PARTISAN CONTROL,MEDIA BIAS,AND VIEWER RESPONSES: EVIDENCE FROM BERLUSCONI'S ITALY

This paper examines whether and how viewers respond to changes in partisan bias in media news. We use data from Italy, where the main private television network is owned by Silvio Berlusconi, the leader of the center‐right coalition, and the public television corporation is largely controlled by the ruling coalition. We first document that after the 2001 national elections, when the control of the government moved from the center‐left to the center‐right, news content on public television shifted to the right. Using individual survey data, we find robust evidence that viewers responded to these changes by modifying their choice of favorite news programs. On the one hand, right‐leaning viewers increased their propensity to watch public channels which, even after the change, remained to the left of private channels. On the other hand, left‐wing viewers reacted by switching from the main public channel to another public channel that was controlled by the left during both periods. We show that this behavioral response, which tended to shift ideological exposure to the left, significantly, though only partially, offset the movement of public news content to the right.     

DO PARTIES MATTER FOR ECONOMIC OUTCOMES? A REGRESSION‐DISCONTINUITY APPROACH

A long‐standing issue in political economics is to what extent party control makes a difference in determining fiscal and economics policies. This question is very difficult to answer empirically because parties are not randomly selected to govern political entities. This article uses a regression‐discontinuity design, namely, party control changes discontinuously at 50% of the vote share, which can produce “near” experimental causal estimates of the effect of party control on economic outcomes. The method is applied to a large panel data set from Swedish local governments with a number of attractive features. The results show that there is an economically significant party effect: Left‐wing governments spend and tax 2–3% more than right‐wing governments. Left‐wing governments also have 7%lower unemployment rates, which is partly due to that left‐wing governments employ 4% more workers than right‐wing governments. (JEL: C21, D72, D78, H71, H72)     

UNMARRIED PARENTHOOD AND REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS

Political survey data for nine West European countries show that women have become increasingly left‐wing compared to men, and that this trend is positively correlated with the rise of nonmarriage in these countries. This pattern is mirrored in German longitudinal data (GSOEP), where transitions out of marriage make women, but not men, significantly more left‐leaning. Analysis of public spending data for high‐income OECD countries (1980–1998) suggests that the political impact of nonmarriage extends to the allocation of State resources with increases in nonmarriage first reducing, and then increasing, State redistribution towards children. (JEL: H31, H42, J12, J13)     

A POLITICAL ECONOMY THEORY OF FISCAL POLICY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper presents a political economy theory of fiscal policy and unemployment. The underlying economy is one in which unemployment can arise but can be mitigated by tax cuts and increases in public production. Such policies are fiscally costly, but can be financed by issuing government debt. Policy decisions are made by a legislature consisting of representatives from different political districts. With the available policies, it is possible for the government to completely eliminate unemployment in the long run. However, with political decision making, the economy always has unemployment. Unemployment is higher when the private sector experiences negative shocks. When these shocks occur, the government employs debt‐financed fiscal stimulus plans which involve both tax cuts and public production increases. When the private sector is healthy, the government contracts debt until it reaches a floor level. Unemployment levels are weakly increasing in the economy's debt level, strictly so when the private sector experiences negative shocks. Conditional on the level of workers employed, the mix of public and private output is distorted.     

Privatization and National Development: A Case Study of Ghana

Proponents of privatization claim that privatization can enhance efficiency, reduce public sector debt and consequently improve overall economic performance. However, in many developing countries, and Africa in particular, the evidence is mixed. An exploratory study is done from the perspective of citizens’ about the impact of privatization on the Ghanaian national economy. The findings of the study suggest that: 1) the privatization program is pro rich; it benefits the economic and political elites more than it benefits the nation as a whole; 2) there is a high level of corruption associated with the privatization process; and 3) Privatization is not considered as one of the most important tools needed for national development, though the survey finds that many respondents believe that there is the need for some reforms in the public sector to promote national development. The results of the study indicate that administrative and political problems cannot be overcome simply by reducing the size of the state bureaucracy, but rather making government more accountable in meeting the needs of its people.     

The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation

Why do both left and right political parties typically propose progressive income taxation schemes in political competition? Analysis of this problem has been hindered by the two-dimensionality of the issue space. To give parties a choice over a domain that contains both progressive and regressive income tax policies requires an issue space that is at least two-dimensional. Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of the standard two-party game, whose players have complete preferences over a two-dimensional policy space, generically fails to exist. I introduce a new equilibrium concept for political games, based on the fact of factional conflict within parties. Each party is supposed to consist of reformists, militants, and opportunists: each faction has a complete preference order on policy space, but together they can only agree on a partial order. Nash equilibria of the two-party game, where the policy space consists of all quadratic income tax functions, and each party is represented by its partial order, exist, and it is shown that, in such equilibria, both parties propose progressive income taxation.     

SOVEREIGNS,UPSTREAM CAPITAL FLOWS,AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES

We construct measures of net private and public capital flows for a large cross‐section of developing countries considering both creditor and debtor side of the international debt transactions. Using these measures, we demonstrate that sovereign‐to‐sovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global imbalances. Specifically, we find that (i) international net private capital flows (inflows minus outflows of private capital) are positively correlated with countries' productivity growth, (ii) net sovereign debt flows (government borrowing minus reserves) are negatively correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by another sovereign, (iii) net public debt financed by private creditors is positively correlated with growth, (iv) public savings are strongly positively correlated with growth, whereas correlation between private savings and growth is flat and statistically insignificant. These empirical facts contradict the conventional wisdom and constitute a challenge for the existing theories on upstream capital flows and global imbalances.     

WHY IS FISCAL POLICY OFTEN PROCYCLICAL?

Fiscal policy is procyclical in many developing countries. We explain this policy failure with a political agency problem. Procyclicality is driven by voters who seek to “starve the Leviathan” to reduce political rents. Voters observe the state of the economy but not the rents appropriated by corrupt governments. When they observe a boom, voters optimally demand more public goods or lower taxes, and this induces a procyclical bias in fiscal policy. The empirical evidence is consistent with this explanation: Procyclicality of fiscal policy is more pronounced in more corrupt democracies. (JEL: E62, D73, D78)     

Understanding Public Sector Debt: Financial Vicious Circle under the Soft Budget Constraint

The article explains why debt of public sector organizations grows beyond the sustainable level by focusing on the principal-agent relationship under the soft budget constraint. Specifically, this article explores the extent to which factors affect the level of public sector debt in the context of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (quangos) in Korea over the past two decades (1993–2012). The findings from the panel data analysis suggest that the level of public sector debt increases as an outcome of the financial vicious circle created by the soft budget constraint: a knock-on effect of the moral hazard of quangos as well as the opportunistic behavior of political principals. Public sector debt is positively associated with agency-specific factors as well as the factors related to the political incentives such as policy preferences and electoral considerations. However, macroeconomic factors made little difference to the general pattern of the evidence.     

财政风险:从经济总量角度的分析

在干预公共风险的过程中,政府会承受各种各样的支出压力,这些支出压力表现为政府的各种形式的负债,即未来一个时期政府资源的流出。作为公共主体,政府面对的债务是不确定的,不能仅仅从会计学角度来认定。公共债务与经济总量是一种历史的循环关系,不同的循环状态决定了政府财政风险是趋向收敛还是发散。不同的债务结构对经济总量及其增长产生不同的影响,因而具有不同的风险。认清不同公共债务类型的来源、不确定性程度及其风险可控性,是把握公共债务与经济总量的关联向哪一种循环转化的重要一环,仅仅关注债务总量是远远不够的,抽象地谈公共债务负担率的高低没有意义。改善公共债务结构,降低整个公共债务的不确定性程度至关重要,这比控制债务规模更迫切。     

REPATRIATION OF DEBT IN THE EURO CRISIS

With the beginning of the Euro Crisis, the long‐standing trend of European financial integration reversed. Investors unwound cross‐border positions of debt obligations and increased holdings of locally issued debt. In other words, debt obligations were repatriated. We use data on bank portfolios to document three new empirical regularities of the financial disintegration: (i) repatriation affected mainly debt of crisis countries; (ii) repatriation affected mainly public debt; (iii) the public debt of crisis countries that was not repatriated was reallocated to large and politically influential countries within the Euro area. We read these results in light of standard theories of cross‐border portfolio allocation and argue that the sum of these patterns constitutes evidence for the secondary market theory of public debt.     

SOVEREIGN DEBT RELIEF AND ITS AFTERMATH

This paper studies sovereign debt relief in a long‐term perspective. We quantify the relief achieved through default and restructuring in two distinct samples: 1920–1939, focusing on the defaults on official (government to government) debt in advanced economies after World War I; and 1978–2010, focusing on emerging market debt crises with private external creditors. Debt relief was substantial in both eras, averaging 21% of GDP in the 1930s and 16% of GDP in recent decades. We then analyze the aftermath of debt relief and conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis around the synchronous war debt defaults of 1934 and the Baker and Brady initiatives of the 1980s/1990s. The economic landscape of debtor countries improves significantly after debt relief operations, but only if these involve debt write‐offs. Softer forms of debt relief, such as maturity extensions and interest rate reductions, are not generally followed by higher economic growth or improved credit ratings. (JEL: E6, F3, N0, H6)     

Bubbles and Self‐Enforcing Debt

We characterize equilibria with endogenous debt constraints for a general equilibrium economy with limited commitment in which the only consequence of default is losing the ability to borrow in future periods. First, we show that equilibrium debt limits must satisfy a simple condition that allows agents to exactly roll over existing debt period by period. Second, we provide an equivalence result, whereby the resulting set of equilibrium allocations with self‐enforcing private debt is equivalent to the allocations that are sustained with unbacked public debt or rational bubbles. In contrast to the classic result by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), positive levels of debt are sustainable in our environment because the interest rate is sufficiently low to provide repayment incentives.     

Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico‐Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

This paper proposes a dynamic politico‐economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose fiscal policy through repeated elections. The presence of young voters induces fiscal discipline, that is, low taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the voting game in each economy, as well as the stationary equilibrium debt distribution and interest rate of the world economy. The equilibrium can reproduce some salient features of fiscal policy in modern economies.     

DISTRIBUTIONAL INCENTIVES IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF DOMESTIC SOVEREIGN DEFAULT

Europe's debt crisis resembles historical episodes of outright default on domestic public debt about which little research exists. This paper proposes a theory of domestic sovereign default based on distributional incentives affecting the welfare of risk‐averse debt and nondebtholders. A utilitarian government cannot sustain debt if default is costless. If default is costly, debt with default risk is sustainable, and debt falls as the concentration of debt ownership rises. A government favoring bond holders can also sustain debt, with debt rising as ownership becomes more concentrated. These results are robust to adding foreign investors, redistributive taxes, or a second asset.     

LACK OF COMMITMENT AND THE LEVEL OF DEBT

The tendency of countries to accumulate public debt has been rationalized in models of political disagreement and lack of commitment. We analyze in a benchmark model how the evolution of public debt is affected by lack of commitment per se. While commitment introduces indeterminacy in the level of debt, lack of commitment creates incentives for debt to converge to specific levels. One of the levels that debt often converges to implies no debt accumulation at all. In a simple example we prove analytically that debt converges to zero, and we analyze numerically more complex models. We also show in an imperfect credibility setting that a small deviation from full‐commitment is enough to obtain these results.     

Supply Policies in an Open Economy with Centralized Wage Setting

Abstract. In this paper we examine the effectiveness of a fiscal policy based on government subsidies to firms in an open economy, characterized by the “strategic” interaction of government and unions. Before developing the theoretical model, some evidence about government reaction functions for selected OECD countries is presented. The main theoretical results can be summed up as follows. A fiscal policy based on a tax-financed increase in government transfers to firms makes the country more competitive internationally, but reduces employment. Only when the increase in government transfers to firms is financed by the public debt is the fiscal policy able to achieve its two-fold aim of greater competitiveness and a higher level of employment.     

11 The Effects of Governments on Management and Organization

Abstract

We review and integrate existing research from organization theory, strategy, organizational behavior, economics, sociology and political science on the effects of governments on organization and management, with a focus on how governing ideology and government capability influence independent organizations’ forms, strategies, and their participants’ behavior. When brought together these works suggest significant research opportunities in the fields of management and organization, as well as new perspectives on public policy challenges. Several avenues of potentially profitable empirical research include more attention to the influence of government on corporate strategies, more research on the strategies of pursuing corruption and government capture for competitive advantage, the role of government in fostering innovation and the growth of entrepreneurial organizations, and extra‐organizational contextual effects on managerial and employee organizational behavior. Possible public policy implications are illustrated with an application to the role of organizations in national wealth generation and dispersion.     

UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON CONSUMPTION

Recent evidence suggests that consumption rises in response to an increase in government spending. That finding cannot be easily reconciled with existing optimizing business cycle models. We extend the standard new Keynesian model to allow for the presence of rule‐of‐thumb consumers. We show how the interaction of the latter with sticky prices and deficit financing can account for the existing evidence on the effects of government spending. (JEL: E32, E62)     

DEMOCRATIC MECHANISMS

We introduce democratic mechanisms as a set of rules that must obey liberal democracy's fundamental principles of equal voting and agenda rights. We show that an appropriate combination of three rules may yield efficient provision of public projects: first, flexible and double majority rules, where the size of the majority depends on the proposal, and taxed and non‐taxed individuals need to support the proposal; second, flexible agenda costs, where the agenda‐setter has to pay a certain amount of money if his proposal does not generate enough supporting votes; third, a ban on subsidies. We highlight that universal equal treatment with regard to taxation is undesirable. Finally, we illustrate how simple constitutions involving fixed super majority rules yield socially desirable outcomes if the agenda‐setter is benevolent. (JEL: D62, D72, H40)