On the Use of Buy Up as a Model of Customer Choice in Revenue Management

We consider settings in which a revenue manager controls bookings over a sequence of flights. The revenue manager uses a buy‐up model to select booking limits and updates estimates of the model parameters as data are accumulated. The buy‐up model we consider is based upon a simple model of customer choice, wherein each low‐fare customer who is not able to purchase a low‐fare ticket will, with a fixed probability, “buy up” to the high fare, independent of everything else. We analyze the evolution of the parameter estimates (e.g., the buy‐up probability) and chosen booking limits in situations where the buy‐up model is misspecified, that is, in situations where there is no setting of its parameters for which its objective function gives an accurate representation of expected revenue as a function of the booking limit. The analysis is motivated by the common situation in which a revenue manager does not know precisely how customers behave but nevertheless uses a parametric model to make decisions. Under some assumptions, we prove that the booking limits and parameter estimates converge and we compare the actual expected revenue at the limiting values with that associated with the booking limits that would be chosen if the revenue manager knew the actual behavior of customers. The analysis shows that the buy‐up model often works reasonably well even when it is misspecified, and also reveals the importance of understanding how parameter estimates of misspecified models vary as functions of decisions.     

Early Sales of Seasonal Products with Weather‐Conditional Rebates

Some retailers of seasonal products adopt weather‐conditional rebate programs to induce early sales and increase profits. In such promotions, customers who buy the product in an advance preselling period are offered rebates if a pre‐specified weather condition is realized during the later normal selling season. We investigate the potential benefits of these programs for retailers. We show that the weather‐conditional rebate program can increase sales by price discriminating among a customer's post‐purchase states. Taking advantage of the early sales, it can also reduce the inventory holding cost and ordering cost, and hence can increase the retailer's expected profits. In addition, we numerically investigate the sensitivity of the rebate program's effectiveness to the model parameters and illustrate its advantages over an advance‐discount policy.     

The Impact of Geographic Proximity on What to Buy,How to Buy,and Where to Buy: Evidence from High‐Tech Durable Goods Market*

Social contagion effects due to geographical proximity refer to the social effects wherein the behavior of an individual varies with the behavior of other individuals who are geographically close. Although the influence of such effects on consumer choices has been established in several contexts, much of the extant studies have focused on its effect on consumers’ decision of whether to buy a new product or adopt a new innovation. There has been no systematic examination of the influence of geographic proximity on other aspects of consumers’ product buying process such as what to buy (i.e., brand choice), how to buy (i.e., the channel), and where to buy (i.e., retailers). Such effects can matter significantly in high‐technology and durable goods markets and therefore, it is critical to understand the scope of these on consumers’ choice of retailers and channel as well. Drawing on literatures from word of mouth effects, ecommerce, and consumers’ perception of risk in their purchase process, we develop a set of hypotheses on the effect of geographic proximity on consumers’ choices of what to buy, how to buy, and where to buy. Leveraging a microlevel dataset of purchases of personal computers, we develop brand‐, retailer‐, and channel‐related measures of proximity effects at the individual consumer level and estimate a joint disaggregate model of the three choices that make up a product purchase process to test these hypotheses. Our results indicate a significant contagion effect on each of the three choices. Furthermore, we find evidence of a greater effect of geographic proximity on inexperienced consumers—those who are new to the product category. Our results thus help develop a holistic understanding of the influence of social contagion effects on consumers’ decision making.     

General Probability‐Time Tradeoff and Intertemporal Risk‐Value Model

This article proposes an intertemporal risk‐value (IRV) model that integrates probability‐time tradeoff, time‐value tradeoff, and risk‐value tradeoff into one unified framework. We obtain a general probability‐time tradeoff, which yields a formal representation form to reflect the psychological distance of a decisionmaker in evaluating a temporal lottery. This intuition of probability‐time tradeoff is supported by robust empirical findings as well as by psychological theory. Through an explicit formalization of probability‐time tradeoff, an IRV model taking into account three fundamental dimensions, namely, value, probability, and time, is established. The object of evaluation in our framework is a complex lottery. We also give some insights into the structure of the IRV model using a wildcatter problem.     

Preferences for One‐Shot Resolution of Uncertainty and Allais‐Type Behavior

Experimental evidence suggests that individuals are more risk averse when they perceive risk that is gradually resolved over time. We address these findings by studying a decision maker who has recursive, nonexpected utility preferences over compound lotteries. The decision maker has preferences for one‐shot resolution of uncertainty if he always prefers any compound lottery to be resolved in a single stage. We establish an equivalence between dynamic preferences for one‐shot resolution of uncertainty and static preferences that are identified with commonly observed behavior in Allais‐type experiments. The implications of this equivalence on preferences over information systems are examined. We define the gradual resolution premium and demonstrate its magnifying effect when combined with the usual risk premium.     

Does the Entry of Third‐Party Remanufacturers Always Hurt Original Equipment Manufacturers?

Researchers and managers broadly agree that the entry of third‐party remanufacturers (TPRs) hurts original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) because of the cannibalization problem. Thus, OEMs should always try to deter the entry of TPRs. In this article, we present a contrasting view: Competing OEMs without remanufacturing capacities sometimes benefit from the entry of TPRs. The key feature of our model is that there exists a group of newness‐conscious consumers in the market who do not buy the remanufactured product regardless of the price, whereas a group of functionality‐oriented consumers (FOCs) may buy a remanufactured one at a low price. In a steady‐state‐period setting, we investigate how the number of TPRs affects the OEMs’ profits. We find that, from the perspective of two competing OEMs: (i) The entry of one or many TPRs may lead to a higher profit; (ii) The entry of many TPRs may be better than the entry of one TPR; and (iii) The impact of the entry of one or many TPRs may be reversed as FOCs’ willingness‐to‐pay for the remanufactured product increases.     

Improving Valuation Under Consumer Search: Implications for Pricing and Profits

There is a growing trend in the retail industry to improve customer experience. In this article, we study retailer‐initiated strategies to increase consumer valuation for a product under duopoly. In such a setting, it is possible that a consumer's valuation may be increased by one retailer; however, the consumer may decide to buy the product from the competitor. We consider a two‐stage game where retailers first decide whether to invest in improvements in customer valuation and then engage in price competition. We computationally explore the Nash equilibria in terms of both investment and pricing. We find that in the majority of cases retailers price in a manner to discourage their local customers to buy from the competitor. Next, we focus on the pricing game and theoretically characterize the pricing Nash equilibrium. We find that a retailer could overcome competitive effects by improving consumer valuation beyond a certain threshold. We also find that a retailer who does not invest could benefit from competition in situations where his competitor increases consumer valuation beyond a threshold. Finally, we explore through a computational study the Nash equilibria of the two‐stage game using an alternate model to establish the robustness of our findings.     

Shocks,Stocks, and Socks: Smoothing Consumption Over a Temporary Income Loss

We investigate how households in temporarily straitened circumstances due to an unemployment spell cut back on expenditures and how they spend marginal dollars of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit. Our theoretical and empirical analyses emphasize the importance of allowing for the fact that households buy durable as well as non‐durable goods. The theoretical analysis shows that in the short run households can cut back significantly on total expenditures without a significant fall in welfare if they concentrate their budget reductions on durables. We then present an empirical analysis based on a Canadian survey of workers who experienced a job separation. Exploiting changes in the unemployment insurance system over our sample period we show that cuts in UI benefits lead to reductions in total expenditure with a stronger impact on clothing than on food expenditures. Our empirical strategy allows that these expenditures may be non‐separable from employment status. The effects we find are particularly strong for households with no liquid assets before the spell started. These qualitative findings are in precise agreement with the theoretical predictions. (JEL: D11, D12, D91, J65)     

Improving Profits by Bundling Vertically Differentiated Products

We consider a firm managing a category of vertically differentiated goods, that is, products which differ with respect to an attribute for which all consumers prefer more to less. The goods can be sold individually, in which case they are referred to as components, or in bundles. The firm chooses the assortment of components and bundles and their selling prices to maximize profit. We show that each bundling strategy (pure components, pure bundling or mixed bundling) can be optimal and obtain closed‐form expressions for the optimal selling prices. We provide insights on the structure of the optimal assortment and prices. In particular, we show that, when consumers benefit from consuming the components jointly, the products in the optimal assortment form nested sets. When consumers do not benefit from the joint consumption of components, the bundles should be offered at a positive discount. We find that bundling vertically differentiated products can significantly improve profits, even if consumers do not benefit from consuming the components jointly. The value of bundling comes from increased sales: a firm, which understands that its customers may buy multiple types of components, offers bundles of components, incentivizing customers to buy more.     

Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions: An Experiment

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price‐based and buyer‐determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price‐based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer‐determined auctions. Only the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply higher quality in buyer‐determined auctions leading to higher market efficiencies in these auctions. Accordingly, buyers prefer the buyer‐determined auction over the price‐based auction, while only half of the bidders do so. A more detailed analysis of buyers' and bidders' behavior and profits provides insights into their mechanism choice.     

THE INEFFICIENCY OF WORKER TIME USE

Much work is carried out in short, interrupted segments. This phenomenon, which we label task juggling, has been overlooked by economists. We study the work schedules of some judges in Italy documenting that they do juggle tasks and that juggling causally lowers their productivity substantially. To measure the size of this effect, we show that although all these judges receive the same workload, those who juggle more trials at once instead of working sequentially on few of them at each unit of time, take longer to complete their portfolios of cases. Task juggling seems to have no adverse effect on the quality of the judges' decisions, as measured by the percent of decisions appealed. To identify these causal effects we estimate models with judge fixed effects and we exploit the lottery assigning cases to judges. We discuss whether task juggling can be viewed as inefficient, and provide a back‐of‐the‐envelope calculation of the social cost of longer trials due to task juggling.     

Channel Coordination with a Risk‐Neutral Supplier and a Downside‐Risk‐Averse Retailer

We investigate how a supply chain involving a risk‐neutral supplier and a downside‐risk‐averse retailer can be coordinated with a supply contract. We show that the standard buy‐back or revenue‐sharing contracts may not coordinate such a channel. Using a definition of coordination of supply chains proposed earlier by the authors, we design a risk‐sharing contract that offers the desired downside protection to the retailer, provides respective reservation profits to the agents, and accomplishes channel coordination.     

Risk Preferences,Probability Weighting,and Strategy Tradeoffs in Wildfire Management

Wildfires present a complex applied risk management environment, but relatively little attention has been paid to behavioral and cognitive responses to risk among public agency wildfire managers. This study investigates responses to risk, including probability weighting and risk aversion, in a wildfire management context using a survey‐based experiment administered to federal wildfire managers. Respondents were presented with a multiattribute lottery‐choice experiment where each lottery is defined by three outcome attributes: expenditures for fire suppression, damage to private property, and exposure of firefighters to the risk of aviation‐related fatalities. Respondents choose one of two strategies, each of which includes “good” (low cost/low damage) and “bad” (high cost/high damage) outcomes that occur with varying probabilities. The choice task also incorporates an information framing experiment to test whether information about fatality risk to firefighters alters managers' responses to risk. Results suggest that managers exhibit risk aversion and nonlinear probability weighting, which can result in choices that do not minimize expected expenditures, property damage, or firefighter exposure. Information framing tends to result in choices that reduce the risk of aviation fatalities, but exacerbates nonlinear probability weighting.     

Lifetime Buy Decisions with Multiple Obsolete Parts

Life‐cycle mismatch occurs when the life cycles of parts end before the life cycles of the products in which those parts are used. Lifetime buys are one tactic for mitigating the effect of part obsolescence, where a quantity of parts is purchased for the remaining life of a product. We extend prior work that determines optimal lifetime buy quantities for one product with one obsolete part by providing an analytic solution and two simple heuristic policies for the optimal lifetime buy quantities when many parts become obsolete over a product's life cycle. We determine which of our two heuristics is most accurate for different product life cycles, which yields a metaheuristic with increased accuracy. That analysis also reveals critical perspectives in making lifetime buy decisions with nonstationary life‐cycle demand patterns.     

The Effect of School Choice on Participants: Evidence from Randomized Lotteries

School choice has become an increasingly prominent strategy for enhancing academic achievement. To evaluate the impact on participants, we exploit randomized lotteries that determine high school admission in the Chicago Public Schools. Compared to those students who lose lotteries, students who win attend high schools that are better in a number of dimensions, including peer achievement and attainment levels. Nonetheless, we find little evidence that winning a lottery provides any systematic benefit across a wide variety of traditional academic measures. Lottery winners do, however, experience improvements on a subset of nontraditional outcome measures, such as self‐reported disciplinary incidents and arrest rates.     

Equity‐Based Incentives and Supply Chain Buy‐Back Contracts*

We analyze the effect of equity‐based incentives in a supply chain with a downstream firm and an upstream supplier. By using the operational decision as a signal to influence external investors’ beliefs, the downstream firm's manager intends to maximize a convex combination of the interim share price and the terminal cash flows. We show that equity‐based incentives create a side effect. Specifically, with a universal buy‐back contract, the deadweight loss of signaling induced by equity‐based incentives could spread throughout the supply chain and cause chain‐wide damages. To mitigate such undesirable consequences, we propose a new mechanism to eliminate the inefficiency. We derive the optimal mechanism that maximizes the downstream firm's profits subject to the constraint that the supply chain efficiency is not undermined. In contrast to the full‐information benchmark, this mechanism gives positive surplus to the supplier. [Submitted: January 5, 2011. Revisions received: June 20, 2011; December 11, 2011. Accepted: December 22, 2011.]     

Browse‐and‐Switch: Retail‐Online Competition under Value Uncertainty

Although online shopping is becoming popular, consumers who are unsure about whether to buy a product may find it advantageous to visit a brick‐and‐mortar retail store to first examine the product before purchasing it. But, after browsing at the store, consumers have the option of switching to an e‐tailer to purchase the item at a cheaper price rather than buying at the store. Recent business press refers to this browse‐and‐switch behavior as “showrooming,” and attributes to it the declining profits of brick‐and‐mortar retailers. To study the effect of the browse‐and‐switch option on retail and online pricing strategies and profits, we analyze a stylized economic model that incorporates uncertainty in consumers' valuation of the product, captures the heterogeneity among consumers in their inclination to purchase online, and permits product returns. We consider various equilibrium scenarios for different combinations of consumer shopping behaviors, characterize the parameter ranges for each scenario, and demonstrate that browse‐and‐switch behavior can indeed occur under equilibrium. Our analysis further shows that the option for consumers to browse‐and‐switch intensifies competition, reducing the profits for both firms.     

Cautious Expected Utility and the Certainty Effect

Many violations of the independence axiom of expected utility can be traced to subjects' attraction to risk‐free prospects. The key axiom in this paper, negative certainty independence ([Dillenberger, 2010]), formalizes this tendency. Our main result is a utility representation of all preferences over monetary lotteries that satisfy negative certainty independence together with basic rationality postulates. Such preferences can be represented as if the agent were unsure of how to evaluate a given lottery p; instead, she has in mind a set of possible utility functions over outcomes and displays a cautious behavior: she computes the certainty equivalent of p with respect to each possible function in the set and picks the smallest one. The set of utilities is unique in a well defined sense. We show that our representation can also be derived from a “cautious” completion of an incomplete preference relation.     

The Impact of Outsourced Manufacturing on Timing of Entry in Uncertain Markets

Several firms are interested in manufacturing and selling new products based on a new process technology. Before manufacturing can begin, either these Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), or a Contract Manufacturer (CM) needs to adopt the process technology, i. e., make a capacity investment in it. Due to market uncertainty, the timing of capacity investment is crucial. In such a setting, we investigate how the timing of process adoption, an important determinant of time‐to‐market, is impacted by the make/buy decision. We first characterize the optimal time for process adoption and show that this delay depends on competitive intensity, cost structure and the rate of forecast improvement. Due to differing cost structures, incentives and risks, an OEM and a CM may invest in a new process technology at different times. We show that while there are conditions where outsourced manufacturing can be advantageous for the OEM from a time‐to‐market perspective, there are also cases where the OEM would be disadvantaged. In these cases, the OEM can accelerate process adoption by risk sharing through joint investment. Finally, the right choice of CM is extremely important for an OEM that faces a short time window for product introduction: An efficient CM not only provides low costs but also rapid access to new process technologies, and therefore higher revenues.     

Coordination in a Single‐Supplier,Multi‐Retailer Distribution System: Supplier‐Facilitated Transshipments

We consider supplier‐facilitated transshipments for achieving supply chain coordination in a single supplier, multi‐retailer distribution system with non‐cooperative retailers. The previous transshipment literature has focused on coordination through retailer‐negotiated transshipments and thus does not consider the supplier's decision‐making. In contrast, in this study, we assume the supplier is an active participant in the system and we seek to understand how the supplier can facilitate the implementation of coordinating transshipments. We study a two‐period model with wholesale orders at the start of the first period and preventive transshipments performed at the start of the second period. Inspired by a supplier‐facilitated transshipment scheme observed in practice, we assume the supplier implements transshipments through a bi‐directional adjustment contract. Under this contract, each retailer can either buy additional inventory from, or sell back excess inventory to, the supplier. We show that coordination can be achieved through carefully designed contracts with state‐dependent adjustment prices and a wholesale price menu. We demonstrate that the supplier's role in facilitating coordinating transshipments is critical. In addition, we use our understanding of the coordinating contract form to derive some simpler and easier‐to‐implement heuristic contracts. We use a numerical study to demonstrate the value, to the supplier, of using the coordinating adjustment and wholesale prices, and to evaluate the heuristics’ performance.