Global Complexity and Global Civil Society

This paper argues that recent struggles against neoliberal axioms such as free trade and open markets have led to a militant reframing of global civil society by grassroots social movements. It contests that this struggle to invest the concept of global civil society with transformative potential rests upon an identifiable praxis, a strange attractor that disturbs other civil society actors, through its re-articulation of a politics that privileges self-organization, direct action, and direct democracy. The paper further suggests that the emergence of this antagonistic orientation is best understood through the lens of complexity theory and offers some conceptual tools to begin the process of analyzing global civil society as an outcome and effect of global complexity.     

The Third Sector and Civil Society: The Case of the “YES” Campaign in Northern Ireland

The recent attention on civil society has brought new focus to the third sector. This welcomed attention accentuates the need to specify the role of the third sector in promoting civil society, generally, and in promoting democratic civil society, specifically. This paper describes and examines the YES Campaign that had roots in the third sector of Northern Ireland and which conducted a nonpartisan campaign to win approval for the Belfast Agreement of April 1998. The case of the YES Campaign illustrates some direct and intentional roles of third sector organizations in promoting a more democratic civil society, and offers a basis for further study of these roles.     

Making Minorities: Cultural Space,Stigma Transformation Frames,and the Categorical Status Claims of Deaf,Gay, and White Supremacist Activists in Late Twentieth Century America

This article compares the efforts of movement activists in three dissimilar groups to replace a stigmatized status with a valued one by portraying their groups as resembling established minorities (claims of contiguity in cultural space) and as differing from groups stigmatized as deviant (claims of distance). The most common claims assert similarity to African Americans, and frequently incorporate civil rights themes (exemplifying frame diffusion). Tactically, these minority status claims exploit both the resonance of cultural pluralism and state recognition of minorities. Strategically, minority status framing enables stigmatized groups to claim legitimacy without changing — simultaneously asserting both normality and difference.     

Civil Society Research Funding from a Global Perspective: A Case for Redressing Bias,Asymmetry, and Bifurcation

This paper adopts a global perspective to review the current situation with respect to the systematic study of civil society. It locates the analysis in a geohistorical framework, arguing that, as a distinct area of scholarship, contemporary civil society research is a two-track post-Cold War phenomenon exhibiting major shortcomings. A new type of dedicated research financing and process of allocation could redress today's research limitations in ways that will beneficially cross-fertilize parallel approaches and epistemological traditions while increasing the spread of centers dedicated to such knowledge generation. The analysis leads to suggestions for a civil society research agenda and investment principles.     

Rethinking reification

Conclusion By now this essay has accumulated over twenty alleged meanings, senses, or aspects of reification; there seems not much point in listing them. Some of them are mutually consistent, almost overlapping; others are incompatible. Some are in accord with the dictionary definition, others not. With some, the sense in which some entity is being converted into a res is evident; with others, try as I might, I cannot find such a sense. The dictionary entry itself is rather slipshod, and interpreters have expanded the term's meaning almost indefinitely beyond it. The main ways in which Lukács and Berger and Luckmann use the word do not fit into the dictionary definition at all. They make the meaning of reification dependent on concepts like can and could that are themselves heavily dependent on the particular context of their use. Lukács's and Berger and Luckmann's discussions are confusing and very probably confused. The whole thing is a swamp.Can this concept be saved? And should it?Within the limits of the dictionary definition, the concept does its work well enough. When Stephen Gould, say, criticizes psychologists for reifying intelligence by assuming that the I.Q. test must be testing something, he and the concept perform a clear and useful function. But if the main concerns are those of Lukács and Berger and Luckmann, in my opinion the term mystifies more than it reveals. Their concerns could be accommodated within the dictionary definition as reification of persons, in the sense of denying people's capacity for agency. But although Lukács and Berger and Luckmann do occasionally use the word this way, for the most part they do not. So articulating their concerns within this sense of the word would require extensive rewriting of their arguments. Would political theorists who share those concerns not do better to abandon the concept?I would unhesitatingly advise it, except for one, crucial consideration. There really is something going on among us that we urgently need to think and talk about, and that Lukács's and Berger and Luckmann's conceptions of reification were meant to address. People do feel trapped, in a way that makes Kafka's little fable so perfectly emblematic for our experience. Despite the prevalence in modern society of all of Berger and Luckmann's social circumstances that favor dereification, very many people do feel helpless to influence the conditions that constrain their lives. Millions of Americans turn their backs on politics, judging that engagement in it would make no significant difference. Millions of members of the underclass feel worthless - though also filled with diffuse rage - because society seems to have no use for them. Almost all of us function in large organizational systems, whether as parts of the machinery or materials being processed, and have learned to take that condition for granted. We function within an economy that depends on a system of international banking and finance that everyone knows to be in constant danger of collapse. Almost all of us submit without question to the technological imperative that daily exhausts our resources, destroys our health, and poisons the earth. And we march like sleepwalkers down the road marked deterrence and nonproliferation, toward nuclear doom. Experts and critics offer various diagnoses of our condition, but whatever measures are actually taken to treat it seem only to make it worse.This familiar litany of troubles suggests a malaise far too extensive and too grave for the powers of political prudence. When a society, or an entire civilization, or even the whole human species seems bent on self-destruction, one suspects systematic, pervasive, fundamental derangement in people's patterns of both thought and conduct. Calling on political prudence here is almost bound to mean calling for more of the same. Here what is needed is a more basic realignment of assumptions, of the sort that has traditionally been associated with great political theory.Wading through the dismal swamp of reification theory, as this essay does, can leave one feeling that such concepts, and political theory itself, are hopelessly abstracted from reality and of no practical use in relation to our urgent political problems, so that political prudence is the only hope. But political reality itself, and the prudence by which gifted actors know how to move within it, always presuppose and depend on theoretical frameworks - if not self-conscious, deliberate theorizing, then unexamined, inherited theory or, more likely, fragments of theories that may well be outdated or mutually inconsistent. So if we seem today bereft of political prudence and judgment, close to our wits' end, that may be because our wits are operating out of such incoherent fragments of inherited assumptions.The message to be derived from the familiar litany of our troubles and our sleepwalking, then, is not the familiar exhortation to, For God's sake, do something before it is too late! For while we may feel inert, we are already doing something - a lot of things - and they are the source of our troubles. Like Kafka's mouse, we run and run. Berger and Luckmann's and Lukács's concept of reification was meant to address precisely those troubles that are the large-scale outcome of our myriad activities, sustained and enlarged by nothing more than what we do. The problem is how to stop, how to do something else, what else to do.That is a problem as much for thought as for action, a problem for action informed and empowered by new thought. Part of the value of Berger and Luckmann's - and even more of Lukács's - discussion of reification is that they tried to provide a general theory of the nature and roots of our condition, orienting us to likely avenues for action, feasible ways and means, probable allies and opponents. Their efforts, this essay has argued, were confused and deeply flawed. The concept of reification is probably not a good tool for the job, and bad tools mean sloppy work. But better sloppy work with a bad tool than no work at all. Those of us who persist in reaching for the word reification as a tool should probably employ greater care. We should require ourselves to specify in each case precisely what we mean, and attend to whether and how our various meanings in various contexts are interrelated. But whether we revise the concept of reification, or abandon it, or just let it continue to slop along in its present state of dishevelment doesn't much matter. What matters is that we continue to think - hard and critically, theoretically and politically - about the conditions that Lukács and Berger and Luckmann were trying to address.Our thinking here must be simultaneously theoretical and political: theoretical in the sense of radical, cutting through conventions and cliches to the real roots of our troubles, seeing social arrangements large-scale and long-range, as if from the outside, which may be what Lukács meant by intending totality. Yet the thinking must also be political, in the sense of oriented to action, practical, speaking in a meaningful way to those capable of making the necessary changes, those Lukács called the we of genesis. For Lukács, of course, that meant the proletariat. But one need not be a Marxist to see the need for locating such a we, and the point of seeking it among those with an objective interest in the right sort of change and the potential power to bring it about. The aim is not some new doctrine to save us from ourselves, but a transformed way of seeing what we already tacitly know and do, which restores us to our real world - the concrete here and now, as Lukács puts it - and our real, living selves, including our capacities for action. That would mean not some access to mysterious, infinite powers, but the appropriation of our actual powers, recognizing the present moment as the moment of decision, the moment of the birth of the new, as Lukács says, out of which we jointly make the future. That is no return to Hegelian idealism, but a recovery of the practical, political Marx.Thinking both theoretically and politically in this way is no easy task; indeed, it is almost a contradiction in terms. Yet it may well be our best hope, and the world is in a hurry. Despite all of the political and philosophical difficulties, unless we undertake this task we may well guarantee our own entrapment, assuring that we will end up like Kafka's mouse, rather than human and free.

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Touristic authenticity,touristic angst,and modern reality

The tourist has become the symbol of a peculiarly modern type of inauthenticity. This paper explores the criticisms that have been directed at the reality experiences of the tourist. In so doing, the following inexhaustive typology of touristic realities is developed: 1) the first-order or true tourist, 2) the second-order or Angst-ridden tourist, 3( the third-order or anthropological tourist, and 4) the fourth-order or spiritual tourist. Each of these types represents a progressively more intense search for reality through travel. Each is, however, criticized for participating in its own form of inauthenticity.After exploring the reality experiences and criticisms of each of these travellers, the paper turns the tables on the cultured despisers of tourism to argue that perhaps the lowly first-order tourist is not so inauthentic after all. True, this traveller may not be having a real heroic adventure, but such is not the goal. Rather, the reality experienced by the first-order tourist is a pleasurable liberation from the normal concerns of everyday life which simultaneously reaffirms commitment to that reality. Quite frequently the first-order tourist is less concerned about having a real experience in the visited place than in experiencing family and friendship relationships-relationships completely ignored by the anti-touristic tourists in their search for authenticity in someone else's reality.The author would like to thank Peter L. Berger, Harry C. Bredemeier, Warren I. Susman, and M. Kathy Kenyon for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. This research was supported in part by NIMH grant no. 5 T32 NH14660.     

When “Life Is but a Dream”: Obliterating Politics Through Business Process Reengineering?

In this article, we explore the genesis andoperation of Business Process Reengineering (BPR) withina medium-sized U.K. bank from the late 1980s to themid-1990s. We dismiss the claims of those evangelical gurus who assume that BPR can bedecontextualized and decoupled from organizationalpolitics and posit that BPR can be managedinstantaneously and unproblematically. Instead we arguethat BPR is likely to be constituted by and through politicalrelations, and that BPR in turn will reconstituteorganizational forms and norms, in a highly politicalfashion. We endeavor to build upon current approachestoward organizational politics. We illustrate thatpolitics is not simply about resistance to some putativeorganizational norm of stability or uniformity as BPR'sgurus imply. Nor does it deriveexclusively from diverse interest groups pursuing separateor conflicting ends that can be juggled and managed asprocessual or pluralistic accounts of organizationalchange tend to assume. Neither, in this instance, can one interpret politics as being entirelyaxiomatic with labor's resistance to management(capital) which is characteristic of a traditional laborprocess analysis, although expressions of this were apparent in our case study. We suggest thatpolitics also needs to be understood interms of power and identity relations or how individualsseek, through political maneuverings, to further or secure their individual careers andidentities in an uncertain world. In view of this, weargue that politics are essential to the very fabric oforganizational life, which renders the outcomes of BPR uncertain and contested.     

Theory at risk: Accounting for the excellence movement

Amidst widespread concern about educational crisis and the need for reform, the current excellence movement places a pronounced emphasis on rigor, standards, and a core curriculum of basic studies. At issue here is whether major macro-the-oretical perspectives can account for the emergence of this movement. Functional and Marxian theories do not meet this challenge well, especially insofar as they posit a tight, rational linkage between school and economy and downplay the institutional autonomy of the educational system. A status conflict approach, emphasizing middle class mobilization, offers greater insight, though it must be complemented with a recognition of constraints imposed by capitalist organization and the institutionalization of educational myths.     

Poland's crisis and East European socialism

Conclusion We began this article by asking whether the Polish crisis is a socialist or a Polish disease. By citing the structural factors, we brought out the common difficulties affecting all East European societies in their political and economic development. These difficulties arose out of the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth and the consequent need to replace political mobilization of the population with their political integration. The structural contradictions occurred together with conjunctural developments in the world economy, the collapse of detente, the post-war demographic explosion, and natural calamities. Poland was least able to cope with these structural and conjunctural dynamics. The result was a society united on a national basis in its conflicts with the Party State apparatus. This conflict was never resolved by Solidarity nor by the subsequent military coup.While Poland and Romania had quite similar structural and conjunctural dynamics, it was only in Poland that the constellation of nation-specific factors yielded a societal reaction of system-threatening character. Looking at the rest of Eastern Europe, we do not see a similar constellation of factors. Rather, the combination of structural, conjunctural, and specific conditions has prevented the deeper contradictions from evolving into Solidarity-type mass movements of the Polish variety. Thus, we believe that the Polish developments will not be replicated in any of the other East European countries in the foreseeable future.Does this mean that the Polish experience is so unique that it is without relevance for the other East European states? On the contrary, the recognition of common structural problems points to fundamental conflicts in all the countries of actually existing socialism. The essence of these conflicts may be the same. It is the ability to identify and deal with them that distinguishes one East European regime from another. This ability varies with the specific and conjunctural factors as applied to each country. While there is little likelihood that the Polish disease will spread, this is partly because the other East European states are beginning to take preventive measures. In other words, they are learning from the Polish experience.There are several indicators that these regimes have learned from the Polish crisis. We can summarize them in the following predictions:First, we believe that state power and the repressive apparatus of the various East European countries will be reinforced and made more effective. This applies not so much to overt shows of force but to more sophisticated methods of social control and repression: e.g., limiting information channels, dispersing dissident groups, giving in to workers protests before they spread, taking practical measures to prevent consumer shortages from getting out of hand, and the like.Second, we can expect that oppositional forces, especially intellectuals, will be increasingly restricted in their ability to formulate and articulate system-threatening demands. The East European states will take any measures - jail, slander, internal deportation, cooptation, forced emigration - to make sure that intellectuals' contact with workers is weakened or at least strictly supervised.Third, we can expect the Eastern European states to take further measures to integrate potential system-threatening movements into the official system. We will see further attempts to improve the access possibilities for those social interests that have up to now been neglected, e.g. in physical and social infrastructures, neglected regions. Moreover, there will be renewed efforts to make the system of political socialization (education, propaganda, culture) more effective. Finally, we can expect anti-corruption campaigns within the State, Party, and industrial bureaucracies as the elites attempt to make these organs more legitimate in the eyes of the population.In recent months there seems to be considerable evidence that the East European regimes have taken all these measures. There have been attempts to re-invigorate the official trade unions. Yuri Andropov's succession was marked by a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign designed to win favor among rank-and-file workers. In Romania there have been exhortations towards more self-sufficiency and self-management, so that individual producers will be less dependent on State retail outlets, and the country less dependent on costly foreign imports. The reduction in East-West trade and decline of detente have also given more leeway for the East European repressive apparatus to crack down on dissidents and oppositional movements.With reduced trade, the economic benefits of detente no longer exist as a restraining factor on the authorities. The West now has reduced influence on domestic politics in East Europe. The combination of integration and repressive measures has so far prevented the structural contradictions from growing into true political crises of the Polish variety. Eastern Europe (and Poland) is remarkably quiet.With the broad enthusiasm fostered in the West by the rise of Solidarity, it is understandable that its brutal demise had generated parallel feelings of disillusionment. It would be erroneous to consider the Polish events as an archetype for Eastern Europe. The problems of East European regimes reflect a general system crisis (economic and political), each country's response depends on specific local conditions and fortuitous conjunctures. If the Polish events are to be understood, they must be explained as a variant in a larger East European context.Having concentrated on the crisis aspects in Poland and Romania should not blind us from the fact that these systems have an amazing ability to reproduce themselves - to muddle through. Actually existing socialism is more than simply brute force. Each of the East European societies exhibits a complex dialectic between the forces of functional stability and the forces of immanent contradictions. As such, in addition to their structural aspects, we must analyze each of these societies in their differing vulnerability to conjunctural events and in their specific political, social, and cultural characters.For those who seek to replace actually existing socialism with a more emancipatory socialism, the Polish crisis constitutes a key point of departure. It should be discussed both in terms of what it means for Poland, and for Eastern Europe. The Polish events provide further evidence that the tasks of social theory reside as much in explaining why societies muddle through as why they fall apart.     

Social affinity among top managerial executives of large corporations in Korea

Korea is a society subject to quite diverse social forces. Modernization should encourage reform, but the yoke of tradition restrains this tendency. This paper examines the patterns of preferential treatment of executives, based on family, school, and regional ties, by the owners of large Jaebol corporations in Korea. We found that about 21% of the total number of executive positions in the large corporations were occupied by individuals who had some type of family tie with the owners of the corporations. Also, there is a strong tendency of corporation owners to employ the executives of the same regional origin of birth as their own, but the affinity based on school ties was not as strong as that of regional origin. The findings of this study seem to support the arguments of previous studies that claimed a trust factor as a main cause of social similarity and affinity between the owners and executives in corporations.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, August 17–22, 1987, Chicago, Illinois.     

Triangular empathy: “The other” in psychotherapy with individuals

This paper seeks to explore triangular dimensions in individual psychotherapy. In addition to serving as the dyadic object of transference projection and/or as selfobject for a person in psychotherapy, the therapist may be called upon to help the patient work on relationships with certain early, important people or their representations and on the interplay between such relationships and the therapeutic one, that is, in a triangular configuration. Because patients' attempts to introduce others into individual psychotherapy are sometimes experienced by therapists as resistant rather than as integral to the therapeutic process, I propose an empathic reconsideration of such patient efforts to get us to help with the complicated dimensions of human relatedness.     

“Marrying off” children as a developmental stage

Conclusion Marrying off the children is an important developmental stage in adulthood. Part of the very long and complex stage described by Erik Erikson as Generativity vs. Stagnation, this stage, like many earlier life stages, can be understood to give rise to a normative adult crisis that is destabilizing and anxiety-provoking. The marriage of one's offspring requires an ongoing transformation of parental narcissism, part of a developmental process that is intrinsic to parenthood. Issues of selfesteem are revived and reworked during this period. Traditional theory looks to oedipal rivalry or drive conflict of some kind to explain the anxiety at this time. An expanded understanding of narcissism, provided by Kohut and Elson has given us a broader view of these phenomena.The experience of hurt and sadness at a time when there is reason to celebrate can be a profoundly lonely and bewildering experience. As informed clinicians we can alleviate some of the loneliness and guilt about these feelings by understanding the challenge to the self that the marriage of adult children may represent.     

Contextualizing the Employment Decisions of New Mothers

This paper suggests that the employment behavior and stated preferences of new mothers are not simply a product of choices that individual women make or characteristics that they have. Rather, using qualitative interview data from a sample of new parents, this paper illustrates some of the interactional and institutional contexts in which new mothers' approaches to paid work are embedded, with a particular focus on gender. Among the themes explored are the influence of husbands' preferences on women's decisions, the role of economic processes in structuring parenting arrangements, as well as the prominence of gendered cultural imagery in new parents' accounts about their work and family arrangements.     

“Even Better Than the Real Thing”: Narratives of the Self in Codependency

This paper argues that the self is best understood as a narrative in progress, rather than a collection of roles or the outcome of a competent performance. Self-narratives draw integrity from institutions, without which they would be groundless, inconsistent, or fanciful. Institutions make self-stories convincing—for tellers and others—by providing formulas, supporting characters, and autobiographical occasions that trigger the telling. Relationships are especially significant institutional anchors for selfhood. The loss of that anchor through breaking up, or uncoupling, requires a particular kind of story that accounts for the loss and minimizes the stigma of failure. A ready-made formula for such stories is offered by the self-help group Codependents Anonymous. Those attracted to the discourse of codependency gain a formula and occasion for generating revised self-stories. Consequently, the group becomes a new institutional anchor for the self that replaces the one lost during uncoupling.     

After the Interview

This article is concerned with after the interview, a strip of time (Goffman 1974, p. 10) between the end of the formal interview and the culmination of leave-taking rituals. Although there is a considerable and growing literature on qualitative interviewing (Arksey and Knight 1999; Kvale 1996; Rubin and Rubin 1995; Weiss 1994), and some corridor talk about the meaning of off the record post-interview comments, this topic has received little attention in the published literature (but see DeSantis 1980 and Wenger 2001). And we think it is an important one, since it illuminates the interviewee's interpretation of the interviewer and interview process, and highlights aspects of the meaning of the topic, and of the interviewer, to the respondent (which is, after all, the endpoint of the qualitative interviewing method). Further, the question of what constitutes after the interview throws into relief the question of what is an interview.     

Predatory,developmental, and other apparatuses: A comparative political economy perspective on the Third World state

Disappointment over the contributions of Third World state apparatuses to industrial transformation and the increasing intellectual dominance of neoutiliarian paradigms in the social science has made if fashionable to castigate the Third World state as predatory and rent seeking. This paper argues for a more differentiated view, one that connects differences in performance to differences in state structure. The incoherent absolutist domination of the klepto-patrimonial Zairian state are contrasted to the embedded autonomy of the East Asian developmental state. Then the internal structure and external ties of an intermediate state — Brazil — are analyzed in relation to both polar types. The comparative evidence suggests that the efficacy of the developmental state depends on a meritocratic bureaucracy with a strong sense of corporate identity and a dense set of institutionalized links to private elites.     

Re-Figuring Marked Bodies on the Borders: Breast Cancer and “Femininity”

The author discusses writings by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Kathleen Martindale, Audre Lorde, and Barbara Rosenblum on their experiences with breast cancer, and explores their articulations of the impact mastectomy has had on their sense of femininity in relation to their own identities and body images, and in relation to cultural expectations, and how others perceive them. Their identification of the body as socially produced, and as a site of contestation and multiple struggles, offers a strategic site from which to engage with the violent gender-inflected notion of the ideal female body. Themes addressed include: the process of writing embodied experience to make it real, the body's role in the process of identity formation, the culturally constructed significance of appearance to the individual's sense of femininity, the value of the female body in a capitalistic society, and heterosexism in society and in the health care system.     

Snarls,Quacks, and Quarrels: Culture and Structure in Political Process Theory

Political process theories of social movements have relied on a set of oppositions between culture and structure that has limited their capacity to capture the supraindividual, durable, and constraining dimensions of culture. The solution is not to abandon an emphasis on objective political structures in favor of potential insurgents' subjective perceptions of political opportunities, but rather to probe the (objective) resources and constraints generated by the cultural dimensions of political structures. Such a perspective would pay closer attention to the cultural traditions, ideological principles, institutional memories, and political taboos that create and limit political opportunities; and would link the master frames that animate protest to dominant political structures and processes.     

Psychosemantics of “One-China” Conception: Fourth-Dimensional Resolution of Taiwan–Mainland Political Deadlock

The political conflicts between Taiwan and the Mainland have progressed, for over 50 years, from the historical hot civil war for the exclusive ownership of one China's territorial sovereignty to the contemporary cold rhetoric circularity around the geopolitical symbolism of the one-China principle. In the process, the United States has been intimately entangled in the disputes in terms of 3 alignment stages--from an unambiguous pro-Taiwan before the 1970s, the ambiguous neutrality in the early 1970s, to the contemporary pro-Mainland China. Despite the fact that during the past 3 decades the United States honored the arms sales and the Taiwan Relations Act commitments in Taiwan's favor, and simultaneously conferred the 3 Nos and 3 communiqués in Mainland China's favor, the cross-Strait tensions have persisted without the prospect of a definitive foreseeable resolution. Further, because of the lack of explicit conception of one China, the United States has to constantly resist the opposing persuasions of the 2 sides, and therefore must continue to rely on the ambiguous dual deterrence strategy for maintaining the dynamics balance over the Taiwan Strait. For such endeavors, the Clinton 4 frameworks and the Bush 5 Taiwan policies have proven to be very effective, but mostly to the extent of assuming a passive role in preventing military confrontations.