Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis

The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of majority rule and Tiebout sorting within a system of local jurisdictions. The idea behind the estimation procedure is to investigate whether observed levels of public expenditures satisfy necessary conditions implied by majority rule in a general equilibrium model of residential choice. The estimator controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity among households, observed and unobserved characteristics of communities, and the potential endogeneity of prices and expenditures, as well as the self‐selection of households into communities of their choice. We estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the Boston Metropolitan Area. The empirical findings reject myopic voting models. More sophisticated voting models based on utility‐taking provide a potential explanation of the main empirical regularities.     

Social Indeterminacy

An extension of Condorcet's paradox by McGarvey (1953) asserts that for every asymmetric relation R on a finite set of candidates there is a strict‐preferences voter profile that has the relation R as its strict simple majority relation. We prove that McGarvey's theorem can be extended to arbitrary neutral monotone social welfare functions that can be described by a strong simple game G if the voting power of each individual, measured by the Shapley–Shubik power index, is sufficiently small. Our proof is based on an extension to another classic result concerning the majority rule. Condorcet studied an election between two candidates in which the voters' choices are random and independent and the probability of a voter choosing the first candidate is p>1/2. Condorcet's jury theorem asserts that if the number of voters tends to infinity then the probability that the first candidate will be elected tends to one. We prove that this assertion extends to a sequence of arbitrary monotone strong simple games if and only if the maximum voting power for all individuals tends to zero.     

ELECTORAL RULES AND CORRUPTION

Is corruption systematically related to electoral rules? Recent theoretical work suggests a positive answer. But little is known about the data. We try to address this lacuna by relating corruption to different features of the electoral system in a sample of about eighty democracies in the 1990s. We exploit the cross‐country variation in the data, as well as the time variation arising from recent episodes of electoral reform. The evidence is consistent with the theoretical priors. Larger voting districts—and thus lower barriers to entry—are associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists—and thus less individual accountability—are associated with more corruption. Individual accountability appears to be most strongly tied to personal ballots in plurality‐rule elections, even though open party lists also seem to have some effect. Because different aspects roughly offset each other, a switch from strictly proportional to strictly majoritarian elections only has a small negative effect on corruption. (JEL: E62, H3)     

INCOMPLETE SOCIAL CONTRACTS

There is a long normative ‘Social Contract’ tradition that attempts to characterize ex‐post income inequalities that are agreeable to all ‘behind a veil of ignorance.’ This paper takes a similar normative approach to characterize social decision‐making procedures. It is shown that quite generally some form of majority‐voting is preferred to unanimity ‘behind a veil of ignorance’ whenever society faces deadweight costs in making compensating transfers. Deviations from unanimity (or ex‐post Pareto optimality) are ex‐ante efficient to the extent that they economize on costly compensating transfers. Put another way, the optimal decision rule trades off the benefits of minority protection and those from greater flexibility. (JEL: H11, G33, G34, D63, P16, P48)     

Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues

We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the committee and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.     

One Person,Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

This paper shows that information imperfections and common values can solve coordination problems in multicandidate elections. We analyze an election in which (i) the majority is divided between two alternatives and (ii) the minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. Standard analyses assume voters have a fixed preference ordering over candidates. Coordination problems cannot be overcome in such a case, and it is possible that inferior candidates win. In our setup the majority is also divided as a result of information imperfections. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. We show that when the common value component is strong enough, approval voting produces full information and coordination equivalence: the equilibrium is unique and solves both problems. Thus, the need for information aggregation helps resolve the majority's coordination problem under approval voting. This is not the case under standard electoral systems.     

The cross-border hostile bid fight between Scania in Sweden and the two German companies MAN and Volkswagen: institutional change and the mandatory bid rule

International hostile takeovers provide a unique context for studying how corporate governance mechanisms migrate across countries. This paper is prompted by a case study of the cross-border takeover fight between the target companies Scania (Sweden) and MAN (Germany) and the involvement of the owners of Volkswagen, Porsche (both Germany) and Investor (Sweden), 1999–2014. It reveals how incumbent owners in Germany and Sweden—two countries with a history of corporate control through blockholdings, corporatist-governance, state control (Germany) and multiple voting shares (Sweden)—manage to take advantage of the minority shareholders through arbitraging the differences in implementation of a new governance device across borders. The study focuses in particular on the mandatory bid rule (MBR) that forces a shareholder who passes a certain threshold of ownership to bid for the rest of the shares. The study reveals over twenty incidents of breaches of the idea of the MBR, to the detriment of minority shareholders. Building on institutional theory and sociology, the study provides useful insight into how incumbent actors may use bargaining power to capture a new regulation and circumvent it. Furthermore, the case illustrates the importance of legitimacy in the efforts to converge corporate governance systems. Thirdly, it adds to the critique of the mandatory bid rule in countries with a governance system supporting blockholders. Overall, the study raises a number of important issues regarding how national politics shape corporate governance and responds to new actors and coalitions of actors entering the scene. A convergence of takeover regulation not compatible with the legal framework might result in a less efficient than anticipated outcome of the market for corporate control. These results are consistent with the institutional theory perspective that key actors may have a vested interest in resisting change.     

On qualitative multi-attribute group decision making and its consensus measure: A probability based perspective

This paper focuses on qualitative multi-attribute group decision making (MAGDM) with linguistic information in terms of single linguistic terms and/or flexible linguistic expressions. To do so, we propose a new linguistic decision rule based on the concepts of random preference and stochastic dominance, by a probability based interpretation of weight information. The importance weights and the concept of fuzzy majority are incorporated into both the multi-attribute and collective decision rule by the so-called weighted ordered weighted averaging operator with the input parameters expressed as probability distributions over a linguistic term set. Moreover, a probability based method is proposed to measure the consensus degree between individual and collective overall random preferences based on the concept of stochastic dominance, which also takes both the importance weights and the fuzzy majority into account. As such, our proposed approaches are based on the ordinal semantics of linguistic terms and voting statistics. By this, on one hand, the strict constraint of the uniform linguistic term set in linguistic decision making can be released; on the other hand, the difference and variation of individual opinions can be captured. The proposed approaches can deal with qualitative MAGDM with single linguistic terms and flexible linguistic expressions. Two application examples taken from the literature are used to illuminate the proposed techniques by comparisons with existing studies. The results show that our proposed approaches are comparable with existing studies.     

Impartial Nominations for a Prize

A group of peers must choose one of them to receive a prize; everyone cares only about winning, not about who gets the prize if someone else. An award rule is impartial if one's message never influences whether or not one wins the prize. We explore the consequences of impartiality when each agent nominates a single (other) agent for the prize. On the positive side, we construct impartial nomination rules where both the influence of individual messages and the requirements to win the prize are not very different across agents. Partition the agents in two or more districts, each of size at least 3, and call an agent a local winner if he is nominated by a majority of members of his own district; the rule selects a local winner with the largest support from nonlocal winners, or a fixed default agent in case there is no local winner. On the negative side, impartiality implies that ballots cannot be processed anonymously as in plurality voting. Moreover, we cannot simultaneously guarantee that the winner always gets at least one nomination, and that an agent nominated by everyone else always wins.     

DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS

We introduce democratic mechanisms as a set of rules that must obey liberal democracy's fundamental principles of equal voting and agenda rights. We show that an appropriate combination of three rules may yield efficient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules, where the size of the majority depends on the proposal, and taxed and non‐taxed individuals need to support the proposal; second, flexible agenda costs, where the agenda‐setter has to pay a certain amount of money if his proposal does not generate enough supporting votes; third, a ban on subsidies. We highlight that universal equal treatment with regard to taxation is undesirable. Finally, we illustrate how simple constitutions involving fixed super majority rules yield socially desirable outcomes if the agenda‐setter is benevolent. (JEL: D62, D72, H40)     

Competition for a Majority

We define the class of two‐player zero‐sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For such games, we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, maximin and minimax strategies for the players, and a Nash equilibrium. If all discontinuities favor one player, then a value exists and that player has a maximin strategy. A property called payoff approachability implies existence of an equilibrium, and that the resulting value is invariant: games with the same payoffs at points of continuity have the same value and ɛ‐equilibria. For voting games in which two candidates propose policies and a candidate wins election if a weighted majority of voters prefer his proposed policy, we provide tie‐breaking rules and assumptions about voters' preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability. These assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the dimension of the space of policies exceeds the number of voters; or with no dimensional restriction, if the electorate is sufficiently large. Each Colonel Blotto game is a special case in which each candidate allocates a resource among several constituencies and a candidate gets votes from those allocated more than his opponent offers; in this case, for simple‐majority rule we prove existence of an equilibrium with zero probability of ties.     

Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation

This paper combines dynamic social choice and strategic experimentation to study the following question: How does a society, a committee, or, more generally, a group of individuals with potentially heterogeneous preferences, experiment with new opportunities? Each voter recognizes that, during experimentation, other voters also learn about their preferences. As a result, pivotal voters today are biased against experimentation because it reduces their likelihood of remaining pivotal. This phenomenon reduces equilibrium experimentation below the socially efficient level, and may even result in a negative option value of experimentation. However, one can restore efficiency by designing a voting rule that depends deterministically on time. Another main result is that even when payoffs of a reform are independently distributed across the population, good news about any individual's payoff increases other individuals' incentives to experiment with that reform, due to a positive voting externality.     

Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections

If voter preferences depend on a noisy state variable, under what conditions do large elections deliver outcomes “as if” the state were common knowledge? While the existing literature models elections using the jury metaphor where a change in information regarding the state induces all voters to switch in favor of only one alternative, we allow for more general preferences where a change in information can induce a switch in favor of either alternative. We show that information is aggregated for any voting rule if, for a randomly chosen voter, the probability of switching in favor of one alternative is strictly greater than the probability of switching away from that alternative for any given change in belief over states. If the preference distribution violates this condition, there exist equilibria that produce outcomes different from the full information outcome with high probability for large classes of voting rules. In other words, unless preferences closely conform to the jury metaphor, information aggregation is not guaranteed to obtain.     

SOCIAL INCENTIVES AND VOTER TURNOUT: EVIDENCE FROM THE SWISS MAIL BALLOT SYSTEM

This paper uses a natural experiment to document the impact of social pressure on voting behavior. The main hypothesis is that social pressure creates incentives to vote for the purpose of being seen at the voting act. This incentive is particularly high in small and close‐knit communities. Empirically, I analyze the effect of postal voting on voter participation in Switzerland. Optional postal voting decreased the voting costs, but simultaneously removed the social pressure to vote. In spite of the large reduction in voting costs, the effect on aggregate turnout was small. However, voter participation was more negatively affected in the smaller communities. This lends support to the view that social incentives played a role for certain people's voting decisions. (JEL: H0, Z13)     

Analysis of Local Decision Rules in a Dual-Kanban Flow Shop

A recent article reported the results of a study on the effects of two kanban policy variables—the length of withdrawal cycle and the type of priority rule—on average customer wait time and total inventory. This study extends that work by adding two kanban policy variables and two performance criteria. It reports the results of simulation experiments that were conducted to determine how four policy variables—withdrawal cycle, priority rule, status of waiting withdrawal kanbans, and number of kanbans influence four performance criteria—average customer wait-time, total inventory, and average number of full containers in the input and output stock points of stations. It was found that the information about waiting withdrawal kanbans in sequencing decisions results in the simultaneous improvement in two conflicting objectives—customer wait time and total inventory. Also, the effects of including the information regarding the status of waiting withdrawal kanbans on system performance are larger than the effects associated with the type of priority rule. The results provide insights into determining the level of each policy variable while fully considering the possible interactions among the variables and the levels of other policy variables to improve system performance. These insights allow for setting the levels of policy variables to make the improvement process smooth.     

The existence of implicit bias is beyond reasonable doubt: A refutation of ideological and methodological objections and executive summary of ten studies that no manager should ignore

In this article, we respond at length to recent critiques of research on implicit bias, especially studies using the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Tetlock and Mitchell (2009) claim that “there is no evidence that the IAT reliably predicts class-wide discrimination on tangible outcomes in any setting,” accuse their colleagues of violating “the injunction to separate factual from value judgments,” adhering blindly to a “statist interventionist” ideology, and of conducting a witch-hunt against implicit racists, sexists, and others. These and other charges are specious. Far from making “extraordinary claims” that “require extraordinary evidence,” researchers have identified the existence and consequences of implicit bias through well-established methods based upon principles of cognitive psychology that have been developed in nearly a century's worth of work. We challenge the blanket skepticism and organizational complacency advocated by Tetlock and Mitchell and summarize 10 recent studies that no manager (or managerial researcher) should ignore. These studies reveal that students, nurses, doctors, police officers, employment recruiters, and many others exhibit implicit biases with respect to race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, social status, and other distinctions. Furthermore—and contrary to the emphatic assertions of the critics—participants’ implicit associations do predict socially and organizationally significant behaviors, including employment, medical, and voting decisions made by working adults.     

Axioms for Deferred Acceptance

The deferred acceptance algorithm is often used to allocate indivisible objects when monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide two characterizations of agent‐proposing deferred acceptance allocation rules. Two new axioms—individually rational monotonicity and weak Maskin monotonicity—are essential to our analysis. An allocation rule is the agent‐proposing deferred acceptance rule for some acceptant substitutable priority if and only if it satisfies non‐wastefulness and individually rational monotonicity. An alternative characterization is in terms of non‐wastefulness, population monotonicity, and weak Maskin monotonicity. We also offer an axiomatization of the deferred acceptance rule generated by an exogenously specified priority structure. We apply our results to characterize efficient deferred acceptance rules.     

Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures

We study the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. We show that the outcomes of every nondictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity will be affected by the incentives of noncontending candidates (i.e., who cannot win the election) to influence the outcome by entering or exiting the election.     

Effects of Product Structure Complexity on Multi-level Lot Sizing*

As an input to the materials requirement planning (MRP) process, the product structure interacts with the lot-sizing rules to affect inventories, materials flow, and production costs. Despite engineering constraints, considerable latitude is still available to construct alternate product structures for the same product. An important concern of MRP managers and designers is the impact of product structure complexity on the cost performance of the lot-sizing rules. To date, there exists no detailed research that provides managers with guidelines that relate the lot-sizing rules to individual product structure parameters. We report on an extensive experiment to test the effects of individual product structure parameters on the relative cost performance of 11 lot-sizing rules. Three parameters—the number of items, number of levels, and commonality index—are proposed to characterise product structure complexity and used as factors in an experiment involving a large variety of product structures. The results indicate that all three parameters affect the relative cost differences but not the ranking of the rules. The overall best lot-sizing rule is Bookbinder and Koch's [11] rule.     

An Evaluation of the NERJIT Priority Rule in a Kanban‐Controlled Flowshop

Significant progress in production and information technologies and innovations in management of operations during the last couple of decades have made the production of small lots and deployment of Just‐In‐Time (JIT) concepts in flowshops possible. As a result, some researchers and practitioners have been seeking to improve the performance of non‐repetitive systems using JIT concepts. In this process, the JIT concepts that were originally designed for mass production have been modified to adapt JIT to non‐repetitive systems. This article uses a priority rule that is based on real‐time demand and production information for sequencing jobs in a kanban‐controlled flowshop. The analysis of the effect of this priority rule; the number of kanbans; the length of the withdrawal cycle; First‐Come, First‐Served (FCFS); and Shortest Processing Time (SPT) on four performance measures—customer wait time, total inventory, input stock‐point inventory, and output stock‐point inventory, shows that the use of this priority rule results in a significant reduction of customer wait time and a slight decrease in inventory.