Optimal Design of a Pharmaceutical Price–Volume Agreement Under Asymmetric Information About Expected Market Size

Price–volume agreements are commonly negotiated between drug manufacturers and third‐party payers for drugs. In one form a drug manufacturer pays a rebate to the payer on a portion of sales in excess of a specified threshold. We examine the optimal design of such an agreement under complete and asymmetric information about demand. We consider two types of uncertainty: information asymmetry, defined as the payer's uncertainty about mean demand; and market uncertainty, defined as both parties' uncertainty about true demand. We investigate the optimal contract design in the presence of asymmetric information. We find that an incentive compatible contract always exists; that the optimal price is decreasing in expected market size, while the rebate may be increasing or decreasing in expected market size; that the optimal contract for a manufacturer with the highest possible demand would include no rebate; and, in a special case, if the average reservation profit is non‐decreasing in expected market size, then the optimal contract includes no rebates for all manufacturers. Our analysis suggests that price–volume agreements with a rebate rate of 100% are not likely to be optimal if payers have the ability to negotiate prices as part of the agreement.     

Technical Note—Demand Uncertainty Reduction in Decentralized Supply Chains

This note analyzes the effects associated with reducing demand uncertainty in a decentralized supply chain comprising one manufacturer, one retailer, and a wholesale price contract that governs the transactions between them. The demand uncertainty level is parameterized through a mean‐preserving spread, and the manufacturer's and the retailer's equilibrium decisions are solved accordingly. We consider the case of an exogenous retail price as well as the case of an endogenous retail price, and we find in both cases that the manufacturer's and the retailer's expected profits in equilibrium are not necessarily monotone decreasing in the uncertainty level. Thus, we find that, even if the cost of reducing demand uncertainty is zero, uncertainty reduction can hurt rather than benefit either or both members of the supply chain.     

The Design and Introduction of Product Lines When Consumer Valuations are Uncertain

This article presents a model of the design and introduction of a product line when the firm is uncertain about consumer valuations for the products. We find that product line introduction strategy depends on this uncertainty. Specifically, under low levels of uncertainty the firm introduces both models during the first period; under higher levels of uncertainty, the firm prefers sequential introduction and delays design of the second product until the second period. Under intermediate levels of uncertainty the firm's first product should be of lower quality than one produced by a myopic firm that does not take product line effects into consideration. We find that when the firm introduces a product sequentially, the strategy might depend on realized demand. For example, if realized demand is high, the firm's second product should be a higher‐end model; if demand turns out to be low, the firm's second product should be a lower‐end model or replace the first product with a lower‐end model.     

Impacts of demand uncertainty on retailer's dominance and manufacturer-retailer supply chain cooperation

Recent studies in marketing and distribution channels have shown that the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers is shifting. Based on this observation, we investigate a two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer in this paper. We first develop retailer-dominant non-cooperative game models by introducing a sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price; then we analyze two cooperative scenarios, in which the Nash bargaining model is utilized to implement profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Under the assumption that the manufacturer and the retailer are risk-neutral, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can bargain to cooperate at any level of retail-market demand uncertainty with exogenous retail price. However, the cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty with endogenous retail price: it can be implemented if the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small, and the measure of retail-market demand uncertainty does not exceed an upper bound. Theoretical and numerical analyses show that the retailer's dominance over the manufacturer increases with the increase in the sensitivity of retailer's order quantity to manufacturer's wholesale price under a limitation of retail-market demand uncertainty. Numerical analyses also show that the retailer's dominance decreases with the increase in retail-market demand uncertainty.     

Fairness in Selling to the Newsvendor

This paper studies the impact of fairness concerns on supply chain performance (SCP) in the two‐party newsvendor setting. We extend prior fairness analysis to a wide range of demand distributions, and also allow the degree and definition of fairness to assume a broader range of preferences than those in prior literature. Contrary to prior literature, we find that if the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is not sufficiently large, regardless of demand variability, a fair‐minded retailer makes no difference to system efficiency when facing a traditional profit‐maximizing supplier. Only when the retailer's ideal allocation to the supplier is above a threshold can the retailer's fairness concern improve the system efficiency for sufficiently high demand uncertainty. In order for the retailer's fairness concern to improve expected profits of both parties compared to the traditional supply chain case (win–win), the demand uncertainty cannot be too low, the retailer is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity, and his ideal allocation to the supplier is within a specific range. If only the supplier is concerned for fairness, the results range from worsening to improving (but not coordinating) the system and a win–win situation is impossible. Finally, when both the supplier and retailer are fair‐minded, SCP is improved unless both parties prefer to allocate small portions of system profit to the other. Again, win–win will be achieved only when the demand uncertainty is sufficiently high, the retailer's ideal allocation is within a certain range, and he is not very averse to disadvantageous inequity.     

Entry Deterrence of Capacitated Competition Using Price and Non‐Price Strategies

We analyze the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm's decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity. We do so by studying two price competition models (Stackelberg and Nash), where we consider the incumbent's entry‐deterrence pricing strategy based on a potential entrant's capacity size. In an extension, we also study a branding model, where the incumbent firm, in addition to pricing, can also invest in influencing market preference for its product. With these models, we study conditions under which the incumbent firm may block the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without any market actions), deter the entrant (i.e., stop entry with suitable market actions) or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow entry and compete), and how the entrant will allocate its limited capacity across its own and the new market, if entry occurs. We also study the timing difference between the two different dynamics of the price competition models and find that the incumbent's first‐mover advantage benefits both the incumbent and the entrant. Interestingly, the entrant firm's profits are not monotonically increasing in its capacity even when it is costless to build capacity. In the branding model, we show that in some cases, the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumer's preference for its product. Finally, we incorporate demand uncertainty into our model and show that the incumbent benefits from demand uncertainty while the entrant may be worse off depending on the magnitude of demand uncertainty and its capacity.     

When to Mass Customize: The Impact of Environmental Uncertainty*

Previous research on mass customization (MC) has focused on what it is and how it is implemented. In this study we examine when MC is an appropriate strategy for firms to follow by scrutinizing the effects of three environmental uncertainty variables (demand uncertainty, competitive intensity, and supply chain complexity) on the MC–performance relationship. Specifically, we distinguish the direct effect of environmental uncertainty on MC ability and the moderation effect of environmental uncertainty on MC ability's impact on customer satisfaction. We examine six competing hypotheses using data collected from 266 manufacturing plants. Our results show that competitive intensity has a direct positive impact on MC ability. However, demand uncertainty moderates the relationship between MC ability and customer satisfaction, and the direct and positive relationship between MC ability and customer satisfaction holds only when customer demand is highly uncertain. Supply chain complexity neither has a direct relationship with MC, nor moderates the MC–performance relationship. Implications of these research findings are discussed and future research directions are identified.     

Committed Versus Contingent Pricing Under Competition

Should capacitated firms set prices responsively to uncertain market conditions in a competitive environment? We study a duopoly selling differentiated substitutable products with fixed capacities under demand uncertainty, where firms can either commit to a fixed price ex ante, or elect to price contingently ex post, e.g., to charge high prices in booming markets, and low prices in slack markets. Interestingly, we analytically show that even for completely symmetric model primitives, asymmetric equilibria of strategic pricing decisions may arise, in which one firm commits statically and the other firm prices contingently; in this case, there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Such equilibrium behavior tends to emerge, when capacity is ampler, and products are less differentiated or demand uncertainty is lower. With asymmetric fixed capacities, if demand uncertainty is low, a unique asymmetric equilibrium emerges, in which the firm with more capacity chooses committed pricing and the firm with less capacity chooses contingent pricing. We identify two countervailing profit effects of contingent pricing under competition: gains from responsively charging high price under high demand, and losses from intensified price competition under low demand. It is the latter detrimental effect that may prevent both firms from choosing a contingent pricing strategy in equilibrium. We show that the insights remain valid when capacity decisions are endogenized. We caution that responsive price changes under aggressive competition of less differentiated products can result in profit‐killing discounting.     

Coping with Gray Markets: The Impact of Market Conditions and Product Characteristics

Gray markets, also known as parallel imports, have created fierce competition for manufacturers in many industries. We analyze the impact of parallel importation on a price‐setting manufacturer that serves two markets with uncertain demand, and characterize her policy against parallel importation. We show that ignoring demand uncertainty can take a significant toll on the manufacturer's profit, highlighting the value of making price and quantity decisions jointly. We find that adjusting prices is more effective in controlling gray market activity than reducing product availability, and that parallel importation forces the manufacturer to reduce her price gap while demand uncertainty forces her to lower prices. Furthermore, we explore the impact of market conditions (such as market base, price sensitivity, and demand uncertainty) and product characteristics (“fashion” vs. “commodity”) on the manufacturer's policy towards parallel importation. We also provide managerial insights about the value of strategic decision‐making by comparing the optimal policy to the uniform pricing policy that has been adopted by some companies to eliminate gray markets entirely. The comparison indicates that the value of making price and quantity decisions strategically is highest for moderately different market conditions and non‐commodity products.     

Facility Location: A Robust Optimization Approach

In this research, we apply robust optimization (RO) to the problem of locating facilities in a network facing uncertain demand over multiple periods. We consider a multi‐period fixed‐charge network location problem for which we find (1) the number of facilities, their location and capacities, (2) the production in each period, and (3) allocation of demand to facilities. Using the RO approach we formulate the problem to include alternate levels of uncertainty over the periods. We consider two models of demand uncertainty: demand within a bounded and symmetric multi‐dimensional box, and demand within a multi‐dimensional ellipsoid. We evaluate the potential benefits of applying the RO approach in our setting using an extensive numerical study. We show that the alternate models of uncertainty lead to very different solution network topologies, with the model with box uncertainty set opening fewer, larger facilities. Through sample path testing, we show that both the box and ellipsoidal uncertainty cases can provide small but significant improvements over the solution to the problem when demand is deterministic and set at its nominal value. For changes in several environmental parameters, we explore the effects on the solution performance.     

Are More Competent Workers More Satisfied?

Abstract. In this paper, we analyse the relationship between workers' competencies and their job satisfaction in the context of dual (i.e. vocational versus communicative) skill demands. We analyse the effects of workers' competencies on their overall, intrinsic, and extrinsic job satisfaction. We focus on pharmacy assistants who need both pharmaceutical and communicative competencies in their work. Results from a linked employer–employee survey show that assistants with more communicative competencies are more satisfied with their job, whereas assistants with more pharmaceutical competencies are not more satisfied than the less competent assistants. In addition, workers who perform tasks below their level of competence are more dissatisfied with both their remuneration and career prospects and the content of their job as such, than were other workers. Our results indicate that the demand shift from vocational towards communication skills, which occurs in many professions, can affect the job satisfaction of the most competent workers.     

Sourcing Decisions with Stochastic Supplier Reliability and Stochastic Demand

Supplier sourcing strategies are a crucial factor driving supply chain success. In this paper, we investigate the implications of uncertain supplier reliability on a firm's sourcing decisions in an environment with stochastic demand. In particular, we characterize specific conditions under which a firm should choose a single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategy. In an environment with both uncertain demand and supply, we characterize the total order quantity, the number of suppliers selected for order placement, and the allocation of the total order quantity among these selected suppliers. For deeper managerial insight, we also examine the sensitivity of the optimal sourcing decisions to interactions between uncertainties in product demand and supply reliability. We show that sourcing from a single supplier is an optimal strategy for environments characterized by high levels of demand uncertainty or high salvage values. A numerical analysis based on data obtained from an office products retailer further reinforces our analytical results. In addition, we also find that when minimal order quantities are imposed, there are situations where it is not optimal to place an order with the lowest cost supplier.     

Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Stability of Supplier Alliances in Assembly Models

In their recent paper, Nagarajan and Sošić study an assembly supply chain in which n suppliers sell complementary components to a downstream assembler, who faces a price‐sensitive deterministic demand. Suppliers may form alliances, and each alliance then sells a kit of components to the assembler and determines the price for that kit. The assembler buys the components (kits) from the alliances and sets the selling price of the product. Nagarajan and Sošić consider three modes of competition—supplier Stackelberg, vertical Nash (VN), and assembler Stackelberg models—which correspond to different power structures in the market, and study stable supplier alliances when the assembler faces linear and isoelastic demand. In this paper, we study the impact that demand uncertainty has on stability results obtained in Nagarajan and Sošić. We first analyze models in which all decisions are made before the uncertainty is resolved, and show that the alliance of all suppliers remains stable when demand is isoelastic, or under Stackelberg models when demand is linear. However, demand uncertainty may change stability results when both parties make decisions simultaneously (VN model) and demand is linear. We then extend our results by considering scenarios in which some decisions may be postponed and made after the actual demand is known. When the ordering quantity can be determined after observing the true demand, we show that stable outcomes correspond to those obtained in the deterministic case and uncertainty has no impact on coalition stability; if only the assembler's pricing decision is postponed, we need additional conditions for stability results to carry over in the additive demand model.     

Role of Random Capacity Risk and the Retailer in Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Suppliers

This research considers a supply chain under the following conditions: (i) two heterogeneous suppliers are in competition, (ii) supply capacity is random and pricing is endogenous, (iii) consumer demand, with and without an intermediate retailer, is price dependent. Specifically, we examine how uncertainty in supply capacity affects optimal ordering and pricing decisions, supplier and retailer profits, and the incentives to reduce such uncertainty. When two suppliers sell through a monopolistic retailer, supply uncertainty not only affects the retailer's diversification strategy for replenishment, but also changes the suppliers’ wholesale price competition and the incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty. In this dual‐sourcing model, we show that the benefit of reducing capacity uncertainty depends on the cost heterogeneity between the suppliers. In addition, we show that a supplier does not necessarily benefit from capacity variability reduction. We contrast this incentive misalignment with findings from the single‐supplier case and a supplier‐duopoly case where both suppliers sell directly to market without the monopolistic retailer. In the latter single‐supplier and duopoly cases, we prove that the unreliable supplier always benefits from reducing capacity variability. These results highlight the role of the retailer's diversification strategy in distorting a supplier's incentive for reducing capacity uncertainty under supplier price competition.     

Evaluating manufacturer's buyback policies in a single-period two-echelon framework under price-dependent stochastic demand

This paper attempts to model the profitability of a secondary market, in a newsvendor setting, to a profit-maximizing manufacturer, who is offering to the retailer a buyback policy for the unsold merchandise left at the end of the selling season. With a buyback agreement, the manufacturer shares the risks of demand uncertainty, thus inducing the buyer to place larger orders. The manufacturer's risk is mitigated to some extent by the availability of an extra market to dispose off the unsold merchandise. Both parties are risk-neutral profit-maximizers and both have the same information about the final demand for the product and its uncertainty. The manufacturer's decision is to arrive at an optimal wholesale price and the buyback price. Based on this offer, the retailer in turn sets the optimal amount of merchandise to purchase, as well as the unit selling price to meet a price-dependent uncertain demand for the merchandise in question. Due to the difficulty of obtaining analytical results, we have undertaken a numerical analysis to (i) compare the optimal policies across demand functions and error structures for three situations namely the no-incentive case and the buyback policies with and without a secondary market; (ii) indicate the conditions whereby the trade incentive is beneficial to both parties; (iii) assess the efficacy of the policies using two other performance indices (probability of achieving a target profit, and pass-through ratios) alternate to profit maximization; and (iv) conjecture the conditions for successful buyback policies and the nature of the benefits from the secondary market.     

Dynamic Pricing,Production, and Channel Coordination with Stochastic Learning

We consider a decentralized two‐period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product with benefits of cost learning, and sells it through a retailer facing a price‐dependent demand. The manufacturer's second‐period production cost declines linearly in the first‐period production, but with a random learning rate. The manufacturer may or may not have the inventory carryover option. We formulate the resulting problems as two‐period Stackelberg games and obtain their feedback equilibrium solutions explicitly. We then examine the impact of mean learning rate and learning rate variability on the pricing strategies of the channel members, on the manufacturer's production decisions, and on the retailer's procurement decisions. We show that as the mean learning rate or the learning rate variability increases, the traditional double marginalization problem becomes more severe, leading to greater efficiency loss in the channel. We obtain revenue sharing contracts that can coordinate the dynamic supply chain. In particular, when the manufacturer may hold inventory, we identify two major drivers for inventory carryover: market growth and learning rate variability. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of our results by examining a model in which cost learning takes place continuously.     

Unfavorable Market Conditions,Institutional and Financial Development,and Exits of Foreign Subsidiaries

In this paper, we examine how market conditions in host countries affect the entry and exit decisions of multinational corporations' foreign subsidiaries. Taking the real options perspective, we expect that smaller investments will be associated with more flexible entries and exits. We also predict that better-established host countries with greater institutional and financial development will facilitate the exits of foreign subsidiaries with smaller investments under unfavorable market conditions. We run a Cox proportional hazard rate model with a dataset of Korean foreign direct investments, and find that when market conditions become more unfavorable, foreign subsidiaries making smaller investments that were endogenously chosen under the influence of market demand uncertainty are more likely to engage in earlier exits than subsidiaries making larger investments. We also find that strong institutional and financial development positively moderates small subsidiaries' exits under conditions of unfavorably resolved uncertainty.     

Quick Response under Competition

We consider a manufacturer serving two competing retailers that sell their products over a single selling season. The retailers place their regular orders before the season starts. In addition to this initial order, quick response (QR) provides a retailer with an additional replenishment opportunity after demand uncertainty is resolved. The manufacturer determines the unit price for QR replenishment. We characterize the retailers’ ordering, and the manufacturer's pricing decisions in equilibrium when none, only one, and both of the retailers have QR ability. We study how the profitability of the manufacturer, the retailers, and the channel depend on QR and competition. We find it may be optimal for the manufacturer to offer QR to only one of the ex ante identical retailers when demand variability is sufficiently, but not overly high. The manufacturer may also find it optimal to offer QR to both or none of the retailers, depending on demand variability. Finally, while QR ability is always attractive for a retailer when competition is ignored, we find QR may prove detrimental when its impact on competition is taken into account.     

Managing High‐Tech Capacity Expansion via Reservation Contracts

We study capacity reservation contracts between a high‐tech manufacturer (supplier) and her OEM customer (buyer). The supplier and the buyer are partners who enter a ‘design‐win” agreement to develop the product, and who share the stochastic demand information. To encourage the supplier for more aggressive capacity expansion, the buyer reserves capacity upfront by paying a deductible fee. As capacity expansion demonstrates diseconomy of scale in this context, we assume convex capacity costs. We show that as the buyer's revenue margin decreases, the supplier faces a sequence of four profit scenarios with decreasing desirability. We examine the effects of market size and demand variability to the contract conditions. We propose two channel coordination contracts, and discuss how such contracts can be tailored for situations where the supplier has the option of not complying with the contract, and when the buyer's demand information is only partially updated during the supplier's capacity lead‐time.     

A real options model of market entry: Endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty

We develop a real options model of market entry that focuses on the dueling growth and deferral options by differentiating between endogenous uncertainty and exogenous uncertainty. While exogenous uncertainty influences the growth option market value or price, it is endogenous uncertainty that influences the value of the growth option through the ability to create a competitive advantage from preemptive market entry. First, the firm can decrease the exercise price of the growth option (i.e., the cost of the follow-on investment) through experiential learning that reduces endogenous uncertainty. Second, the firm can increase the relative discounted cash flows of the follow-on investment due to its ability to influence market demand that reduces endogenous uncertainty. On the other hand, the value of the deferral option increases with exogenous uncertainty as firms cannot influence exogenous uncertainty, and therefore, should invest elsewhere while waiting for the exogenous uncertainty to subside. As such, we provide a solution to the conundrum that the value of both the growth option and the deferral option increase with uncertainty. Finally, we demonstrate how the model addresses sequential market entry; irreversibility and market entry mode; competition; scarce strategic resources; host country development level; and industry life cycle stage.