Bringing Aid Management Closer to Reality: The Experience of Danish Bilateral Development Cooperation

In 2003, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertook a decentralisation of the management of bilateral aid to the embassies in major partner countries. However, while decentralisation appears to live up to the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the specific delegation of responsibilities as well as the political context of aid management may jeopardise the intended contribution to effective development co‐operation. This article explores some factors potentially limiting the usefulness of decentralised aid management in the Danish case, and discusses certain intra‐organisational dynamics and extra‐organisational pressures influencing ‘donor effectiveness’.     

Financing for Development: The Gap between Words and Deeds since Monterrey

The Monterrey Consensus agreed at the UN summit on Financing for Development in 2002 promised a breakthrough in terms of donor generosity, aid effectiveness and new means of financing. However, the development orientation of world leaders proved to be short‐lived. This is even though our evaluation reveals progress since Monterrey in some areas, notably debt relief and private (FDI) flows. Calls for substantially scaling‐up regular aid had less effect than envisaged, and financial innovations have contributed only marginally to overall development financing so far. Nor is there much progress from the perspective of critics focusing on the quality of aid. In particular, the targeting of aid according to need and merit leaves much to be desired. The gap between words and deeds continues to be wide with regard to aid proliferation and donor co‐ordination as well.     

Political‐Economy Analysis,Aid Effectiveness and the Art of Development Management

Recognising that aid effectiveness critically depends upon the quality of host‐country institutions and policies, international aid agencies have sought to inform their activities through more systematic political‐economy analysis (PEA). In this article, three analytical frameworks for PEA are compared, contrasted and critically appraised in the light of reflections by PEA practitioners and recent theoretical debate about development management. The article finds that the potential of PEA to improve development effectiveness depends on how far it addresses the micro as well as macro politics of aid and permits a finer‐grained engagement between analysis and action. This requires more reflexivity on the part of those who commission and produce PEA, and further movement from intervention to interaction modalities for aid delivery.     

Why Do Aid Agencies Exist?

This article seeks to explain the organisational set‐up of foreign aid delivery from a Coasian perspective: Why are there many and different aid organisations and not just one? Why is foreign aid not transferred directly from donor to beneficiary? With zero transaction costs and fully shared preferences between donors and beneficiaries, there would be no need for aid agencies. Their role is not so much to transfer funds or goods and services to developing countries, but (a) to reduce ex‐ante transaction costs and (b) to mediate between the diverging preferences of donors and recipients, and package aid flows in a contract that reduces ex‐post uncertainties for donors. Outcomes differ according to types of agencies and aid delivery instruments.     

From Rome to Accra via Kigali: ‘Aid Effectiveness’ in Rwanda

Since the mid‐2000s, significant strides have been made in Rwanda to implement the ‘aid effectiveness’ agenda as captured in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This article explores the historical evolution of this process since 1994, exposing the complex manoeuvring to establish workable practices, and the less visible political implications of this agenda. The Rwandan government is considered to have strong ‘ownership’ of aid strategies. However, the article demonstrates that the concept of progressive ownership implicit within ‘aid effectiveness’ discourse is misleading. The evidence points rather to joint ownership between donor and recipient, reflecting limitations to the amount of control over aid that donors will cede.     

Easy to Declare,Difficult to Implement: The Disconnect Between the Aspirations of the Paris Declaration and Donor Practice in Nigeria

The arguments in academia over the effectiveness of foreign aid fall into two broad categories: those grounded in political economy and those focused on donor conduct and aid effectiveness. There have been policy attempts within the donor community to reconcile them, including the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This article examines the key features of foreign aid to Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. Using the Declaration as a framework, it looks for ways of making foreign aid in Nigeria more effective.     

Policy Experiments,Democratic Ownership and Development Assistance

In an effort to enhance the impact of development aid, recipients are called on to provide democratically sustained ‘ownership’ for development policies, and donors to align their interventions with these ownership‐dictated strategies of their partners. This article illustrates the weaknesses of such an approach. From a political‐economy perspective, severe tensions exist between concepts of democratic ownership, on the one hand, and the experimental and iterative organisation of a society's encompassing interests in democratic settings, on the other. These tensions are even more pronounced in emerging democracies, making democratic ownership as a prerequisite for aid effectiveness an illusion, and provoking the re‐emergence of traditional donor‐recipient problems.     

The PRSP Approach and the Illusion of Improved Aid Effectiveness: Lessons from Bolivia,Honduras and Nicaragua

Since 1999, poor countries that want to qualify for concessionary IMF loans and debt relief must elaborate and implement Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Donors claim that the PRSP approach will increase aid effectiveness since PRSPs will enhance broad country ownership and lead to better ‘partnership’ with donors, implying more donor co‐ordination under government leadership. By examining the experiences of Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua, this article finds that the results are disappointing. The article also shows that, by emphasising rational planning and ignoring politics, the PRSP approach has unintended and sometimes harmful consequences. This leads to recommendations for changes of the approach.     

Leader,Protester, Enabler,Spoiler: Aid Strategies and Donor Politics in Institutional Assistance

Aid co‐ordination has come to be seen as a miracle cure for the ills of donor proliferation. However, in weak states where aid conditionality may be a catalyst for institutional change, the ideal of aid co‐ordination is conceptually suspect, and in some instances politically counterproductive. Co‐ordination is one of the two solutions to the collective‐action problem that the public good of effective institutional conditionality generates; donor leadership is the other. The desirability of each solution depends on every donor's commitment and presence, which together generate a four‐fold typology: leader, protester, enabler, and spoiler. As long as there is at least one enabler or spoiler donor present, aid co‐ordination will be less effective than donor leadership.     

Donor co‐ordination or donor confusion? How disputed facts and problem framing affect the prospects for aid harmonization

A declared commitment in international development assistance is to promote donor co‐ordination. Yet, how this objective plays out in practice, or how feasible and realistic it is, have rarely been evaluated. Using the fisheries sector as a critical case, this article explores whether two major international actors, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Bank, meet the demands of policy harmonization as spelled out in the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. Through a systematic qualitative analysis, the article investigates whether the policies of these actors are complementary or contradictory. It also assesses how the potential challenges to harmonization can be understood and what the broader implications for aid and development policies in general might be.     

Aid Effectiveness: On the Radar and Off the Radar

Poverty is a human construct, yet the Euro‐American development assistance programmes that aim to reduce poverty remain a function of systemic problems, profit and politics. Critics argue that widened global income inequality and neoliberalism's ineffectiveness in the Global South can be reflected in recent geopolitical and epistemic tensions. China's rise as an economic and military power and its authority in setting up the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank directly threaten Euro‐American dominance in development discourse. These changes can bring multiple perspectives in the aid effectiveness debate. While these views introduce alternatives to the business approach of poverty reduction, they also make the Sustainable Development Goals appear more significant than ever.     

Paris in Bogotá: The Aid Effectiveness Agenda and Aid Relations in Colombia

This article uses an aid‐relationships perspective to explore the application of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in Colombia. It argues that aid donors were subjected to an attempt to push them (back) into a technocratic corner, and that social actors' advocacy outcomes were put under threat. Both are worrying developments in a politically complex context marked by internal armed conflict and human‐rights abuses. Analysis of the Colombia case offers some useful insights into applying the Paris Declaration, and other global aid‐policy frameworks, to diverse settings.     

DOES NATION BUILDING SPUR ECONOMIC GROWTH?

Nation building, the allocation of economic aid conditional on military assistance in conflict and post‐conflict environments, has cost the world trillions of dollars over the last half century. Yet few attempts have been made to quantify the potential economic growth effects for the recipient country from the provision of this aid. Using a 45‐year panel dataset, we construct a measure of nation building using a three‐way interaction term between military assistance, economic aid, and conflict regime. Considering that slow growing and problem‐prone countries may be less likely to receive aid, we instrument for economic aid by estimating donor‐to‐donee aid flows in a first‐stage procedure. Using this approach, we find that spending on nation building has positive growth effects during conflict periods, but that these effects disappear after conflict. (JEL F3, F4, O5)     

Bilateral Donors' Efforts to Assess and Manage UN Agencies' Effectiveness: Seeking a Balance between Paris Principles and Domestic Accountability

Since the turn of the century, results orientation and performance measurement have become buzzwords in development aid. Bilateral donors are increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of core‐funded UN specialised agencies, funds and programmes, through which they channel a substantial part of their funds. While the logic for increased monitoring is clear, it is less evident how to assess this information for purposes of accountability, performance‐based funding and governance. This article describes the general evolution in this area and discusses two major initiatives to harmonise and align bilateral assessments, using case‐study material from three bilateral donors (Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK) with clearly diverging performance‐management cultures, and exploring the extent to which they rely upon joint and aligned initiatives.     

Donor Requirements and Pockets of Effectiveness in Senegal's Bureaucracy

Donors increasingly value the work of statistics, project assessment and related offices in developing countries, but can they ensure these offices are able to do their work? This article assesses donors’ efforts to do so in Senegal's ministries of finance, health and agriculture in the mid‐2000s. It contends that donors' impact is greatest if they generate political incentives for governments to create ‘pockets of effectiveness’ in these areas. The health and agriculture case studies indicate that direct donor involvement, particularly if incompatible with domestic political forces, produces disappointing results, while the finance case studies suggest donors can induce political support for the work of specific offices if donor incentives coincide with domestic political imperatives.     

An analysis of donor engagement with education policy development in Lao PDR from 1991 to 2000

This paper describes the relationship between donor agencies and government during the development of Lao basic education policy in the post‐Cold War period, 1991‐2000. We argue that Laos had only recently been ‘re‐ born’ from colonial regimes, and was thus unable to resist or mediate donor policy agendas and donors who acted on behalf of economically developed nations. The nature of the power relationship between donor and government is explored through an analysis of policy developed at that time as well as the perceptions of aid conditionalities, as recalled by government officials and those working in the aid sector at that time. These perceptions were gathered through interviews conducted by one of the authors.     

The Attributes of Effective NGOs and the Leadership Values Associated with a Reputation for Organizational Effectiveness

Building on prior research characterizing organizational effectiveness as a social construction, this article identifies the perceived attributes of effective transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the leadership values associated with higher reputations for organizational effectiveness. Results are based on an in‐depth, mixed‐method interview study of 152 NGO leaders located in the United States and representing all major sectors of organizational activity. Among the twenty‐nine attributes that leaders identified in peer organizations that they regarded as particularly effective, leaders stressed instantiation of sound principles or strategy, a grassroots approach, large organizational size and resources, being collaborative, singleness of focus, campaigning abilities, funding and fundraising prowess, global scope, and quality people. Furthermore, statistical analysis reveals that NGOs with leaders who value similarities with peer organizations, grassroots approaches, diversity of strategies, dedication, professionalism, and distributed organizational structures have significantly higher reputations for effectiveness.     

Management of the international development aid system: The Case of Tanzania

This article tries to clarify Government behaviours as to how to manage aid in Tanzania. Contrary to the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor intentions, the development aid structure, carefully constructed under the poverty reduction regime in Tanzania, has led to Tanzanian‐owned initiatives toward a national development plan (NDP). Furthermore, this article shows that, in the process of creating an international development aid system, the Tanzanian Government has learned to manage aid in a recipient‐driven manner not only from DAC donors, but also from China.     

Developing interprofessional relationships: tapping the potential of inter‐agency training

The creation of effective Local Safeguarding Children Boards in England and Wales is contingent upon the development of new interprofessional partnerships amongst practitioners, managers and strategic planners. Inter‐agency training will have a role to play in facilitating partnership development throughout an increasingly complex inter‐agency system. The following article reviews the recent history of inter‐agency training and the increasing clarity regarding its distinctive purpose. It highlights three theoretical frameworks that have been influential in the development of ideas about the most appropriate focus and process when working across organisational and professional boundaries. Finally, attention is drawn to an emerging consensus as to the core dimensions of effectiveness in interprofessional working relationships. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance‐Based Aid: Why It Will Probably Not Meet Its Promises

Performance‐based aid (PBA) is increasingly advocated as a way to improve the effectiveness of development aid by resolving incentive issues inherent in aid relationships, and some donors use it together with performance‐based financing arrangements within partner countries. Expectations from PBA are high, but, while its rationale may look appealing, it is based on a restrictive model and is flawed when taking account of the real‐world context. A number of problems associated with PBA have already been observed, and its appropriateness to provide incentives all along the chain from recipient governments to those who are supposed to produce results is questionable. Thus believing that PBA can have a mechanistic trickle‐down incentive effect seems illusory.