Structure, Agency and Social Transformation

Revisiting the structure/agency debate, the article puts forward the broad position shared by Giddens'structuration theory and Bhaskar's transformational model. It defends Giddens'concept of structure as'rules and resources'against charges of idealism, arguing that its strength is its focus on the interface of structure and agency. But both Giddens and Bhaskar emphasise social reproduction as an unintended consequence of social action. Taking issue with postmodern pessimism, the article goes on to consider the conditions of possibility, and requisite forms of knowledgeability, for deliberate social transformation.     

For Bourdieu, Against Alexander: Reality and Reduction

Jeffrey Alexander argues that despite Bourdieu's considerable achievements ultimately his work is reductionist and determinist. He further argues that though Bourdieu is a middle range theorist he is implicitly realist in his meta-theoretical assumptions. This article accepts these conclusions but argues that Bourdieu's meta-theoretical realism is a virtue rather than a vice and that the manner in which he is a reductionist and determinist necessitate a re-thinking of what is meant by these notions. Alexander uses Bourdieu's concept of habitus to demon-strate a fundamental contradiction in Bourdieu's theorising. According to him habitus presents us with the oxymoron of unconscious strategisation. This article uses a discussion of habitus in order to demonstrate that in its relationship with the concept of field it instead produces a practical resolution of long standing theoretical problems concerning structural determination and human agency. It is also argued that these problems are resolved at the meta-theoretical level in the form of critical realist ontology and that it is Alexander's misunderstandings on this level which cause him to fail to appreciate the significance of Bourdieu's achievements.     

Determinism and the Recovery of Human Agency: The Embodying of Persons

Intending the recovery of human agency with the aid of theories of human socio-cultural life, Turner and Harre do so however in terms of conflicting conceptions of the embodying of persons. Consequently, their theories share the problem of determinism and embodied human agency. This is the problem of the proper location of agency with regard to the person, the body, and society. These theories then are in fundamental conflict on exactly this issue of the proper location of agency. Turner's thesis of location: in the beginning is the body, and therefore the person. Thus Turner's recovery of agency: the effectiveness of persons resides in the discourse-independent agency of the bodies of persons. Harre's thesis of location: in the beginning is the person, and therefore the body. Thus Harre's recovery of agency: the effectiveness of persons resides in the discursive agency of persons embodied. For both Turner and Harre the intent to recover agency through embodiment is also a scientific intent. Thus, the problem of the proper location of agency requires that agency must be formulated in terms of ubiquitous determinism and not regularity determinism: only the former provides a conception of causal powers. To answer the question of location Turner is led to Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and its conception of the lived body. Instead, Harre enlists a realist philosophy of science with its special conception of causual powers. A systematic conception of agentive causation is shown to constitute the recovery of human agency and to enable us to make principled determinations in the assignment of agency. It is argued that, since phenomenology presumes the ontology of regularity determinism, it cannot provide us with what it in fact denies, a conception of causal powers. It is argued that Merleau-Ponty moved from his idea of the actual body as lived to the actual body as flesh, and in that reformulation it is best understood as causal powers. It is argued that without a conception of causal powers Turner's use of the lived body to establish the agency of effective persons must fail, revealing instead that the effectiveness of persons is the discursive agency of persons embodied. Persons discursively embodied enact the practices of speech acts and action signs systems.     

Animals,Agency and Resistance

In this paper we develop a relational approach to the question of animal agency. We distinguish between agency and action and, using three examples of non‐human animal behaviour, explore how human‐other animal interactions might be understood in terms of action, agency and resistance. In order to do this we draw on the distinction between primary and corporate agency found in the work of Margaret Archer, arguing that, while non‐human animals are able to act and to exercise primary agency, they are unable to exercise corporate agency. Animals are therefore agents; they act and their actions have consequences, they also resist conditions which they do not like and, in some circumstances, are able to change the conditions of their agency. We discuss the place of animals in the social world and the political implications of this way of viewing animal agency.     

The Role of Structure in Effective Agency Advocacy

Structured accountability at every agency level is essential for effective advocacy. The Lancaster model illustrates this. The structure requires commitment to the advocacy issue, clear role definition for staff, board and community members, mandated involvement of staff, board and community members (clients, professionals and people who have experienced the problem), and documentation and evaluation throughout the process.     

A sociological formalization of Searle's social ontology

John Searle's theory of social reality is among the most influential accounts in the history of philosophy. His theory also implicates concepts and issues of foundational interest to sociologists, including social structure, institutional differentiation and the relationship between linguistic performativity and institutional reality. Despite this overlap with sociological theory, and despite some sustained attention from sociologists (e.g., Lukes, 2007 ), no formal theoretical model of Searle's work exists within sociology. This paper reviews the core concepts of Searle's theory before concisely describing and then formally modelling their propositional structure. Though the overlap of Searle's approach with classical and contemporary sociological theory is discussed throughout, the paper concludes with a specific argument about his proper assimilation into sociological theory vis‐à‐vis Durkheim, Bourdieu and Giddens.     

独立与权利：中美女性主义运动与性别平等观念比较研究

本文利用“世界价值观调查”的数据比较了20世纪末中美两国性别平等观念的差异后发现,两国性别平等观念的差异并不表现为平等化程度的高低,而是观念模式的不同,中国社会的分工平等意识强于美国,但权利平等意识弱于美国。本文认为,20世纪中后期的女性主义运动以性别平等为目标,对人们的性别平等观念有重要影响。中美性别平等观念模式的差异与两国女性主义运动所提出的共识框架不同有关。在此基础上,本文进一步比较了二者在动员机制上的差异及其对性别平等观念形成的影响。结果发现,那些在美国能够影响性别平等观念形成的微观机制在中国却难以发挥作用,这是因为,中国妇女解放运动能够借助于国家社会主义体制,将性别平等观念渗透到整个社会,而美国女权运动的动员却没有这样的优势,人们因此有较多的选择空间。     

Agency Function and Social Work Principles

Summary The concept of agency function is examined in relation to thenature of the social work task. It is often the case that agencyfunction is seen more as a problem for social work and not asone of its characteristics. It is argued in this paper thatthe agency itself is not responsible for the apparently delicatestate of present day social work, but that on the contrary,the failure to appreciate social work's relationship to societyand social processes in part accounts for its uncertain condition.     

吉登斯社会行动时空向度模型的知识社会学改造

行动的时空结构问题在吉登斯的结构化理论中占有非常重要的位置,吉登斯在其社会结构化理论中提出了关于社会行动的时空模型。研究在行动的结构中时间与知识的连接,必须对吉登斯的行动时间性模型进行改造,而改造其实质是知识化的结果。对吉登斯空间模型的知识社会学改造可通过三个学术追问来完成。     

The two stories of the habitus/structure relation and the riddle of reflexivity: A meta-theoretical reappraisal

This article argues that two key puzzles arising from the theories of Bourdieu are inter-related. One is the question of how Bourdieu analyses the relationship between structure and habitus, and the other is the place of reflexivity in Bourdieu's work. We contend that it is only by carefully analysing Bourdieu's theoretical structure to grasp the relationship between these elements that one can understand whether or not his work offers useful resources for analysing the relation between routine action and self-reflection. This paper argues that there are two narrations of the structure/habitus relation in Bourdieu's work, and that the concept of self-reflective subjectivity is a residual element of the first narration and does not appear in the second. We then contend that this residual and under-developed concept of self-reflective subjectivity should not be confused with Bourdieu's analysis of epistemic reflexivity. These moves allow us to contribute to ongoing debates about the relation between routine action and self-reflection by arguing that the concept of the “reflexive habitus” – which some have argued is characteristic of social agents in high/late modernity – is both conceptually confused and is not a logical extension of Bourdieu's theories. In this way we try to clear the ground for more productive ways of thinking about routine action and self-reflection.     

From Habituality to Change: Contribution of Activity Theory and Pragmatism to Practice Theories

The new social theories of practice have been inspired by Wittgenstein's late philosophy, phenomenology and more recent sociological theories. They regard embodied skills and routinized, mostly unconscious habits as a key foundation of human practice and knowledge. This position leads to an overstatement of the significance of the habitual dimension of practice. As several critics have suggested this approach omits the problems of transformative agency and change of practices. In turn classical practice theories, activity theory and pragmatism have analyzed the mechanisms of change. Pragmatism suggests that a crisis of a habit calls for reflection. Through working hypotheses and experimentation this leads to a transformation of a practice. Activity theory introduced the concept of remediation. A collective elaboration of shared mediational artefacts is needed to transform an activity.     

Institutional Entrepreneurship and Agency

The notion of institutional entrepreneurship has become very popular in the last decade. Starting from a review of the literature on the topic, I first focus on the use of the idea of individual entrepreneurs and point out three theoretical incongruities it produces. I then discuss notions of collective entrepreneurship and institutional work to see if they can overcome these incongruities. I conclude that although they can remedy some of the problems, these notions run the risk of describing everything until they describe nothing. In order to limit and enable the entrepreneurship literature to discuss agency meaningfully, I argue, it needs to develop analytical frames of agency derived either from existing sociological theories or from further developing its own brand of agency theory.     

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition

This article analyses and evaluates the uses of the concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition, which is based on Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of science. The concept of causal power that appears in the early works of Rom Harré and his associates is compared to Bhaskar's account of this concept and its uses in the critical realist social ontology. It is argued that the concept of emergence should be incorporated to any adequate notion of causal power. The concept of emergence used in Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works is shown to be ambiguous. It is also pointed out that the concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti‐essentialist way. Ontological and methodological problems that vitiate Bhaskar's transcendental account of the concept of causal power are examined. Moreover, it is argued that the applications of the concept of causal power to mental powers, reasons, and social structures in the critical realist social ontology are problematic. The paper shows how these problems might be avoided without giving up the concept of causal power and the notion of structural social causation.     

社会工作机构与政府组织的相互嵌入及其影响

由于政府的主导推动和社工机构对政府资源的强依赖,社工机构在创建及运作过程中与政府之间呈现出相互嵌入的倾向和特点,其中政府对社工机构的嵌入突出表现为一种结构性的强嵌入,而社工机构对政府的嵌入则是一种制度性和职能性的弱嵌入。本文以上海市自强社会服务总社等三家社工机构为例,来具体分析社工机构与政府之间如何相互的嵌入,以及这种相互嵌入对社工机构的实际运作及长远发展又产生怎样的冲击与影响。     

In Whose Interests? A Case Study of Community Work in a Voluntary Welfare Agency

This article traces the development of a community work project sponsored by a voluntary welfare agency. The context of its birth is outlined, as are the struggles it encountered during its operation. These struggles hinged on questions of accountability to the local community and the resistance to this concept from the sponsoring agency, resistance which led ultimately to the demise of the project. Community work has been regarded at times as the ‘radical’ form of social intervention, the means of working for dramatic social change in society. Whether or not it can be that, it certainly need not be. The events to be related here concern a welfare agency of essentially conservative orientation seeking to redefine its role within the changing welfare environment of the 1960s and 1970s. In the event it was quite prepared to embrace the outward forms and codes of community work, so much a part of the new welfare ethos of the Whitlam era, while maintaining unaltered its conservative orientation. For its field staff, however, the situation was hot so easy. Themselves influenced by the thoughts and practices in community work, they found a real tension between accountability to local community on one hand and to the sponsoring agency on the other. Conflict was inevitable. It was only when the agency was faced with demands regarding community accountability, a concept cutting across its traditional practice and presenting a perceived threat to agency autonomy and control, that it moved away into other, safer directions.     

Designing social action: The impact of reflexivity on practice

The main goal of this article is to analyse the relationship between reflexivity and action along three axes. The first entails the discussion of a reflexive action model that explores the combination of factors, processes and mechanisms which explain the guiding role reflexivity can play with regard to practices, in specific circumstances. The second axis concerns situations in which reflexivity does not act as an orientation mechanism and may even have the opposite effect, as a source of disorientation and paralysis of practices. The third relates to the production of social change and reproduction that may arise from the exercise of reflexivity. The whole discussion points to the mediation role that reflexivity assumes in the relationship between structure and agency, i.e. in the way structural enablements and constraints are received, filtered and mobilised by subjects in the subjective definition and reflexive implementation of their personal projects.     

Toward a Dialogical Perspective on Agency

The aim of this article is to motivate and outline a dialogical perspective on agency that accommodates centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in current cultural theories of agency. To complement approaches that assume a high degree of integration and clarity, we emphasise the diversity of agency as it is experienced in the open-ended dialogical relationship with a particular other. While these former approaches to agency provide us with the means to examine the influence of social processes such as division of labour and reproduction of community, they tend to underplay the importance of agency as it is embodied and experienced in the lives of particular people. To reflect on this aspect of agency, we will draw extensively on Bakhtin's work, which crosses boundaries between philosophy, psychology and literary criticism, and which is concerned to understand what is personal in activity. In terms of agency, his work draws our attention to the sense of responsibility and potentiality that imbues our dialogues with particular others, the aesthetics and ethics involved in dialoguing with the other, and the sense of dilemmatic choice and intonation that is involved in our dialogue with the other.     

Durkheim and realism

This article examines Durkheim's relationship to realism. I argue that there is enough prima facie evidence of realist commitments in his work that our task should be to consider what kind of realist Durkheim was. I discuss, first of all, Durkheim's epistemics and follow that analysis with a discussion of metaphysical realism in his texts. The first part of the paper covers a wide range of his work; the second part focuses primarily on The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. In a final concluding section, I go on to consider how his epistemic arguments and his philosophical realism might work together to support important parts of his general sociology. Realism is not often brought to bear on Durkheim's work. When it has been, Durkheim has been identified as a naïve realist. These interpretations of Durkheim do not recognize the sophistication of contemporary realism, which does not reduce to naïve representationalism. This paper will sort out Durkheim's realist commitments in his texts, and in light of the variety of realisms consistent with “sophisticated” (that is, non-naïve) realism.     

Abstracts

The concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ as the means by which individuals interpret the ‘rules’ of social interaction occupies a central role in all the major contemporary theories of action and social structure. The major reference point for social theorists is Wittgenstein's celebrated discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. Focusing on Giddens' incorporation of tacit knowledge and rules into his ‘theory of structuration’, I argue that Wittgenstein's later work is steadfastly set against the ‘latent cognitivism’ inherent in the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules. I also argue that the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules is either incoherent or explanatorily vacuous. Scholars of the emotions maintain that all anger requires an object of blame. In order to be angry, many writers argue, one must believe than an actor has done serious damage to something that one values. Yet an individual may be angered without blaming another. This kind of emotion, called situational anger, does not entail a corresponding object of blame. Situational anger can be a useful force in public life, enabling citizens to draw attention to the seriousness of social or political problems, without necessarily vilifying political officials. In the first half of this paper I show how H. L. A. Hart's theory of rules can resolve, or at least clarify, a central methodological problem in legal anthropology that was first posed in Llewellyn and Egebel's The Cheyenñe Way In the second half I explore and develop Hart's theory (a) of rules, and apply it to problems of agency and behaviourism in legal anthropology, and (b) of legal development, and apply it to the problem of rule-scepticism in legal anthropology as it is posed in Roberts and Comaroffs Rules and Processes and elsewhere. As human beings, we share many historically developed, language-game interwoven, public forms of life. Due to the joint, dialogically responsive nature of all social life within such forms, we cannot as individuals just act as we please; our forms of life exert a normative influence on what we can say and do. They act as a backdrop against which all our claims to knowledge are judged as acceptable or not. As a result, it is not easy to articulate their inadequacies in a clear and forceful manner. However, within most of our forms of life, we have a first-person right to express how our individual circumstances seem to us. And by the use of special forms of poetic, gestural talk—talk that can originate new language-games—we can offer to make our own ‘inner lives’ public. In this paper, I want to claim that this is just what Wittgenstein is attempting to do in his later philosophy: by use of the self-same methods that anyone might use to express aspects of their own world picture, he is offering us his attempts to make the background ‘landscape’ of our lives more visible to us. These methods are explored below. Proponents of the view that social structures are ontologically distinct from the people in whose actions they are immanent have assumed that structures can stand in causal relations to individual practices. Were causality to be no more than Humean concomitance correlations between structure and practices would be unproblematic. But two prominent advocates of the ontological account of structures, Bhaskar and Giddens, have also espoused a powers theory of causality. According to that theory causation is brought about by the activity of particulars, in the social psychological case, individuals of some sort. Consistence would demand that structure be those individuals. But neither Giddens nor Bhaskar wish to reify structure to the extent that would fit it for a role as a powerful particular. If only human beings can be powerful particulars in these contexts, the only way that structures can be real must be as properties of conversational (symbolic) interactions. Human action is social just in so far as people direct themselves to engage well in joint activities with others.