CEO Duality,Agency Costs,and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency

This study examines the impact of CEO duality on firms’ internal capital allocation efficiency. We observe that when the CEO is also chair of the board, diversified firms make inefficient investments, as they allocate more capital to business segments with relatively low growth opportunities over segments with high growth opportunities. The adverse impact of CEO duality on investment efficiency prevails only among firms that face high agency problems, as captured by high free cash flows, staggered board structure and low board independence. Depending on the severity of the agency problem, CEO duality is associated with a decrease in industry‐adjusted investment in high‐growth segments of 1% to 2.1% over the following year, relative to that in low‐growth segments. However, CEOs’ equity‐based compensation curbs the negative effect of CEO duality on internal capital allocation efficiency. Overall, the findings of this study offer strong support for the agency theory and postulate the internal capital allocation policy as an important channel through which CEO duality lowers firm value in diversified firms.     

Directors’ human capital,firm strategy,and firm performance

Ideally, corporations are directed by boards whose directors provide valuable human capital that match the firms’ strategy. We investigate how directors’ human capital (international experience, industrial know-how, CEO experience, and financial know-how) affects firm performance including the firm’s strategy (diversification and internationalization) and how human capital is related to acquisition strategies (non-diversifying and international acquisitions). Our sample consists of 560 firm-year observations in Switzerland. We find empirical evidence that directors’ human capital affects firm performance and that this relationship depends on the firm’s strategy. Furthermore, human capital is also correlated with acquisition strategy. The study shows that focusing on board independence and compliance issues may be unrewarding in board research and practice.     

机构投资者持股与上市公司违规行为的实证研究

本文采用部分可观测的Bivariate Probit估计方法,对2001年至2009年中国1729家上市公司进行回归检验,发现机构投资者持股比例降低了公司违规行为倾向,同时增加了公司违规行为被稽查的可能性。该结论在控制了机构投资者变量内生性的因素后仍旧稳健。进一步研究表明,相比公司经营违规,机构投资者对信息披露违规倾向的影响更强。另外,相比证券机构投资者,养老保险基金、社保基金、企业年金持股的公司中违规公司比例更低。除此以外,机构投资者对公司违规的抑制与检举作用并不受其它公司治理变量的影响。本文的研究表明中国机构投资者在预防与打击上市公司违规行为方面发挥了重要的作用,并且也为上市公司与监管部门提供了治理和防范企业违规的线索。     

The interaction between stock prices and corporate investment: is Europe different?

I find limited evidence of firm learning from stock prices in Europe and uncover multifaceted complementarities between firm informational and operating environments in determining investment sensitivity to stock prices. Specifically, European firms seemingly do not shift away from their own (peer) stock prices even in instances in which their peers’ (own) stock prices become relatively more informative about firms’ fundamentals. This is consistent with European managers adopting more conservative strategies relative to their U.S.-based peers, and stock prices being less revealing in Europe than in the U.S. Furthermore, while a firm may attach equal weight to both its own stock prices and peer price innovations when peer firms are relatively smaller, investment responds more positively to peers’ price shocks than to that firm’s own stock prices when peers are relatively larger. Interestingly, investment sensitivity to peers’ stock prices decreases in peers’ market share, operating performance, and capital intensity. The decrease is accentuated when peer firms have more informative stock prices and are industry leaders or more capital intensive, thereby signaling perceived reduced growth opportunities. Broadly, these results imply that the specifics of the interaction between stock prices and firm behavior in the U.S. do not necessarily generalize to Europe. More important, these different learning patterns are partly attributable to differences in the amount of internal information, which in turn depends on country-level institutional infrastructures.     

Shareholders and managers: Who care more about corporate diversity and employee benefits?

We test two competing theories that explain a firm’s engagement in corporate diversity and employee benefits: socially responsible investment theory and management overinvestment theory. We find that publicly-traded companies with strong shareholder rights are more likely to promote women and/or minorities to the positions of CEO and board of directors in their organizations, conduct business with women- and/or minority-owned operations, and provide better family benefits to their employees than firms with strong management power. These findings indicate that the companies with strong shareholder rights engage more actively in internal aspects of CSR activities, which supports the socially responsible investment theory rather than the management overinvestment theory. Shareholders (i.e. institutional investors) tend to integrate their social goals (i.e. internal CSR issues) and financial goals into their investments. In response to these changes, managers should engage in the internal aspects of corporate social issues more aggressively as the agents of shareholders.     

Financial Globalization and the Governance of Domestic Financial Intermediaries

We model a small open economy in which both domestic financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , to study the general equilibrium impact of various types of capital inflows on the efficiency and governance of domestic banks. Banks have an advantage in monitoring firms, but the latter can collude with banks and offer side‐payments to reduce the intensity of monitoring. Opening up to international capital flows makes domestic banks’ capital scarcer relative to uninformed capital, thus increasing the relative cost of monitoring. We show that capital account liberalization has ambiguous effects on the governance of the domestic financial system by sometimes increasing firms’ incentives to collude with banks. We characterize the conditions under which governance is more likely to deteriorate after opening up the capital account, and discuss the effects on investment, productivity and output. We also analyze the effects of foreign direct investment in the corporate and banking sectors. Stylized facts are consistent with the predictions of the model.     

What affects new venture firm’s innovation more in corporate venture capital?

Although corporate venture capital (CVC) is a potential source of innovation, few studies have directly examined the impact of a parent company’s knowledge and resources on a new venture firm’s innovation performance. This article investigates the impact of experience with parent’s alliance and investment intensity on the extent to which new ventures in the U.S. use their parents’ knowledge and financial resources for their innovation activities at the inception of the CVC relationship over a 44-year period. Our findings suggest that ventures with alliance experience draw more on collaboration knowledge and relational capital, while investment intensity also increases innovation. At a low level of investment complexity, the use of alliance experience and investment intensity is positively related to innovation performance. However, when a parent company has high investment complexity for innovation performance, investment intensity and alliance experience are less effective. Our results, thus, unveil the CVC backing associated with the innovation of new venture firms.     

Board attributes and foreign shareholdings in Malaysian listed firms

This study examines the association between foreign shareholdings and several characteristics of board of directors in the context of a developing capital market. Using data of 777 listed firms on Bursa Malaysia for the financial year 2008, the study predicts that foreign shareholdings are positively related to board independence, multiple directorships, and financial literacy of the board of directors. The study finds a strong positive relationship between multiple directorships and foreign shareholdings. Contrary to our expectation, the association between board financial literacy and foreign shareholdings is negative and significant. With regard to the link between board independence and foreign shareholdings, we find weak evidence to support our prediction that there is positive relationship between board independence and foreign shareholdings. The multivariate results also show strong positive relationships between foreign shareholdings and number of foreign directors on boards, and between foreign shareholdings and audit quality. The study also documents a significant negative association between foreign shareholdings and firm size, and between foreign shareholdings and book-to-market ratio. The findings of the study supports the view that multiple directorships is an important asset to firms in emerging markets partly due to limited pool of potential talents and experts which in turn could signal reputational capital and quality of directors. Since there is a mandated presence of finance and accounting qualified director on the audit committee, foreign shareholders can somewhat rely on the oversight of audit committee instead of depending entirely on the board of directors for the quality of financial statements and financial reporting oversight. Finally, the presence of foreign directors on a board of directors may signal a firm’s commitment to adopt good corporate governance practices. It is also possible that foreign investors can influence corporate governance through their participation on the board of directors.     

我国财务危机公司投资行为的财务特征分析

在引入一个简化的理性财务危机公司投资模型的基础上,论文分析了企业陷入财务危机后,债权人与债务人之间在期权博弈过程中,企业在投资策略的选择上会偏离正常的投资行为的财务特征。在此基础上,重点分析了我国经济转轨时期财务危机公司严重地过度投资和在债务重组过程中的盲目性、短期性和功利性及其形成的主要原因。企业的过度投资是内部人控制和银行债权弱化的具体体现,虚假的债务重组是将危机转嫁给企业债权人的真正动因。     

融资约束与代理成本对上市公司非效率投资的影响——基于双边随机边界模型的实证度量

在有效地控制企业最优投资水平的前提下,本文将融资约束与代理成本同时纳入到前沿异质性双边随机边界模型(Two-tier stochastic frontier model)框架下对我国上市公司的非效率投资程度进行了实证度量,并探讨了各种财务因素对融资约束与代理成本的影响.实证结果表明:融资约束的存在使得上市公司的投资支出较最优水平低了37.5％,而代理成本导致上市公司的投资支出超出其最优水平的30.6％,两者的净效果使我国上市公司整体上表现为投资不足,投资不足率为6.9％.此外,流动资产净额和资本存量的增加有助于缓解公司面临的融资约束程度,而规模较大、持有较多自由现金流的公司内部代理问题更为严重,并且不同规模和地区之间的上市公司非效率投资程度存在较大的差异.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

政府治理、产权偏好与资本投资

本文从投资机会和融资约束视角分析了地方政府治理水平影响企业投资行为的机制,认为地方政府通过提供高质量的公共治理水平,帮助企业获得更多的投资机会和融资渠道,扩大企业投资规模,提高投资效率。以我国2005-2007年间上市公司为研究样本,本文实证检验的结果表明,较高的地方政府治理水平会提高公司的资本投资规模;政府治理影响企业资本投资与投资机会的敏感度在民营企业中更为显著,政府治理对国有企业资本投资的影响随着实际控制人的行政级别提高而降低。进一步研究发现,政府治理能够降低企业的融资约束,提高企业投资效率。     

FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND INNOVATION: WHY POOR COUNTRIES DON'T CATCH UP

This paper examines micro‐level channels through which financial development can affect such macroeconomic outcomes as level of income. Specifically, we investigate theoretically and empirically how financial constraints affect a firm's innovation activities. Theoretical predictions are tested using unique firm survey data, which provide direct measures for innovations and firm‐specific financial constraints, as well as information on shocks to firms' internal funds that serve as firm‐level instruments for financial constraints. We find unambiguous evidence that financial constraints restrain the ability of domestically owned firms to innovate and hence to catch up to the technological frontier.     

公司证券投资、所有权类型与资本结构决策关系研究

考察了股市收益波动与公司资本结构决策之间的关系,以此分析上市公司是否存在违规举债炒股行为。研究发现:股市收益波动与公司负债水平正相关,即上市公司会根据市场收益情况举债进行证券投资决策,这种正相关关系在非国有企业更为显著;政府的监管政策效果不明显。研究结果证实了上市公司存在违规举债炒股行为,检验了政策效果并明确了监管的重点与方向。     

CEO and Chairperson characteristics and firm performance

This paper focuses on the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairperson characteristics and firm performance. Specifically, the study examines the association between the characteristics of the CEO and the Chairperson of the board and firm performance. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms, the evidence found suggests that demographic and experience-related characteristics may be associated with the market valuation and financial performance of the firm. In particular, the reported results indicate a positive relationship between the presence of female CEOs or Chairs and firm performance, thus suggesting that gender-based differences may affect the CEO’s/Chairperson’s success. Moreover, the findings concerning the age of the CEO or Chair are mixed, while their experience and quality appear positively related to firm performance. Interestingly, a CEO or Chairperson holding multiple board seats is negatively associated with firm performance, whereas CEO duality has a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q and the return on assets (ROA) of the firm.     

研发投入对企业绩效的影响研究 ——基于企业金融化水平门限回归

本文选取1435家A股上市公司2011—2018年度的面板数据,以企业金融化水平作为门限变量,研究企业研发投入对企业绩效的非线性影响关系。研究结果表明:(1)企业金融化行为给研发投入对企业绩效的促进作用带来严重的时滞效应,研发投入对当年企业绩效不存在促进作用;(2)研发投入对未来一年企业绩效有双门限效应,二者呈倒N型关系,在第二区间内研发投入促进未来一年企业绩效;研发投入对未来二年企业绩效有单门限效应,在第一区间内研发投入促进未来二年企业绩效;(3)在适度的企业金融化水平区间内,研发投入才会促进未来企业绩效。本文指出上市公司金融化水平最优区间占比分布具有区域、行业和企业性质异质性,并进一步基于实证研究结果提出了相应的政策建议,有利于企业合理管理研发投入和防止企业脱实向虚。     

利润分享:一种协调人力资本的治理手段

在Mumcu模型的基础上,建立一个人力资本密集型企业与人力资本有关薪酬谈判的模型,即人力资本凭借其专用性使其投资重要性不断攀升,在与企业薪酬谈判中的话语权也不断增强。在这种情况下,关键性的人力资本已不仅限于获取劳动市场上的均衡工资,更可以与企业分享其创造的价值。反观,当人力资本密集型企业生产对关键性人力资本的依赖性不断增强并且难以控制时,企业只有通过与其分享租金以协调人力资本与企业保持合作,实现共赢。     

基于流动性偏好的上市公司现金持有行为研究

以流动性偏好理论为基础,通过理论模型推导出不同融资约束的公司会依据其现金流波动性进行有差异的现金持有行为决策;以2001～2006年间4 285个公司年数据为样本,实证检验并分析了中国上市公司融资约束、现金流波动性和现金持有量之间的相互关系.结果表明:在中国资本市场,融资约束公司的现金流波动性高于非融资约束公司,而现金持有量却低于非融资约束公司;前者现金持有量与现金流波动性显著正相关,而后者无显著相关性.     

对企业实行债转股的思考

启动财务杠杆给企业带来的效益一直是理论界关注的焦点.本文所介绍的是在西方较为流行的两种对启动财务杠杆实行馈转股的企业进行效益分析的理论模型.第—种模型强调资本成本在债转股中的重要性,认为企业制订是否实行债转股的决策依据就是对企业破产成本,委托代理成本和无形资产成本的评估.而对投资者来说,在投资中选择持债还是持股也依据他们对委托代理成本和无形资产的评估.第二种模型则建议企业在启动资本杠杆实行债转股中注重对风险的规避. 对于中国国有企业实行的债转股,本文以为它在所有制、市场条件及社会经济制度背景等方面具有完全不同的性质.但我们仍可以利用财务杠杆的工作原理将国有企业的债务转为股份公开上市交易,以实行中国国有企业的民营化,减轻企业的债务负担,同时减少国有银行的呆坏帐.     

金融推荐服务的渠道竞争策略研究

投资者对理财产品的认知能力有限,主要依赖外部“价值信号”形成自己对收益期望的“愿景”,从而简化投资过程。据此,本文通过构建一个新的三方博弈模型研究银行与数字金融平台之间的竞争决策,以探讨当银行有选择其销售顾问能力水平时,如何利用投资者的价值感知和对手特征来占客户对“愿景”错误理解的“便宜”,从而将这种系统性偏差转化为另一种获利来源。研究表明,金融服务强度的有效配置提升了银行的竞争力,但投资者剩余往往被完全剥夺。有趣的是,在同平台竞争中,银行增加了提供金融知识培训的额外动机,并且可能更喜欢强敌而不是弱者。此外,银行应该努力控制服务成本,以规避监管者为防止恶意竞争而禁止银行销售理财产品的风险。