Ansley J. Coale on Increases in Expectation of Life and Population Growth

The rapid decline in mortality after the end of World War II, in combination with a much slower downward adjustment of fertility, resulted in an extraordinary acceleration of world population growth. In a contribution prepared for the 1959 Vienna conference of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Ansley J. Coale présented a concise and spirited exploration of the influence of mortality and fertility on the levels and patterns of growth and on the distribution of the population by age. Using the stable population model as his tool of exploration, Coale présents a comparative analysis of the implications of movements between stable states, making imaginative illustrative assumptions on changes over time and highlighting the often surprising and counterintuitive results of such calculations. The full text of this article, omitting summaries in English and French, is reproduced below from pp. 36–41 in Union Internationale pour I?étude scientifique de la population, Internationaler Bevölkerungskongress, Wien:Im Selbstverlag, 1959. Ansley Coale was one of the most prominent figures in demography in the second half of the twentieth century. He was born in 1917 and was educated at Princeton University. He spent his entire professional career at Princeton, as a member of the economics faculty and in association with the Office of Population Research, of which he was director from 1959 to 1975. In 1967/68 he was president of the Population Association of America, and from 1977 to 1981 he was president of IUSSP. His many scientific works include Population Growth and Economic Development in Low‐Income Countries (1958), coauthored with Edgar M. Hoover, a book that was highly influential in shaping the international population policy agenda from the 1960s on—lately receiving renewed attention as a predictor of the “demographic dividend” benefiting economies as a result of the transition to low fertility. He was initiator and leader of the Princeton project exploring the causes of the decline in marital fertility in Europe, culminating in the 1986 book, coedited with Susan C. Watkins, The Decline of Fertility in Europe. His most lasting contribution to population studies, however, was in the field of formal demography, as both teacher and scholar. His research in this area is exemplified by the 1972 book The Growth and Structure of Human Populations: A Mathematical Investigation, and in the application of demographic models to the estimation and analysis of population data. Ansley Coale died on 5 November 2002, at the age of 84.     

中国生育率研究方法:30年回眸

改革开放30年是我国人口学及人口研究迅速成长的30年。生育率研究方法从一个侧面反映出改革开放以来我国人口学研究方法的发展。中国的生育率研究方法既有从西方引进的各种生育率指标和模型,也有中国学者为了适应自己的需要而改进和创建的方法和模型。笔者从生育率度量指标和生育率模型两个方面总结我国生育率研究方法的应用及变化。对在中国生育率研究中所使用的主要方法进行回顾并对这些方法对我国生育率研究的贡献进行总结。     

人口红利问题研究

人口红利问题是经济学和人口学共同关注的热门话题之一，但是对于人口红利的具体定义仍然存在分歧。文章重新界定了人口红利的概念以及衡量标准。并以此标准探讨了中国人口红利的特征和影响经济增长的条件和传导机制。     

中国人口转变与消费制度变迁

从抑制消费到刺激消费是中国消费制度的重大变革。本文运用新制度经济学和人口经济学理论,论证了中国人口转变通过人口增长的迅速下降,人口年龄结构的变化及其带来的人口红利对消费制度变迁的影响:死亡率下降主导的初期阶段,人口转变固化了抑制消费的制度,出生率下降主导阶段,人口转变与改革开放条件下的高速经济增长相叠加加剧了原有消费制度的不均衡。通过实证分析,揭示出消费率在人口转变过程中下降的必然性和中国保持适度人口增长的必要。     

The research of population science must initiate a new situation]

The basis for initiating a new situation in population research lies in Hu Yaobang's address at the 12th National Congress when he said that the population problem is of extreme importance and that birth control is a basic national policy. The rapid population growth, he continued, influences income, food, clothing, shelter, education and work, and it might even influence the stability of a society. Thus, birth control work, particularly in the countryside, must never be lax. But if the work is done well, then population control can be successful. There already exists a good basis for population research. Since the 1970s, demography developed rapidly, whether it was in population theory, population control, disseminating information, training cadres for census work, projecting population, or in developing professional relationships on an international level. The Population Association of China, established in 1981, was followed by population associations in the provinces, cities, and autonomous regions. In the last 2 years, the Population Association of China convened 5 specialized meetings. Currently China has a Population Research Center and 217 offices, plus demographic studies at the People's University and Fudan University. In initiating a new situation in demography, one should study new situations, sum up new experiences, and solve new problems. The national policy is to control population numbers and raise population quality. This can be done by educating peasants that female babies are worthwhile, protecting mothers who bear female babies, and encouraging eugenics.     

China's demographic dilemmas

The year 2000 marks the end of a tumultuous century in China's population history, which weathered the demographic effects of devastating famines, wars, and epidemics and population growth and change. This paper examines the effect of population policies on the demographic dilemmas of China. In the 1950s, China had seen the fastest demographic transition in history, with a dramatic decline in mortality rates, followed by a decrease in fertility rates. However, in the 1970s, revisions in population control measures, changes in age structure, and fluctuations in age at marriage resulted in lower fertility rates. The struggles encountered by China in regulating fertility are described; these include the different methods of birth control, gender preference, marriage, population aging, and minority populations. Population and development issues within the context of urbanization, employment, education, health care, economy, and environment are also discussed. Future implications of these findings indicate the need for a systematic, effective, and complete environmental clean-up, as well as fertility and population policies.     

Sixty years of change in Tibetan fertility: An assessment

Existing knowledge of Tibetan historical population development is mostly based on ‘best-guess’ estimates and is heavily politicized. Using census data, I reconstruct the development of Tibetan fertility in China since the 1940s, with the objective of providing an independent assessment that can be used as benchmark for future studies and debates on Tibetan demography. Following major social and economic transformations starting in the 1950s, Tibetan fertility unexpectedly increased from the late 1950s to the late 1960s. As noted in several existing studies, Tibetan fertility in China then declined swiftly from the early 1980s onwards and has now reached values close to replacement level. Focusing on the 1950–70 period, I examine factors that contributed to shaping the Tibetan fertility increase in more detail. This confirms that changes in nuptiality and disease-related infertility both played a role in pushing up fertility rates among Tibetan women in China.     

The population growth in the city of Beijing and our present tasks (author's transl)]

Concern for the rapid population growth since 1949 of China's second largest city, Beijing, is discussed in terms of population control, migration, and rises in the productive development of the city. From 1949 to 1963 the natural rate of population increased from 7.5 to 35.3%; however, after the introduction of a birth control program in 1971, the natural increase of population declined to 4.02% in 1977. From 1949-1978, the average birth rate was 145,000/year while the average death rate was 46,500/year, leaving the annual average increase in population at 98,000. The natural population increased by 2,340,000 from 1949-1978. The massive population growth since 1949 affected the economic development of the city as well as the country. Cultivated land near Beijing increased from 1949-1952, but because of urban development the land for cultivation decreased by 1,527,000 market acres from that available in 1949 (7,965,000 market acres). Population density increased from 430 persons/ square kilometer in 1962 to 506 persons/ square kilometer in 1978. From 1953 to 1978, production and consumption rates fluctuated with a net balance of only 2020 million catties in the 26 years, causing the need for products to be imported from other areas of the country. Unemployment is exacerbated by the lack of jobs and increasing numbers of people. Transportation problems also have developed. New efforts are being made to inform people of population control by the Beijing Population Association begun in 1979, because Beijing's population will continue to increase until 1989 due to the baby boom years during the fifties which created a 2nd boom in the late 1970s as well as the lack of education on population control. Other programs are being developed to, 1) educate people on economical measures of reducing the population, 2) promote governmental departments to improve birth control programs by means of social security services, child health agencies, and nursing schools, 3) propagandize eugenics and genetic education to enhance the population, and 4) reinforce the propaganda on birth control and technical guidance.     

Our population predicament: a new look

Issued to mark the Population Reference Bureau's 50th anniversary, this issue updates the story of world population presented in its popular predecessor of 1971, "Man's Population Predicament." Estimated at 1/2 billion in 1650, world population reached about 2 billion in 1930, 4 billion in 1975, and is projected to be about 6 billion in 2000. Most of today's rapid growth is occurring among the 3/4 of the world's peoples living in less developed countries where the post-World War II gap between high birth rates and falling death rates has only recently begun to narrow. This growth, coupled with high consumption in developing countries, is putting tremendous pressures on the Earth's resources, environment, and social fabric. New evidence on Europe's population transition and from China, Indonesia, and Thailand in the 1970s suggests that well-designed family planning programs can speed fertility decline but rapid worldwide attainment of replacement level fertility will also require special development efforts and measures that go beyond family planning. Current projections of the world's ultimate peak population range from 8 billion in the mid 21st century to 11 billion in about 2125, depending on when replacement-level fertility is reached. China's drive for a drastic birth rate reduction and the oil crisis might change fertility behavior more rapidly than most demographers have heretofore thought likely.     

D. V. Glass on the Problems of a Declining Population

During the past quarter century fertility has dropped below replacement levels in many parts of the world. According to United Nations estimates, in 2005 this was the case in 65 countries, comprising 43 percent of the world's population. In many cases, most notably in Europe and East Asia, the shortfall of fertility from the level that would be necessary in the long run to sustain a stationary population is substantial. In Europe, for example, the average total fertility rate for the period 2000–2005 was 1.4. Indefinite maintenance of such a level implies a shrinkage of the total population by one‐third over a generation–roughly every 30 years. Accompanying that rapid decline of total numbers would be an age structure containing a preponderance of the elderly, posing extreme adjustment difficulties for the economic and social system. Societies that wish to avoid radical depopulation would have to engineer a substantial rise infertility–if not to full replacement level (slightly more than two children per woman), then at least to a level that would moderate the tempo of population decline and make population aging easier to cope with. An additional counter to declining numbers, if not significantly to population aging, could come from net immigration. This is the demographic future assumed in the UN medium‐variant projections for countries and regions currently of very low fertility. Thus, for example, in Europe over the period up to 2050 fertility is assumed to rise to 1.85 and net immigration to amount to some 32 million persons. The UN projections also anticipate further improvement in average life expectancy–from its current level of 74 years to 81 years. This factor slows the decline in population size but accelerates population aging. Under these assumptions, Europe's population would decline from its present 728 million to 653 million by 2050. At that time the proportion of the population over age 65 would be 27.6 percent, nearly double its present share. Demographic change of this nature is not a novel prospect. It was envisioned in a number of European countries and in North America, Australia, and New Zealand in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Concern with the possible economic and social consequences generated much discussion at that time among demographers and social scientists at large and also attracted public attention. Possible policy measures that might reverse the downward trend of fertility were also debated, although resulting in only hesitant and largely inconsequential action. The article by D. V. Glass reproduced below is an especially lucid and concise treatment of demographic changes under conditions of low fertility and their economic and social implications. It appeared in Eugenics Review (vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 39–47) in 1937 when the author was 26 years old. Glass's line of argument is broadly representative of the main focus of demographic analysis in the mid‐1930s on aspects of population dynamics, applying the then still novel analytical tool of the stable population model. It also echoes the work of economists then witnessing the great difficulties capitalist economies faced in adjusting to structural changes in consumer demand and labor supply. While Glass addresses these issues primarily with reference to England and Wales, he sees the issues as affecting all industrialized countries. The Malthusian problem of relentless population growth he persuasively declares to be irrelevant for these countries. The Western world faces the opposite problem: population decline, a trend only temporarily masked by the effects of an age distribution that still has a relatively high proportion of women in the child‐bearing ages, reflecting the higher fertility level of the past. A stationary population, Glass cogently argues, is to be welcomed, and he considers the absolute size at which zero growth would be achieved relatively unimportant. In contrast, a continuous population decline would have “thoroughly disastrous” results in an individualist civilization and in “an unplanned economic system.” And, he concedes, somewhat quaintly, that sustained below‐replacement fertility would pose a great problem “even in a country in which the means of production were owned communally.” Glass's conclusions about the reversibility of low fertility are as pessimistic as those of most informed observers today. Still, he sees hope in a future “rationally planned civilization” that would “produce an environment in which high fertility and a high standard of life will both be possible.” In this context, high fertility means the level necessary to sustain the population in a stationary state. By present‐day standards the level Glass calculates as needed for long‐term zero growth is indeed fairly high: 2.87 children per woman. But that figure reflects the fact that, when he wrote, mortality up to age 50 was still fairly high and fertility occurred almost wholly within marriage; it also assumes zero net immigration. In the last 70 years much has changed in each of these three components of population dynamics, both in England and Wales and in the rest of Europe. Still, Glass's commentary remains highly relevant to the discussion of the problems of low fertility today. David Victor Glass (1911–78) was associated with the London School of Economics throughout much of his scientific career. He followed R. R. Kuczynski as reader in demography in 1945 and became professor of sociology in 1948. His work on demography, population history, and population policy had already made him one of the most influential demographers in pre‐World War II Britain. After the war he rose to international prominence through pioneering work on the Royal Commission of Population; through his research on historical demography, the history of demographic thought, and social mobility; and through founding, in 1947, the journal Population Studies, which he edited until his death.     

Population trends and differentials in countries of the ESCAP region

The total population of the ESCAP region reached 2.4 billion in 1979, up from 2 billion in 1970. 6 of the 10 largest countries are in the region: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. East Asia contains 1.1 billion; Middle South Asia contains 923 million; Eastern South Asia, 354 million; and Oceania, 22 million. The crude birth rate for the total region dropped by 5 points from 1970-9; the crude death rate dropped by 2 points, resulting in a decline in the annual growth rate of .3 percentage points, from 2.1% in 1970 to 1.8% in 1979. Overall, the total fertility rate decreased by 15% from 4.8 to 4.1. The total fertility rate in Australia fell 33% from 2.8 to 1.9 and in New Zealand from 3.0 to 1.9, or 37%. Generally fertility is lower in urban areas than in rural with some exceptions. A strong negative relationship between level of education and fertility exists in all countries of Asia and the Pacific, however, the parity of women with some primary education exceeds that of women with no schooling. Life expectancy at birth for both sexes in the region increased from 55.1 years in 1970 to 58.7 years in 1979, or by 7%. The highest life expectancy is in Japan at 75.2 years. The infant mortality rate in the ESCAP region in 1979 was estimated to be 78/1000. World Fertility Survey data indicate that the mean age of first marriage is generally very low but gradually increasing.     

Characteristics of fertility transition in China]

Since 1949 and in particular the 1970s, China's fertility rate has undergone rapid and continuous change. This is a direct reflection of China's success in population control. The decline in China's fertility rate regulated the speed of population growth, altered the population structure, and brought population development to be in line with economic development. Data used in this article are from the National 1/1000 Random Sample of Fertility (1982), the 10% Sample of the 1982 Population Census, 1981, 1983 and 1984 statistical yearbooks, and other data from the Statistics Bureau. China's fertility rate dropped an annual average of 2.5/1000 from 1950-81. However, this time, the fertility rate fluctuated, depending on political, social and economic factors. As the nation prospered, the fertility rate remained stable and high; as China suffered severe economic losses, the fertility rate dropped. A steady decline was evident beginning in 1970 as the government began to propagandize the merits of smaller families. Between 1971-83 the average yearly rate of growth was 1.6%. The number of years a woman was fertile was similar for both urban and rural women in 1964 and 1981; moreover, in 1981 both groups showed a sharp drop in fertility between the ages of 27-35. The 1 child rate for urban women rose from 21.9% in 1964 to 86.6% in 1981. Urban women tend to be more receptive to late marriage, late births, and fewer children. This change in the 1 child rate contributed to the drop in the birth rate of 31.1/1000 in 1964 to 20.9/1000 in 1981.     

曲折、艰难、辉煌的中国生育转变

从1979～2009年30年人口变动的历程来看,中国人口转变是成功的,其结果是辉煌的,但其转变的历程,尤其是生育转变的历程是曲折和艰难的,历史留给人们的经验和教训是深刻的。本文将近30年来的生育转变历程为四个阶段,从而突显了不同阶段生育水平的变化,以及生育水平与社会经济变革、生育行为以及生育政策博弈的结果。1979～1984年生育水平反弹波动,反映出严格的生育政策遇到强大阻力,结果是欲速而不达。1985～1991年生育高峰如期而至,显示了人口内在规律的强大威力,从而最大限度地调动了人口控制的力量。1992～1999生育率再次下降,并穿透替代水平生育率,宣告人口转变基本完成。2000～2009低生育水平持续稳定,人口结构性问题逐步显现,统筹解决人口问题势在必行。     

Fertility Transition in China:A Zigzag and Splendid Course

Examining China’s population changes in the past three decades demonstrates that China’s demographic transition has been successfully completed with a splendid and zigzag path.There are profound historical experiences and lessons.This paper reviews China’s fertility transition which is divided into four periods and argues that fertility changes are a result of the interactions between socioeconomic development,fertility behaviors and fertility policies.Substantial resistance to the "one-childpolicy" during 1979 to 1984 resulted in rebounding and fluctuating fertility.The baby boom occurred in the period 1985 to 1991 was a manifestation of the inherent laws of demographic dynamics,and subsequently forceful birth control was again mobilized.The period from 1992 to 1999 witnessed large declines in fertility which penetrates the replacement zone,showing that China was completing the fertility transition.China’s stabilizing low fertility and emerging population structural issues since 2000 call for comprehensive ways in addressing the population problems.     

人口容量是一个历史范畴——对人口容量范畴的再认识

研究人口容量的范畴归属是研究人口理论的重要基础。站在不同的研究角度上,学者们已对人口容量这个范畴研究出了许多成熟的结论,在此基础上,我们从历史唯物辨证观出发,从人口容量本身和人类发展情况等方面对其作出了论述,提出人口容量是历史范畴的观点。     

Asian and Pacific population targets

2 population targets for the Asian and Pacific regions were established in 1981-82: 1) by the Asian Conference of Parliamentarians on Population and Development at Beijing, China to attain 1% population growth rate for the Asian region by the year 2000, and 2) by the 3rd Asian and Pacific Population Conference at Colombo, Sri Lanka, to attain replacement level of fertility by the year 2000. In an attempt to ascertain whether these targets can be achieved and/or related, the Population Division of the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) prepared population projections in which the 2 targets are achieved. These projections were prepared by aggregating the total population of member countries. When net reproduction rate (NRR) equals 1 (replacement level fertility) it will lead to a stable population with a growth rate of zero. In the short-term a population with replacement level fertility will continue to increase if it has a young age structure due to previous higher levels of fertility. Some projections for the period 1980-2005 are: 1) population growth rate will decrease from 1.78% to 1.05%, 2) total fertility rate will decrease from 3.63-2.11, 3) male life expectancy will increase from 59.8-67.3, and 4) infant mortality rate will decrease from 67.3-34.5. For the ESCAP region, a target of NRR of 1 would be easier to achieve than a growth rate of 1%. The UN projects the total population of the region to be 3,382,000,000 in the year 2000. If the NRR can be lowered to 1 by then, however, the total population would be 3,342,000,000 and if the growth rate can be reduced to 1% by the end of the century the resulting population would be 3,300,000,000. Major demographic benefits will be attained in terms of the age structure of the population if a 1% growth rate is achieved; the proportion under age 15 was 37.1% in 1980 but will be 27.2% in 2000 with a dependency ratio of 48.8 compared to 70.8 for 1980.     

Social Demography and Eugenics in the Interwar United States

This article explores the relationship between eugenics and demography in the United States in the interwar era. In focusing on the founding of the International Union for the Scientific Investigation of Population Problems and the Population Association of America, it shows how early population scientists contested and negotiated the boundaries of the population field. The article maps the shifting focus away from biological interpretations of population dynamics toward the social, in part as a reaction to the rise of Fascist population research and policy. However, it also shows how social demography was closely intertwined with a “social eugenics” that attempted to ensure human betterment through methods more consistent with New Deal policymaking. This, the article argues, contributed critical intellectual and material resources to the development of social surveys of fertility behavior and contraceptive use, surveys that are more commonly perceived as having undermined eugenics through challenging the biologically deterministic assumptions upon which it was based.     

Birth planning on many fronts: personal glimpses of innovations in China's Population Programme

The national birth planning program was initiated in 1965 in China with the establishment of a general office for family planning. Birth planning offices exist at the provincial, district, county, and municipal levels. Shanghai, in particular, is cited as 1 locale with a very active birth planning program with publicity campaigns and education reinforced by a national system of incentives. There is also a disincentive measure aimed at those with 2 children who have a 3rd--each parent must forfeit 10% of their monthly wage to the government. The ESCAP mission was told that few were expected to be so penalized since education and propaganda had become more efficient since 1974. Likewise, the province of Guangdong established an incentives/disincentives program with the guiding philosophy being that birth planning, education, ideology, and incentives exist in order to help solve practical problems. Once again in China the significance of population programs has been recognized and the study of population is being reinstituted in universities. The Chinese Academy of Sciences is developing a center for population research in Beijing along with an information center for the purposes of academic and applied research. Beijing University is creating a population studies program in the Economics Department with input from other departments. The municipality of Shanghai has established the Population Research Society while in Guangdong a similar such organization was established in September 1979, with areas of concentration in legal aspects of population change and zero population growth by 2000. Population studies is also being organized at Dr. Sun Yat Sen University and Jie-Nan University.     

A look at Philippine population in the year 2000

The major subject areas explored by the University of the Population Institute were fertility, mortality, the Filipino family and nuptiality, migration and urbanization, and the structure and growth of the labor force. Data were extracted primarily from the Philippine Censuses (1903-1970) the National Demographic Surveys of 1968 and 1973, and special surveys conducted by the Institute research team. On the basis of the findings, a range of alternative population futures is projected for the year 2000, with their respective policy implications. The estimate of the crude birthrate for 1970 placed the range at between 39.3 and 42.7. The crude birthrate may have declined by 21-23% in the last 70 years, and by almost 13% in 1960-1970 alone. On the national level, fertility rates will continue to decline if the trend of delayed marriages continues. Fertility was found to decrease with the introduction of the positive socioeconomic factors that make some regions more developed than others. The present low levels of mortality have decreased its importance in relation to fertility. Mortality prospects can be improved by several policy actions which are presented here in the order of priority. Current evidence points strongly to an increase in the proportion of single individuals who delay marriage and those not planning to marry at all. The record of internal migration in the Philippines during the 20th century has been dominated by the phenomenon of urbanization, which increased from 13% in 1903 to 33% in 1970. An effort needs to be made to achieve greater rural-urban balance. The country's high population growth has increased the number of job seekers in recent years; the expansion of the regional labor force in the 1960-1970 decade was highly correlated with the growth of regional populations. Fertility, mortality, nuptiality, migration, and urbanization are the major factors determining the growth and structure of Philippine population. Alternative projections for each of these factors were combined in different ways and 3 alternative scenarios for population in the year 2000 are presented.     

Population growth and poverty in the developing world

The links between rapid population growth and the absolute poverty currently affecting 780 million people in the developing countries (excluding China and other centrally planned economies) were examined. Absolute poverty is defined as having less than the income necessary to ensure a daily diet of 2150 calories per person ($200 per person a year in 1970 United States dollars). Focus is on poverty and demography in the developing world (defining poverty; income, fertility and life expectancy; demographic change and poverty), effect of poverty on fertility, family planning programs and the poor, and the outlook for the future. Rapid population growth stretches both national and family budgets thin with the increasing numbers of children to be fed and educated and workers to be provided with jobs. Slower per capita income growth, lack of progress in reducing income inequality, and more poverty are the probable consequences. Many characteristics of poverty can cause high fertility -- high infant mortality, lack of education for women in particular, too little family income to invest in children, inequitable shares in national income, and the inaccessibility of family planning. Experience in China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Colombia, Korea, Sri Lanka, Cuba and Costa Rica demonstrate that birthrates can decline rapidly in low income groups and countries when basic health care, education, and low-cost or free family planning services are made widely available.