基于新制度经济学的同城化研究

同城化作为一项制度安排,是相邻城市之间围绕＂同城化租金＂与共同利益这一核心,基于更低交易费用诉求的利益博弈与利益共享的制度变迁过程,是基于区域制度租金与潜在收益的＂协调博弈—合作博弈—分配博弈＂的结果。     

“电荒”背后的博弈困境

即使再多的经济专家将电力体制改革视为一种破除垄断、提高效率的市场经济改革,但其实质是多目标多群体参与的制度博弈,博弈之下无道德更无目际,有的只是手段和结果。目前各国的实证只能表明,拥有一个坚强电网以及多样化的发电技术手段是好的电力体制的基础保障,并没有结论表明分拆电网能走向更优。     

成长的烦恼

过去20年间,中国城市化的加速造就了房地产市场的繁荣,国际城市的形成和各种资源的加速聚积也成为房价过快上涨的助推器。中国各地方政府间的博弈从来就没有间断过,一样的孩子,父母再理性,＂偏心＂总是难免的,也由此造就了各种＂成长的烦恼＂。当离北京100多公里外的天津响螺湾和于家堡,因空置过多和招商艰难陷入鬼城传言时,北京的写字楼空置率却连续数年的全国最低。     

对加强师范生教育及促进充分就业的思考

随着高校毕业生就业制度改革的进一步深入和高等教育规模的不断扩大,师范生垄断基础教育市场的局面被彻底打破.     

楼市调控进入生死博弈期

进入2012年夏季,关于楼市调控政策的走向格外引人关注。在某种程度上,当期已经进入楼市调控的生死博弈期,而博弈的结果,直接关系到中国房地产市场未来的发展形态,是继续＂涨价一调控一降价一刺激一涨价＂的老循环,还是步入一个持续稳定的健康发展之路？揪动人心的博弈新闻频频出现5月2日中国指数研究院发布的2012年4月份中国房地产指数系统百城价挤指数显示,4月份中国百个城市的住宅均价无论是环比还是同比,     

外资追逐高端房产加速，中低端房产成交“失速”

市场经济有好的市场经济与坏的市场经济之分,坏的市场经济又有“次坏”与“最坏”之别。垄断行业高薪所对应的“垄断资本掠夺公众福利”,是当下中国最坏的市场经济。对任何市场来说,垄断都是一种破坏性力量。但如果垄断收益能通过某种制度形式转化为公共福利,这种垄断就属于“次坏”的垄断。比如我国上世纪70、80年代以前的国家垄断,政府通过农产     

以传媒集团化为例浅析市场公正保护问题

市场激烈的竞争,必然会导致媒体集团化,虽然媒介的集团化会带来一系列的竞争优势和经济利益,但过度的并购重组可能会使行业资源高度集中,难免不造成行业的垄断,影响市场的自由竞争和市场的公正。因为媒体行业的特殊性,它的垄断带来的负面影响比较大,不但涉及到经济方面,更使言论市场高度集中,造成思想和观点表达的不公平,破坏新闻自由。所以保护传媒市场公正的发展具有重大意义。     

“特高压”不是该不该干,而是怎么干

特高压电网建设5000亿的投资正在让资本市场＂上火＂,但其垄断、技术、安全、经济性等问题也让反对者上火。若搁置部门和集团利益,对整个国家而言,建特高压电网到底是利大于弊还是相反？     

我国反行政垄断必要性分析——以对比“西方反垄断制度”为视角

反垄断法一直以来被视为规范市场秩序、保障公平竞争和促进经济发展的经济基本法。我国的反垄断制度随着《中华人民共和国反垄断法》的实行也在逐步建立起来。但我国的反垄断制度有着自身的特点,不能盲目效仿西方在自由竞争充分发展了几百年的情况下,以遏制经济垄断主。我国应根据本国国情,将反行政垄断作为首要任务。面对目前全球竞争不断加强的形势下,反垄断制度的实行应当在保证市场公平竞争秩序的前提下,引导企业加强自身的竞争力。     

草场特殊资源与农牧民经济行为的异化——以青海三江源区虫草资源为个案

青海三江源区不仅仅是因为其作为＂中华水塔＂和独特的生态价值与生态地位而引起国内外的关注,同时也因为素有＂软黄金＂之称的＂冬虫夏草＂享誉国内外。近年来随着虫草价格的不断攀升,一方面使当地农牧民的收入大幅度提升,但另一方面却使农牧民的经济行为不断异化。文章试图从＂异化＂的内涵及其本质出发,深入考察三江源区农牧民生产、劳动、消费等经济行为的异化现象,揭示其根源和本质,为三江源区虫草资源的科学合理开发利用、推动地区经济社会可持续发展,寻求有效途径。     

INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Predictions of various models of public sector supply rely on the assumption of bureau monopoly power. This assumption is tested first by measuring industrial structure of the federal public sector using the concentration ratio and Herfindahl index, and second by examining the relationship between the resulting estimates and bureau monopoly power. The findings indicate that monopoly structure of the federal bureaucracy is more limited than is generally assumed. Interpretations on the basis of traditional industrial organization theory and contestable market theory suggest that bureau monopoly power is questionable and may not be the source of observed inefficiencies in bureau supply.     

A model of monopoly and “efficient” unions with endogenous union coverage: Positive and normative implications

We present a model of a rent-maximizing union that organizes to increase its coverage of an industry and analyze monopoly and “efficient” unions in this setting. Our model is unique in that we allow for a competitive industry with free entry and find union and nonunion firms coexisting with product market equilibrium. This is achieved by incorporating the insight that firms are heterogeneous in productive characteristics. An important implication of our model is that an “efficient” union that covers a nontrivial share of the market is not efficient and may in fact be less efficient than a monopoly union.     

市政建设的主体选择标准及其制度研究

城镇化对中国顺利实现小康社会和社会主义现代化具有重要的战略意义。城镇化的过程会有巨大的市政建设需求,在政府财政资金有限的情况下,政府应通过完善制度设计、激励机制充分发挥市场或社会在市政建设中的作用,以弥补市政建设财政资金的不足。在参与市政建设的过程中,政府通过引入竞争机制,对比市政建设参与主体的综合成本,选择市政建设的参与者,以解决公共产品垄断的低效率问题,提高市政建设的效率和质量。与此同时,政府应该完善相应的管理机制,以维护市政建设市场或社会参与的制度化、规范化运行。     

BETA, FIRM SIZE, and CONCENTRATION

The asset beta of a firm is defined as the uncertainty about the firm's future value scaled by its current value. Empirically, beta is negatively related to a firm's size and concentration in its major product market. This relation has been interpreted as evidence that monopoly power affects beta. This paper shows that this empirical result is also consistent with competitive product markets where greater firm size and concentration are due to greater efficiency in production. Thus, the correlation between beta, firm size and concentration is not prima facie evidence of widespread monopoly power.     

THE EFFECT OF COMPETITION ON CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY

Theory predicts that the combined capacity of two competing utility firms will be greater than the market requires and excess capacity will result. This study tested a set of monopoly and a set of duopoly electric utility firms and found that the outcome predicted by theory did not occur. Even though the duopoly firms did face more downward pressure on capacity utilization than the monopoly firms, the difference was not statistically significant. These results reveal that public policy decisions, predicated upon assumptions that combined capacity of two competing electric firms would be greater than the market requires, should be re-examined.     

STACKELBERG, COURNOT AND COLLUSIVE MONOPOLY: PERFORMANCE AND WELFARE COMPARISONS

This article compares and evaluates performance and welfare in three classical oligopoly models: Stackelberg leader, Cournot, and collusive monopoly. Hahn's stability conditions render an unambiguous ranking of market price; the monopoly price is highest and the Stackelberg price is lowest. Welfare comparisons are less clear-cut due to additional effects coming from reallocation of outputs among sellers. Conditions under which these reallocation effects will enhance or offset the unambiguous price effects on welfare are discussed and examples are given. Possible implications for antitrust policy, regarding constraints on market share of large producers in noncompetitive markets, are examined.     

CONSUMER SEARCH COSTS AND MARKET PERFORMANCE

We conduct laboratory markets to evaluate the effects of consumer search costs on market performance. The primary research goal is to assess the behavioral relevance of Diamond's [1971] paradoxical conclusion that the injection of a small consumer search cost alters the equilibrium price prediction from competitive to monopoly levels. Although monopoly prices are not consistently observed, we find that search costs do tend to raise prices. Additional experimentation indicates that below-monopoly prices are not explained by buyer avoidance of high-pricing sellers, but that prices increase as search costs are raised.     

THE DEMAND TO REGULATE FRANCHISE MONOPOLY: EVIDENCE FROM CATV RATE DEREGULATION IN CALIFORNIA

The motivation to price control a franchise monopoly is examined in the context of three distinct economic views of regulatory behavior. These views are tested against data from the California cable television market, over the years 1980–85, during which a subset of monopoly firms converted from regulated to unregulated pricing for basic cable service. As the price constraints of regulation appear to be insignificant in a welfare analysis, the demand for such controls by municipalities is derived from their utility in enforcing vote-maximizing transfer schemes–a Peltzmanian political outcome with a Stiglerian economic welfare result.     

上海城市公用事业运营模式演变及思考

作者根据调查研究和认识,论述了上海城市公用事业运营模式的演变过程,以政资分离、政企分开,确立投资主体、授权经营为突破口;打破垄断,引入公私合作制;对运营模式进行了改革。对目前上海城市公用事业运营中存在的问题进行思考,提出应该建立多元化投融资模式、转变政府的职能和定位、改革审批制度等等,加强对城市公用事业市场体系的监管。     

THE SUPPLY OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION

This paper examines the state's decision to supply monopoly rights to occupations. The two key aspects of the analysis are the degree of political competition and the proportion of market demand of the regulated service accounted for by government officials. An application of the analysis is developed to explain an episode of comparative occupational regulation in mercantile England and France. Other applications of the analysis are suggested.