A Bayesian inference of P(λ1<λ2) for two Poisson parameters

The statistical inference drawn from the difference between two independent Poisson parameters is often discussed in the medical literature. However, such discussions are usually based on the frequentist viewpoint rather than the Bayesian viewpoint. Here, we propose an index θ=P(λ_{1, post}<λ_{2, post}), where λ_{1, post} and λ_{2, post} denote Poisson parameters following posterior density. We provide an exact and an approximate expression for calculating θ using the conjugate gamma prior and compare the probabilities obtained using the approximate and the exact expressions. Moreover, we also show a relation between θ and the p-value. We also highlight the significance of θ by applying it to the result of actual clinical trials. Our findings suggest that θ may provide useful information in a clinical trial.     

A note on fiducial model averaging as an alternative to checking Bayesian and frequentist models

Just as frequentist hypothesis tests have been developed to check model assumptions, prior predictive p-values and other Bayesian p-values check prior distributions as well as other model assumptions. These model checks not only suffer from the usual threshold dependence of p-values, but also from the suppression of model uncertainty in subsequent inference. One solution is to transform Bayesian and frequentist p-values for model assessment into a fiducial distribution across the models. Averaging the Bayesian or frequentist posterior distributions with respect to the fiducial distribution can reproduce results from Bayesian model averaging or classical fiducial inference.     

The Bayesian and frequentist approaches to testing a one-sided hypothesis about a multivariate mean

This paper compares the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to testing a one-sided hypothesis about a multivariate mean. First, this paper proposes a simple way to assign a Bayesian posterior probability to one-sided hypotheses about a multivariate mean. The approach is to use (almost) the exact posterior probability under the assumption that the data has multivariate normal distribution, under either a conjugate prior in large samples or under a vague Jeffreys prior. This is also approximately the Bayesian posterior probability of the hypothesis based on a suitably flat Dirichlet process prior over an unknown distribution generating the data. Then, the Bayesian approach and a frequentist approach to testing the one-sided hypothesis are compared, with results that show a major difference between Bayesian reasoning and frequentist reasoning. The Bayesian posterior probability can be substantially smaller than the frequentist p-value. A class of example is given where the Bayesian posterior probability is basically 0, while the frequentist p-value is basically 1. The Bayesian posterior probability in these examples seems to be more reasonable. Other drawbacks of the frequentist p-value as a measure of whether the one-sided hypothesis is true are also discussed.     

Hybrid Bayesian inference on HIV viral dynamic models

Modelling of HIV dynamics in AIDS research has greatly improved our understanding of the pathogenesis of HIV-1 infection and guided for the treatment of AIDS patients and evaluation of antiretroviral therapies. Some of the model parameters may have practical meanings with prior knowledge available, but others might not have prior knowledge. Incorporating priors can improve the statistical inference. Although there have been extensive Bayesian and frequentist estimation methods for the viral dynamic models, little work has been done on making simultaneous inference about the Bayesian and frequentist parameters. In this article, we propose a hybrid Bayesian inference approach for viral dynamic nonlinear mixed-effects models using the Bayesian frequentist hybrid theory developed in Yuan [Bayesian frequentist hybrid inference, Ann. Statist. 37 (2009), pp. 2458–2501]. Compared with frequentist inference in a real example and two simulation examples, the hybrid Bayesian approach is able to improve the inference accuracy without compromising the computational load.     

The p-values for one-sided hypothesis testing in univariate linear calibration

In this article, we focus on the one-sided hypothesis testing for the univariate linear calibration, where a normally distributed response variable and an explanatory variable are involved. The observations of the response variable corresponding to known values of the explanatory variable are used to make inferences on a single unknown value of the explanatory variable. We apply the generalized inference to the calibration problem, and take the generalized p-value as the test statistic to develop a new p-value for one-sided hypothesis testing, which we refer to as the one-sided posterior predictive p-value. The behavior of the one-sided posterior predictive p-value is numerically compared with that of the generalized p-value, and simulations show that the proposed p-value is quite satisfactory in the frequentist performance.     

Abandon Statistical Significance

ABSTRACT

We discuss problems the null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) paradigm poses for replication and more broadly in the biomedical and social sciences as well as how these problems remain unresolved by proposals involving modified p-value thresholds, confidence intervals, and Bayes factors. We then discuss our own proposal, which is to abandon statistical significance. We recommend dropping the NHST paradigm—and the p-value thresholds intrinsic to it—as the default statistical paradigm for research, publication, and discovery in the biomedical and social sciences. Specifically, we propose that the p-value be demoted from its threshold screening role and instead, treated continuously, be considered along with currently subordinate factors (e.g., related prior evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and data quality, real world costs and benefits, novelty of finding, and other factors that vary by research domain) as just one among many pieces of evidence. We have no desire to “ban” p-values or other purely statistical measures. Rather, we believe that such measures should not be thresholded and that, thresholded or not, they should not take priority over the currently subordinate factors. We also argue that it seldom makes sense to calibrate evidence as a function of p-values or other purely statistical measures. We offer recommendations for how our proposal can be implemented in the scientific publication process as well as in statistical decision making more broadly.     

Editorial Collaborators

Abstract

The present note explores sources of misplaced criticisms of P-values, such as conflicting definitions of “significance levels” and “P-values” in authoritative sources, and the consequent misinterpretation of P-values as error probabilities. It then discusses several properties of P-values that have been presented as fatal flaws: That P-values exhibit extreme variation across samples (and thus are “unreliable”), confound effect size with sample size, are sensitive to sample size, and depend on investigator sampling intentions. These properties are often criticized from a likelihood or Bayesian framework, yet they are exactly the properties P-values should exhibit when they are constructed and interpreted correctly within their originating framework. Other common criticisms are that P-values force users to focus on irrelevant hypotheses and overstate evidence against those hypotheses. These problems are not however properties of P-values but are faults of researchers who focus on null hypotheses and overstate evidence based on misperceptions that p?=?0.05 represents enough evidence to reject hypotheses. Those problems are easily seen without use of Bayesian concepts by translating the observed P-value p into the Shannon information (S-value or surprisal) –log₂(p).     

Bayesian point null hypothesis testing via the posterior likelihood ratio

This paper gives an exposition of the use of the posterior likelihood ratio for testing point null hypotheses in a fully Bayesian framework. Connections between the frequentist P-value and the posterior distribution of the likelihood ratio are used to interpret and calibrate P-values in a Bayesian context, and examples are given to show the use of simple posterior simulation methods to provide Bayesian tests of common hypotheses.     

The p-value Function and Statistical Inference

ABSTRACT

This article has two objectives. The first and narrower is to formalize the p-value function, which records all possible p-values, each corresponding to a value for whatever the scalar parameter of interest is for the problem at hand, and to show how this p-value function directly provides full inference information for any corresponding user or scientist. The p-value function provides familiar inference objects: significance levels, confidence intervals, critical values for fixed-level tests, and the power function at all values of the parameter of interest. It thus gives an immediate accurate and visual summary of inference information for the parameter of interest. We show that the p-value function of the key scalar interest parameter records the statistical position of the observed data relative to that parameter, and we then describe an accurate approximation to that p-value function which is readily constructed.     

Testing equality of regression coefficients in heteroscedastic normal regression models

This article addresses the problem of testing whether the vectors of regression coefficients are equal for two independent normal regression models when the error variances are unknown. This problem poses severe difficulties both to the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference. In the former approach, normal hypothesis testing theory does not apply because of the unrelated variances. In the latter, the prior distributions typically used for the parameters are improper and hence the Bayes factor-based solution cannot be used.We propose a Bayesian solution to this problem in which no subjective input is considered. We first generate “objective” proper prior distributions (intrinsic priors) for which the Bayes factor and model posterior probabilities are well defined. The posterior probability of each model is used as a model selection tool. This consistent procedure of testing hypotheses is compared with some of the frequentist approximate tests proposed in the literature.     

A Bayesian analysis for the multivariate point null testing problem

A Bayesian test for the point null testing problem in the multivariate case is developed. A procedure to get the mixed distribution using the prior density is suggested. For comparisons between the Bayesian and classical approaches, lower bounds on posterior probabilities of the null hypothesis, over some reasonable classes of prior distributions, are computed and compared with the p-value of the classical test. With our procedure, a better approximation is obtained because the p-value is in the range of the Bayesian measures of evidence.     

Bayesian Analysis of Contingency Tables

ABSTRACT

The display of the data by means of contingency tables is used in different approaches to statistical inference, for example, to broach the test of homogeneity of independent multinomial distributions. We develop a Bayesian procedure to test simple null hypotheses versus bilateral alternatives in contingency tables. Given independent samples of two binomial distributions and taking a mixed prior distribution, we calculate the posterior probability that the proportion of successes in the first population is the same as in the second. This posterior probability is compared with the p-value of the classical method, obtaining a reconciliation between both results, classical and Bayesian. The obtained results are generalized for r × s tables.     

The Limited Role of Formal Statistical Inference in Scientific Inference

ABSTRACT

Such is the grip of formal methods of statistical inference—that is, frequentist methods for generalizing from sample to population in enumerative studies—in the drawing of scientific inferences that the two are routinely deemed equivalent in the social, management, and biomedical sciences. This, despite the fact that legitimate employment of said methods is difficult to implement on practical grounds alone. But supposing the adoption of these procedures were simple does not get us far; crucially, methods of formal statistical inference are ill-suited to the analysis of much scientific data. Even findings from the claimed gold standard for examination by the latter, randomized controlled trials, can be problematic.

Scientific inference is a far broader concept than statistical inference. Its authority derives from the accumulation, over an extensive period of time, of both theoretical and empirical knowledge that has won the (provisional) acceptance of the scholarly community. A major focus of scientific inference can be viewed as the pursuit of significant sameness, meaning replicable and empirically generalizable results among phenomena. Regrettably, the obsession with users of statistical inference to report significant differences in data sets actively thwarts cumulative knowledge development.

The manifold problems surrounding the implementation and usefulness of formal methods of statistical inference in advancing science do not speak well of much teaching in methods/statistics classes. Serious reflection on statistics' role in producing viable knowledge is needed. Commendably, the American Statistical Association is committed to addressing this challenge, as further witnessed in this special online, open access issue of The American Statistician.     

Three Recommendations for Improving the Use of p-Values

ABSTRACT

Researchers commonly use p-values to answer the question: How strongly does the evidence favor the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis? p-Values themselves do not directly answer this question and are often misinterpreted in ways that lead to overstating the evidence against the null hypothesis. Even in the “post p?<?0.05 era,” however, it is quite possible that p-values will continue to be widely reported and used to assess the strength of evidence (if for no other reason than the widespread availability and use of statistical software that routinely produces p-values and thereby implicitly advocates for their use). If so, the potential for misinterpretation will persist. In this article, we recommend three practices that would help researchers more accurately interpret p-values. Each of the three recommended practices involves interpreting p-values in light of their corresponding “Bayes factor bound,” which is the largest odds in favor of the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis that is consistent with the observed data. The Bayes factor bound generally indicates that a given p-value provides weaker evidence against the null hypothesis than typically assumed. We therefore believe that our recommendations can guard against some of the most harmful p-value misinterpretations. In research communities that are deeply attached to reliance on “p?<?0.05,” our recommendations will serve as initial steps away from this attachment. We emphasize that our recommendations are intended merely as initial, temporary steps and that many further steps will need to be taken to reach the ultimate destination: a holistic interpretation of statistical evidence that fully conforms to the principles laid out in the ASA statement on statistical significance and p-values.     

A Condition to Obtain the Same Decision in the Homogeneity Testing Problem from the Frequentist and Bayesian Point of View

We develop a Bayesian procedure for the homogeneity testing problem of r populations using r × s contingency tables. The posterior probability of the homogeneity null hypothesis is calculated using a mixed prior distribution. The methodology consists of choosing an appropriate value of π₀ for the mass assigned to the null and spreading the remainder, 1 ? π₀, over the alternative according to a density function. With this method, a theorem which shows when the same conclusion is reached from both frequentist and Bayesian points of view is obtained. A sufficient condition under which the p-value is less than a value α and the posterior probability is also less than 0.5 is provided.     

The discrepancy of P-values and posterior probability: Two-sided hypothesis of variance of normal distribution with unknown mean

This article is concerned with the comparison of P-value and Bayesian measure in point null hypothesis for the variance of Normal distribution with unknown mean. First, using fixed prior for test parameter, the posterior probability is obtained and compared with the P-value when an appropriate prior is used for the mean parameter. In the second, lower bounds of the posterior probability of H₀ under a reasonable class of prior are compared with the P-value. It has been shown that even in the presence of nuisance parameters, these two approaches can lead to different results in the statistical inference.     

p-Values,Bayes Factors,and Sufficiency

ABSTRACT

Various approaches can be used to construct a model from a null distribution and a test statistic. I prove that one such approach, originating with D. R. Cox, has the property that the p-value is never greater than the Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR). When combined with the general result that the GLR is never greater than any Bayes factor, we conclude that, under Cox’s model, the p-value is never greater than any Bayes factor. I also provide a generalization, illustrations for the canonical Normal model, and an alternative approach based on sufficiency. This result is relevant for the ongoing discussion about the evidential value of small p-values, and the movement among statisticians to “redefine statistical significance.”     

Why should clinicians care about Bayesian methods?

There is a growing awareness of Bayesian methods within the medical research community, and increasing discussion of their potential applications. This interest has, however, so far failed to convert into the routine use of such methods by working clinicians. I argue that attempts to encourage the use of Bayesian methods by highlighting the deficiencies of conventional (frequentist) inference have not succeeded because these deficiencies typically have minor practical consequences, while their more serious effects can usually be explained away by appeal to other statistical issues. As a result, Bayesian methods have not appeared to offer practical pay-offs big enough to justify the cost of acquiring the necessary expertise. In an attempt to remove this “cost–benefit” hurdle, I outline a simple Bayesian technique that can be used alongside frequentist methods to address an issue of routine practical concern to working clinicians: the credibility of new research findings.     

Why are p-Values Controversial?

While it is often argued that a p-value is a probability; see Wasserstein and Lazar, we argue that a p-value is not defined as a probability. A p-value is a bijection of the sufficient statistic for a given test which maps to the same scale as the Type I error probability. As such, the use of p-values in a test should be no more a source of controversy than the use of a sufficient statistic. It is demonstrated that there is, in fact, no ambiguity about what a p-value is, contrary to what has been claimed in recent public debates in the applied statistics community. We give a simple example to illustrate that rejecting the use of p-values in testing for a normal mean parameter is conceptually no different from rejecting the use of a sample mean. The p-value is innocent; the problem arises from its misuse and misinterpretation. The way that p-values have been informally defined and interpreted appears to have led to tremendous confusion and controversy regarding their place in statistical analysis.