连带责任治理在供应商集群中的有效性研究

在核心企业与供应商集群的渠道关系情境下探讨连带责任治理对机会主义行为的作用,将网络中心性和使用渠道权力纳入连带责任治理研究框架,考察二者对机会主义行为的影响以及对连带责任与机会主义行为之间关系的调节效应。以一家出口企业的供应商集群为研究对象,获得82个连带责任小组样本共246个被调查者的调查数据,应用SPSS 19．0软件和层级回归法对研究假设进行检验。研究结果表明,供应商之间的连带责任对其机会主义行为有显著的抑制作用;供应商领导者的网络中心性负向影响其他供应商成员的机会主义行为,并强化连带责任对机会主义行为的抑制作用;核心企业通过使用渠道权力负向影响供应商集群的机会主义行为,但会弱化连带责任对机会主义行为的抑制作用。     

基于交易成本理论的中小企业数字化能力对供应链融资绩效的影响研究

基于交易成本理论,探索中小企业数字化能力通过降低机会主义影响供应链融资绩效的内在机制,同时分析资产专用性投资和关系专用性投资在中小企业数字化能力与机会主义之间的情境作用。通过对384家中小企业样本进行实证分析发现：中小企业数字化能力正向影响供应链融资绩效;机会主义在中小企业数字化能力与供应链融资绩效之间具有中介作用;资产专用性投资与关系专用性投资均会增强中小企业数字化能力降低机会主义的作用;当较高的资产专用性投资与关系专用性投资相结合时,会在一定程度上替代中小企业数字化能力对机会主义的抑制作用。     

联盟信任与伙伴机会主义的关系研究——来自我国医院间联盟的证据

传统的交易成本理论认为,信任与机会主义负相关。但在战略联盟背景下,这种观点具有明显的局限性。首先,它只考虑了联盟成员间的善意信任,忽视了能力信任这一重要维度;其次,社会交易理论认为,(善意)信任具有阴暗面(dark sides),从而信任与机会主义之间并不总是线性关系。本文在社会交易理论的基础上,深入分析了善意信任及能力信任对伙伴机会主义的影响,并采用190份我国医院间联盟的数据进行了实证检验。结果表明,善意信任并不是越高越好,过高的善意信任会由于缺少监控而增加伙伴的机会主义行为,从而善意信任与机会主义之间呈现一种先降低后增加的U型关系;能力信任与机会主义之间负相关的假设没有获得通过。     

渠道冲突管理的"生命周期观"——机会主义及其治理机制

渠道冲突管理是营销研究的热门课题之一.遗憾的是,文献对于渠道冲突管理的分析都是以结果为导向,忽视了对渠道冲突的前因分析,也没有树立渠道冲突管理的全程意识.本文指出,机会主义是渠道冲突的直接前因,必须引入渠道冲突的全程管理.机会主义治理的渠道冲突观认为,渠道关系初期进行渠道成员选择,渠道关系持续期谋求长期导向、互动、协商、开放的渠道关系,可以确保渠道冲突管理树立全程的"生命周期观".本文结合中国市场渠道中机会主义的渠道冲突案例进行剖析,为如何进行机会主义治理、杜绝渠道冲突之源,保持渠道和谐提供了新的视角.     

关系成员企业管理者社会资本水平其机会主义行为间关系的实证研究——以中外合资企业为例

本文以中外合资企业为主要研究对象,就关系成员企业管理者社会资本水平与其在特定关系中的机会主义行为水平的联系及其对关系绩效的影响进行了实证研究。研究结果首次证实了企业管理者社会资本会提高其在特定关系中的机会主义倾向这一潜在关系的存在,但这种机会主义行为主要体现在对关系程序控制权的获取上,并不会降低社会资本在提升关系收益水平方面的价值,同时也不会影响关系成果分配的公平性。本研究的相关结论对于进一步的研究与企业管理实践均有一定价值。     

营销渠道中控制机制的使用与机会主义行为

正式和非正式控制机制能抑制机会主义已得到承认,但对它们的使用条件约束还少有研究． 基于交易成本理论、社会交换理论和权变视角,探讨了正式控制(如契约) 和非正式控制(如关系治理) 对渠道中机会主义的单独以及联合作用在不同的关系内外部条件(关系持续时间和环境不确定性) 下是否会发生变化． 结果显示,长关系时间会削弱两种机制的作用,高环境不确定性抑制了契约的效果． 关系时间短或环境不确定性低时,两种机制相互替代,而关系时间长或环境不确定性高时,二者相互加强． 文章最后对研究的理论意义和管理启示进行了讨论．     

渠道销售中的机会主义——收益与损失

研究表明,当制造商处于竞争性环境,而购买商具有一定的市场势力时,制造商的机会主义行为并不能使自己的利润增加,反而使购买商的销售利润增加、福利有一定的提高。因而在渠道销售中有必要区分“好”的机会主义行为和“坏”的机会主义行为,针对不同的机会主义行为采用相应的治理机制,才能够科学地保证渠道销售低交易成本运行,那种凡机会主义行为必有害、必须严厉控制的观点会适得其反,导致不必要的资源浪费和福利损失。     

交易专项投资对伙伴机会主义行为影响的实证研究

以企业交易专项投资与伙伴强形式和弱形式机会主义行为的关系为研究对象,重点探讨其随伙伴交易专项投资水平和关系持续时间的变化趋势。以制造商营销渠道负责人和分销商采购人员为调研对象,通过问卷调查获得216组家电行业制造商-分销商配对样本数据,采用多元调节回归对假设进行验证。研究结果表明,随着伙伴交易专项投资水平的增加,企业交易专项投资会从引发伙伴两类机会主义行为转变为抑制伙伴机会主义行为,特别是企业交易专项投资对伙伴强形式机会主义行为的作用变化较为显著;随着交易关系的延续,企业交易专项投资始终增强伙伴的强形式机会主义行为,并不随关系持续而发生明显改变,但企业交易专项投资会从引发转变为抑制伙伴的弱形式机会主义行为。     

跨国绿色创新国际合作中机会主义行为治理机制研究

跨国绿色创新国际合作是提高本土企业绿色创新能力,拓展外商企业发展空间的有效途径,但国际合作过程中机会主义行为造成跨国绿色创新国际合作的短期化。本文基于演化博弈理论及模拟仿真手段探索跨国绿色创新国际合作机会主义行为治理机制,以及外商直接投资、对外直接投资及政府监管对跨国绿色创新国际合作机会主义行为治理的作用关系。研究表明：外商直接投资增加、与市场状况和产业类别相匹配的政府监管强度均可有效遏制跨国绿色创新国际合作中机会主义行为,使其向互惠主义策略演化,但对外直接投资因逆向技术溢出效应较弱,对其遏制作用效果甚微。同时,乐观的绿色创新国际合作市场前景将显著抑制国际合作中的机会主义行为,有利于长期绿色创新合作关系的维持,而悲观的市场前景不利于跨国绿色创新国际合作稳定性。最后,本文设计出最优机会主义行为治理机制,促进跨国绿色创新国际合作双赢目标的实现。     

供应商机会主义行为对信息共享与运营绩效的影响

在交易成本理论基础上,构建供应商机会主义行为、信息共享与运营绩效之间关系的理论模型。以广东省珠三角地区189家制造企业为研究对象,利用结构方程模型对供应商机会主义行为、信息共享与运营绩效的关系进行实证研究。将信息共享划分为信息共享内容和信息共享质量两个维度,将运营绩效划分为速度、服务和财务3个维度。研究结果表明,在供应商机会主义行为与信息共享的关系层面,供应商机会主义行为对信息共享内容和信息共享质量均有显著的负向影响;在信息共享与运营绩效的关系层面,信息共享内容和信息共享质量均对运营绩效有显著的正向影响;而供应商机会主义行为对运营绩效有显著的负向影响。根据上述实证研究结论给出供应链企业和政府的相关管理启示。     

Contract functions in service exchange governance: evidence from logistics outsourcing

The logistics outsourcing literature emphasises relational governance mechanisms and has underplayed the role of formal contractual provisions. This paper empirically examines the multiple functions that contracts perform in the governance of service exchanges. Codification, safeguarding, coordination and adaptation functions are linked to contract specification schedules, payment mechanisms, (early) termination rights, performance review and communication provisions, service variations clauses and renegotiation provisions. Contracts may also embody exchange- or partner-specific learning, albeit to a limited extent. Overall, the empirical findings lend support to the functional view of contracting. The functionality of contracts extends beyond safeguarding against opportunism and financial losses. In addition to offering economic and legal safeguards, contracts are used to coordinate and adapt service exchanges in the face of complexity and uncertainty.     

动态环境下联盟竞合、治理机制与创新绩效的关系研究

本文从竞合视角审视联盟组合,结合动态关系观探讨有效的联盟治理机制,揭示了联盟组合中竞合关系(横向竞合、纵向竞合)、治理机制(契约治理、关系治理)和创新绩效之间的关系,并考察了动态环境特征(技术波动、竞争强度)的二次调节作用。在不同的竞合关系中,由于合作和竞争的强度不同,契约治理与关系治理机制的作用也存在差异,同时,治理机制与创新绩效之间的关系也受到两种不同环境动态性特征的影响。研究结果显示,在纵向竞合中,运用关系治理比运用契约治理能更好地提升创新绩效,技术波动正向调节契约治理、关系治理与创新绩效间的关系。在横向竞合中,运用契约治理比运用关系治理有效,竞争强度加强了契约治理对创新绩效的影响,即关系治理在波动的环境中更有效,契约治理在竞争的环境中更有效。本文为企业开展研发联盟组合管理提供了新的视角和管理对策。     

Effect of Formal Contracts,Relational Norms and Trust on Performance of Joint Research and Development Projects

This paper examines the effect of governance mechanisms – formal contracts, relational norms and trust – on the performance of exploration and exploitation joint research and development (R&D) projects. While the authors acknowledge the need for a twofold approach, transactional and relational, to understand the interfirm exchange governance, the joint action of formal contracts and relational governance has been caught between the complementary or substitutive forces involved in interorganizational relationships. Using survey data on joint exploration and exploitation R&D projects developed by the European biotechnology companies, the synergies of both mechanisms and their effects in improving project performance are investigated. The analysis suggests that contracts and relational norms and trust act as complementary mechanisms, but while contracts are more effective in exploitation projects, relational norms and trust are more powerful in improving the performance of exploration projects.     

Opportunism in Distribution Networks: The Role of Network Embeddedness and Dependence

Prior research documents the value of network relationships to firm behavior but is relatively silent on how networks influence opportunism in distribution channels. Focusing on a common type of distribution networks in which multiple distributors serve a single, dominant supplier, this study moves beyond a dyadic view to examine how a focal distributor's relational and structural embeddedness in such a distribution network influences its opportunism toward the dominant supplier. In particular, we postulate that a distributor's relational embeddedness in the network curbs its opportunism, whereas its network centrality, as a form of structural embeddedness in the network, promotes its opportunism. Moreover, we propose that relational embeddedness magnifies the role of a focal distributor's dependence on the supplier in suppressing the distributor's opportunism, whereas network centrality buffers such a role. We first empirically test these hypotheses using data collected from car dealers in China; the results provide support for the hypotheses. We then develop an analytical model to validate and further explain the underlying mechanisms of the network effects. Our analytical results not only validate the empirical results but also provide guidance for managers on controlling opportunism in distribution networks.     

Formal governance,interfirm coordination,and performance in partnerships: An empirical investigation of a mediation model

This study investigates the extent to which formal governance mechanisms such as contracts and equity ownership affect interfirm coordination and partnership performance. We analysed data from a survey of 301 Korean firms to show that interfirm coordination partially mediates the relationship between contract completeness, defined as the extent to which a contract specifies task operations and contingencies, and partnership performance. Furthermore, we find that more complete contracts can attenuate the negative effects of equity ownership on coordination, and that this effect is particularly strong when partner tasks are interdependent and relational norms are weak.     

The Safeguarding Effect of Governance Mechanisms in Inter‐firm Exchange: The Decisive Role of Mutual Opportunism

This study empirically investigates the safeguarding effect of (1) administrative control, (2) a dominant power position and (3) relational norms, on opportunistic behaviour of suppliers, by means of a survey among 624 information and communication technology professionals in Dutch municipalities. The findings indicate that individual effectiveness of relational norms, particularly in terms of flexibility and solidarity, was most prominent. Administrative control and power did not show a significant impact on supplier opportunism in our sample. Research into the simultaneous use of several safeguards against opportunism generated the finding that different relational norms fortify each other's safeguarding effect. Furthermore, we demonstrate that supplier opportunism is only mitigated by a dominant power position when the buyer does not exploit its favourable position and the buyer does not behave opportunistically. Hence, power seems to have a safeguarding effect only when it is not used.     

What drives contract design in alliances? Taking stock and how to proceed

We collect and assess prior empirical evidence on contract design in alliances that has been published since Parkhe’s (1993) seminal study on inter-firm contracts. We elaborate on the effects of transaction-related factors, experience gained from prior relationships, and deliberate learning efforts on contracts. Our paper offers three contributions. First, we systematically review the existing literature on alliance contracts and summarize our findings. Second, while prior research has traditionally focused on contractual complexity, we place the content of contracts center stage and identify three contractual functions. While existing studies on contractual functions predominantly refer to safeguarding as a response to appropriation concerns, we also consider coordination and contingency adaptability as outcomes of adaptation concerns. Third, we disentangle the differential influences of previous experiences on distinct contractual functions and show that experience gained from prior relationships has different effects on safeguarding and contingency adaptability than on coordination. Overall, we add to the systematization of the current debate on alliance contract design and trace promising avenues for future research on the impact of transaction- and experience-related factors on the complexity and content of alliance contracts.     

Cooperation,Contracts and Social Networks: From a Bounded to a Procedural Rationality Approach

The idea of this paper is that ifdecision-making processes are more consideredin a procedural rationality assumption, thenthe interplay of trust and calculativereasoning, and, at a more collective level, theinterplay of contracts and social networks maybe clarified. We use Lindenberg's framingtheory to define enlightened self-interest asthe rationality of contractual relationships.Cooperation is then explained by thewillingness to pursue the relationship which,from the background, decreases the salience ofthe gain frame. This willingness is supportedby a process of mutual relational signaling.When temptations of opportunism are strong,cooperation needs to be embedded, first in aformal contract and then, if stakes are toohigh, in a social network. In this framework,we show that the acceptance of contractualincompleteness by the parties is a positivesignal, which favors cooperation.     

There is more to contracts than incompleteness: a review and assessment of empirical research on inter-firm contract design

This paper aims at achieving a greater understanding of how contracts operate in practice through a review of recent empirical literature on inter-firm contract design. Our focus on the structure of contractual agreements differentiates this review from others that dedicated ample coverage also to the antecedents of the decision to contract and of the choice of contracting versus integration. Our framework develops Stinchcombe’s (Organization Theory and Project Management, 1985) hypothesis that contracts are an organizational phenomenon. This allows us to uncover considerable but unevenly distributed evidence on a number of organizational processes formalized in relational contracts, which partially overlap with the processes that are observed in integrated organizations. It also enables us to describe contracts in terms of a larger number of dimensions than is commonly appreciated. The paper summarizes the evidence by proposing a general and tentative framework to guide the design of relational contracts, discusses a number of lingering issues, and outlines directions for further research on contracts as an organizational phenomenon.

营销渠道中的合同治理、公平与角色外利他行为

本文以交易成本理论等为理论基础，应用AMOS 24.0软件对660份问卷数据进行结构方程建模分析，探讨了营销渠道中的合同治理（合同详尽性、合同监督）、渠道公平（分配公平、程序公平）与依赖对经销商角色外利他行为的影响。研究表明：第一，合同的详尽性、经销商的合同监督对其感知的分配公平、程序公平均有显著的正向影响；第二，经销商感知的分配公平、程序公平对其角色外利他行为均有显著的正向影响；第三，经销商依赖会增强分配公平对角色外利他行为的正向影响，减弱程序公平对角色外利他行为的正向影响。第四，合同详尽性和合同监督通过分配公平、程序公平促进经销商的角色外利他行为。