dynamics compared to the flat-rate rule. The results suggest that increasing the level of strategic uncertainty among taxpayers could be an effective device to deter tax evasion.     

Uncertainty resolution in tax experiments: Why waiting for an audit increases compliance

Tax compliance in a between-subjects experiment was higher when the uncertainty about the occurrence of an audit was not resolved until three weeks after participants had filed their tax returns than in a control treatment with immediate uncertainty resolution. Results have important implications for experimental tax research where providing immediate feedback whether participants are audited is common practice.     

CORPORATE TAX GAMES WITH CROSS‐BORDER EXTERNALITIES FROM PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE

We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructure investment to attract foreign direct investment, thus enhancing their tax bases. In doing so, we allow for cross‐border infrastructural externalities. Depending on the externality, governments are shown to strategically over‐ or underinvest in infrastructure. We also examine how tax cooperation influences investment in infrastructure and find that welfare may be lower under tax cooperation than under tax competition; this is the case when infrastructure is very effective in raising the tax base and generates a large negative cross‐border externality. (JEL F23, H40)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

Regulatory fit effects on perceived fiscal exchange and tax compliance

Paying taxes can be considered a contribution to the welfare of a society. But even though tax payments are redistributed to citizens in the form of public goods and services, taxpayers often do not perceive many benefits from paying taxes. Information campaigns about the use of taxes for financing public goods and services could increase taxpayers’ understanding of the importance of taxes, strengthen their perception of fiscal exchange and consequently also increase tax compliance. Two studies examined how fit between framing of information and taxpayers’ regulatory focus affects perceived fiscal exchange and tax compliance. Taxpayers should perceive the exchange between tax payments and provision of public goods and services as higher if information framing suits their regulatory focus. Study 1 supported this hypothesis for induced regulatory focus. Study 2 replicated the findings for chronic regulatory focus and further demonstrated that regulatory fit also affects tax compliance. The results provide further evidence for findings from previous studies concerning regulatory fit effects on tax attitudes and extend these findings to a context with low tax morale.     

HOW DOES GLOBALIZATION AFFECT THE IMPLICIT TAX RATES ON LABOR INCOME,CAPITAL INCOME,AND CONSUMPTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?

This article analyzes the effects of globalization on implicit tax rates (ITRs) on labor income, capital income, and consumption in the EU15 and Central and Eastern European New Member States (CEE NMS). We find supportive evidence for an increase in the ITR on labor income in the EU15, but no effect on the ITR on capital income. There is evidence of convergence in terms of the ITR on consumption, as countries with higher than average ITR on consumption respond to globalization by decreasing their tax rates. There are important differences among the welfare regimes within the EU15. Social‐democratic countries have decreased the tax burden on capital, but increased that on labor due to globalization. Globalization exerts a pressure to increase taxes on labor income in the conservative and liberal regimes as well. Taxes on consumption decrease in response to globalization in the conservative and social‐democratic regimes. In the CEE NMS, there is no effect of globalization on the ITR on labor and capital income, but we find a negative impact on the ITR on consumption in the CEE NMS with higher than average ITR on consumption. (JEL H23, H24, H25, F19, F21)     

TAXATION, AGGREGATE ACTIVITY and ECONOMIC GROWTH: FURTHER CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE ON SOME SUPPLY-SIDE HYPOTHESES

This paper investigates the effect of marginal tax rates on the level of economic activity. Data from sixty-three countries for the period 1970-84 provide support for Koester and Kormendi's method of estimating marginal tax rates for individual countries. However, their conclusion that increases in marginal tax rates have negative effects on the level of economic activity is not robust when we extend the time period from 1970-79 to 1970-84. Further, even for Koester and Kormendi's own data set, the negative relation does not hold when the sample is disaggregated into industrial countries and low-income countries.     

DOES THE PUBLIC SECTOR IMPLODE FROM BAUMOL'S COST DISEASE?

The root of the Baumol cost disease is higher productivity increases for manufactured goods than for services. The implied increase in relative costs of service production is widely claimed to have devastating implications for the public sector as a provider of tax‐financed services such as health, education, and care. To match the increasing costs it appears inevitable that tax rates would be ever increasing. It is shown that this inference does not follow under standard assumptions when accounting explicitly for service provision from both the private and public sectors. Strikingly under assumptions often made in the literature, the welfare maximizing tax rate for a utilitarian policy maker would remain constant despite the Baumol cost disease, and by implication the share of public employment in total employment will remain constant. (JEL H5, H11, O41)     

A RESPECIFIED TAX-ADJUSTED FISHER RELATION

How much will a 1% increase in expected inflation increase nominal interest rates? Irving Fisher's famous equation implies that nominal interest rates will rise in proportion to an increase in expected inflation. Darby and Feldstein, correcting the Fisher equation for taxation, predict a nominal interest rate increase of [1/(1 - T)]% where T is the marginal tax rate: i.e., if T =3, then a 1 % increase in expected inflation should cause a 1.4 % rise in interest rates. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the rise in interest rates is much smaller than the Darby/Feldstein prediction. Estimates are around 9, varying mostly between 5 and 1.15, which is much closer to Fisher's original prediction. It is important to know the size of the interest rate response to inflation expectations in a world in which inflation and interest rates are volatile and in which tax laws are designed to influence savings and investment through interest rates. In this paper we attempt to close the gap between theorized and estimated effects of inflation by incorporating into the Fisher equation two important aspects of the U.S. tax code: historic cost depreciation and the lower tax rate on capital gains. Our model shows that the effect of expected inflation on interest rates is dampened by the lower benefits from depreciation deductions arid the capital gains tax. Our corrected Fisher equation predicts a 1.12 % nominal interest rate increase, rather than the 1.4 % increase implied by the Darby/Feldstein model. The, our model closes about 56 % of the gap between theory and empirical evidence. The remainder could be closed by additional refinements in the model or better empirical modeling.     

THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION,AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth. The model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries. The calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates, the corruption associated with public investment projects, and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue. The presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant, but not large, negative effects on economic growth. The relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross‐country data. The model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare. (JEL H3, O4)     

EFFICIENT TAX REPORTING: THE EFFECTS OF TAXPAYER LIABILITY INFORMATION SERVICES

The complexity of the individual income tax system can give rise to both under‐ and overreporting of liability, thus creating a wedge between taxpayer perceptions of the price of public services and their actual cost, and potentially leading to budget misallocations and associated efficiency losses. This study uses theory and experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of taxpayer service programs that endeavor to resolve uncertainty over tax liability. To do so, we induce uncertainty over tax liability and investigate the effects of both service accuracy and reliability. We find participants are less likely to file when tax liability is uncertain but the provision of information offsets this effect; furthermore, it appears that simply providing a service, even one that imperfectly reveals liability, increases the propensity to file and the accuracy of the filing. When a service that promises to resolve uncertainty completely is requested but not delivered, the result is underreporting even more severe than in a setting where no service is available. (JEL H2, H26, C91)